Three Batters Too Late
The Phillies and Cardinals split the first two games of their division series with each team winning in dramatic fashion. The teams now travel to St. Louis for two more contests after the Cardinals accomplished their goal of splitting on the road. However, both games could have turned out much differently had Charlie Manuel and Tony La Russa more actively managed their starting pitchers.
Kyle Lohse and Cliff Lee were each removed three batters too late, and as reactionary measures after the worst had already transpired. Being proactive in the manager’s seat is very important this time of year, when every out is crucial and a significant mistake can cripple playoff hopes. While Lohse’s implosion and non-removal seems more egregious given the nature of the Phillies comeback, the decision to leave Lee in the game for the seventh inning was just as ill-advised.
The Cardinals took a 3-0 lead in the first inning on Saturday after Lance Berkman tattooed a Roy Halladay mistake into the right field seats. The ball was a no-doubter, the type that silenced a raucous crowd and shocked Phillies fans everywhere. How could that have happened? That doesn’t happen at home and with the best pitcher in the game on the mound. Lohse then threw a mere 23 pitches over three perfect innings.
Before anyone knew it, the Cardinals led 3-0 after three frames, and Lohse was on the verge of something special.
The Phillies capitalized on a fourth-inning mistake, when Shane Victorino singled in a run after David Freese dropped a foul popup. Lohse didn’t look as effective in the inning. It seemed the Phillies offense had reconfigured its game plan and started working more optimal plate appearances. Even in the fifth inning, when Lohse retired the Phillies in 1-2-3 fashion, Placido Polanco worked a solid at-bat, Carlos Ruiz smashed a liner up the middle that was all inertia’d as Lohse blocked it with his legs, and Halladay hit a fairly tough grounder to third. Lohse threw just nine pitches, but the Phillies batters, for the second straight inning, attacked the best possible offerings.
Lohse had a solid season, but he doesn’t have anywhere near enough of a reputation to remain in a playoff opener, with a lead on the road, and the potential for both Utley and Howard to bat. Plus, it would have been the third time through the lineup. All signs pointed towards a reliever, but Lohse was left in.
The rest is history. Jimmy Rollins singled, and after Utley struck out, Hunter Pence roped a single up the middle. Even if Lohse was allowed to start the frame, this was definitely the chance to remove him. Howard isn’t the same player that hit 58 home runs, but he is still dangerous against righties.
Eight pitches later, his three-run homer gave the Phillies a 4-3 lead. Lohse then allowed Victorino to single before serving up a two-run blast to lefty Raul Ibanez. To top the situation off, La Russa then went Marc Rzepczynski, the tougher southpaw in the bullpen. In other words, neither Rzepczynski or Arthur Rhodes were used knowing Utley and Howard were due up; neither was used when Howard came up with two men on in a two-run game; and neither was used for Ibanez after Howard already homered. Instead, Rzepczynski was brought in for the bottom of the order, which was fully comprised of righties, and after the lineup’s lefties already made the Cardinals pay. Three batters too late, and the Phillies were staked to a 6-3 lead.
The Phillies made a similar mistake with Lee, allowing him to continue pitching even when his ‘stuff’ fell flat and the Cardinals hitters started putting good wood on the ball. Sure, some of his 12 hits were BABIP-lucky, but let’s not turn a blind eye to the solid contact made against him throughout the game. Several line drives were hit, and if anything, the Phillies very good defense made it seem like more of those hits were fieldable, which led to the increasing perception that the Cards were merely getting lucky. The Cards were lucky in the sense that various liners or hard-hit balls weren’t directed right at fielders, but they still hit these balls well. It wasn’t as if they ducksnorted Lee to death.
The Cardinals frustrated Lee for three runs in the fourth, and nearly tied the game on a Rafael Furcal single. Ibanez threw Jon Jay out at the plate to end the inning, but the Cardinals had worked their way back into the game while the Phillies offense stagnated. A quick fifth inning for Lee, complete with strikeouts of Allen Craig and Albert Pujols, restored order but the bottom of the lineup once again utilized a solid approach to eke out another run. Ryan Theriot doubled on a hard-hit liner to left, and Jon Jay followed with a second-pitch single the other way. Ibanez came close to throwing another runner out, but his throw was too high for Carlos Ruiz to easily handle.
Lee would escape without further damage, but he came close to allowing more runs. After Jay’s single, Skip Schumaker pinch-hit and singled himself, and Furcal followed with a grounder that nearly sneaked through Rollins and Polanco. They were handling Lee, and with his spot due up in the bottom of the inning, a double-switch or a one-inning reliever made sense to start the seventh. Especially with Craig, Pujols and Berkman due up.
Craig tripled to the deepest part of the park, and Pujols singled him in on the first pitch, an 87 mph, belt-high cutter without much movement. Lee didn’t have much left, and it wasn’t until Berkman blooped a single to right field that Charlie Manuel went to the bullpen. Lee may have earned the right to continue pitching, but mantras like that go by the wayside when playoff baseball starts. He was removed three batters too late, and while a reliever may have experienced the same outcome, blindly sticking with the principle that Lee is an ace and should pitch until the eighth didn’t help the Phillies comeback cause.
Maybe these games end up being split even with the appropriate managerial moves, but neither team put itself in the best position to enhance its odds of winning by leaving the starting pitchers in too long.
Eric is an accountant and statistical analyst from Philadelphia. He also covers the Phillies at Phillies Nation and can be found here on Twitter.
This article very easily could have been written about Joe Girardi and Freddy Garcia.
Its not like Garcia got hit hard. He gave up an error and then some weak contact. Garcia was fine.
Already down 2-0 in the sixth with runners on first and third and less than two outs, there is no way you let Garcia face Cabrera. The bullpen was beyond rested. Robertson should have been in right there.
Robertson should have been in with one out in the sixth and no indication that Garcia had lost any of his effectiveness?! Why can’t his starting pitcher pitch a high leverage situation? If he had made the move, I would have had no problem with it (there was no chance it would ever be Robertson in that situation though. It would have been Soriano.). However, it certainly isn’t the case that he had to make a move in that situation.
Because a decent starting pitcher going through the lineup a third time is nowhere near as effective as an elite reliever coming out fresh. Getting Miguel Cabrera (and Victor Martinez) out was a huge moment for keeping that game close, and in the playoffs, you go to your best to do so.
How do “all signs point to a reliever” after 5 innings and 65 pitches? No manager goes to the bullpen with a 2-run lead that early in the game, and the only manager that yanks Kyle Lohse before the 5th is one that has the benefit of hindsight. He was absolutely dealing, he was ahead on Howard, and until he left that changeup up, he was outpitching Roy Halladay.
Strongly disagree with this article regarding Lee. Every single manager in baseball would have left him in to start the 7th inning. Hindsight is 20-20.
Just because baseball managers–a notoriously set-in-their-ways group of old baseball curmudgeons–would do something doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s the right move. Here, Lee’s reputation gave him the benefit of the doubt but he clearly wasn’t pitching at his best.
Am I the only one who finds it amusing that the article is saying La Russa of all people didn’t go to his bullpen quickly enough?
and hilarity
It also ignored the fact that he managed his bullpen pretty well in Game 2, when he needed every pitcher in it to get through the game.
Pitchers are always removed a few batters too late, this series is no exception. The problem is that the only signs we have that a pitcher is going to perform poorly in the near future are that a) his pitch count is really high, or b) he has already performed poorly. I suspect there’s a lot of room for sabremetrics to study how to predict when a pitcher should be removed.
How to predict when a pitcher should be removed:
Wait until after the game, then write a retrospective about it….
The classic hindsight criticism of a manager leaving a pitcher in too long is Grady little in game 6 of the 2003 ALCS. Pedro famously gave up the big hit to Hideki Matsui and the Yankees came back to win the series. Little was fired leaving Pedro in.
Little did the right thing though. Of course he wants the best pitcher in the game (and one of the greatest of all time) on the hill in that situation. I guarantee Matsui was hoping Little would have panicked and taken Pedro out for anybody else. Little played his best hand but the improbable happened and he lost his job for it. Such is baseball….
Have you never heard the story of Grady’s interactions with Pedro? He told him multiple times that he was done and was not going back out there. Pedro sat down, chilled, and didn’t think about pitching the next inning, Then, at the last second, Grady changes his mind and sends Pedro out there.
That’s why people should rightfully criticize Grady.
at least he didn’t pull a dusty baker and give his pitcher the game ball before the game and series were over.
So you think the reason he failed to get Matsui out was that Grady told him before the inning that he wasn’t going to pitch that inning and then changed his mind? So how does this work? Pedro didn’t understand that he was supposed to get Matsui out because 12 minutes earlier he thought he wouldn’t be out there?
This is Pedro Martinez we are talking about…. Of course he should have been out there.
The same Pedro who had given up 3 hits the previous inning, one of them a homerun? The same Pedro Martinez who had already thrown 110 pitches before that inning started? The same Pedro Martinez who had been terrible after 100 pitches all season?
The biggest deal wasn’t that he let Martinez go out for the 8th. The biggest deal was that he let him give up Out-Double-Single-Double-Double before he pulled him.
You’ve got a pitcher who got hit around the last inning. He’s at 100+ pitches, and hasn’t thrown that many pitches very often this season.You’re in a do-or-die. He should have been on a very short rope. One or two hits and hes gone. Instead you let him give up 4 hard hit line drives in a row before pulling him.
There were a million signs that Pedro was done. Little ignored all of them.
Oh, the bitterness of Redsox fans. They will never forgive. …of course if he had pulled Pedro and the Yankees had lit up whatever lesser pitcher the Sox had, Little would have still been fired. …for pulling Pedro too soon.
@Jason
Holy strawman! Of course Pedro still had a good chance to get Matsui out, but surely you must recognize that Grady messing with Pedro’s head like he did is something worthy of a good amount of criticism. It certainly hurt Pedro’s chances to get Matsui out.
Plus, Pedro had already been told mid-inning that he just had to get one more batter. Once he got him, Grady still left him out there.
Not a Red Sox fan. Cheered as loud as anyone when they blew that lead to the Rays.
I am just a fan of sound reasoning.
Im pretty sure the strawman is the idea that Little hurt Pedro’s chances of getting Matsui out by talking to him. How is that even possible?!
How is that possible? Because he told a player in a competitive game that he was no longer going to be in said game. SO the player’s focus changes. He stops thinking about how the upcoming hitters, scouting reports, pitch sequences, etc. Thus, he is less likely to pitch well.
Wow, Pedro is easily rattled! Its a wonder he’s going to the Hall of Fame with that weak constitution!
Again, a strawman…i.e. something I did not say. You are really making yourself look silly here.
Correct me if I’m wrong. You think Pedro had no focus and didn’t know the scouting report when pitching to Matsui because Little told him before the inning that he was done. Is that a strawman? If it is, you constructed it, not me.
You guys have so much fun bringing up the Strawman here and the Strawman there. I should start counting how many times people bring it up on each comment section. Quit being whiners and realize that in nearly every argument there are going to be misconceptions of your argument. Clarify and move on.
I see TLR’s non-move as more defensible (which is not to say more nearly right) than Manuel’s. The tactical situation is very different if you have a rest day after the game than if you’re playing the next day. In the former case (Manuel’s), you have that off day to get your bullpen some rest, and your bullpen is presumably stocked (at least it should be) with guys for whom one day’s rest is enough to recharge their batteries. You can accordingly use everybody in the pen who still has an arm attached, knowing that they’ll all be available for the next game. In the situation with a game the following day (TLR’s), you have to manage so that a significant hunk of the pen is available that day.
Round one of the chess match that is baseball to La Russa. It’s not that he didn’t make mistakes; even top chess grandmasters do. It’s that he did better at maximizing his chances of winning than Manuel did. That’s all you can ask of a manager.
Oh, please! Comparing baseball managers to chess grandmasters! Give me a break!
Please do not encourage TLR to pull starts earlier.
This article could likely be applied to almost every game.
When to pull a starter or leave them in is easily the simplest decision to criticize. If they do well, good decision. If they don’t bad decision. It’s not that simple.
Ted Keith writes the obligatory “Girardi makes wrong decisions” for Sports Illustrated:
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/ted_keith/10/02/tigers.yankees/index.html?sct=mlb_t13_a2
When I watch Cliff Lee (as a former LHP) I cannot figure out how he doesn’t get hit like this all the time.
He pounds the zone with low 90s fastballs. He uses location very well (especially inside corner), and somehow gets guys to chase high and away.
But I’m amazed at how often batters foul off what look like centered pitches.
The 2-2 change to Freese was damn near orgasmic. But the majority of his pitches are not visually stunning.
I’m temtped to keep a pitching chart on him during the game just to track how he varies location, velocity, and sequencing.
I agree that he looks like he should be easy to hit. Mariano Rivera too. I think the answer to both of them is the same. Late movement that doesn’t show up to those of us not in the batter’s box. Which is why my dream is to stand in against Rivera. I want to see what that pitch does from the hitter’s perspective. Just give me one at bat!!!
I didn’t want to be the one to say this also but I have to agree 100%. Did Cliff Lee pay major league batters to pretend his fastball isn’t completely hittable? Every time I watch him pitch I am amazed that his cheese isn’t just slaughtered all over the diamond.
He can give up his fair share of hits but the weak contact he induces and relatively high k-numbers (when considering velo) is amazing.
I try to compare him to Roy Halladay but nothing Doc throws is straight at all. Lee pounds with a relatively straight fastball in good spots but the hitters mostly know where it will be as his command is so good. Even still, they never really square him up all that often.
He is a marvel.
I completely agree. There was no good reason to put Cliff Lee out there in the 7th.
You would think on the Phillies sabermetric-related blogs, like Crashburn Alley and The Good Phight, that every single one Lee’s 12 hits were 20-hoppers through the infield. I’ve never heard so much whining about BABIP in my life. The Cardinals were getting solid contact off Lee all night. Face it Phillies fans, the mighty 102-win Phillies, the team that defies sabermetrics, that defies the aging process, that defies variance, is in a dogfight now.
This scenario of lookibg back the same way we do with the LI and ‘relief ace’ usage.
After the game, we can look back and see that the 7th inning 2-out situation was when the closer should have been used.
In the moment, the manager only knows that it’s a big situation. He doesn’t know that the same scenario isn’t going to occur in the 8th or 9th inning.
As a manager/coach you have to decide if what you are seeing is the result of fatigue or SSS … And then be right about it.
You not only have to be right about it (meaning choosing the option that maximizes your likelihood of success), but you also have to be lucky (meaning your choice works out). ….lots of times, the correct choice doesn’t work out in a sport where failure is often times more common than success. However, it is pretty well guaranteed that you will be second-guessed when that correct choice doesn’t work out in your favor.
I agree that it’s easier to judge a decision retroactively, but there is a lot of data to support the short leash on starters (in the playoffs especially).
check it out:
http://sportsstatsanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/10/03/the-hook/
Completely agree on the short leash.
The layoffs, IMO, are the area where “It’s his game to win or lose” is completely unacceptable … Given all the days rest relievers get.
And if Quade took dempster out 3 batters sooner, I’d have won my fantasy baseball league (I lost by 2 walks/hits) in the whip category.
It should also be noted that if a frog had wings, it wouldn’t bump it’s ass ahoppin’
On the other hand, if you take Lee out and the bullpen gives up the lead, then you have to deal with that.
Lee looked outstanding the inning before.
I’m not sure I’d call Theriot’s approach good. He simply swings at the 1st pitch every at bat.
They IBB’d a batter to load the bases, and rather than work the pitcher he hacks at a 1st pitch slider and hits into an inning ending DP. Earlier he 1st pitch swung at a high and out FB and hit it down the EB line for a double. It works out for him occasionally.