What Happens When Billy Hamilton is on Third Base?
When I first dreamt this post up, I figured the title would somehow include the phrase, “Billy Hamilton Effect.” That was before I discovered Eno already wrote a post called “Todd Frazier and the Billy Hamilton Effect” back in July. Point is, there are a lot of unusual ways in which Billy Hamilton affects the game, because Billy Hamilton is an unusual player. We know this because stealing 155 bases in a single season is not usual, and neither is this.
I wrote a post about Frazier last week, examining how he was able to steal 20 bases despite possessing what appears to be just mediocre speed. In that post, I noted that three of Frazier’s 20 steals “were essentially catcher’s indifference.” Catchers indifferences are typically insignificant, but these three were noteworthy because they all happened for the same reason. At the time, I didn’t get into the details because I didn’t want to spoil the premise of this piece, but after I saw the first one, I knew I had to write a post about it.
In Little League baseball, when runners were on first and third base and there were less than two outs, you would often see the runner on first base steal second without a throw from the catcher. The thinking here is that kids typically weren’t good enough to a.) execute a throw down to second base to catch the stealing runner and/or b.) execute a throw back to the catcher when the runner on third subsequently took off for home. Not only would this move a runner up one bag for the team at the plate, but it also eliminated the double play. Second and third with less than two outs in obviously better than first and third with less than two outs. You don’t need a table to know this, but there exists such a table for this very scenario in the MLB, so I might as well publish it.
| Base Runners | Average runs scored/inning | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1B | 2B | 3B | 0 outs | 1 out | 2 outs | |
| 1B | — | 3B | 1.853 | 1.211 | 0.530 | |
| — | 2B | 3B | 2.050 | 1.447 | 0.626 | |
Once you reach the high school level, though, you stop seeing this as often. Catchers are more adept at throwing down to second, middle infielders are more adept at throwing back to home, and you start to run the risk of your seemingly-free base at second turning into an inning-ending double play. By the time you reach the majors, this strategy essentially becomes obsolete.
That is, unless Billy Hamilton is standing on third base.
I enlisted the help of spreadsheet super-genius Jeff Zimmerman to find me all the instances from last year when the Reds had a runner on first base with Billy Hamilton on third. That yielded 45 results. But this strategy doesn’t really matter with two outs, because all it would take is a good throw to second base to end the inning, so I nixed those. It also doesn’t make much sense to do this in the first inning, because if the stealing baserunner is slow, you’re risking an out at second and essentially playing for one run. It doesn’t make any sense to play for one run in the first inning, so let’s nix those, too.
I feel like pointing out that I had decided I was going to write about this subject before I did any of the research. Turns out it’s not that big of a big deal — less so than I thought it might be, at least — but it’s still interesting to think about. Any time one player’s extra ordinary ability affects the game in ways we don’t typically see, it’s something worth thinking about.
When first-inning and two-out scenarios are removed from the equation, we’re left with 13 “acceptable” situations where the Reds could have used this strategy. Less than I had expected. Of those 13, the Reds took advantage five times. Again, less than I had expected, but it was nice to at least see that this does appear to be a real strategy the Reds have considered and executed.
It doesn’t look like anything more than what you’d expect, but here’s what it looks like in action:
Catcher Jarrod Saltalamacchia pump-fakes to second, hoping to induce Hamilton into breaking for home. He was ready.
What the Reds broadcasters had to say right before the play:
“You probably can’t throw down with Hamilton at third.”
What the Reds broadcasters had to say right after the play:
“You weigh the chances of throwing out the baserunner at second versus the chances that Hamilton will streak home on you, and it’s better to just put it in your pocket. But it puts another man in scoring position for Frazier.”
And although the effects of this particular scenario turned out not to be as prevalent as I’d hoped, a couple other interesting nuggets popped up during my research. When Hamilton is on third, teams have to adjust their defensive alignments. Take, for example, what the Pirates did:
The Pirates elected to bring their infield in, hoping to cut off Hamilton at home on a ground ball. This allowed Frazier to steal second base with even less resistance than normal. Even more interesting is what the Brewers had to do (emphasis not mine):
The Brewers wanted to put an infield shift on left-hander Jay Bruce, where the third baseman would play where a shortstop typically stands. But with Hamilton on third, the third baseman can’t really abandon his post, or else Hamilton would get a big enough lead to where he could just straight up steal home. Hamilton’s presence on third alone kept the Brewers from deploying their optimal defensive alignment. Also, Frazier stole second base without a throw here.
Even when the strategy doesn’t exactly go according to plan, Hamilton’s speed can still make it all work out:
The thing that I thought might be a big deal turned out not to be a very big deal. The Reds only stole second without a throw five times over the course of the season with Hamilton on third, and they only had about 13 sensible opportunities. I’m not quite sure why they didn’t do it more often, but even if they did, it’s something they could only take advantage of maybe 10 times in a year.
But perhaps more important are the other things we saw. Look at the gif above. Hamilton’s presence made the Phillies execute a run-down in a way they aren’t accustomed to. His presence made the Brewers play a defensive alignment they aren’t accustomed to. He made the Pirates align their defense differently. At the very least, Billy Hamilton’s presence on third base alone will take defenses out of their comfort zone, and that’s a part of what makes him Billy Hamilton.
August used to cover the Indians for MLB and ohio.com, but now he's here and thinks writing these in the third person is weird. So you can reach me on Twitter @AugustFG_ or e-mail at august.fagerstrom@fangraphs.com.





Pain.
Very intriguing article.
One strategy in Little League to combat the “1st and 3rd free steal”, would be for the SS to cut the throw to second thus making a shorter/quicker throw back to home to nab the theft of the plate. I don’t even think this would work against Billy boy.
I remember a play we worked so the catcher threw to the pitcher who then thre home. That may work with the best infield arm only 60 feet away.
I remember the Yankees did this against the Tigers with Roger Clemens on the mound in 2007.
Joe Buck said something along the lines of “Have you ever seen anything like it?”
Tim McCarver: “Yes.”
*Cuts to commercial
I assume Troy Aikman then interjected with a quick story about Michael Irvin and Emmitt Smith pulling off the stunt in a pre-season celebrity fundraiser softball game.
wasn’t 1st and 3rd but I saw this once with the DBacks and Randy JOhnson pitching and Damian MIller catching. Runner takes off and Miller comes up gunning, he throws as hard as he can down to 2nd. . . .and Johnson plucks the ball right out of the air. Never even flinched, never even occurred to him that the runner was stealing, never even really acknowledged that the runner had gone. Meanwhile Miller is staring out at the mound with kind of a half-bewildered look that I will never, ever forget. I’m sure he was thinking “Damn Randy, WTH?” but knows there is no way in the world he is going to go out there and say anything to the Unit.
Thank-you KGIY94 and Seattle Homer for combining on the biggest laugh I’ve had all day.
Anon, sounds like you witnessed the infield version of the infamous Manny-Damon relay.
Lol, I totally remember that strategy from Little League where the throw from the catcher to second is cut off. I also remember that sometimes the pitcher would be the person to cut off the throw, that situation always seemed more effective. Like you mentioned, this strategy obviously works best in Little League where the dimensions are much smaller and the players are 12 and under.
Despite all the times our coach had us practice this, I don’t remember it ever working.
Yeah, we had a bunch of variations of that play in our arsenal for some tournament. The pitcher is the ideal cutoff man, but it’s so hard for the catcher to throw the ball high enough that it looks like it’s going down to second while actually being low enough for the pitcher to snare. If you throw it at the pitcher’s head nobody ever takes off from third.
The standard defense of this situation at the levels higher than little league involves having the second baseman act as the cut off, but he only makes the cut if the runner breaks for home (and otherwise lets the throw go through to the SS at second to get the runner). In that scenario, the catcher makes the initial decision by glancing at the runner on third as he breaks from his crouch to throw to second. Having a speedy runner on third certainly puts pressure on the defense to make strong, accurate throws, but I’m guessing at the major league level they *should* be able to effectively defend against this strategy. As the last gif shows, even defensively lacking Howard is able to ‘quickly’ spin and make a throw as Hamilton breaks for home (although he’s quick enough to get back to third on time, barely).
The best LL strategy, given above average players at C and 2B, is to fire down to the second baseman, who is coming in toward the baseline and not toward the bag. If the runner at third is coming home he ignores the tag and throws home, too far off third and he runs at him until the runner commits. Ten minutes a day with baserunners and they eventually get the hang of it.
This is the correct answer — though it would be extremely tough with Hamilton.
The Brewers alignment isn’t unique. You have to keep a third baseman near the bag if you’re shifting with runners on the corners. Otherwise the guy can take a lead halfway home.
Note this instance from a tie game in the bottom of the 10th: Nelson Cruz on 3rd, nearest defender is the pitcher on the rubber. Billy Hamilton would not allow this optimal defensive positioning I would think.
http://m.mlb.com/video/v33495151/oakbal-as-catch-cruz-stealing-home-in-the-10th/?query=nelson%2Bcruz
How many times did this happen in the 1st inning? I wouldn’t have eliminated those instances. Considering Hamilton was leading off the first, that may have eliminated 1/3 of your sample.
Yeah, I was also surprised by your decision to eliminate the 1st inning. Even if it’s suboptimal strategy to play for 1 run in the 1st, I don’t think it’s a safe assumption that that would stop the Reds (or most other teams) from doing it, at least occasionally.
I had the same thought. While Bryan Price talked a sabermetric game when he was hired, he proved himself to be pretty darn old school. He had no problem playing for 1 run in the first inning.
Can we see this happening with other speedsters? Is there a player on the Dodgers who got extra steals because of Dee Gordon, or on the Astros because of Jose Altuve? [This might turn out to be slightly fantasy-relevant, if we can predict who on the Astros or Marlins might get a couple extra steals this season.]
Interesting stuff. A little clarification though, of the 13 opportunities, you say they took advantage 5 times. Does that mean they stole successfully without a throw 5 times? Or just attempted it?
There were 41 instances where Billy Hamilton was on third last year and first base was occupied and second was open. And there were 5 steals of second. However, 2 of those steals occurred with 2 outs and 1 in the first inning with fewer than 2 outs. There were only 2 steals of second with less than 2 outs and not in the first inning, and there were 17 opportunities, not 13, although on 4 occasions the batter hit the first pitch in play so that accounts for Jeff telling you there were 13. There were 3 other occasions where the runner on first was running on the pitch with less than a 3 and 2 count. One resulted in a foul ball, the second a walk, and the third a line drive out that doubled up the runner who was running from first.
August, please learn how to download and query Retrosheet data. Its not that hard and it is essential if you want to do baseball analysis.
Wow, that is some bad data. If Peter is right, August really should be more careful and/or learn some new tricks.
I would love to see Billy hit one into the RF-CF gap and just open up the throttle.
I saw him do just that in Spring Training in 2013. Billy pinch hit in the later innings and knocked one towards the gap – I turned to my buddy and said “Uh, oh, I think that’s gonna be a triple,” and I was right. It was a relatively routine gapper; well hit, hit the wall on a bounce. The outfielder got the ball back in a fairly timely manner too, but the play wan’t even particularly close, IIRC.
There’s also a problem with the assertion “you start to run the risk of your seemingly-free base at second turning into an inning-ending double play.” This would be a very difficult play to make in time (make the tag at second and THEN throw home), and the runner from first is usually coached to stop anyway, making it impossible to get both outs unless runners screw up and create two consecutive rundowns.
It’s also worth noting that the RE matrix advises us that it is worth conceding the run and throwing down with no outs as long as you have about a 2/3 chance of getting the out. Game situation might make the run at 3B more valuable, but this says that really the only time the double steal strategy makes a lot of sense is with one out.
Similar to eliminating 1st inning chances, should also eliminate chances when Reds are down by more than 2 runs. It’s unlikely they would trade an out at 2nd for a run in that situation.
Was there a great positive run expectation scenario in early Little League than a man on 1st and 3rd with less than 2 outs?
In AA Little League, we were taught to do the “wounded rabbit” when on 1st with a man on 3rd. By the mid-point of the season, every team had been coached to not make that throw to 2nd, and just give up the bag.
To counter that, our coach instructed us that if no throw came to 2nd, to slow down, and if still no throw came, to fall down as if we had tripped. And then they make the throw, and the guy on 3rd scores (and often, that throw goes into the outfield).