Which Royals’ Stolen Base Made The Biggest Difference?
It doesn’t feel like corny sentiment to say the Kansas City Royals stole the American League Wild Card from the Oakland A’s. The Royals lineup does not inspire much in the way of fear but this ragtag bunch hung nine runs on the A’s best starter and its (rightly) maligned bullpen.
They did so while hitting just two extra base hits, both of which came in the 12th inning. Eric Hosmer tripled and Salvador Perez yanked the walkoff double down the line compared to 13 singles and three walks. Without the benefit of big bats, the Royals instead did what the Royals do – they swiped and stole and small ball’d their way to victory, just as our fearless leader suggested they should mere hours before the game began.
They stole seven bases on the night, equalling the record for a postseason game. While none of these steals are likely to reach “Dave Roberts Game 4” levels of notoriety, five of the seven thefts came around to score. Let’s look at each steal, ranking them by win probability added to see which was truly the biggest steal of the night.
7. Alcides Escobar, 8th inning, 7-3 Oakland – .008 WPA
Down four runs, an extra 90 feet doesn’t feel like it makes much of a difference. But every inch counts for this punchless Royals bunch. Rather than going down hoping to string together a series of hits that may never come, Kansas City gets active, putting at least some concern in the back of Derek Norris’ head.
Escobar singled up the middle, stole second (with ease), went to third on a ground out and scored on a single. The stolen base kept them out of the double play, allowing Nori Aoki to do his bat control thing and move the runner along to third.
6. Nori Aoki, 1st inning, 2-0 Oakland – .009 WPA
After Alcides Escobar leads off the Royals first with a single, Aoki bounces into a fielder’s choice that easily becomes a double play with a better feed from A’s second baseman Eric Sogard. Aoki goes to second on a steal with two out and then scores after Billy Butler stretches a double into a single.
The steal itself, coming so early in the game, didn’t increase the Royals odds of winning as much as set up the botched double steal attempt that should live in infamy forever. For this, we are all grateful.
5. Lorenzo Cain, 8th inning, 7-4 Oakland – .01 WPA
This is the moment this comeback starts to feel like…something. Cain dashes into scoring position. Oakland’s prone battery starts to show some cracks, as A’s starter Jon Lester doesn’t give his catcher much to work with and Norris again fails to make a strong throw.
Cain looked to get a decent jump but he just beat the throw, which was low and to the third base side of the bag. A better throw gets him? And yet here we are.
4. Alex Gordon, 8th inning, 7-6 Oakland – .03 WPA
Gordon runs into scoring position with little resistance from the A’s. Their focus is on batter Salvy Perez, who flails at a slider away for strike three. Another example of KC taking what they’re given while staying out of the double play. In WPA terms, this steal doesn’t come close to the blow Perez’s strikeout dealt to their chances of winning.
3. Christian Colon, 12th inning, 8-8 – .043 WPA
The circumstances of this steal make it feel more significant than its WPA suggests. The A’s guessed right, calling for a pitchout on a hunch that Colon would take off on a likely breaking ball with the count 1-2.
A strong throw gets them out of the inning. Instead, it’s the prelude to a walkoff win and a wild celebration. Needless to say, the Royals got caught with their hand in the cookie jar. But “pressure on the defense” has its intoxicating lure for a reason – the other team still has to catch it and throw it to get you out.
Everything went right for Oakland right up until the moment Derek Norris bricked the catch, failing to squeeze a pitchout that tailed back towards the plate. After all the havoc the Royals wreaked on the bases, this was Oakland’s best shot to neutralize and they blew it.
2. Terrance Gore, 8th inning, 7-5 Oakland – .056 WPA
This is the Dave Roberts moment. A pinch runner plopped into a situation with one thing on his mind – grab and extra 90 feet. Gore wasted no time in doing so, taking off on the first pitch and taking second base with relative ease thanks to a great jump.
Norris makes a strong throw, a little high but right on the money. Does it ever matter If the throw is a little lower and into the runner? Hard to say. It sure looks like Gore stole this pitch off pitcher Luke Gregerson.
The million dollar question: did this steal influence the next pitch, a slider Gregerson yanked that eluded Norris for a wild pitch, allowing the tying run to score?
1. Jarrod Dyson, 9th inning, 7-6 Oakland – .133 WPA
The greatest change in Kansas City’s win expectancy comes via this daring steal of third by pinch runner Jarrod Dyson. Not quite as Robertsian as the Gore steal, Dyson swings things in the Royals’ favor by giving them options.
It was another great jump by a KC base runner, Dyson took advantage of Doolittle’s relatively slow move to the plate by getting well down the line before Norris even received the pitch. His throw was right on the money but just a moment too late.
Aoki’s sac fly plates Dyson and the Royals manufactured themselves a tie. The risk of stealing third pays off, as the Royals gambled against a very tough reliever. Doolittle didn’t allow another hit but the tying run crossed the plate on his watch regardless.
The Royals record-tying performance on the base paths showed a national audience how one of the worst offensive teams in baseball qualified for the postseason. They made the most of their opportunities and created some of their own luck.
The right personnel, a good scouting report,and good execution carried the Royals past Oakland. Will this style work in a five game series against a much better opponent, a team under the watchful eye of the man who all but wrote the modern book on aggressive base running?
You better believe Mike Scioscia will have his catching tandem prepped and his pitchers working hard to hold the running game in check.
Drew used to write about baseball and other things at theScore but now he writes here. Follow him on twitter @DrewGROF
Dayton Moore and KC, 2014 WS champs. Take that, Oakland. Take that, sabermetrics. Take that, fangraphs.
Could you imagine…?
Sure I can, I’m a Giants fan.
The wonderful thing about baseball is while the numbers are so very, very useful, it will surprise you in ways beyond your imagination. Sometimes it feels so good to just put away the numbers and have some fun. And my goodness that Wild Card game was fun.
It was fun, true, but let’s not forget KC won because of cheap choppers and wild pitches that should have been blocked (perhaps if Soto was in there). That’s why sabermetric analysts hate 1 game playoffs where such a small sample size determines who moves on. It’s ridiculous.
The A’s could’ve avoided this whole situation by just being below average in the second half.
Jeff and Dave hardly seemed to hate it last night. They were having a blast, other than the late hours. Jeff even said a 1 game playoff isn’t all that different from a 7 game playoff with respect to randomness.
Are you saying that winning your division has more meaning now? Because if you are I think that is totally awesome.
If you don’t want to play the suicide game, don’t finish in second (or third, as the case may be).
“You better believe Mike Scioscia will have his catching tandem prepped and his pitchers working hard to hold the running game in check.”
Having your staff focus on the base runners more could easily lead to more upsetting results from the plate. While none of their hitters strike fear, Hoz/Butler/Gordon are all capable of taking a pitcher deep – and the reallocation of focus to the base paths could cause that. If I’m a manager, I’d much rather a team try to get a few bloops hits to fall to the right place than worry about them stealing too much and raise the chance that my guy throws a bad pitch.
This is an interesting question – exactly how much does ‘distracting’ pitchers via aggressive base stealing influence their ability to pitch effectively? I’m not sure if fangraphs has done something on this already, but I’d imagine you’d have to look not just at pitching out of windup vs. stretch, but the particular baserunners and situations to see if location, velocity, and other pitch f/x data are influenced by the distraction. Off the top of my head I’m guessing it doesn’t matter ‘that’ much – but maybe enough to make a difference.
“The Book” has done research on this, and the basic conclusion is that having fast, disruptive runners on the basepaths actually hurt the batter more than the pitcher. This actually makes a good amount of sense since the batter having to wonder about whether or not to swing based on the runner stealing would be more disruptive to the batter than anyone else.
That makes sense. I guess you could make the case that being aggressive is more effective for the Royals since their lineup is so weak – the negative effects aren’t quite as pronounced when you are distracting a cleanup hitter withe a league average wRC+.
“Small-balling Royals go against SABR Golden Boy Mike Trout and the Angels”
the majority of the backlash against sabermetrics, and mostly WAR, is due to the high value placed on baserunning and defense, you know, what the royals are built on….
“SABR Golden Boy Mike Trout” – Right, because Mike Trout offers nothing to those folks who are content with traditional statistics and they think he’s terrible.
Not only 7 SB, but by seven different players. It’s the first time it’s ever happened (7 unique players on the same team with at least one SB) since the modern stolen base rule was instituted in 1898 – regular season or postseason!
“They did so while hitting just two extra base hits, both of which came in the 12th inning.”
Not that it really matters all that much, but I think Cain had a double earlier in the game.
Actually you’re right – Salvy’s hit just went as a single.
“… after Butler stretches a double into a single.”
Not so often the steal comes after the bunt.
I was more than a little frustrated by that sequencing. I’m glad it worked out anyway, but I don’t know why they didn’t steal 2B and then bunt to 3B rather than trying to grab 3B by stealing.
Bunting with one less strike to use is harder?
Dyson said it was b/c stealing 2nd off a lefty is harder. I guess he felt confident he’d get 3rd on the steal, so they drew it up that way.
Based on Shane Tourtellotte’s methodology, http://www.hardballtimes.com/wps-and-the-postseason-part-two/ the game had a WPS score of 753.2 which ranks it among one of the top 5 post season games of all time.
Based on Shane Victorino’s methodology, the game had a FLYNHWN score of .279/.355/.491, which is tied as the best post-season game of all-time!
Fun for everyone except us A’s fans. It was excruciating most of the night.
What on earth was Lester doing out there in the 8th inning. Yost may get be getting killed in the media for “almost” losing the game when he brought in Ventura, but Bob Melvin DEFINITELY lost the game by bringing Lester back out for the 8th inning.
Yost still takes the cake for “huh?” moves. Delayed double steal with Billy Butler taking off from first? I guess it was 0-2 on Gordon vs. a LH pitcher so not a lot to lose but really? And the way it was executed was like Yost made it up on the spot.
Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition.
Escobar’s steal was huge, if we think Aoki hits the same ball with him on first. That’s a tailor made double play ball.
“The Royals record-tying performance on the base paths showed a national audience how one of the worst offensive teams in baseball qualified for the postseason.”
The goal of an offense being to score runs, the Royals were 9th out of 15 in the AL and 14th in the MLB, not exactly “one of the worst.”
That’s true. He probably meant one of the worst “batting” teams in the league. By wRC+ they’re 11th in the AL, which is pretty bad.
Yostie’s dedication to the run was the real winner today here dudes. Melvin’s ragtag bunch of misfits couldn’t stop Royal Speed.
The Roberts steal had a WPA of only .106.
Dyson’s was bigger.