Why Billy Butler To The A’s Makes Perfect Sense

This past offseason was one of the most tumultuous in recent memory in terms of player movement. A wave of GM turnover triggered roster implosions from Atlanta to Los Angeles, and particularly to San Diego. Domino effects roiled almost all 30 franchises, with only the Indians, Twins, Mets, Phillies and Giants not undergoing at least somewhat significant change. Many teams fancied themselves clear contenders, others, clear rebuilders. Then there were the Oakland Athletics.

At first, it appeared they going the rebuilding route, as evidenced by the megadeal with Toronto involving Josh Donaldson. In the ensuing days and weeks, onlookers were left scratching their heads, wondering what Billy Beane was up to this time, as Billy Butler and Ben Zobrist, two players not exactly made of rebuilding cloth, were brought to town to complement the A’s newly more youthful nucleus. The Butler transaction was particularly curious; why would the A’s spend $30 million over three years on a pure DH coming off of a poor season? Was there, as there usually is, a method to Beane’s madness?

Butler was the Royals’ 1st round draft pick, 14th overall, out of Wolfson HS in Jacksonville, Florida. As you might expect, Butler was a bat-only prospect, but a pretty darned good one. Prince Fielder had been successfully tabbed on the first round by the Brewers a couple of years earlier, and while Butler lacked Fielder’s explosive raw power, he was every bit his match as a pure hitter.

When you get down to it, Butler was arguably as good a minor league hitter as any in the past decade. He knifed through the Royals’ system to the tune of a .336-.416-.561 batting line, and first showed up in Kansas City just after his 21st birthday. Each season I compile my own minor league position player top prospect list based upon OBP and SLG relative to league/level, and adjusted for age. Butler ranked very near the top of this list in each of three minor league seasons, at #5 in 2005, #15 in 2006 and #9 in 2007. Of course, once traditional scouting methods are used to then tweak the list, Butler would suffer a bit, as there wasn’t much to him beyond his bat. Still, this guy was going to be a long-term big leaguer, and make an offensive impact.

And that is just what he did in Kansas City. When you draft a player, you’re buying only his control years, and by any measure, Butler was an exceptional value to the Royals during that time frame. He has logged over 150 games and 600 plate appearances in each of the last six seasons, posting a solid .295-.359-.449 line for his career. He hit the free agent market, unfortunately for him, immediately after his worst major league season, a .271-.323-.379 campaign, with only nine homers. Those are pretty rough raw numbers for a DH, and his resulting (0.3) WAR total made it pretty easy for the Royals to let him walk away at season’s end.

Do those 2014 numbers accurately represent Butler’s present true talent level? To get a better feel for it, let’s examine his plate appearance frequency and production by BIP type data. First, the frequency info:

FREQ – 2014
Butler	%	REL	PCT
K	15.9%	85	37
BB	6.8%	87	39
POP	5.3%	65	17
FLY	25.6%	89	26
LD	21.0%	100	51
GB	48.2%	114	82

Butler’s K rate has always been quite low for a middle-of-the-order hitter. His 2014 K rate percentile rank of 37 fits in nicely among his career norms; it has floated in a narrow band between 33 and 44 in five of the last six seasons. The main negative in his 2014 frequency profile was the collapse in his BB rate from 90 in 2013 to 39 in 2014. A strong BB rate had previously been a trademark of Butler’s offensive game; he posted a 71 or higher BB rate percentile rank three times in the four seasons from 2010-13.

As for his BIP frequencies, 2014 marked the sixth straight season Butler posted a liner rate percentile rank of 50 or better. Of course, his 51 mark was barely above average, and four of those six above average marks were in the 50’s. Liner rates do fluctuate more than those of other BIP types, though some players have established strong positive or negative liner tendencies. At this stage of the game, one should expect at least an average liner rate from Butler in any given season. Another strong positive is Butler’s low popup rate; his 17 popup rate percentile rank fits squarely within the narrow range between 13 and 25 in which he has resided for each of the last seven seasons.

Lastly, his 2014 high grounder (82 percentile rank) and low fly ball (26) rates fit in neatly with Butler’s past performances. A high grounder rate obviously isn’t ideal considering Butler’s utter lack of speed. The combination of his low K and high grounder rates makes him an annual candidate to lead the league in double play grounders, something he has done twice.

So, we have a slow righthanded hitter with low K and popup rates and a solid liner rate. If Butler could run, he’d be a cinch .300 hitter each year, and an occasional candidate for a batting title. The frequency data only tells us so much; let’s take a look at Butler’s production by BIP type data to get a better feel for his batted-ball authority:

PROD – 2014
Butler	AVG	OBP	SLG	REL PRD	ADJ PRD
FLY	0.286		0.634	92	142
LD	0.652		0.815	93	107
GB	0.246		0.256	97	147
ALL BIP	0.328		0.456	94	128
ALL PA	0.271	0.321	0.376	100	133

Butler’s actual production on each BIP type is indicated in the AVG and SLG columns, and it’s converted to run values and compared to MLB average in the REL PRD column. That figure then is adjusted for context, such as home park, luck, etc., in the ADJ PRD column. For the purposes of this exercise, SH and SF are included as outs and HBP are excluded from the OBP calculation.

There are very significant disparities between Butler’s actual and context-adjusted production on each BIP type. Some are much more explainable than others. First, he batted only .286 AVG-.634 SLG on fly balls last season, for a 92 REL PRD. When you’re a righthanded DH, you probably shouldn’t be producing at below league average level on fly balls. Butler’s hard/soft fly ball rates support a much higher production level, however, at 142 ADJ PRD. That’s more at the Victor Martinez/Adam Jones/Evan Longoria level of adjusted fly ball contact, rather than the Brian Dozier/Matt Dominguez level that his actual figure of 92 would suggest. His Kauffman Stadium home park hindered his fly ball production, obviously, but so did random chance. Butler made a lot of long, loud outs in the air last season.

Butler also underperformed significantly on grounders last season, posting a 94 ADJ PRD, but a significantly higher 128 REL PRD based upon his hard/soft grounder rates. On this one, we can point the finger more at Butler’s lack of speed. While he hits the ball relatively hard and sprays the ball around on the ground (3.16 pull factor) and thus isn’t an overshift candidate, he will never be a big producer on ground balls.

Based on BIP authority alone, however, it’s clear that Butler was much better than his actual numbers. Adjustment for context boosts his pedestrian actual 94 REL PRD up to 128 ADJ PRD. Adding back the K and BB raise those numbers a bit higher to 100 and 133, respectively.

Before coming to a firm conclusion on Butler’s true offensive talent level, we have to try to extract some speed out of those contextually adjusted numbers which are based on league average production at various exit speed/angle levels. Let’s keep Butler’s grounder production at the lower 97 REL PRD level, to be conservative. Let’s also knock down his projected SLG on liners a bit; balls that Butler hits that would be doubles/triples for others are singles/doubles for him. These adjustments turn Butler from the league average offensive performer he was in 2014 into more of a 115-120 OPS+ guy. Butler may no longer be the offensive force he was in 2009-12, but he’s every bit the player he was in 2013.

Billy Butler had relatively bad offensive numbers for a DH last season, but with much more positive underlying fundamentals. That is basically the only scenario in which he would become an Oakland Athletic this past offseason. If his numbers were as positive as his fundamentals, he would have been priced out of the A’s range. If his fundamentals were poor, the A’s wouldn’t have been interested, even if the actual results were much more positive. Butler is entering his age 29 season, has established a solid but not spectacular true talent level for a DH, and was guaranteed just over half of the money that the five years older Nelson Cruz received. Cruz will hit more homers, but once you take home park, durability and age into account, it’s close to a 50-50 call as to which of the two will be the more productive player in 2015.

The mid-to-small market club obviously has many challenges when trying to assemble a contender. You really can’t be a buyer or a seller; you sort of need to be both. I don’t necessarily agree with all of the moves the A’s made this offseason — Josh Donaldson should be a monster in the short-term in Toronto — but I understand them all. When in position to make a postseason run, as they were in 2014, they had to push their chips to the center and go for it. It didn’t work out in the end, but instead of crying into their beer, the A’s got right back to work, setting out to identify value wherever it existed. Billy Butler isn’t some high-ceiling growth stock that is going to make you rich, but he is that predictable blue chip that can help build the backbone of a winning portfolio.