Why Billy Butler To The A’s Makes Perfect Sense
This past offseason was one of the most tumultuous in recent memory in terms of player movement. A wave of GM turnover triggered roster implosions from Atlanta to Los Angeles, and particularly to San Diego. Domino effects roiled almost all 30 franchises, with only the Indians, Twins, Mets, Phillies and Giants not undergoing at least somewhat significant change. Many teams fancied themselves clear contenders, others, clear rebuilders. Then there were the Oakland Athletics.
At first, it appeared they going the rebuilding route, as evidenced by the megadeal with Toronto involving Josh Donaldson. In the ensuing days and weeks, onlookers were left scratching their heads, wondering what Billy Beane was up to this time, as Billy Butler and Ben Zobrist, two players not exactly made of rebuilding cloth, were brought to town to complement the A’s newly more youthful nucleus. The Butler transaction was particularly curious; why would the A’s spend $30 million over three years on a pure DH coming off of a poor season? Was there, as there usually is, a method to Beane’s madness?
Butler was the Royals’ 1st round draft pick, 14th overall, out of Wolfson HS in Jacksonville, Florida. As you might expect, Butler was a bat-only prospect, but a pretty darned good one. Prince Fielder had been successfully tabbed on the first round by the Brewers a couple of years earlier, and while Butler lacked Fielder’s explosive raw power, he was every bit his match as a pure hitter.
When you get down to it, Butler was arguably as good a minor league hitter as any in the past decade. He knifed through the Royals’ system to the tune of a .336-.416-.561 batting line, and first showed up in Kansas City just after his 21st birthday. Each season I compile my own minor league position player top prospect list based upon OBP and SLG relative to league/level, and adjusted for age. Butler ranked very near the top of this list in each of three minor league seasons, at #5 in 2005, #15 in 2006 and #9 in 2007. Of course, once traditional scouting methods are used to then tweak the list, Butler would suffer a bit, as there wasn’t much to him beyond his bat. Still, this guy was going to be a long-term big leaguer, and make an offensive impact.
And that is just what he did in Kansas City. When you draft a player, you’re buying only his control years, and by any measure, Butler was an exceptional value to the Royals during that time frame. He has logged over 150 games and 600 plate appearances in each of the last six seasons, posting a solid .295-.359-.449 line for his career. He hit the free agent market, unfortunately for him, immediately after his worst major league season, a .271-.323-.379 campaign, with only nine homers. Those are pretty rough raw numbers for a DH, and his resulting (0.3) WAR total made it pretty easy for the Royals to let him walk away at season’s end.
Do those 2014 numbers accurately represent Butler’s present true talent level? To get a better feel for it, let’s examine his plate appearance frequency and production by BIP type data. First, the frequency info:
| FREQ – 2014 | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Butler | % | REL | PCT |
| K | 15.9% | 85 | 37 |
| BB | 6.8% | 87 | 39 |
| POP | 5.3% | 65 | 17 |
| FLY | 25.6% | 89 | 26 |
| LD | 21.0% | 100 | 51 |
| GB | 48.2% | 114 | 82 |
Butler’s K rate has always been quite low for a middle-of-the-order hitter. His 2014 K rate percentile rank of 37 fits in nicely among his career norms; it has floated in a narrow band between 33 and 44 in five of the last six seasons. The main negative in his 2014 frequency profile was the collapse in his BB rate from 90 in 2013 to 39 in 2014. A strong BB rate had previously been a trademark of Butler’s offensive game; he posted a 71 or higher BB rate percentile rank three times in the four seasons from 2010-13.
As for his BIP frequencies, 2014 marked the sixth straight season Butler posted a liner rate percentile rank of 50 or better. Of course, his 51 mark was barely above average, and four of those six above average marks were in the 50’s. Liner rates do fluctuate more than those of other BIP types, though some players have established strong positive or negative liner tendencies. At this stage of the game, one should expect at least an average liner rate from Butler in any given season. Another strong positive is Butler’s low popup rate; his 17 popup rate percentile rank fits squarely within the narrow range between 13 and 25 in which he has resided for each of the last seven seasons.
Lastly, his 2014 high grounder (82 percentile rank) and low fly ball (26) rates fit in neatly with Butler’s past performances. A high grounder rate obviously isn’t ideal considering Butler’s utter lack of speed. The combination of his low K and high grounder rates makes him an annual candidate to lead the league in double play grounders, something he has done twice.
So, we have a slow righthanded hitter with low K and popup rates and a solid liner rate. If Butler could run, he’d be a cinch .300 hitter each year, and an occasional candidate for a batting title. The frequency data only tells us so much; let’s take a look at Butler’s production by BIP type data to get a better feel for his batted-ball authority:
| PROD – 2014 | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Butler | AVG | OBP | SLG | REL PRD | ADJ PRD |
| FLY | 0.286 | 0.634 | 92 | 142 | |
| LD | 0.652 | 0.815 | 93 | 107 | |
| GB | 0.246 | 0.256 | 97 | 147 | |
| ALL BIP | 0.328 | 0.456 | 94 | 128 | |
| ALL PA | 0.271 | 0.321 | 0.376 | 100 | 133 |
Butler’s actual production on each BIP type is indicated in the AVG and SLG columns, and it’s converted to run values and compared to MLB average in the REL PRD column. That figure then is adjusted for context, such as home park, luck, etc., in the ADJ PRD column. For the purposes of this exercise, SH and SF are included as outs and HBP are excluded from the OBP calculation.
There are very significant disparities between Butler’s actual and context-adjusted production on each BIP type. Some are much more explainable than others. First, he batted only .286 AVG-.634 SLG on fly balls last season, for a 92 REL PRD. When you’re a righthanded DH, you probably shouldn’t be producing at below league average level on fly balls. Butler’s hard/soft fly ball rates support a much higher production level, however, at 142 ADJ PRD. That’s more at the Victor Martinez/Adam Jones/Evan Longoria level of adjusted fly ball contact, rather than the Brian Dozier/Matt Dominguez level that his actual figure of 92 would suggest. His Kauffman Stadium home park hindered his fly ball production, obviously, but so did random chance. Butler made a lot of long, loud outs in the air last season.
Butler also underperformed significantly on grounders last season, posting a 94 ADJ PRD, but a significantly higher 128 REL PRD based upon his hard/soft grounder rates. On this one, we can point the finger more at Butler’s lack of speed. While he hits the ball relatively hard and sprays the ball around on the ground (3.16 pull factor) and thus isn’t an overshift candidate, he will never be a big producer on ground balls.
Based on BIP authority alone, however, it’s clear that Butler was much better than his actual numbers. Adjustment for context boosts his pedestrian actual 94 REL PRD up to 128 ADJ PRD. Adding back the K and BB raise those numbers a bit higher to 100 and 133, respectively.
Before coming to a firm conclusion on Butler’s true offensive talent level, we have to try to extract some speed out of those contextually adjusted numbers which are based on league average production at various exit speed/angle levels. Let’s keep Butler’s grounder production at the lower 97 REL PRD level, to be conservative. Let’s also knock down his projected SLG on liners a bit; balls that Butler hits that would be doubles/triples for others are singles/doubles for him. These adjustments turn Butler from the league average offensive performer he was in 2014 into more of a 115-120 OPS+ guy. Butler may no longer be the offensive force he was in 2009-12, but he’s every bit the player he was in 2013.
Billy Butler had relatively bad offensive numbers for a DH last season, but with much more positive underlying fundamentals. That is basically the only scenario in which he would become an Oakland Athletic this past offseason. If his numbers were as positive as his fundamentals, he would have been priced out of the A’s range. If his fundamentals were poor, the A’s wouldn’t have been interested, even if the actual results were much more positive. Butler is entering his age 29 season, has established a solid but not spectacular true talent level for a DH, and was guaranteed just over half of the money that the five years older Nelson Cruz received. Cruz will hit more homers, but once you take home park, durability and age into account, it’s close to a 50-50 call as to which of the two will be the more productive player in 2015.
The mid-to-small market club obviously has many challenges when trying to assemble a contender. You really can’t be a buyer or a seller; you sort of need to be both. I don’t necessarily agree with all of the moves the A’s made this offseason — Josh Donaldson should be a monster in the short-term in Toronto — but I understand them all. When in position to make a postseason run, as they were in 2014, they had to push their chips to the center and go for it. It didn’t work out in the end, but instead of crying into their beer, the A’s got right back to work, setting out to identify value wherever it existed. Billy Butler isn’t some high-ceiling growth stock that is going to make you rich, but he is that predictable blue chip that can help build the backbone of a winning portfolio.
Cue all of the comments from idiots wrongly complaining that FanGraphs is obsessed with the A’s.
Thank you for the cue.
FanGraphs is as obsessed with the A’s as they are with hating the Orioles for no reason.
There was also less-than-unrequited love towards the Giants. The last five years have cured that.
How can something be less than unrequited?
What are the odds this article gets written if he signs the exact same deal with a non-“savvy” team?
I’m pretty certain that if the Red Sox or A’s had signed Nick Markakis to the same deal the Braves did, we’d be reading “why the Nick Markakis contract makes perfect sense.”
Almost any deal a MLB franchise makes can be spun into seeming rational if you pull the right numbers.
Low, but not because Fangraphs has a bias, but because most “savvy’ teams are low-revenue clubs. The point Blengino makes is that those teams have to be on the look out for players coming off of season that look worse than they are, like Butler’s 2014.
As to your other, unconnected point, perhaps! If a different team signs Markakis, a team that isn’t punting 2015 in order to compete in 2017+, his deal might make more sense. None of those teams signed him; the Atlanta ballclub did, the same Atlanta ballclub projected to lose 90 games. So they spent $11m this year to move from 70 wins to 72 wins, and by the time an extra 2 wins might actually help them, Markakis will be 33 or 34. So you’re right! Just for the complete wrong reasons.
Are the “savvy” teams low revenue? I think most people consider the Red Sox, Yankees and Dodgers as among the savviest teams and the Diamondbacks among the least.
There were two different criticisms of the Markakis deal:
1) Markakis is not very good and is not worth signing to a long, expensive contract, regardless of circumstance. His defense is overrated (and probably below average, especially in a larger outfield than Camden Yards) and he’s overrated in general due to being so promising when he was younger.
2) The Braves circumstance makes it dumb for them to sign ANY players that are Markakis’s age to a contract that size.
I think most FG writers agree with BOTH points.
So, you make a statement about the past three years, are wrong for two of the three years, and when someone points that out, they’re the sensitive one?
I reject the notion that a veteran signing is automatically a bad idea because the team is “rebuilding” and there is no difference between losing a lot of games a few less. Why should be opposed to teams spending money to make their team less putrid? Are any of us going to see a penny of the savings if they don’t? Why do we want to root for teams to penny-pinch just for the sake of penny-pinching?
If Markakis were blocking a serious prospect this season, then fine, it would be a bad move for the Braves. But the Braves’ best outfield prospect is Braxton Davidson, and he is 18. They have no other outfielders in their top 10 prospects per FG. Nor is Markakis making so much money that this will tie their hands in future years – he’s being paid like 1.5-2 WAR player, which is probably what he will be for the whole length of the contract.
Why is this a bad deal for the Braves?
Completely agree. This interest stats sites have with helping multi-millionaires keep as much of their money as possible, screw the players, is a very strange one.
Braves haven’t made the playoffs the last 3 years in a row.
hmmmmm…
http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/ATL/2013.shtml
http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/ATL/2012.shtml
They made the wild card game in 2012, and they lost to the Dodgers in the NLDS in 2013, when they won the division.
Cool, and how were in 2014?
Oh right…
So hows about maybe not being so sensitive in future?
Or not fuck up what’s common knowledge making a non-point.
The last 3 years in a row all took place in 2014, I see.
People asked why fangraphs was obsessed with the A’s, I stated because they made the playoffs 3 years in a row, someone bought up that if the A’s signed Markakis we’d be reading about it, which means by proxy that the there should be an article about why the Braves signing him makes sense. Butthurt Braves fans get mad at me for bringing up how they have not made the playoffs the last 3 years. The end.
Enjoy not contending again this year.
I don’t intend to speak for Braves fans, not being one myself, but I’d have to assume they’re “mad at you” for saying, wrongly, they’ve missed the playoffs the past three seasons. Even if you don’t consider the play-in game a true postseason game (your opinion), the Braves did win the East outright in 2013, which was within the past 3 years.
You were wrong, man. Own it and move on.
What? I said
“Braves haven’t made the playoffs the last 3 years in a row.”
They have not done that. They did not make it last year. They made it 2/3 years. I was not wrong in saying that.
you do understand that 2012 and 2013 are within the last three years though, right?
i’m starting to think maybe you’re like a genius baby who can read and write but who was only born last year, so you don’t really understand how time works yet.
congratulations on your advances so far, baby. you’ll figure the rest out soon.
I’m starting to think I’m the only one who understands the English language in this thread.
How hard is it to understand this? Yes, the Braves made the playoffs in 2012 & 2013, but not 2014. That is not making the playoffs the last 3 years in a row. The A’s have done that. How does this not compute to people?
Read more books, everyone.
Ahh, I see. What we have here is failure to communicate. Your original comment is worded poorly for the message you wanted to convey. The way it’s worded, you are saying that, for the past 3 years, the Braves have missed the playoffs. Here’s a helpful alternative:
“Braves only made the playoffs 2 of the last 3 years, unlike the A’s, who made it in for 3 straight years.”
When you have a lot of people misunderstanding your point like this, fault lies with the writer, not the readers.
Forrest – this statement:
“haven’t made the playoffs the last three years in a row”
outside of any context can pretty easily be read as ‘did not make the playoffs at all in the last three years’. Feel free to get annoyed if people jumped down your throat about something so silly, but you have to admit it’s an ambiguous way to phrase what you’re trying to say when there are clearer options (ex: “the braves aren’t on a three year playoff streak”).
Linguistically, this is a scope ambiguity (http://www.coli.uni-saarland.de/projects/milca/courses/comsem/html/node92.html):
“(The Braves have not made the playoffs) the past three years in a row)”
“The Braves have not (made the playoffs the past three years in a row)”
Either is a possible reading of the sentence as written; it was ambiguous.
Don’t be stupid! Despite the glaring ambiguity, it is crystal clear in his own mind what he meant. Read some books!
(I love when like 19 people point out how someone is wrong, a person still insists on doubling down rather than just saying “My bad! I worded that poorly!” and moving on to other things.)
When in doubt, DOUBLE DOWN!!
I agree, doubling down is awesome.
I also think people are dumb as rocks for not being able to understand what I meant!
YES I JUST TRIPLED DOWN!!!! LIVIN ON THE EDGE, BABY!!!!
People are responsible for their knee-jerk reactions, but you’re responsible for your failure to accurately convey an idea. I don’t think anyone here feels very bad about not having a psychic connection with your intentions.
I don’t see why it should be a mystery that we’d take a harder look at a surprising move from a team that has an established history of getting contributions from unexpected sources than we would if that team has a history of throwing money at overvalued players.
Maybe so, but the fact of the matter is that Billy Beane is nearly always right about these types of things.
We’ve Beane here before.
If they’re able to compete for a playoff spot the year after “push(ing) their chips into the center and go(ing) for it”, then why did being close last year then so compel them? The statements are opposite, they cannot logically coexist.
Fangraphs is often unfairly accused of bias. But not here. A writer cannot address on Fangraphs how the A’s handled last year WITHOUT arguing that up is down, left is right, the A’s HAD to go all-in last year and yet somehow they’re still competing this year while also keeping an eye on their future.
Their midseason-2014 moves were focused on 2014 at the expense of future seasons. However, they didn’t literally “go all in”, in that what was left after 2014 was still an ok team. This offseason, they made some moves focused on 2015 and some focused on the future.
It’s not that complicated.
Butler was a pretty good hitter before last year, I’m sure the A’s feel last was an anomaly.
Maybe so. Let’s say that Billy Butler was just as good last year as he normally is, but was just unlucky. Let’s say that Billy Butler as a hitter is currently 17% above-average (coincidentally, both his career mark and his 2013 mark is a 117 wRC+).
Then the A’s still should not have invested 30M/3 on him. Because a 117 wRC+ DH is not worth that much. Especially for a team on a tight budget that is better off investing that $30M elsewhere.
There are so many IF’S you need to accept in order for this to look like a good deal, it’s ridiculous. We need to accept the idea that the A’s need to overpay for sluggers because no one wants to hit in their ballpark, the idea that this somehow means they *should* be willing to overpay for sluggers (rather than acquire sluggers via trade, or simply focus on other types of players), the idea that it’s important to have a diversity of skills within a lineup (such as a groundball hitter amongst flyballers), and the idea that Butler’s 2014 was a bad-lucky anomoly.
Why do writers keep trying to find ways to justify this contract? There doesn’t have to be a complicated explanation for it. Maybe the owners just said, “That guy’s nickname is ‘Country Breakfast’ and he’s entertaining as hell. Sign him, Billy.”
“Especially for a team on a tight budget that is better off investing that $30M elsewhere.”
It isn’t investing $30 million elsewhere. It is investing an average of $10 million per year for the next three. Ten million doesn’t get you much in today’s game. And even if BB chose to invest that $10 million this season on pitching or elsewhere in the field, he still has to find a Billy Butler-esque player to fill Butler’s roster spot (and to be more accurate, Butler will make less than $6 million in 2015). On the free agent market this year, there were three other players like him for comparable money: Cuddyer, Morse and Kendrys Morales.
Cuddyer signed 10 days before Butler, and his price was 2/$21 million, plus the loss of a first round pick. Cuddyer is 7 years older than Butler, has the Coors Field effect to consider, and has durability concerns.
Morse got 2/$16 million. Like Butler, Morse is a power hitter who doesn’t hit a lot of flies. But Morse never walks, strikes out a ton, and he’s five years older than Butler. Power aside, I don’t think Morse is in the same class as Butler as a hitter. Morse also has durability concerns.
Kendrys Morales got 2/$17 million plus an $11 million mutual option. Morales is four years older than Butler, has durability concerns, and was so awful last year that one has to wonder whether he has much left in the tank. Perhaps Morales will bounce back as he approaches his 33rd birthday. But there’s a huge difference between having an off year like Butler and playing like dogshit like Morales. And early on Scott Boras was doing his typical song and dance and acting like Morales was worth Nelson Cruz type money. Perhaps Beane touched base with Boras, and decided to move elsewhere.
When put into proper context, the A’s overpaid for Butler but not by a lot for the comparable players on the market.
Did Yirmiyahu just call Billy Butler a slugger?
Butler’s quite good with a bat, but a slugger he most certainly is not.
I did. His profile is definitely atypical for a DH (high contact, lots of GB’s). But in the current offensive environment, I’d call a guy with a career .449 SLG and 15-20 HR’s a year a “slugger”.
That’s a big logic leap. You can’t cite career numbers with the caveat of ‘current offensive environment’.
Ichiro slugged .450 for his early years too. Slugging% is the new RBI. Most people recognize by now that is doesn’t measure what you’d think it does.
Regardless of how he actually hits, Beane has made the playoffs 3 years in a row pretty much strictly off depth and finding platoons. Now he got Butler and Zobrist, who over the last 5 seasons rank #5 and #12 in total games played. That’s 2 guys who literally are everyday players who don’t get hurt (knock on wood).
Its so important to not play bad players, ever, and not many teams have figured this out yet. Most teams go for the big splash but then ending up losing games when their stars miss a few weeks here and there and games are lost when a fringy AAAA guy comes up and acts as a warm body who does nothing to help win. Butler is a 1-dimensional DH who can hit ok, and that’s all he needs to be. He’s also entering his prime years so bouncing back to 29 HR form of 2012 isn’t out of the question either. But its mostly so that someone who isnt entirely terrible at hitting like Adam Rosales or Alberto Callaspo has to be in the lineup as the “DH” in position title only.
After 2015, it is pretty likely that the A’s won’t have made the playoffs 4 years in a row.
Isn’t the problem much moreso with the contract rather than the player/team relationship? The Royals had just declined what amounted to 1/$11.5M option for Butler’s services and there was very little buzz surrounding his possibilities. Then the low-budget A’s swooped in with relatively big money. Overpaying by a year and $8M for a player with little market presence doesn’t seem like a smart deal for a team like Oakland.
Not many free agent hitters want to play in Oakland, they offered Adrian Beltre more money, AVV and years than Boston did, same with Furcal, same with Berkman. All of them declined due to the Coliseum skewing-pitcher friendly. They also have to spend the revenue sharing money which in previous years went to relievers, and this year it went to Butler. No hitter is every going to go there unless there’s an overpay, and 3/30 isn’t that bad an overpay anyway in the scheme of things.
But also, the A’s are owned by one of the wealthiest ownership group in pro sports, but because their terrible stadium does not sell out each game they cant spend too much money if they want to turn a profit, which they do every season. That statement is changing though, and they are starting to move up the attendance rankings a bit, so therein lies the spending.
In theory they could offer the most money to any single player if they stopped caring about running the team in the black, but seeing how the ownership group also includes Beane who is a master at running a winning team on less money, it would be difficult to convince the owners to run the team at a loss, therefore they can’t be throwing around $100M deals to whoever they wanted – even though they actually could do that if they cared more about winning than making money, instead thanks to Beane, they do both – win and make a profit.
Well it isn’t like Beane is perfect, and therefore all of his deals must be defensible. If the ballpark must be as great for pitchers as it is rough on hitters, so why pony up $10M for washed-ups like Jim Johnson and Ben Sheets?
I think Beane is as good a GM as anyone in the biz but a bad deal is a bad deal.
“why pony up $10M for washed-ups like Jim Johnson and Ben Sheets?”
I already explained this: the A’s HAVE to spend their revenue sharing money by overspending on players. MLB gave them money that has to go somewhere, even if it doesnt make sense in terms of “fits”. Usually that money goes to pitchers like Johnson, Sheets, Gregerso et al but this time a hitter who is actually not terrible said yes to them.
Beane isn’t perfect in terms of “winning trades”, but he actually has to be perfect in putting a team that will contend for 4+ months a year or else people would bring up contraction again, like they did when he tried to make a splash too early when he traded Cargo for Holliday. Only a fan of a non-big market team would not understand this concept: he actually IS perfect because the team still exists. If he wasn’t, then the A’s are moved or gone altogether.
LOL MLB Contraction.
The A’s are trying, quite unsuccessfully in fact, to move the team so I wouldn’t call the current situation “perfect”.
Following your logic, the Yankees have no bad contracts as they are moderately competitive and make money (and haven’t had to move to Oakland yet).
“the A’s HAVE to spend their revenue sharing money by overspending on players.” They may have to spend that money, but I don’t see why they have to overspend too. Ok, maybe they need to sign hitters for extra because of the stadium, but pitchers too? Why is Jim Johnson the only place they could have spent that $10M?
I hate that Beltre example. The fact that he chose boston for “less” money was propaganda in the A’s stadium push. Sure the A’s offered him more money for three years, but the Bosox offered him more AAV for one year and he turned that into a big contract in Texas. So Beltre earned significantly more per year than the A’s ever offered him.
One positive for Beane is that Butler’s contract is seriously back loaded, this year at $6.666m, next two years at $11.667m. Beane may be hoping for one good year cheap, then trade Billy to a club playing in a shoebox, Baltimore and Toronto come to mind, or Fenway with the monster, stadia where Billy’s RH power would get him to adjust his swing and be a 30 HR guy.
Having watched Butler for a few years, he stays back on the ball and tends to drive cookies to right center for singles on the rare liner or more often ground outs to second. Only balls he pull are low and away breaking pitches to short.
Seeing as you’ve been watching him closely:
How was 2014 9 HR Butler different from 2012 29 HR Butler? Was the 9 HR skewing low because of the league-wide power outage, or was it more on his approach?
29 HR Billy Butler was an anomaly.
In 2012, Hamilton, Granderson, Dunn, Reddick, Willingham, Cano, I Davis, Trumbo, Fielder, Hart, Kubel, Butler, BJ Upton & Pierzinski combined for 435 HR.
In 2014: 153.
Lots on anomalies there, huh?
I can cherrypick arbitrary home run totals, too!
In 2012, Alex Rodriguez had 18 HR. In 2014 he had 0
Swing and pitch recognition. ’12 Butler got ahead of pitches with upward plane of the bat and didn’t chase as many low and away sliders early in counts. He also didn’t waste mistakes. ’14 Butler looked more like ’14 Escobar, slap hitter using the whole field. No reason Billy can’t turn it around with adjustments, he still has bat speed and 240lbs of power.
while i dont agree with the conclusions of this article i cant help but wonder why the red sox weren’t in on butler. they clearly dont care about risking to waste $30 million and their farm system is completely bereft of impact bats while at the major league level they exclusively have guys with no track records or who are being projected for bouncebacks
hahaha what???
Farm is stacked, David Ortiz and Mike Napoli exist. Guys like Brock Holt might not make the big league team because there’s too many bats. Victorino, Betts, Hanley etc etc etc
Pretty Please.
Signed,
The rest of the Blue Jays community.
Is this a troll job? How is this rec’d? No team “clearly doesn’t care” about 30m being wasted. Where should the Sox have put another 1B/DH type? They already have a full-time DH in Ortiz and Napoli is at first. You can’t platoon Napoli with Butler because they are both right-handed.
If we’re ignoring last season’s production, then Kendrys Morales makes more sense than Billy Butler.
It’s still confusing that the A’s would throw that much money at a guy who has been declining the last two years. I mean he’s not a bad hitter, but this seems more like a move centered around competing right now when the move at hand really doesn’t make them that much better. Am I wrong?
Bulter’s age + A’s being forced to spend revenue sharing = Billy Butler getting 3/30.
Pretty sure not many other hitters would come to Oakland.
Well played. Basically spending money they have to spend. That makes it a bit more understandable.
To me the question is why Butler when you could keep Brandon Moss for less money. Steamer has projected OPS+ of 131 for Moss and 116 for Butler. Is there any reason to think those projections are wrong?
Should have said wRC+, not OPS+.
i dont mind the butler signing if donaldson, moss were still here. actually his 2015 salary is pretty manageable at 6 million. i just have concerns with a zobrist, butler, davis, reddick, lawrie, vogt etc in middle order, the power is a huge uncertainty
It’s not the players Beane is after, its the teams they came from.
Did I miss the article where Blengino describes what all of his personal favorite stats are and how they work? This article is totally impenetrable if you don’t understand the statistics he is using, which I do not.
Any specifics you want to ask about? I might not have know just from the data tables, but the write-up around them I think explained what I was looking at well enough…
Ryan Howard had 95 RBI’s last season.
Of course it makes perfect sense. It’s a Billy Beane move and on Fangraphs every Billy Beane move makes perfect sense. Because he is dreamy,
I didn’t like this signing. Nor the Nelson Cruz. Nor Michael Cuddyer. Nor Panda, Hanley, etc. etc.
At some point it’s hard to avoid the reality that the market has moved. If a WAR costs $8-9 million, Butler is probably worth it. Morales and Hart aren’t worth more than an NRI, however. If Morales is worth $17 million, teams should be lining up to take Howard from the Phillies.