In a stunning turn of events, Jon Heyman managed to break a story about one of Scott Boras’s clients, reporting that Matt Holliday has resigned with the Cardinals for seven years and 120 million dollars with a full no-trade clause.

Make no mistake about it: Although he didn’t receive “Mark Teixeira money,” Holliday, who turns 30 next week, is a tremendous baseball player. Over the last 4 years, he’s accumulated about 24 Wins Above Replacement — an average of 6 wins a year. Of course, the Cardinals aren’t paying for what he’s already done, but what he will do in the future.

What are the Cardinals paying for? The market is still working itself out, but assuming an average market value of $4.4 million per marginal win, seven percent annual salary inflation, and 0.5 WAR a year decline, seven years, $120 million dollars indicates a 4.5 WAR player for 2010. With that number in mind, what is a reasonable projection for Holliday?

CHONE’s context-neutral projection for Holliday’s 2010 offense is .303/.379/.513, 29 runs above average per 150 games. (by the time you’re reading this, Sean may have moved Holliday to the Cardinal’s team page and adjusted for league and park). My own projection is very close to CHONE’s.

Holliday’s defensive reputation may have taken a hit in the minds of many during the 2009 playoffs, but most fielding metrics see Holliday as an above-average left fielder. Earlier this offseason (before most projections had come out), I used UZR and the Fans Scouting report and estimated Holliday’s defense at +4, and Jeff Zimmerman’s recent UZR projections get the same result. Taking into account the positional adjustment for left field (-7.5/162), let’s call Holliday a -3 fielder per 150 games.

Adding it all up: +29/150 offense, -3/150 fielding, +20/150 replacement level = 4.6 WAR player. For all practical purposes, given the assumptions we’re working with (and dealing only with the guaranteed years of the contract), St. Louis gave Holliday a contract almost exactly in line with his market value.

It has been said before, but it’s worth repeating: paying average market value for a win isn’t necessarily a “dumb” move, but it isn’t “smart” either. It’s “average” …on average. Moreover, straight market value isn’t the only factor to consider in this particular case. Leaving aside the possibility that the actual value of a win might actually be lower this offseason (dropping it down to $4.4 million, the market value of a 4.5 WAR player over 7 years drops to about $109 million), seven years is a long time for a corner outfielder in his thirties. Yes, the 0.5 win-a-season decline curve takes this into account to a certain extent, but when a team gives a player a contract this long, it not only guarantees their “control” over the player, but also gives him a higher degree of security through his likely decline years. For this reason, players usually give something of a “discount” for that security. The Cardinals did not get such a discount. Moreover, the no-trade clause inhibits the Cardinals’ flexibility down the road — and even if Holliday is willing to waive the clause, that is almost always just another negotiating ploy for more money. In other words, that is more value the Cardinals gave up on top of the money for the deal. [I’m leaving aside the vesting option for an eighth year based on MVP voting.]

The Cardinals get a player who should be very good-to great for a couple of years, and above average for maybe a few after that. Perhaps that is worth it to make a run while Albert Pujols is still under contract (and perhaps to convince him to re-sign if there’s enough left in the budget to do so while filling the other 23 spots on the roster). Still, paying market value long-term for a player in his thirties involves a great deal of risk for a franchise, and even without the no-trade clause, an expensive Holliday in his mid-to-late thirties would be very difficult to move if St. Louis needs to do so. The road to ruin for many a general manager and franchise is littered with long-term “average” contracts for players like Holliday — it doesn’t take much of a drop-off (injuries, anyone?) to turn a seemingly “reasonable” contract into an albatross. Flags may fly forever, but the only sure winners in this deal are Matt Holliday and Scott Boras.

If you read FanGraphs, you’re probably familiar with Sean Smith’s work. Mr. Smith is the progenitor of the CHONE projection system, hosted annually here at FanGraphs and also at his own website, Baseball Projection, through which website you can also access the Projection Blog, where Smith makes periodical notes about or observations on the CHONE projections.

Mr. Smith is also the brain behind the TotalZone defensive ratings available at Baseball Projection and also, for minor leaguers, at Jeff Sackmann’s Minor League Splits.

Finally, it needs to be said, Sean Smith appears to be a genuinely kind person, with whom I am happy to have participated in the following.

Smith consented to be interviewed Sunday by means of EtherPad, a program that allows multiple users to create and edit a document. Hence, the “etherview” — the phenomenon that no one anywhere describes as “the single most important contribution to news media this year.”

Carson: Okay, so first things first: You live in Maryland and are one of baseball nerdom’s most well-known projectionists. That same description — Maryland, projectionist — also applies to Dan Szymborski. My first question is — and it’s super hard-hitting, so watch out — is: Are you and Dan Szymborski the same person?

Sean: You figured us out. Now we’ll have to dispose of you. Just kidding. Dan and I have met before — there was a Baseball Primer (now BTF) meetup for the 2003 world series. There are several witnesses to attest we are different people, not to mention we don’t even remotely look alike. Have not seen Dan since, just emailed a few times. There was a meetup in Baltimore, a group of us saw Manny Ramirez’s 500th homer, but Dan couldn’t make it.

Carson: Mystery semi-solved. But it is true: You live in Maryland. Baltimore or elsewhere?

Sean: About halfway between Baltimore and DC, in the suburbs. Don’t want to be too specific though. You never know about stalkers.

Carson: Were I more successful, that might begin to be a problem. As it is, I do know about stalkers, and I’m confident that I have none.

But here’s why I asked that: because you’re an Angels fan. I mean, even alot of people in Los Angeles aren’t Angels fans. What gives, man?

Read the rest of this entry »

General Manager: Andy MacPhail
Farm Director: David Stockstill
Scouting Director: Joe Jordan

FanGraphs’ Top 10 Prospects:
(2009 Draft Picks/International Signees Not Included)

Even with the graduation of quite a few pitchers in ’09, the organization is top heavy in pitching prospects. There are some hitting prospects, but their ceilings are more modest for the most part. With that said, Josh Bell could displace veteran Garrett Atkins at the hot corner before the 2010 season is up.

1. Brian Matusz, LHP, Majors
DOB: February 1987 Bats: Left Throws: Left
Signed: 2008 1st round – University of San Diego
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2
Repertoire: 88-94 mph fastball, plus curveball, slider, change-up

Matusz reached the Majors in his first full pro season and showed that he belonged, thanks in part due to a 4.08 FIP and a walk rate of just 2.82 BB/9. He also struck out his fair share of batters with a rate of 7.66 K/9. Matusz struggled a bit with his command – especially with the fastball – and he allowed too many hits (52 in 44.2 innings), as well as a high home-run rate at 1.21 HR/9. The lefty needs to improve his ground-ball rate of 31.2% if he’s going to keep the ball in the yard. Batters made below-average contact against Matusz in ’09, which bodes well for his future. Once he improves the command of his pitches, he could develop into a No. 1 or 2 starter. He joins Chris Tillman at the top of a young, exciting starting rotation.

2. Josh Bell, 3B, Double-A
DOB: November 1986 Bats: Both Throws: Right
Signed: 2005 4th round – Florida HS (Los Angeles NL)
MLB ETA: mid-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3

With the loss of incumbent third baseman Melvin Mora, Bell has an outside chance of breaking camp with the club in 2010. That likelihood diminished, though, with the club’s acquisition of long-time Rockie Garrett Atkins, who is expected to keep the hot corner warm until Bell is ready. After a solid showing in double-A this past season, it should not be long for the former Dodgers prospect. Bell hit .296/.386/.497 in 334 at-bats after coming over from LA. He also posted a solid .201 ISO (.281 in the LAD system), so he has the power that most teams covet at the position. With modest speed, Bell has produced rather high BABIPs in the minors, so he may not be a .280-.300 hitter in the Majors like he was in the minors. Despite that fact, Bell has an intriguing mix of power and patience (13.0% walk rate).

3. Brandon Erbe, RHP, Double-A
DOB: December 1987 Bats: Right Throws: Right
Signed: 2005 3rd round – Maryland HS
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3
Repertoire: 88-94 mph fastball, slider, change-up

When he was healthy in ’09, Erbe produced some interesting numbers. In 73.0 double-A innings, he was almost un-hittable by allowing just 44 hits. Erbe was particularly tough against right-handed hitters, who managed a batting average of just .150. However, he did struggle with his control and posted a walk rate of 4.32 BB/9. His strikeout rate was OK, but not great, at 7.64 K/9. The young right-hander is still learning how to pitch and develop his secondary pitches, so he has yet to take full advantage of his stuff, which is electric at times. Some doubt whether or not Erbe will be able to refine his secondary pitches enough to remain in the starting rotation. If he does head to the bullpen, he could develop into a solid late-game option.

4. Jake Arrieta, RHP, Double-A
DOB: March 1986 Bats: Right Throws: Right
Signed: 2007 5th round – Texas Christian University
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 87-93 mph fastball, slider, change-up

Arrieta split the ’09 season between double-A and triple-A and posted solid numbers overall. The right-hander posted a 3.08 FIP and strikeout rate of 10.68 K/9 in 11 starts in the junior league before moving up to triple-A, where he posted a 4.15 FIP and strikeout rate of 7.66 K/9. His control actually improved with the promotion and dropped from 3.51 to 3.24 BB/9. Arrieta also did a nice job of keeping the ball in the park, although it rose a bit upon his promotion (from 0.61 to 0.88 HR/9). The right-hander projects as a solid No. 3 starter.

5. Zach Britton, LHP, High-A
DOB: December 1987 Bats: Left Throws: Left
Signed: 2006 3rd round – Texas HS
MLB ETA: Mid-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 88-93 mph fastball, slider, curveball, change-up

This left-hander is quietly developing into one of the best young pitchers in the minor leagues. Britton posted a solid 3.26 FIP in high-A in ’09 while also allowing just 123 hits in 140.0 innings. He also posted a solid strikeout rate of 8.42 K/9 and an OK walk rate of 3.54 BB/9. He allowed just four homers all season and posted a crazy ground-ball rate of 65%. Britton did a nice job of battling both right-handed (.229 average allowed) and left-hander (.232) batters, although he showed a better strikeout rate (10.98 K/9) against the latter. He could develop into a No. 2 starter if he can keep the ground balls coming and retain the fastball velocity.

6. Brandon Snyder, 1B, Triple-A
DOB: November 1986 Bats: Right Throws: Right
Signed: 2005 1st round – Virginia HS
MLB ETA: Mid-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3

Losing their catching eligibility can be the kiss of death for a lot of prospects (Just ask Neil Walker), but Snyder has shown that he just might survive the move. The right-handed hitter has moved to first base, where his average projects to be below-average for the position, but he has shown solid gap power and the ability to hit for a solid average. He could develop into a solid Lyle Overbay-type of first baseman. Snyder got off to a great start in double-A in ’09 and hit .343/.421/.597 with an ISO of .254 in 201 at-bats. That momentum cooled after a promotion to triple-A and he hit just .248/.316/.355 with an ISO of .107 in 262 at-bats. His true value likely lies somewhere in the middle. He does a nice job of getting on base (almost 10% in ’09), as well, but it would be nice to see him trim the strikeout rate (24.4% in triple-A).

7. Caleb Joseph, C, High-A
DOB: June 1986 Bats: Right Throws: Right
Signed: 2008 7th round – Lipscomb University
MLB ETA: Late-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

Joseph has an up-hill climb to acquiring the starting catcher gig in Baltimore thanks to the presence of Matt Wieters, but he could develop into an above-average backup – if he’s not used as trade bait. The backstop had a solid first full year in the minors and hit .284/.337/.450 in 380 at-bats. His ISO of .166 suggests that there could be some more power to come as the 6’3” hitter adds more muscle to his 180 lbs frame. Joseph’s strikeout rate was impressive at 16.8%, but he could stand to show some more patience after posting a walk rate of just 6.4%. Defensively, he has some work to do in throwing out runners after his caught-stealing rate dropped from 43% in his debut to just 27% in ’09.

8. Kam Mickolio, RHP, Majors
DOB: May 1984 Bats: Right Throws: Right
Signed: 2006 18th round – Utah Valley State College (Seattle)
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2
Repertoire: 89-95 mph fastball, slider, change-up

Mickolio has come a long way in a short period of time, but the 6’9” monster is still far from a finished product. His control is mainly to blame and he posted a walk rate of 4.61 BB/9 in the Majors in ’09. He also relies heavily on one pitch (his fastball at 80.3% of the time) but his slider also has a lot of promise. Mickolio’s ground-ball rate has been all over the map. It dropped heavily in the minors from ’08 to ’09 when it went from an outstanding 58.6% to a scary 28.6%. If everything clicks – and he can get his ground ball numbers back to a reasonable rate – then Mickolio could develop into the O’s closer.

9. Troy Patton, LHP, Triple-A
DOB: September 1985 Bats: Both Throws: Left
Signed: 2004 9th round – Texas HS (Houston)
MLB ETA: Mid-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2
Repertoire: 87-91 mph fastball, slider, change-up

Patton has had some tough times and he no longer projects to be a top-of-the-rotation star like in his early Astros days. The southpaw has lost velocity thanks to injuries and he now projects as a solid back-of-the-rotation starter, if he can remain healthy. Now 24, Patton made 11 solid starts in double-A this past season and posted a 3.53 FIP. He moved up to triple-A, though, and got hit around and posted a 6.80 FIP. He allowed 62 hits in 44.2 innings and tossed up a home-run rate of 2.42 HR/9. If he cannot recover, Patton could be headed to the bullpen as a middle reliever, but he shouldn’t be written off quite yet.

10. Brandon Waring, 3B, Double-A
DOB: January 1986 Bats: Right Throws: Right
Signed: 2007 7th round – Wofford College (Cincinnati)
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

Waring is a slugger. He’s hit 20 or more home runs in each of his three pro seasons. He’s not higher on this list because of a lot of people doubt his ability to hit for average at the MLB level. The right-handed hitter had a solid year in ’09 and batted .273/.354/.520 in 473 high-A at-bats. The 23-year-old third baseman posted an ISO rate of .247 and slugged 26 homers, as well as 35 doubles. His walk rate was OK at 9.7% but his strikeout rate was high – but not unexpected for a slugger – at 25.6%. Waring’s defense at third base is shaky so he split the ’09 season between the hot corner and first base. At either position, the right-handed hitter will have to balance other prospects (Bell and Snyder) for playing time.

Up Next: The Atlanta Braves

When asked about his plan to improve the Red Sox earlier this winter, GM Theo Epstein emphasized a need to upgrade the defense, noting that his club was not very good in the field a year ago. He wasn’t kidding around, as yesterday, Boston signed Adrian Beltre to take over at third base, adding another premium defender to the earlier acquisition of Mike Cameron.

Beltre isn’t just a good defender. He is in the conversation of the best defensive third baseman of all time. Since 2002, the first year we have UZR data available here on the site, Beltre has put up a total of +104.5. That’s an average of +14 per 150 games over an eight year span. Forget complaints about small sample size or year to year variations – +14 UZR/150 over eight years is impossible to fluke.

It isn’t just the numbers, either. When you watch Beltre play third base, you are amazed at the things he can do. He has perfected the charge on a bunt – no one in baseball comes in on the ball as well as he does. His lateral range is hilarious at times, as he regularly fields balls that are hit directly at the shortstop, just because he can. He has a great arm, often throwing lasers across the field without transferring his weight, showing pure arm strength.

But don’t take my word for it – take the word of the fans who filled out Tom Tango’s scouting report project. Beltre grades out as the best third baseman in the game, rating a 4.56 out of a possible 5, and only five players in the game were graded out higher than Beltre. Or, you could take the word of Tampa Bay manager Joe Maddon:

“[Beltre is] clearly the best [third baseman] I’ve ever seen in person,” said Tampa Bay Rays manager Joe Maddon. “I think [Evan Longoria] is good, I used to think Scott Brosius was really good. … [Eric] Chavez was good, but Beltre was stupid good. I think Beltre is the best who I’ve ever seen with my two eyes – defender, not just third baseman, but defense.”

Maddon isn’t the only one who feels that way. It is impossible to watch Beltre play third base and not be impressed. There isn’t a question over whether he’s a great defensive third baseman. The only argument you can have is where his glove ranks with the all-time greats.

The Red Sox just signed a great defensive player, but the value for them doesn’t end there. Offensively, Fenway Park should be a huge boon to his numbers, as Dave Allen showed how well Beltre’s game is suited towards a park that is friendly to right-handed pull hitters. He’s leaving the hardest park in baseball for a right-handed hitter and going to one that famously improves the performances of players with his offensive approach. Beltre has been a league average hitter while toiling in Safeco Field, and he has the chance to be much more than that in Boston.

This is simply a tremendous addition for the Red Sox. They got a +3 win player with upside, at age 30, on a one year deal for $10 million. They significantly upgraded over Mike Lowell, and put their defense back on track to being an asset, not a liability. Theo Epstein saw an opportunity to add undervalued assets and made huge improvements to the team by bringing in both Cameron and Beltre.

Boston fans, get ready to be spoiled. You’ll never see another third baseman play the hot corner as well as you’ll see it played in 2010.

There has been a lot of movement on the third base market already this offseason, with the latest being Boston’s addition of Adrian Beltre. Dave will have more on that later, but now I’d like to focus on the depleted state of the third base market. So far, we’ve seen the following moves.

Placido Polanco to Philadelphia from Detroit, 3/18
Chone Figgins to Seattle from Los Angeles (A), 4/36
Pedro Feliz to Houston from Philadelphia, 1/4.5
Garrett Atkins from Colorado to Baltimore, 1/4.5
Adrian Beltre from Seattle to Boston, 1/9 with pl. option for 5M
Mark DeRosa from St. Louis to San Francisco, 2/12

And some other possibilities who aren’t strictly third basemen:

Craig Counsell re-signed with Milwaukee 1/2.1
Troy Glaus from St. Louis to Atlanta 1/2

That’s quite a bit of movement, and we’re not even a week into the new year. With Beltre off the board, arguably all of the above-average options at third base are gone. I would argue that Joe Crede is also above average, but his injury issues and light bat make him an asset that isn’t terribly sought after. After Crede, Robb Quinlan is the youngest FA 3B at age 33, and he’s been under replacement level for three straight years. Melvin Mora is the only one who received a type B rating from Elias, and he’s 38, although he has averaged only slightly under 2.0 WAR per season since 2007.

We may see some team have to resort to minor league options or move players around going into 2010. Are the Marlins satisfied with Emilio Bonifacio and Wes Helms? Who will the Twins go to, if not Joe Crede? Does Nick Punto move to 3B? Do the Orioles consider Atkins and Ty Wigginton good enough? Are the Angels willing to hand the reins over to Brandon Wood as a full time starter? For the Cardinals, will it be David Freese? Somebody will have to get creative. Perhaps a team will move Miguel Tejada to the hot corner?

Here we are seeing multiple teams with clear playoff aspirations with major question marks remaining at third base. We will learn a great deal about their respective GMs by how they respond in this nearly completely depleted market.

The American League’s current superiority (as a whole) to the National League is well-established. Here is one brief illustration of the gap. In short: if someone asks why you think the AL is better than the NL, ask them why they think a 90-win team is better than a 70-win team.

The more interesting issue is source of the disparity. One can imagine various explanations with different degrees of credibility: money, the DH, luck, and so on. It’s likely a combination of a number of different factors. I won’t pretend to have all the answers, but I will suggest that the relative quality of front offices (represented here by general managers) plays a major role.

Rather than going through every team, I’ll avoid the illusion of being definitive and pick whom I see as the five best and five worst current general managers. I know that every choice is debatable, but I’ll try to be relatively uncontroversial. It is also worth looking back at the “Front Office” sections of Dave Cameron’s organizational rankings from last off-season, although the judgments presented here are my own. Keep in mind that this is merely a brief reflection. These are not rankings, but merely groupings the five best and the five worst GMs in baseball.

The best: Andrew Friedman (TBA) and Theo Epstein (BOS) work in very different situations, but would be on anyone’s short list for “Best GM” given the numerous ways in which their organizations excel. Billy Beane (OAK) is still one of the top GMs in the game, despite the current rebuild. It’s easy to forget just how good the As were from 1999-2006 on a shoestring budget. It’s only been one full season and less than two off-seasons, but Jack “Jack Z.” Zduriencik (SEA) has vaulted himself into this conversation. As for a fifth member in this group… well, that’s tough. I’d like to put Brian Cashman (NYY) here, given his metamorphosis the last few years from the Yankees’ Tom Hagen into their Michael Corleone, but I’m trying to avoid too much controversy and people always get hung up on the budget. Mark Shapiro (CLE) would also be a good choice, but given Cleveland’s recently struggles, I can understand why some would object. Josh Byrnes (ARI) would be another good candidate, but if Shapiro doesn’t make it, neither should Byrnes. For #5 I’ll go with Doug Melvin (MIL), who does a good job of blending traditional and contemporary methods, but any of the other guys could make it. In no particular order: Friedman, Epstein, Beane, Zduriencik, and Melvin.

Best GMs Tally: AL 4, NL 1

The Worst: Oh boy… This was surprisingly (and depressingly) easy. In no particular order, the Frightful Five are: Dayton Moore (KCA), Omar Minaya (NYM), Ed Wade (HOU), Ned Colletti (LAN), and Brian Sabean (SFN). Seeing those names together gives “Murderer’s Row” a new meaning. I’ll pursue the increasingly uncanny Moore/Minaya dynamic at length some other time. Suffice it to say, no one would blink an eye if tomorrow Minaya lectured Mets fans about “trusting the process” while Dayton Moore held a press conference at which he accused Joe Posnanski of gunning for a player development position with the Royals. Ed Wade’s Brandon Lyon contract aside, his organization is sort of like the Royals except older and without the glimmers of hope in the minor leagues. Some may feel it is unfair to put Colletti on this list given his team’s success, but look at the cash he has (or, more accurately, had) at his disposal relative to his divisional rivals. Then there’s Colletti’s mentor, Brian Sabean… That I’m so impressed that he’s restrained himself from resigning Bengie Molina sort of says it all.

Worst GMs Tally: AL 1, NL 4

The NL only has one of the best GMs (and again, there were other candidates in the AL that could have taken his place), and all but one of the worst. One or two changes would not alter the overall point: front office excellence seems slant heavily toward the American League, and the opposite of excellence toward the National League. Neither the selections nor the “method” employed are definitive, but I do think there is something here.

General Manager: Andy MacPhail
Farm Director: David Stockstill
Scouting Director: Joe Jordan

2006-2009 Draft Results:
First three rounds included
x- over-draft signees ($200,000 or more)

2009 1st Round: Matt Hobgood, RHP, California HS [90-94 FB, CB, SL, CH]
2. Mychal Givens, SS, Florida HS
3. Tyler Townsend, 1B, Florida International
5x – Ashur Tolliver, LHP, Oklahoma City [88-93 FB, CH, SL]
7x – Aaron Wirsch, LHP, California HS [85-88 FB, CB, CH]
9x – Ryan Berry, RHP, Rice [87-92 FB, CB+ SL, CH]
11x – Michael Ohlman, C, Florida HS
18x – Jarret Martin, LHP, California JC
22x – Cameron Coffey, LHP, Texas HS [85-91 FB, CB, CH]
30x – Brenden Webb, OF, California JC

The club took an interesting strategy in the ’09 draft. It didn’t skimp on the money it dished out (signing 10 players to deals worth $200,00 or more) but the Orioles organization did pass up some higher-ranked, and more expensive, players to take Hobgood with the fifth overall choice. The right-hander signed quickly and made eight pro starts in ’09 at rookie ball. He allowed 32 hits in 26.2 innings, while showing good control (2.70 BB/9). Hobgood did not allow a home run and showed a heavy ball, as witnessed by his ground-ball rate, which was just shy of 53%.

The club almost gave up on coming to terms with Givens, but the two sides agreed to a deal before the deadline. Givens, though, did not sign in time to make his pro debut in ’09. Berry, Martin, and Coffey also did not come to terms in time to make their debuts.

College-signee Townsend had a rough debut by posting a strikeout rate of 32.8 K% in 119 at-bats, and he hit just .143/.226/.303. Wirsch posted a 2.84 FIP in 16.2 rookie ball innings. He allowed just 12 hits, but he walked 10 (5.40 BB/9). Tolliver made just three relief appearances, struck out seven batters in 8.0 innings and did not allow a run. Ohlman had just 12 plate appearances after signing and managed one hit – a double. Webb appeared in 13 rookie ball games and hit .186/.352/.233 with two steals.

2008 1st Round: Brian Matusz, LHP, San Diego
2. Xavier Avery, OF, Georgia HS
3. L.J. Hoes, 2B, Washington HS
8x – Bobby Bundy, RHP, Oklahoma HS
14x – Jesse Beal, RHP, Virginia HS

Matusz is already making an impact at the MLB level for the club. The lefty made eight starts for the Orioles and allowed 52 hits in 44.2 innings of work. He showed solid control with a walk rate of 2.82 BB/9 but he struggled with the gopher ball to the tune of a home-run rate of 1.21 HR/9. Matusz’s curveball was his best pitch in his debut, but his fastball posted a negative pitch value.

Avery had a promising first full season by hitting .262/.306/.340 but the 23.5% strikeout rate is worrisome considering his lack of power (.078 ISO). He doesn’t do himself any favors in the on-base department, either, with a walk rate of 5.4%. Hoes had a similar season in ’09 in low-A. He hit .260/.299/.318 with a low ISO rate of .058 and a walk rate of just 5.1%. He kept his strikeouts down a little bit more (18.6%) than Avery.

The organization has been patient with Bundy, who has appeared in just 14 games (12 starts) over the past two seasons in rookie ball. In ’09, he allowed 47 hits in 54.2 innings while posting a 4.55 FIP. Beal posted a 2.98 FIP in 13 rookie ball starts in ’09 and showed impeccable control with a walk rate of 0.97 BB/9. However, his strikeout rate was just 4.99 K/9 and he was aided by a low BABIP of .270.

2007 1st Round: Matt Wieters, C, Georgia Tech
2. None
3. None
x- Tim Bascom, RHP, IND
x- Jake Arrieta, RHP, Texas Christian

The club did not have its second or third round picks, but it had its best draft in a number of years, thanks solely to the addition of Wieters, who made his MLB debut in ’09. The former Georgia Tech star hit a modest .288/.340/.412 in 354 at-bats, along with an ISO of .124, but he showed steady improvement during the season. A good fastball hitter, Wieters needs to improve against breaking balls and off-speed pitches. The organization owes the Pittsburgh Pirates a huge debt of gratitude for passing on the catcher in an effort to save some cash with the selection of left-hander Daniel Moskos.

Bascom and Arrieta were also nice signings. The latter pitcher appears on the club’s Top 10 list, due up tomorrow. Bascom split ’09 between high-A and double-A where he showed good control (3.20 BB/9 in double-A) but a low strikeout rate (6.50 K/9). He’ll likely top out as a back-of-the-rotation starter or middle reliever.

2006 1st Round: Billy Rowell, 3B, New Jersey HS
1S. Pedro Beato, RHP, Florida JC
2. Ryan Adams, SS, Louisiana HS
3. Zach Britton, LHP, Texas HS

The first prep bat taken in the draft, ahead of Toronto’s Travis Snider, Rowell has been a huge disappointment and hit just .225/.284/.336 in 423 high-A at-bats. Beato has also fallen off the prospect cliff, although he did reach double-A in ’09. His strikeout rate fell below 6.00 K/9, as his fastball has lost some of its zip. The 1.69 HR/9 rate in double-A suggests he needs to get his pitches down in the zone. Adams had injury problems in ’09 at high-A, but if he can get his strikeouts under control (>24% in his career), then he should have a career as a MLB utility player.

Britton was the cream of the crop in this draft and you’ll read more about him tomorrow. Jason Berken was a serviceable MLB pitcher in ’09 for the Orioles and he made 24 starts, but his 6.54 ERA (5.31 FIP) was ugly.

Up Next: The Baltimore Orioles Top 10 Prospects

Based on early returns of published Hall Of Fame ballots, Jack Morris is getting support from about half of the voters who elect players to Cooperstown. Let’s be entirely honest – Morris has no case if you eliminate Game 7 of the 1991 World Series. His reputation is heavily dependent on that classic performance, a 10 inning shutout that gave the Twins the championship.

From that performance, the legend of what Morris was has grown. He was a bulldog, an ace, a true winner, and the kind of talent who shines when the spotlight is brightest. Or, at least, so his supporters will tell you. That game drastically altered the perception of what Morris was. As a human watching the game, it’s almost impossible not to get wrapped up in that kind of fairy tale performance. When his team needed him the most, he delivered.

One shining moment of greatness in October is a huge part of Morris’ candidacy. Yet, for these same writers, the performance of Edgar Martinez in the 1995 ALDS is not even considered. And I’m here to suggest that Martinez’s performance may have been even more impressive.

In Game One, the Yankees beat the Mariners 9-6, but it wasn’t for Edgar’s lack of effort. He reached base in four of his five trips to the plate, going 3 for 4 with a walk, a run scored, and an RBI.

In Game Two, the Yankees would again prevail, winning 6-5 in 15 innings. Martinez went 3 for 6 with a double and a walk. Despite his hitting, the Mariners were on the verge of getting swept out of their first ever playoff appearance.

In Game Three, the Yankees decided to stop pitching to him. He was 0 for 1 with 3 walks, scoring a couple of runs as the Mariners would win 7-4 and push the series on.

In Game Four, he had his Jack Morris performance. The Mariners won 11-8, and it was almost entirely due to Martinez. He went 3 for 4 with 2 home runs, the first a three run shot and the latter a grand slam in the bottom of the 8th inning that proved to be the decisive blow. John Wetteland, one of the elite closers in the game, couldn’t keep Martinez from extending the series to a final fifth game.

In Game Five, Martinez went 3 for 6 with a pair of doubles, the last of which ended the series in the 11th inning. In Seattle, it is simply known as “The Double”, and it will stand for eternity as one of the most dramatic hits in baseball history.

For the series, Martinez came to the plate 27 times and reached 18 of them. He was 12 for 21 with 3 doubles, 2 home runs, 10 RBIs, 6 runs scored, and 6 walks. He hit .571/.667/1.000 for the series. He had the three most important hits of the series, carrying the team to victory in Game Four and then coming up with the clutch hit to end it in Game Five.

In 5 games, two of which went into extra innings, he made a grand total of 9 outs. He destroyed Yankee pitching and was the reason the team knocked off the Bronx Bombers in 1995.

Morris’ Game 7 performance may have come on a bigger stage, but Martinez’s 1995 performance was every bit as incredibly clutch. With the whole world watching, Martinez proved that he was a dominant offensive force.

So, Morris voters who do not elect Edgar, please call MLB and get a DVD of the 1995 ALDS. Watch that series again. Experience post-season greatness in a form other than a memorable Game 7 start. Pitchers don’t have a stranglehold on amazing October performances, and you’re doing the Hall Of Fame a disservice by not using the same standard for Morris and Martinez.

I have never toured the confines of Safeco Field. I watch a few Mariners games throughout a given season, mostly when the Rays visit the Pacific Northwest, and I’ve never asked anyone who would know, but I do not believe the Mariners have a flag flying or pennant hung commemorating their 116 win season. Though I wish they did.

Ask most baseball fans: what is the ultimate team goal in any given season?

The responses will be something along the lines of “World Series,” “winning the title,” “championship,” or a synonym thereof. Fair enough. That goal is certainly shared throughout the league itself and it’s probably the correct answer. I pose this question to Mariner fans: would you trade that 116 win season for a World Series title? And to fans of the Phillies: would you trade your world title for a 116 win season? Both sides likely reply no. In part because familiarity breeds comfort and most people hate change.

Let’s try something different with the next set of questions. Which is more impressive? Which is more valuable? Which should be more respected?

Consider this: winning 116 of 162 games means the team won 72% of their games. Winning the 11 games required to become World Series champions in the post-season could mean the team won 58% of their post-season games if each series went the distance. We expect that, as sample size increases, the true talent levels will be unveiled in more clarity. Compared to 19 games, 162 is a large sample. 162 is a pretty small sample compared to what we would want if our goal was true talent levels throughout.

A 162 game schedule also represents more time in which injuries could occur, but there’s also the ability to add additional players throughout a regular season. In the post-season, what you have is what you can use. Also, in the playoffs, the quality of teams against which you play rises – or at least it should – and the amount of home games is decreased. Although, that might be a wiling sacrifice for teams who in turn get to use their top three or four starters instead of starting a so-so-option every fifth day.

None of this is groundbreaking and some may call it obvious. There is a large sector of college football fans – casual and diehard – who very much want a playoff. A real playoff, they say. It makes sense, depending on how you weigh the BCS with the potential selection committee. The idea is a bit odd, though. Why is it that we need a post-season tournament to tell us which team is the best? Is that not what the regular season is for? In the case of two or more teams that seem equally qualified, then the means of additional play as a way to give conclusion to the crown seems adequate, but if a team wins 116 games, they were (a) incredibly lucky and (b) incredibly good.

So I’m torn. It seems the majority place unfair significance on the victor of the final game rather than the 160 before. I don’t know if it’s right or wrong and I’m not even sure there is a right or wrong. I do hope Seattle has a “116” flag though.

Some questions for discussion:
1. Is the ultimate goal to win, or to win the title?
2. What amount of regular season wins would you trade a World Series title for? What about the lowest amount of regular season victories with a World Series title for 116 regular season wins?

This past week, while a lot of us were on hiatus, there was a good bit of discussion going on in the blogosphere about the role stats played in baseball. This eventually led to “The Mike Silva Chronicles” posts over at insidethebook.com, in which Mike Silva asked 10 questions and Tangotiger answered them. They’re without a doubt worth reading.

One of these posts in particular had to do with “Stats Saturation” in which Mike Silva asked:

Do you believe the advanced metric community is saturating the market with stats, to the point where progress that was initially made with the evolution of traditional stats is now minimal at best. Wouldn’t it be wiser to allow some of the current metrics to gain acceptance before you “advance the current advanced metrics” (corny phrase so to speak).

FanGraphs has been around for almost 5 years and this is a question which is frequently on my mind.

For the most part, FanGraphs does not create new statistics. It’s more of an aggregation of what I consider the best publicly available sabermetric work on the internet from the minds of people like Tom Tango, Mitchel Lichtman, Dan Szymborski, Dave Studeman, Sean Smith, with contributions from many others including our own staff.

There are certainly a lot of stats available on FanGraphs. By my count there are well over 100 different metrics available for batters and pitchers, which are generally broken into logical sections which make them a bit easier to handle. Some of these stats have caught on more in the mainstream, while others I’m sure will continue to only be used among the sabermetric crowd.

With so many stats, I can certainly understand the question of why things might be getting overkill with additional stats. The truth of the matter is that there really are different categories of stats and even those who are not particularly interested in sabermetrics are very much interested in scouting statistics.

Four of the stat sections on FanGraphs are devoted entirely to scouting statistics. These include the Pitch Types, Plate Discipline, and Batted Ball sections. The data in these sections is based literally off what Baseball Info Solutions scouts see. There are no fancy calculations and everything is fairly intuitive. Was the ball in the strike zone or out of the strike zone? How fast was the pitch and what type of pitch was it? Is there room for some disagreement on these? Of course. There’s always going to be some disagreement between scouts, but you really can’t blame the formulas.

Which brings us to the stats which are based on formulas. Many of the metrics on FanGraphs are rooted in “linear weights”. wOBA, wRC, wRAA, wRC+, FIP, and the Batting component of our Value section are all entirely linear weight based. These all use linear weights to measure different things, or in some instances the same thing expressed in a different way. But at their heart they’re all measuring bucketed stats in runs.

Now neither scouting stats nor linear weight based stats are, in my mind, particularly controversial. There are, however, controversies on how linear weights are adjusted, such as by park or by league. And then when scouting stats and linear weights are combined, it seems to be a particularly hot button issue. UZR, for instance, relies on both scouting data (where the ball landed, how hard it was hit, its trajectory) and turns that data into linear weights depending on how the ball was classified, and then adjustments are also applied.

UZR and the Pitch Type values are really statistical scouting. They’re all about putting a value on what you see.

So getting back to Mike Silva’s question of if it’s better to wait for acceptance before introducing new stats, I’ll say it depends. The standard linear weight based stats on FanGraphs aren’t going anywhere. I really don’t think it’s worth introducing an entirely new named set of statistics for what might be a very small increase in accuracy. The current ones may from time to time be tweaked slightly, but they’ll remain under the same familiar names and will represent the same things.

Though when it comes to stats that really do bring a new point of view, whether it be with new scouting data, or drastically different models, then I’ll say they’re welcome at FanGraphs. The other type of stat that I’m not opposed to adding is one that makes an existing model more accessible, which I felt was the case with wRC+.

With all that said, I’d just like to throw out a quick reminder for the new year about thinking. Please take the time to understand the stat you’re using before you use it in an argument and before you criticize it. It’s best when the stats available on this site are used in thoughtful, open-minded discussions that enhance your knowledge and, most importantly, your enjoyment of the game of baseball.