Last year, the Yankees decided not to retain an aging corner outfielder in an attempt to upgrade their defense and save money, as Bobby Abreu was seeking a significant paycheck for his durability and consistent offensive abilities. He found the market for his services nearly non-existent, however, and eventually settled on a one year, low money deal with a club in the AL West that was in need of an offensive boost.

Fast forward to today, and history is apparently trying very hard to repeat itself. This year’s aging corner outfielder that the Yankees are not retaining is Johnny Damon, and just like Abreu, he’s finding out the hard way that teams do not value him like they used to. This afternoon, Buster Olney reported that Damon’s best offer may come for $4 or $5 million on a one year deal from the Oakland A’s – an AL West club that could use an offensive boost.

2008 Abreu and 2009 Damon had very similar offensive seasons.

Abreu: 684 PA, .296/.371/.471, 10.7% BB%, 17.9% K%, .176 ISO, .368 wOBA
Damon: 626 PA, .282/.365/.489, 11.3% BB%, 17.8% K%, .207 ISO, .376 wOBA

Basically the same kind of production, once you adjust for the change in Yankee Stadiums. They’re similar hitters at similar spots in their career. Both have declined from their prime, but not fallen all that far.

There is one big difference between 2008 Abreu and 2009 Damon, however, and that’s on defense. Abreu was victim of the backlash against bad defensive corner outfielders. From 2004 to 2008, his UZR/150s as an LF were -10, -5, -14, -3, and -25. At the very best, you could surmise that he was below average, and realistically, he was more likely to be terrible. He was a borderline DH, the kind of defender who shouldn’t play much outfield except in case of emergency.

Damon, on the other hand, throws like a girl but is otherwise a decent defender. It’s true that his 2009 UZR is not good, but his total UZR over the last three years at the position is a +5, and as we try to remind people frequently, larger sample sizes are needed when evaluating defense.

Damon is clearly a better defender now than Abreu. He’s not great, and he may even be reaching the point in his career where he’s below average, but he’s simply not a guy that costs your team a ton of runs in the field.

Abreu was a bargain on a one year, $5 million deal with the Angels, even as he proved that he didn’t really belong in the outfield anymore. Damon, though, is basically the same hitter, just with better defensive skills, and he might have to settle for less than what Abreu got? This is a market correction gone way too far.

Even with the reduced costs of wins, Damon is easily worth $8 to $10 million for 2010. Just like with Abreu last year, teams will be kicking themselves in a few months if they let him sign for peanuts. There are enough clubs out there that could use a +2 to +3 win left fielder that this level of disinterest is simply a market failure.

In this thread, your ONLY comments allowed are those that do NOT favor the pitcher being part of the hitting lineup. I will delete any post otherwise.

There is really only one reason that you don’t want the pitcher to bat: the gap in talent level is too great. While a team may play a no-hit, great-field player, a team would never play a no-pitch, great-hit pitcher. A pitcher truly is a different class of player. So, I’m looking for alternatives.

The first two are a hybrid approach:
1. Let the home manager make the call. Just as in spring training, the managers decided whether to play with a DH, and just as in the World Series they alternate the DH, this rule allows the home manager to decide when to play the DH. The marketplace will decide how much DH is too much DH. Story potential for every game.

2. Make the DH as a pinch hitter for the pitcher, but the pitcher can stay in the game (the one-and-done DH). Manager has to decide how much he wants to deplete his bench. He can go to 4 pinch hitters in a game while his pitcher pitches a complete game, or he can let the pitcher bat in low-leverage situations. The marketplace will decide how much DH is too much DH, with an in-game cost. Story potential if the bench gets depleted.

These are pure: no pitcher-as-batter:
3. Rotate the guy as DH onto the field, maybe alternating with the 1B and/or LF. The one-dimensional player like Adam Dunn is always exposed.

4. Limit the number of games a player can play as DH. Similar to the rotation rule in #3, but rather than rotate in-game, he rotates between games. Say, at most 50% of games played as DH. Same “expose” rule as above.

5. Do away with the DH, and go with 8 hitters in a lineup. Wrecks havoc with the magic nine of baseball, but so be it.

6. Same as number 5, and reduce the innings down to 8: 8 batters, 8 innings. And, one less crappy reliever to see. Game time shortened by twenty minutes.

7 to n: You tell me

Related thread: “Pro pitcher-as-batter“.

In this thread, your ONLY comments allowed are those that favor the pitcher being part of the hitting lineup. I will delete any post otherwise. You can put in whatever argument you want to support you. For example:

1. Tradition

2. All nine players should take the field and bat in the lineup: pure 2-dimensional.

3. The gap in talent level means that you have to decide when to bring in a pinch hitter or when to bunt. Extra layer of strategy consideration.

4 to n. You tell me

Related thread: “Anti pitcher-as-batter“.

Note to the Reader: I’m not positive, but I’m pretty sure that what follows constitutes a genre-busting moment in the annals of sportswriting. So, just prepare yourself for that, is what I’m saying.

What you’re reading when you’re reading these words is Carson Cistulli’s most recent submission to the All-Joy Team. If you’re unfamiliar with the project, then you’ll want to read the introductory posts (yes, plural!) some time before you shuffle off this mortal coil.

In the meantime, you’ll be fine knowing that this is an attempt to compile a 25-man roster of current players most capable of providing joy to the sabermetrically inclined.

Today, shortstop (categories in parentheses).

SS: Ben Zobrist, Tampa Bay (1,3,5)
Sometimes you’re enamored of a player because he rises from relative obscurity to the top of the WAR charts on the strength of power, patience, and a glove than can handle almost any position admirably. Other times, it’s because a normally courteous internet presence threatens violence against your person unless you include him (i.e. Zobrist) in the Fake Team you’re composing.

In this case, it’s both.

I’m sure I don’t have to remind present company about Zobrist’s criz-nasty 2009 season. I don’t have to, but I will, anyway. Regard:

40.1 park-adjusted wRAA

Pow!

26.4 UZR

Bang!

8.6 WAR.

Schla-gong!!!

Owing to the East Coast/West Coast-style gang war currently going on in re peak years, I feel uncomfortable saying whether the 28-year-old Zobrist has already had, is about to enter, or is currently in the midst of his peak. One school of thought — a.k.a. probably the only school that would ever grant admission to someone like me — is that it doesn’t particularly matter: Zobrist has made his bed, lied in it, fallen into a deep asleep, woken up the next day, driven to Tropicana field, hit a bunch of homers, gone to the club with R. Kelly, gone to the after party with R. Kelly, gone to the hotel lobby with R. Kelly, hired a car service to bring him home, and fallen back asleep in/on/whatever that very same bed that he made earlier. In other words: he’s the realest of the deals. Ya heard!

Another point in Zobrist’s favor — and one that makes him a Category Five player — is the presence of the letter Z in his surname. It’s a well-known fact that Zs are reserved only for the coolest of the cool dudes: Bay Area yoga instructor and occasional left-handed starter Barry Zito, German filmmaking ubermensch Werner Herzog, and Wu-Tang founding fathers The RZA and The GZA.

The BZA — as he’s known to absolutely no one — is projected by CHONE to bat .268/.368/.463. ZiPS is even less optimistic: .261/.356/.443. My Intution says “Funk dat.” And much like Sex Panther cologne, 60 percent of the time, my Intuition is right every time.

Oh, and to the guy in the back who’s all, “Hey, why’d you pick Zobrist to play shortstop when he’s clearly more valuable as a second bas- blah blah blah,” here’s my reply: First, I think it’s pretty obvious we all agreed to call him “The BZA.” Get it right, please. Second, I’ve already made it abundantly clear that I will not always be “utilizing reason” or “using facts” to support these selections. If you have a problem with that, take it up with the transparent eyeball:

General Manager: Ruben Amaro Jr.
Farm Director: Steve Noworyta
Scouting Director: Marti Wolever

2006-2009 Draft Results:
First three rounds included
x- over-slot signees ($200,000 or more)

2009 1st Round: None
2. Kelly Dugan, OF, California HS
3. Kyrell Hudson, OF, Washington HS
6x – Steven Inch, RHP, Alberta HS [85-88 FB, CB, CH]
7x – Brody Colvin, RHP, Louisiana HS [89-94 FB, CB, CH]
8x – Jonathan Singleton, 1B, California HS

A bit of a surprise pick in the second round (the club’s first choice), Dugan was expected to go to Pepperdine University, but the Phillies organization convinced him to go pro. He had a slow start to his career by posting a wOBA of .288 and a triple-slash line of .233/.297/.300 in 150 at-bats. Known for having some pop, he did not go deep in his debut and his ISO rate was just .067.

Hudson appeared in just 10 games after signing and he hit .162/.225/.216 in rookie ball. Inch, a Canadian, appeared in two games after signing and allowed six runs in two innings of work.

Colvin, perhaps the best prospect grabbed in the draft, appeared in just one game after signing and did not allow a hit in two innings of work. The organization stole him away from a Louisiana State commitment and he possesses a good fastball-curveball combo.

Headed for Long Beach State, Singleton was swayed to pro ball for just $200,000 and that may end up being a steal. He had an excellent debut in rookie ball and hit .290/.395/.440 in 100 at-bats. He walked more than he struck out (1.38 BB/K) while showing solid power potential.

2008 1st Round: Anthony Hewitt, SS, Connecticut HS
1S. Zach Collier, OF, California HS
2. Anthony Gose, OF, California HS
2. Jason Knapp, RHP, New Jersey HS
3. Vance Worley, RHP, Long Beach State
3S. Jon Pettibone, RHP, California HS
4x – Trevor May, RHP, Washington HS
6x – Colby Shreve, RHP, Nevada CC
38x – Jarred Cosart, RHP, Texas HS

Although the club’s first two picks in Hewitt (.223/.255/.395 at short-season ball in ’09) and Collier (.218/.275/.319 at A-ball in ’09) have not shown much in pro ball, this was an outstanding draft for the organization, as it nabbed two Top 10 picks (Gose and May) and one that just missed (Cosart). Knapp would have been a Top 10 prospect if he had not been sent to Cleveland in the Cliff Lee deal last season.

Worley had an excellent debut, but he slipped a bit when he was rushed to double-A in ’09. The right-hander posted a 4.39 FIP and he allowed 163 hits in 153.1 innings of work. He showed good control (2.88 BB/9) but his strikeout rate was just 5.87 K/9. Worley also allowed 17 homers. Pettibone had a better year in ’09 than his 5.35 ERA would suggest in short-season ball. His FIP was just 2.61 and he was unlucky due to a high BABIP (.368) and a low LOB% (48.2%). He does need to improve his control (4.08 BB/9) but the strikeout rate was good (9.17 K/9).

The club handed Shreve a $400,000 contract to forgo his University of Arkansas commitment, despite the fact that he was due to undergo Tommy John surgery. He has yet to throw a pro pitch, but he is expected back on the mound in 2010. Cosart was a two-way player in high school with potential with the bat, but clubs coveted his mid-90s fastball. The Phillies organization got a deal done and it looks like a very smart decision. Cosart made just seven appearances in ’09 after beginning the year in extended spring training but he looked good. In 24.1 innings he allowed just 12 hits and seven walks (2.59 BB/9). He also did not give up a home run.

2007 1st Round: Joe Savery, LHP, Rice
1S. Travis D’Arnaud, C, California HS
2. Travis Mattair, 3B, Washington HS
3. Brandon Workman, RHP, Texas HS (Did not sign)
3. Matt Spencer, OF, Arizona State
x- Julian Sampson, RHP, Washington HS

This was a disappointing draft, save for D’Arnaud, who was recently sent to Toronto in the Roy Halladay deal. Third-rounder Spencer was sent to Oakland in a trade in ’08. First-rounder Savery has been a disappointment and has never fully recovered from injuries suffered in college. His command and control deserted him in ’09.

Mattair had a tough year while repeating low-A ball and hit just .236/.326/.333 in 450 at-bats. He posted a strikeout rate of 29.1K% and an ISO rate of just .098. Sampson has failed to build on his promise, thanks in part to chronically-low strikeout rates. In 69.2 high-A innings in ’09, the right-hander had a K-rate of 4.78 K/9 and allowed 93 hits (including 10 homers).

Michael Taylor was a great value in the fifth round, but he was lost in the Halladay deal.

2006 1st Round: Kyle Drabek, RHP, Texas HS
1S. Adrian Cardenas, 2B, Florida HS
2. Andrew Carpenter, RHP, Long Beach State
3. Jason Donald, SS, Arizona
x- Domonic Brown, OF, Georgia HS

The 2006 draft was another excellent one for the organization but the returns have been gutted by trades. First pick Drabek was lost in the Halladay trade. Cardenas went to Oakland in the Joe Blanton deal, and Donald went to Cleveland in the Lee trade.

On the plus side, the club also nabbed top prospect Brown in the 20th round for just $200,000. Carpenter has filled in for injuries a few times at the MLB level and looks like a future back-of-the-rotation starter or long reliever.

Up Next: The Philadelphia Phillies Top 10 Prospects

A few years ago, the NFL saw a shift in how running backs were used. Rather than sticking with the single starter model, many teams shifted towards job shares, preferring to let two guys split the playing time in order to keep both more fresh and healthy than either could be by themselves. It became more efficient, in some cases, to have multiple players at the position than a single player getting all of the playing time.

We may be seeing something similar in baseball with the designated hitter. If there’s been one theme to the last two free agent periods we’ve seen, it has been a lack of interest in guys who cannot play the field, or who play it poorly. Teams have significantly pulled back from aging offense-only types, finding value in other types of players at the expense of some legitimately good hitters.

But it doesn’t appear to be just a renewed focus on the value of defense. Several teams are all but abandoning the idea of having a full-time designated hitter to begin with. The White Sox yesterday admitted that they wouldn’t be bringing Jim Thome back, because they just didn’t have the at-bats for him. Instead, their DH position will be filled with a rotation of guys that cannot hit as well as Thome. Yet, they see value in having the flexibility to use the spot for various players.

The Tigers, Mariners, and even the Yankees appear to pursuing similar strategies. Detroit has declined to bring in an additional power hitter, preferring to use their DH to give Carlos Guillen, Magglio Ordonez, and Miguel Cabrera time away from their gloves while keeping their bats in the line-up.

The Mariners are going into the season with LF and DH being a job share between various players, depending on where Milton Bradley is healthy enough to play on any given day. And while the Yankees were willing to spend $6 million to bring in Nick Johnson, he’s the kind of guy who simply can’t play every day, which will allow the Yankees to use the DH spot to rest Jorge Posada and any other veteran who needs it.

Teams are choosing to increase their flexibility, even if it comes at the expense of some production. Increasingly, teams want the option to use the DH spot as a pseudo off day for their regulars, or as a fall back plan if their banged-up position player is unable to acceptably field his position. With the move towards 12 man pitching staffs, limited bench sizes put a premium on roster flexibility, and teams are reacting by devaluing players who can’t play the field.

Given that there are only 14 designated hitter jobs in baseball to begin with, this is bad news for aging players. If even half of those teams move towards a rotating-DH plan, you’d be left with only a half dozen or so full time, offense only players. To get one of those jobs, you’d have to be a monster of a hitter, a David Ortiz in his prime kind of guy. And once you decline even a little bit, your chances of getting another job go out the window.

It will be interesting to see how teams react to this emerging DH usage.

Just because you are optimistic overall doesn’t mean you are doing anything good or bad.

It may reduce the absolute error by guessing the median higher than the mean. For example, what’s the better guess:

Guess1	Guess2	Actual
490	575	700
490	575	675
490	575	650
490	575	625
490	575	600
490	575	550
490	575	500
490	575	400
490	575	200
490	575	0

Guess1 represents the actual average, while Guess2 represents the median.

Here is the absolute error for each pick:

Guess1	Guess2	Actual	Error1	Error2
490	575	700	210	125
490	575	675	185	100
490	575	650	160	75
490	575	625	135	50
490	575	600	110	25
490	575	550	60	25
490	575	500	10	75
490	575	400	90	175
490	575	200	290	375
490	575	0	490	575

The average of Error1 is 174 and the average of Error2 is 160. So, guessing higher reduces the overall average error.

Guess1 totaled 4900 PA while Guess2 totaled 5750 PA. The actual PA was 4900. So, in this particular illustration, if it represents anything resembling reality, fans are justified in guessing PA 10% above what the group total would suggest.

Basically, fans are not only justified but are probably correct: they are not guessing on random events; they are not guessing randomness by distributing things evenly to everyone.

Indeed, in this particular illustration, the Fans could have set the forecast at anything between 550 and 600, and the average error would remain at the (minimum) of 160.

So, it is NOT a requirement that things actually add up at the league or team level. Indeed, being optimistic may very well be the right thing to do.

At the same time, you now have to be careful in trying to take things out of context. You can’t add up all the team’s forecasted WAR or forecasted HR and think that’s what is the best forecast at the team level. If we add up all the individual forecasted WAR, we’re going to get a total like 1500, when in reality, it’s going to come in at 1000. Just be careful in taking things out of context.

As mentioned in the comments section of yesterday’s post regarding Gabe Gross, the idea of a player being limited to a platoon player seems to limit his perceived value. That leads me to an obvious question – does this perception agree with reality?

The crux behind many of the arguments against players with these high platoon splits is that their vulnerability to pitchers of the same hand makes them a worse value. A manager can merely put in a decent left-handed pitcher, in the case of Gross and, for example, Curtis Granderson, and the otherwise good hitter is reduced to a shell of his former self.

However, this doesn’t account for the ability for a manager to now leverage the situation. If the team has a right handed hitter with good or even normal platoon splits, by replacing the left handed hitter with that batter, the team could be in an equivalent or better situation. This is especially notable when facing a starting pitcher who would have the platoon advantage against your team’s hitter, as the pinch-hitting penalty wouldn’t be in play here. Overall, by taking the advantage in a vast majority of platoon situations, the team will get more wins out of that position or lineup slot than if the player did not have a large platoon split.

MGL puts it best, I think.

In fact, having good overall numbers with a horrible split is a POSITIVE and not a negative! If it turns out that he is truly (true-talent wise after accounting for small sample performance) poor against LHB, then you would be able to platoon him, sit him against tough (high splits) lefties, or pinch hit for him against lefties in high leverage situations, which would provide even MORE value to his team than his overall or historical numbers would suggest!

We can also infer, as MGL goes on to say, that we can apply this to anyone who has a large split in any sort of numbers – such as offensive value and defensive value, for example.

This isn’t to say there aren’t disadvantages to platoon players. If you can’t find a player with comparable defense to your platoon player, the gain from pinch-hitting or spot-starting another player could be minimal or even negative. We also are forced to deal with the limited number of roster spots. With 25 roster spots, we can only see so many players of this type on one roster, as eventually you run out of the roster spots for the players who cover their weaknesses. This is certainly at the center of the debate over whether teams should carry 12, 13, or 14 position players, and why many sabermetric writers implore teams to carry as many position players as possible.

In the end, though, what matters more than whether or not a player has leverageable platoon or defense or any other kind of skills is his overall talent. The decision of who to play becomes easy when one player is just clearly better than the other. Despite that, these issues will probably come into play for years to come as MLB teams attempt to squeeze every last possible run out of the resources that are available to them, and the smartest teams will properly leverage their platoon players.

I looked at all pitcher forecasts with at least 8 fan votes. There are 329 pitchers, which is 11 per team.

The total wins-losses is 2410-2036. Seeing that there are 2430 wins and losses available, Fans pretty much nailed the wins column. But, there are many losses unaccounted for. The win% comes in at .542, which is 7 losses too few per 162 games. (This is a similar story as with the position players.)

The average ERA is 3.98, which is pretty optimistic compared to the 4.3 that is the norm. Total runs per 9 IP is 4.28, which is 10% too low.

Total IP is 39310, which works out to 146 9-inning games. IP estimates are actually low by 10%.

Total WAR is 570, which is a similar story to the position players: multiply by 75% in order to get the number to make sense.

The Angels and Maicer Izturis came to an agreement today on a three-year contract reportedly for $10 million. If true, it buys out Maicer’s final year of arbitration and two years of free agency.

Maicer had asked for $3 million for his arbitration hearing and the team countered with $2.3 million. The 29-year-old was worth nearly three wins for the Angels last year and provided a lot of defensive flexibility, being able to man 2B, SS and 3B at an above average level. No matter the result of arbitration, Maicer was going to be a steal for the Angels, that they were able to rope in two more years at an insanely discounted rate is even more in their favor.

Given a full season’s worth of playing time, Maicer has been playing at about a three win level for the prior four seasons. Even in my most pessimistic scenario for Maicer Izturis, his market value for these three seasons is nearly $20 million. If you remove this arbitration year from the calculation – since we know the figures that were filed for and Izturis filed for way too little per his actual value – the Angels are still getting two free agency years at roughly a one win per season valuation.

Izturis even typically adds a few extra runs to the bottom line on the base paths. There is no other reasonable conclusion here: the Angels struck themselves a fantastic deal. The only question is whether he’ll continue to be used as a roving infielder behind Howie Kendrick, Erick Aybar and Brandon Wood, a situation that should still allow him to get 400 to 500 plate appearances, or be given an opportunity to win one of those left-side positions.