This subject is something I’ve juggled for the past few months. If it sucks, I blame Carson Cistulli. Not because his Marcel of Joy series probably spawned it, but because everything that goes wrong is clearly his fault. I’d also dish some of the discredit Tommy Bennett’s way. He’s basically the sabermetric version of Jay Electronica and helped me flesh this out beyond its initial stages.

I’ve looked over the Yankees’ gamelogs for attendance numbers as well as the Rays’. The one thing that always stands out is that people go to the games against the Red Sox while nobody goes to the games against the Orioles. The Red Sox were the second best team in the division last year with the Yankees and Rays flanking them. Without doubt, they are and have been a superior team to the Orioles for a while now. Ultimately, we go to games to be entertained and experience joy, so why don’t more people go to Orioles games?

It would seem that a win is more enjoyable to experience than a defeat. I’d rather go to a Rays game where they win than one where they lose. And, I’m not sure if I went to those games against the Washington Nationals last season because subconsciously I wanted to see victories, but I suppose I could’ve been on a losing strike without really knowing it. If I asked a thousand Yankee fans which team they’d rather pay to see live, 95% would say the Red Sox and the other 5% would make vulgar comments about the folks from Boston. But is this rational?

If the goal of attending a game is to enjoy oneself, and we get the most enjoyment from attending victories, then why wouldn’t people regularly attend more games where victory is in higher likelihood? Of course, the obvious answer is that the spread of the odds of victory aren’t so extreme as to attend any game that can be marked down as a definitive win.

Does it come down to the hedonic value of a defeat over the Red Sox, one that a victory over the Orioles doesn’t carry with? Or is there something more? The Orioles tickets are likely cheaper and the seating choices likely more expansive. Fewer people are prone to attend, which means the social aspect is diminished, although there’s probably fewer [expletive] Sox fans too.

Much like I did with the 116 wins versus a world title post, I’d like to pose some discussion questions; I am hopeful none of these result in someone telling me I don’t belong on this site, but I accept full blame if it comes to that. As for those questions:

1. Say you are a Yankee fan and price is irrelevant. Would you rather buy tickets to an Oriole or Red Sox game?
2. Would you pay more money to guarantee that you are attending a victory? If yes, how much more?
3. Do you ever consider the likelihood of a victory when purchasing tickets, or do you base your decisions on availability? Or is it purely on the quality of the opponent?

Tangotiger’s running the same poll over at insidethebook.com:

[Authors Note Added, 7:42 p.m. EST: Thanks to the commentators below who spotted the obvious error… You all are great. Fortunately (for me) the revised standings for the top five remain almost the same. It was a simple Excel mistake on my part, silly and embarrassing. Some good came out of it: there is now a bidding war between San Francisco, Houston, Kansas City, and New York (NYN) to hire me as Head of Research and Analysis.]

The so-called Three True Outcomes are the walk, the strikeout, and the home run. They are called “true” outcomes because they reflect the pitcher-hitter relationship without the mediation of defense, luck on balls in play, etc. The celebration of three true outcome (TTO) hitters is a classic staple of sabermetric writing on the internet. In that tradition, let’s take a look at the leaders in TTO rate from 2007-2009. The pool of players are those defined as qualified over the past three calendar years by the FanGraphs leaderboards. The definition of Three True Outcome rate I’ll use is (HR+K+BB-iBB)/(PA-iBB). I’ve excluded intentional walks since they are out of the hitter’s control.

In reverse order, your top five members of the Rob Deer Fan Club from 2007-2009:

5. Jim Thome
TTO%: 47.0
TTO: 728
PA-iBB: 1549
HR: 92
uBB: 232
SO: 404

Although Thome is a sure DH-only at this point, I’m surprised his name hasn’t popped up more frequently this offseason in hot stove rumors. Thome still has something to offer, but teams seem to be more circumspect regarding the relative value of designated hitters than in the past. Moreover, it’s one thing to have old player skills, and another to simply be old.

4. Carlos Pena
TTO%: 48.0
TTO: 845
PA-iBB: 1761
HR: 116
uBB: 258
SO: 471

It bears repeating: for all the (uninformed) talk of Tampa Bay’s rapid ascent being due to years of high draft picks, smart acquisitions like that of Pena have had as much or more to do with their recent success. I’ve heard that during the 2006-2007 offseason, one of his suitors was the Kansas City Royals, and that part of the reason he didn’t sign with the Royals was that they wanted him to complete with Ryan Shealy for a starting spot.

3. Adam Dunn
TTO%: 48.4
TTO: 926
PA-iBB: 1914
HR: 118
uBB: 302
SO: 506

For all the (justified) talk of Dunn’s dreadful performance in the field, there is no doubting his offensive value. Dunn is arguably the most miscast player in baseball — he’s one of the few guys who could actually carry the DH spot, yet he’s stuck in the NL… Remember way back in 2008, when then-Blue Jays GM J. P. Ricciardi put down Dunn’s abilities, leading to general mockery and vilification of Ricciardi all over the internet? A fired up Adam Dunn responded by finishing 2008 with monstrous 1.2 WAR and following it up with an equally impressive 1.2 WAR in 2009. Interesting.

2. Mark Reynolds
TTO%: 48.5
TTO: 815
PA-iBB: 1682
HR: 89
uBB: 170
SO: 556

Reynolds may not be much of a defender on the hot corner, but he’s Adrian Beltre compared to the rest of this group. Particularly interesting in this context is that Reynolds is the only member of this group not in his 30s, and as the youngest of the five, he reflects much what we generally known about player aging: he has the most defensive skill, the lowest walk rate, the highest three-year batting average (.257), the most steals, and the highest speed score.

1. Jack Cust
TTO%: 54.4
TTO: 929
PA-iBB: 1707
HR: 84
uBB: 299
SO: 39.3

What, you were expecting Howie Kendrick? As has been said before, perhaps they should rename this category the “Three True OutCusts.” Cust outstrips even Dunn in his extremity. Cust is known for his old player skills, and his down year in 2009 did nothing to change that perception. However, CHONE projects Cust’s 2010 context-neutral runs above average per 150 games at +23, second-highest in this group to Pena’s +30. Oakland recently resigned Cust for $2.65 million guaranteed as part of their goal of fielding one Adam Dunn and eight Endy Chavezes, and if he’s anywhere close to +23 as a hitter, that will be a bargain.

Later this week: The 2007-2009 trailers

General Manager: Andrew Friedman
Farm Director: Mitch Lukevics
Scouting Director: R.J. Harrison

FanGraphs’ Top 10 Prospects:
(2009 Draft Picks/International Signees Not Included)

Pitching. Pitching. Pitching. The Tampa Bay organization just keeps churning out mound prospects and the Top 10 list is littered with seven pitchers. The impressive part is that none of the players were taken in the first round; all seven were drafted in the third round or later, save for Lobstein. One other pitcher was signed internationally, while another was acquired in the Scott Kazmir trade with Los Angeles (AL). You can also see signs of excellent scouting when you look at the top prospect, Desmond Jennings, who was acquired out of a small community college in the 10th round.

1. Desmond Jennings, OF, Triple-A
DOB: October 1986 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2006 10th round – Alabama Community College
MLB ETA: mid-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3

Injuries limited Jennings to just 24 games in high-A ball in ’08 so few knew what exactly to expect from the rusty prospect in ’09. The outfielder did not miss a beat by jumping to double-A and he hit .316/.395/.486 in 383 at-bats. He also saw his strikeout rate drop from 18.8% to 13.6% while his ISO rate rose from .153 to .170. Jennings also stole 37 bases in 42 attempts in double-A. Promoted to triple-A for his final 32 games, the Alabama native hit .325/.419/.491 with an ISO of .167 and 15 steals in 17 attempts. He also posted a BB/K rate of 1.27 and is clearly on the cusp of the Majors. Currently more of a 10-15 homer threat, there is hope that Jennings can develop at least 20 homer power.

2. Jeremy Hellickson, RHP, Triple-A
DOB: April 1987 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2005 4th round – Iowa HS
MLB ETA: mid-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3
Repertoire: 89-94 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

Another impact prospect on the verge of realizing his MLB dream, Hellickson blew through both double-A and triple-A in ’09. Only 22, the right-hander allowed just 41 hits in 56.2 innings of work in double-A, while also posting a strikeout rate of 9.85 K/9. He showed solid control with a walk rate of 2.22 BB/9. Of concern, though, is his 35.3% ground-ball rate, which rose by 10% with the move to triple-A. In the senior league, Hellickson allowed just 39 hits in 71.0 innings thanks in part to a crazy-low BABIP of .228. He didn’t walk anyone, either, and posted a base-on-balls rate of 2.35 BB/9. His 10.99 K/9 rate was outstanding. Hellickson could really stand to improve his ground-ball rate further but a strong outfield defense with the likes of B.J. Upton, Carl Crawford, and Desmond Jennings will certainly help the fly-ball pitcher.

3. Tim Beckham, SS, Low-A
DOB: January 1990 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2008 1st round – Georgia HS
MLB ETA: mid-2013 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

One full season into his career, it’s still far too early to get worried about this former first-overall pick’s offensive showing. The soon-to-be 20-year-old infielder hit a respectable .275/.328/.389 in 491 at-bats in low-A ball. Beckham’s power is obviously MIA at this point, and his ISO rate was just .114 – a slight improvement over his debut number in ’08 of .102. His 33 doubles hint at future power potential. His base running also needs to improve after he was caught 10 times in 23 attempts. Beckham’ strikeout rate (23.5%) is too high for someone with little power and his allergy to walks (6.5%) hurts his potential as a top-of-the-order hitter. There is a lot of added pressure on first-overall draft picks so the wOBA of .327 is clearly a disappointment for many, but ’09 was a solid foundation season. The organization will look for more in 2010.

4. Wade Davis, RHP, Majors
DOB: September 1985 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2004 3rd round – Florida HS
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2
Repertoire: 89-94 mph fastball, plus curveball, change-up, cutter

It seemed like a long time in coming, but Davis finally made his much-anticipated MLB debut. Both Davis and Jacob McGee (slowed by Tommy John surgery) have been on the Rays’ Top 10 lists since ’05. Davis’ stuff has leveled off a little bit since his early days in the system, but he had a solid season in triple-A in ’09 where he allowed 139 hits in 158.2 innings of work. Davis’ strikeout rate was down a bit at 7.94 K/9 but his walk rate was around career-levels at 3.40 BB/9. He was aided somewhat by a BABIP of .289. On the MLB landscape, Davis made six starts and allowed 33 hits in 36.1 innings. He posted a strikeout rate of 8.92 K/9 and showed respectable control with a walk rate of 3.22 BB/9. According to Pitch Type Values, Davis had a lot of success with his 92 mph fastball, as well as his curveball.

5. Matt Moore, LHP, Low-A
DOB: June 1989 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2007 8th round – New Mexico HS
MLB ETA: Late-2012 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 89-94 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

An eighth-round steal, Moore has posted crazy (and oddly consistent) strikeout numbers in three minor league seasons of 12.84, 12.75, and 12.88 K/9. His walk rate, though, rose from 3.15 in ’08 in short-season ball to 5.12 BB/9 in ’09 at low-A ball. Moore made up for the walks by not allowing many hits: just 86 in 123.0 innings of work. The southpaw did not allow a homer to a left-handed batter and posted a 71.2% ground-ball rate in limited innings. His overall ground-ball rate was 45.8%. Moore has a huge upside, but the loss of control in ’09 is worrisome.

6. Nick Barnese, RHP, Low-A
DOB: January 1989 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2007 3rd round – California HS
MLB ETA: Mid-2013 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 88-93 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

A personal favorite of mine, Barnese got a late jump on the season thanks to an injury. Once he got going, though, the right-hander pitched well in low-A ball. The 21-year-old hurler posted a 3.43 FIP and allowed 56 hits in 74.2 innings. His ground-ball rate was just shy of 52%. He showed OK control, especially considering is loss development time, with a walk rate of 3.01 BB/9. On the negative side, he was aided by a .263 BABIP and his strikeout rate hit a career low of 7.47, down from 11.45 K/9 in ’08. His stuff isn’t electric, but Barnese has a good chance of developing into a middle-of-the-rotation starter, if he can stay healthy.

7. Reid Brignac, SS, Majors
DOB: January 1986 Bats: L Throws: R
Signed: 2004 2nd round – Louisiana HS
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2

Brignac’s prospect status has stagnated a bit in the past two seasons in triple-A as he’s posted wOBAs of .311 and .329. This past year, he hit .282/.327/.417 in 415 at-bats. His ascent to the Majors was also slowed by the emergence of Jason Bartlett, who currently mans the shortstop position for the big league club and is the superior fielder and hitter. Brignac will have to wait for A) a trade, B) a position switch (to second?), or C) Bartlett to get injured/become ineffective/too expensive. In truth, Brignac does not offer much power (.135 ISO) or speed (five steals in 10 tries), and he has hit more than .260 just once in the past three seasons. Now 24, it’s up to him to force the organization’s hand with some above-average play.

8. Alexander Colome, RHP, Short Season
DOB: December 1988 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2007 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Late-2013 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 90-95 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

A casual observer may have taken one look at Colome’s debut numbers in ’08 that featured a 6.80 ERA… and looked the other way. However, his FIP was just 4.49 and he was hurt by a BABIP of .364 (not to mention his 5.05 BB/9 rate). After taking a year to acclimatize himself to North America, Colome also received some better luck in ’09 with a BABIP of .277. His control also improved and his walk rate improved to 3.79 BB/9. The strikeout rate jumped from an already-good 10.10 to 11.13 K/9. Colome allowed just 46 hits in 76.0 innings and he did not have a ball leave the yard. His 50.3% ground-ball rate was encouraging, as was the miniscule 8.7% line-drive rate.

9. Kyle Lobstein, LHP, Short Season
DOB: August 1989 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2008 2nd round – Arizona HS
MLB ETA: Late-2013 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 88-92 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

An ’08 second-round pick, Lobstein did not make his mound debut until ’09 in short-season ball and he established himself amongst the top arms in the system. He posted a 2.95 FIP, while allowing 55 hits in 73.1 innings of work. He gave up just four homers (0.49 HR/9) and his walk rate was solid at 2.82 BB/9. Lobstein also missed a fair number of bats, with a strikeout rate of 9.08 K/9. He’ll likely jump to low-A ball in 2010, where he should spend the full season. Lobstein is not a flame-thrower, but he has middle-of-the-rotation potential thanks, in part, to a solid ground-ball rate (51.2%) and good numbers against right-hander (9.73 K/9, .204 batting-average-allowed).

10. Alexander Torres, LHP, Double-A
DOB: December 1987 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2005 non-drafted international free agent (Venezuela)
MLB ETA: Mid-2011 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3
Repertoire: 88-91 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

Obtained in the surprising Scott Kazmir trade, Torres narrowly edges first baseman Matt Sweeney in terms of present prospect value amongst those obtained from Los Angeles in the swap. Torres made three minor-league stops in ’09, including seven double-A starts (two with Tampa Bay). He showed some rough edges, though, with a walk rate above 5.00 BB/9. Torres misses a good number of bats, though, with an overall strikeout rate of 8.49 K/9 and his ground-ball rate was excellent at 57.9%. He’s also equally effective against both left-handed (.218 average) and right-handed (.221) batters. Despite his below-average stature (5’10, 160 lbs), Torres showed his durability in ’09 with 155.0 regular-season innings pitched.

Up Next: The Florida Marlins

Over the weekend, Chuck Brownson did a post over at THT Live, showing the premium that a few teams have been willing to pay for closers this winter, even as the market for nearly everyone else collapsed. Despite a pullback on spending, some clubs still value late inning relievers enough to pay a premium to acquire guys who have had success in that role.

WAR, as you probably know, doesn’t think much of relief pitchers. The very best relievers in the game are generally worth +2 to +2.5 wins over a full season, or about the same as an average everyday player. This has caused quite a few people to state that WAR doesn’t work for relievers, because the results of the metric don’t match what they believe to be true about relief pitcher value. I think it works just fine.

While the quality of their work is very high, the quantity is low, which limits their total value. It’s nearly impossible to rack up huge win values while facing less than 300 batters per season. Yes, each of those batters faced are more critical to a win than a regular batter faced, but this is accounted for in WAR.

The average Leverage Index of a closer is about 1.8, meaning that each plate appearance is about 80 percent more important than an average PA. We give the closer credit for half of that, based on the principle of chaining. Because relief pitchers are mostly fungible, and can move from one role to another if needed, replacing a closer is not the same process as replacing a starter or a position player. If a team’s closer gets hurt, they do not then call up a replacement level reliever from the minors and use him to close out games.

Instead, that replacement level reliever who gets called up from Triple-A becomes the mop-up guy, and everyone gets promoted one slot; the setup guy moves into the closer role, the middle reliever becomes the setup guy, so on and so forth. The high leverage innings are handed to the remaining best pitchers in the bullpen, not the guy replacing the lost relief ace.

Because of this, it does not make sense to give a reliever full value for the credit of his leverage index. That leverage does not belong to him, nor does it go with him when he goes away. Remember, this is Wins Above Replacement, and the guy who replaces a closer is generally a pretty good pitcher. We want to measure the marginal win of a player over what the team would lose if they did not have him, and in the case of relief pitchers, the replacement level is very high.

That a half dozen major league clubs are overvaluing proven relievers does not mean that WAR doesn’t work for them. It’s just an arbitrage opportunity for the rest of baseball.

After adding Ryan Church on a contract for 1.5 million dollars plus incentives, the Pirates turned around this weekend and gave a very similar deal to veteran reliever Brendan Donnelly. The deal pays 1.5 million in base salary and can reach up to 3 million if all incentives are reached.

Brendan Donnelly is coming off one of his best seasons since his years with the Angels in the early part of the last decade. He still didn’t amass many innings, but he was excellent with the opportunities he received last season with the Marlins. His strikeout and walk rates were reminiscent of his first three years with Anaheim, in which he compiled 4.8 wins above replacement. He also did a fantastic job of keeping the ball in the yard, only allowing one home run in 25.1 IP.

There’s the problem, though – Donnelly only compiled 25.1 IP, and that was his highest IP total since 2006. He was almost certainly due for some regression, as his 3.7% HR/FB ratio is quite low compared to 6.8% overall. His xFIP of 3.76 was nearly a full run higher than his FIP. His 8.88 K/9 marked the first time his strikeout rate was above 8.00 since 2004. Simply put, Donnelly hasn’t been relevant since 2004.

Most importantly, though, Donnelly will turn 39 years old in July of 2010. Relievers at the age of 29 are very fungible, not to mention relievers nearing 40. At age 39, it’s hard to either project Donnelly to maintain his performance from last year or to complete an entire season without injury. It’s for that reason that Donnelly is projected for only 2 runs above replacement by CHONE. That projection values Donnelly at roughly .7-.8 million dollars on a one-year deal.

Even if the Pirates weren’t overpaying, adding Donnelly to their roster in any form just doesn’t make any sense. The Pirates have 11 relievers projected to produce between 0 and 3 runs above replacement. To commit any sort of money to Donnelly would be committing money to, at best, a marginal improvement and somebody who could just as easily be either below replacement level or injured for most of the year. Not only that, but given the Pirates low spot on the marginal win curve, one or two extra runs simply won’t make a difference in the team’s short term future.

Much like Ryan Church, the best way for Donnelly to provide value is for the Pirates to flip him for some prospects at the trading deadline. However, unlike Church, it’s very unlikely that Donnelly provides the Pirates with enough value before the trading deadline for any teams to have significant interest. The most likely scenario here is that the Pirates will be out 1.5 million dollars or more with almost no return on investment, and that’s 1.5 million dollars that can’t be used to sign the international prospects, draft picks, or freely available talent that will be needed to rebuild this franchise.

The trio today involves Jim Thome, Russell Branyan, and Carlos Delgado.

Here’s a fun fact about Branyan: 51% of his career plate appearances have ended in either a homer, walk, or strike out. By comparison, Adam Dunn sits at 49% and Carlos Pena at 45%.

Rocco Baldelli was barely acclimated to the professional baseball scene when the name Joe DiMaggio began popping up as a comparison. The relationship had to do more with the etymology of Rocco’s surname than the physical and positional similarities. Seven seasons in the Majors later, Baldelli is anything but a replica of the Yankee Clipper. Cursed with a cellular disorder, Baldelli’s lack of playing and production of late is blameless except for the cruel randomness that subjected an athlete to the one scenario in which he feels the most helpless. His body won’t comply with the grind and lacks the stamina necessary to partake in the role he was destined to play.

Over the last three seasons, Baldelli has recorded 150, 90, and 164 plate appearances. Plate appearances are always a tricky thing to project, so don’t take this as a shot at CHONE or Marcel when I write that their 364 and 291 PA projections can be labeled as “optimistic.” When he does play, Baldelli is an average-to-slightly-above hitter (CHONE and Marcel average out to a .330 wOBA) and fielder. A healthy Baldelli is as nearing the point of paradox. There is a slim possibility that a team can sign and milk Baldelli out of 250-300 productive trips to the plate, but the same can be said of Mark Prior.

Pittsburgh signed Ryan Church, who is somewhat comparable in the sense that he gets injured a lot and plays the corner outfield. Church’s deal was worth $1.5M guaranteed, with incentives that would push the value close to $3M. Church is considered a risk because he’s averaged 339 at-bats the past two seasons; by comparison, Baldelli has367 at-bats since the 2007 season.

Some team is going to take a shot on Baldelli for a similar deal – probably one with a decent insurance policy waiting a level away (much like the Rays and Red Sox of the last two years). The rumor de jour involves Baldelli heading to the Yankees. He is being paid to play baseball and through his profession gets access to some fantastic medical care. Still, you have to admire the guy’s perseverance, and one has to hope, for his sake, that one day he does collect a full season’s worth of plate appearances.

The one residual effect from Moneyball that I admire the most about Billy Beane is how significant he remains in baseball pop culture. Anytime he makes a signing, trade, or draft selection, everyone – even his grandmother – takes two looks at the transaction. That notion is in overdrive with his latest move.

As recently as 24 hours ago, the Athletics’ third base depth chart featured: the always-injured Eric Chavez; the more-than-svelte Tommy Everidge (now Mariners’ property); and not-really-a-third-baseman-at-all Jake Fox. Tonight the order looks a bit different as the A’s acquired Kevin Kouzmanoff and Eric Sogard from the Padres for Scott Hairston and Aaron Cunningham.

Let’s get the obvious out of the way: Kouzmanoff is everything that the Moneyball caricature of Beane disliked. He rarely walks (4.9% career) and expands his strike zone often. A raw offensive line of .261/.308/.435 causes him to appear as a below average batter, although our park adjustments have him in the black over the last three seasons combined. Kouzmanoff’s offensive game is more pop-based than a 13-year-old’s diet. The park he’s moving from isn’t much friendlier than the one he’s frantically fleeing and he’s moving to the American League. Don’t expect too much of an upswing. Kouzmanoff’s value comes from his position and ability to defend the position better than the average. Give him credit for consistent WAR values, if nothing else, as he’s been worth 2.7 or 2.8 WAR for each of the past three seasons. He’ll probably be worth 2.5-3 wins next year as well and has three seasons of team control remaining.

Sogard, on the other hand, walks like crazy. He turns 24 in May and plays second base while batting lefty. In 2008 he walked in nearly 13% of the time in High-A and 11% in 2009 at Double-A. He’s not a power hitter and Marc Hulet pegged him as the left-handed part of a platoon or future utility player.

In exchange, the Athletics give up two seasons of Hairston and six of Cunningham. Both are right-handed outfielders with Hairston holding the ability to play a Major League quality center right away. Hairston was acquired from the Padres just last July and his run with Oakland can’t be described much kinder than “awful”. Hairston held a .279 wOBA in 248 plate appearances with the A’s, which was probably in the 1% percentile of unlikely results given his .390 wOBA in 216 plate trips with San Diego.

The A’s have a loaded outfield already: Coco Crisp, Ryan Sweeney, Rajai Davis, and Travis Buck. Clearly they have the means to go with a three-centerfielder outfield already, and Hairston was not going to DH with Jack Cust returning. This leads to Cunningham. His status as the most desirable outfield prospect within the system was in danger with Michael Taylor sitting near. Cunningham turns 24 years old in just three months and he has nothing to prove at the Triple-A level anymore (an .899 OPS through nearly 460 plate appearances).

Acquired in the Dan Haren trade, Cunningham was blocked by Matt Holiday last year and seemingly lacked opportunity to break into the Athletics’ lineup this season as well. It’s silly to say that Beane sold high on Cunningham. Instead, it seems he sold before Cunningham lost too much of his previous luster. Whether the A’s simply held low evaluations of Cunningham nowadays or he was lost in a numbers game is a mystery.

This move improves the Athletics in 2010, but not enough to make a serious push for the division. Kouzmanoff for Hairston is fine, it’s the other two pieces that I’m unsure of. Unless I’m missing something or too optimistic on Cunningham, I think the edge has to go to San Diego here.

As Dave noted yesterday, Adam LaRoche’s recent deal with the Diamondbacks puts the remaining first base/DH types still on the market on notice: there aren’t many spots left, and the contracts aren’t going to get any bigger. It’s not the most “scientific” method out there, but let’s use LaRoche’s contract and projected value as a baseline for some of the 1B/DH types remaining on the market. It might be illuminating in its own way, particularly given the ambiguity in the free agent market in general this offseason.

For offensive projections, I’ll use CHONE’s context-neutral linear weights per 150 games. For defensive, I’ll use Jeff Z.’s (Jack’s long-lost cousin) UZR projections.

Starting with our “baseline”: LaRoche’s contract is reportedly $4.5 million with a $1.5 million buyout for 2011, so six million dollars guaranteed. CHONE has LaRoche as a +7/150 hitter for 2010, and defensively Jeff has him at -1/150. +7 hitter, -1 defender, -12 prorated positional adjustment for 1B, + 20 replacement level = 1.4 WAR player. Both CHONE and the Fans project LaRoche for almost 150 games. Dividing the six million guaranteed dollars by 1.4, we get about four million dollars a win.

So who are the rest of our contestants on the first base/designated hitter game of musical chairs? [To avoid repetition, simply assume -12 position and +20 replacement for each player.]

Russell Branyan: +15 hitting, average defense. Of course, if Branyan was likely to play 150 games, he would have been signed for pretty big money by now. Fan Projections have him playing 118 games; CHONE is less optimistic, projecting 103. Splitting the difference, let’s call it 110, which would mean about 1.7 WAR — the best player here. Given our “LaRochian baseline,” 1.7 WAR would cost about 1/$6.8M or one year. He might make sense for the Mets if they are serious about contention this year. They have the money and could get Branyan for one year — even 100 games of Branyan is probably worth one marginal win over Daniel Murphy at first, and with Carlos Beltran missing the first month of the season or so, the Mets will need every win they can get. I wonder what he turned down from Seattle?

Jason Giambi: +8 hitting, -6 fielding = 1 WAR, but the fans project him for 80 games, and CHONE for only 100, so he’s closer to 0.5 WAR. I’d be surprised if anyone gave him two million dollars guaranteed. His fielding stats imply that he’s better off as a DH. How many platoon DH spots are there?

Jim Thome: +11 hitting, no defense (DH-only -17), 1.4 WAR. Closer to 1 WAR after adjusting for playing time. Thome is better than Giambi, but won’t play first under any circumstances. He’s definitely near the end of the line, but I’m a bit surprised there hasn’t been more talk about him. If he’s willing to take a big pay cut (to around $4 million), Thome might actually make sense for the White Sox, unless they really think Andruw Jones is going to hit enough to DH full-time (or play in the outfield full-time while Carlos Quentin DHs, which seems unlikely).

Ryan Garko: +8 hitting, -3 fielding = 1.3 WAR. CHONE projects him for 130 games, so 1.1 WAR. LaRoche’s contract implies 4 million dollars. We’ve been over the Giants’ foolish decision to non-tender Garko before. No, Garko isn’t a star, but he’s at least a decent stopgap. At 29, he’s probably not going to fall off of a cliff. If you are surprised he projects as a better hitter than LaRoche, keep in mind that Garko has spent most of his time facing the superior pitching of the American League, while LaRoche has been (aside from a few weeks in Boston) an NL guy. Given that Garko was just going into arbitration for the first time this off-season, the team acquiring him would also have him under control for the following season. Once that is factored in, Garko might end up being the best “value deal” left on this list, and could fit into plans for a variety of teams.

Carlos Delgado: +1 hitting, -2 fielding = 0.7 WAR. Over 120 games, 0.6 WAR. I’ve always liked Delgado, but given his age and injuries, I’m not sure he’s worth it at this point unless he’s willing to take a minor league deal. Some team will probably pay him for his “veteran presence.”

Hank Blalock: -3 hitting, -2 fielding = 0.3 WAR. Do you really think Blalock’s going to play 150? Six years ago, it seemed like he and Mark Teixeira would be torching the AL West for years to come. Tex is a superstar in pinstripes, while Blalock looks like he’s done. I’d say he’ll be lucky to get a major-league deal, but you never know.

Fernando Tatis: -3 hitting, +1 fielding (TotalZone) = 0.6 WAR. Over 120 games, 0.5 WAR. Tatis has also played left field, so might be closer to a 1 WAR player. He fit on a team that needs a right-handed bench bat that can play 1B and some OF, and has been mentioned in connection with Seattle.