Vegas odds principally aim to achieve equal bettor action on over/unders. That is, the oddsmakers set the lines so that they can best achieve a 50/50 split on the bets. Their general aim is then to predict what the average gambling public will think about the number of wins a given team will achieve.

The fan projections here at FanGraphs, converted into wins by David Appelman, measures much the same goal except that the input comes from what is most likely a more forward-thinking and baseball-educated crowd and appeals to the same people.

These similar goals presents a great comparison opportunity. Here are some of the more egregious differences between the Vegas oddsmakers and the FanGraphs readership with CHONE’s projections provided as well.

Arizona. Vegas: 82.5, Fans: 87 (CHONE: 79)
Baltimore. Vegas: 73.5, Fans: 78 (75)
Cubs. Vegas: 82.5, Fans: 78 (79)
Angels. Vegas: 84.5, Fans: 80 (81)
Athletics. Vegas: 77.5, Fans: 81 (81)

Phillies. Vegas: 92.5, Fans: 84 (87)
Padres. Vegas: 69.5, Fans: 79 (78)

The first five teams listed all had about a 4-win difference between the fans and Vegas with CHONE mostly siding with the fans, aside from Arizona, and waffling between the two on Baltimore. The bottom two represented the largest divergence between Vegas and FanGraphs readers and, again, CHONE mostly agrees with the fans.

Is there a common thread running through the five teams where the fans and CHONE offer different opinions than the Vegas oddsmakers? I would say the general public, and Vegas by extension, are too prone to be swayed by 2009 results. Hence, teams that were good Angels, Phillies) or bad (San Diego, Oakland) suffer from some residual effects. The Cubs are present I expect because of their large and devotedly optimistic fan base.

In the end, I would consider shorting the Phillies, Angels and Cubs and buying on the Padres and Athletics.

Hat tip to Jonah Keri for passing along the odds.

You know what the Boston media doesn’t want you to forget? That Theo Epstein focused on run prevention this off-season. As such, columnists hold a sense of animosity towards the Red Sox’s lineup. Boston scored 872 runs last season, third most in the American League, and hit 212 homers, also good for third most in the American League. Oh, and they did this with Nick Green or Alex Gonzalez in the lineup most days.

Let’s focus on this season though. For whatever reason, Adrian Beltre and Mike Cameron are being looked upon as defensive collateral, allowed to bat only so they are allowed to field. For whatever reason, the common thought is that Boston’s offense will struggle to score runs. That assumption is based in something, but that something is not reality.

Using Baseball Musings’ lineup analysis tool, I ran the 2009 Red Sox through (with Victor Martinez and Nick Green included) and found that their optimal lineup netted 5.86 runs per game (in reality they averaged 5.38). I then ran the CHONE projections for their prospective starters* through the same analysis and found that their optimal lineup expects to produce 5.33 runs per game. Odds are the Red Sox won’t score exactly 5.33 runs per game, but if they do, the difference in optimal lineups – which, let’s be honest, few teams actually run out what the lineup analysis tool would consider optimal – is a half run per game. In reality, the difference would be 0.05 runs per game; or about eight runs over a full season.

Yes, Beltre and Cameron are going to swing and miss quite a bit. And yes, they’ll chase some pitches they shouldn’t have. And yes, the sixteenth time Dan Wheeler enters to face the pair is going to be as tedious as the dozen before, but at the end of the day, Boston’s offense is going to be fine. And odds are, the Red Sox as a whole will benefit from these changes more than expected.
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Given what we’ve written about the Royals over the last year, it’s not surprising to find them hanging out near the bottom of these rankings. If there’s any surprise at all, it may be that they aren’t dead last, since they make more moves that make us shake our heads than any other team in baseball. Put simply, the Royals are the anti-FanGraphs team. They just don’t think about baseball the same way we do.

We think Yuniesky Betancourt is basically worthless; they go out of their way to trade for him. We think that Scott Podsednik has no business playing center field; they give him the job with no questions asked and offer up the lead-off spot as well. We think they should be rebuilding; they sign Jason Kendall. The disconnect here is Grand Canyon-esque.

The management is bad enough to offset almost all of the good. Zack Greinke, Billy Butler, David DeJesus – there are pieces here that should be the core of a good young team. But they’ve been surrounded by chaff, and expensive chaff at that. There are some good young players on the way, but not enough. By the time those guys get to KC – if they get there before Moore trades them for something else without value – Greinke’s contract will be expiring, Butler will be expensive, and they’ll be faced with another necessary rebuilding process, because there isn’t enough talent in the organization to contend either now or in the future.

All jokes aside, there is a process in place in Kansas City, but the problem is that it just doesn’t work anymore. It may have worked in the 1980s before Bill James and Pete Palmer started challenging people to think differently, but it doesn’t work anymore. The Royals are behind the curve, and they’ve got a lot of catching up to do before they can contend again. Moore may believe in his process, but he shouldn’t. The Royals are bad now, they’re going to be bad next year, and they’ll be bad until someone injects some new thought into that front office.

It would make a nice story to cite the offseason between 2001 and 2002 as the birthplace of a new Royals regime, an overhaul in organizational drafting philosophy. In 2001, the team was captured by a sideshow act, Colt Griffin, that held few skills beyond the ability to throw a baseball as hard as an 18-year-old ever could. The next year, of course, the team looked for pitchability from their prep pitcher first rounder — and found their city’s great hope, Zack Greinke. But what could have been a symbolic upheaval wreaks now merely of coincidence, as the farm system — and the process for acquiring talent — has barely improved. Coupled with the occasional resistance to give successful prospects an opportunity, headlined by Internet favorites Kila Ka’ahiue and Disco Hayes, and the Royals’ problems seemingly extend to every department of their organization.

This is not to say they don’t have young talent, and with a particular shade of rose-colored glasses, couldn’t be projected for a successful future. Top ten picks yield prospects, and while neither Alex Gordon or Mike Moustakas or Eric Hosmer have yet had the success for which they were projected, each still harbors reasons for optimism. Behind Greinke, the best draft pick from this decade has been Billy Butler, who I still believe will flourish into a dominant hitter during his forthcoming arbitration seasons. And while I can’t claim much faith in Luke Hochevar’s future, I’m a bigger believer than most in regards to Aaron Crow, who has three pretty good starting bullet points on a scouting resume: fastball velocity, fastball movement and fastball command. It shouldn’t take a lot of pitching instruction or time to smoothly develop their second option behind Greinke.

If there’s further reason for optimism, it’s a subtle loosening of the purse strings the scouting department has been afforded in the middle rounds. The team isn’t wasting their time on polished college players that will help a Major League roster soon, but instead buying out college commitments from extremely talented and extremely raw young players. The poster boy of this approach will be Wil Myers, whose $2 million bonus as a third-round pick is one of the ten biggest the Royals have ever handed out. Myers then followed it up with a .426/.488/.735 debut in 18 Pioneer League games, quickly validating the Royals new middle-round strategy. That is, if Chris Dwyer or Tim Melville or Tyler Sample all didn’t already do it, all pitchers given above-slot bonuses in the fairly early rounds. And that’s to say nothing of consensus top prospect Mike Montgomery, who was a more agreed-upon talent entering the 2008 draft, but still is providing great value for a 36th overall selection.

So, on the positive side, I do see a wealth of pitching that, even when accounting for attrition, should provide the pieces of a good pitching staff. But what of these problems developing position players, and perhaps more concerning, struggling to properly develop Moustakas and Hosmer? Given the mid-market organization’s relative inability to lure free agents, developing offensive pieces will be the key to their success. This is also a team that simply must begin to plunge into foreign waters, as — brace yourself — their last homegrown international player to have any semblance of Major League success is probably Runelvys Hernandez. Dayton Moore, who was second in-command of an organization with a top-notch international scouting department, should know better. But that isn’t the first time we’ve said that.

Considering only current ability to win rather than value relative to salary, if one looks at the Royals’ roster long enough, focusing in the decent rotation, the closer, and a couple of young (-ish) position players with upside, one might convince oneself that this is a decently talented team. One would be wrong. The Royals currently have one of the worst major league rosters in the American League (thank you, Blue Jays rebuild!).

The starting rotation is actually pretty good. After the monstrous Zack Greinke, there is a sizable drop-off, but not to the depths. Gil Meche isn’t as good he was a couple of seasons ago, but he’s likely better than 2009, and may still be a decent #2 starter. Injuries are a serious concern for Meche, however. Injuries also loom over sabermetric darling Brian Bannister, who might be a marginal #3 starter. Luke Hochevar is unlikely to live up to the expectations generated by being the #1 overall pick in 2006, but he has a non-trivial chance of being above-average. The #5 spot is a question mark, but that is the case for many teams.

The two losers of the epic Kyle Farnsworth–Kyle Davies–Robinson Tejeda battle royale for the #5 spot will end up in the bullpen. While each might be worth (another) try in the rotation, Davies and Tejeda profile better as relievers, and Farnsworth profiles better as an object lesson in what kind of player not to sign to a multi-year deal. Joakim Soria’s value, like that of most closers, is quite exaggerated, but he is one of the best relievers in the game, and keeps this group from being dreadful. For the ‘pen in front of Soria, the Royals have to hope some combination of Davies, Tejeda, and Carlos Rosa combined with the sunk costs of Kyle Farnsworth and Juan Cruz turns into something useful in middle relief.

If the rotation looks like it could be above average (provided good health), and the bullpen looks mediocre-but-passable (mostly due to Soria), the position players look absolutely dreadful. Billy Butler, Alex Gordon, and David DeJesus are the only players projected to be above average, and while Butler can’t defend or run, Gordon isn’t the next George Brett, and DeJesus bothers people who think that defense in the corner outfield spots doesn’t matter, they are good players that could help most teams. It would be unfair to blame the Royals’ failures on Butler and Gordon not becoming superduperstars. I’ve run the numbers – if Butler and Gordon turned into Mark Teixeira and Alex Rodriguez, the 2010 Royals still wouldn’t project as a .500 team. The Royals have other useful pieces such as Alberto Callaspo, Chris Getz, and perhaps Rick Ankiel. However, far too much playing time and/or roster space is slated for players who are nearly worthless (Scott Podsednik and Jason Kendall), completely worthless (Yuniesky Betancourt and Willie Bloomquist) and worse than worthless (Jose Guillen). Yes, the Royals could (and should) better utilize stopgap role-players like Josh Fields, Kila Ka’aihue, Mike Aviles, Mitch Maier, and Brayan Pena, but a couple more wins would only make them less bad.

This might be understandable if the Royals were committed to a thorough rebuild, but current management has never seemed to grasp that notion, and the signing of thirty-something mediocrities (Ankiel) and scrubs (Podsednik, Kendall) doesn’t signal a change. Moreover, while Butler is still young, Greinke, Hochevar, and Gordon are all already in their mid-twenties, and Meche and DeJesus are all in their thirties (Bannister is 29), so the aging curve doesn’t offer much hope for 2010 or 2011. Significant help won’t be arriving from the minors anytime soon.

The 2010 Royals will probably win 70+ games in 2010, and some will hail this as improvement. Don’t be fooled, it is less “improvement” than positive regression. “Even” 74 wins is never a sign of a good team, particularly in the weak AL Central. The very fact that 74 wins appears to be improvement says as much about the current state of the team than any number of player analyses.

The Astros probably aren’t the worst team in baseball. With a couple of solid drafts of late, they may not have the worst farm system anymore. And, thanks to the guys up in KC, they aren’t the worst run organization either. But their combination of a bad roster full of old players with large contracts and a management that is either unwilling to admit that a rebuild is necessary or unwilling to commit to one makes them the franchise that needs more help than any other.

Even the good comes with bad. Lance Berkman is a star, but he’s headed for his decline years, is having knee surgery, has a large contract and a full no-trade clause, plus little interest in leaving Texas. He should be a significant asset, but in reality, he may be a liability. And that pattern is found up and down the roster. The players with talent are mostly untradeable outside of Wandy Rodriguez, who they shouldn’t want to trade. It would be one thing if they had a bunch of good young talent surrounding that core, but that isn’t there either.

There is some hope on the farm, but it’s mostly a few years away, and there’s not a lot of depth there. It falls off quickly after Castro, Mier, and Lyles, none of whom are franchise players. They spent too many years ignoring both Latin America and the draft, and even with a recent reconversion back to building from within, the years of neglect have left them in bad shape going forward. The core of the next good Astros team is not yet in the Houston organization, requiring them to make a lot of savvy moves to bring in some high quality young players.

And, unfortunately, they just don’t seem committed to doing that. They spent the winter pursuing middle relievers and stop gap role players who won’t help the team contend now or in the future. Their owner is one of the most involved in the sport, and not in a good way. They have large payroll commitments going forward, and the GM is not exactly a shrewd market analyst or adept at finding bargains on a budget.

It’s just bad news everywhere you look. The Astros had a good long run of success, but they won’t see another one for a while.

In 2002, the Houston Astros started a homegrown product on the mound for 127 of 162 games. They were among the first organizations to develop a pipeline to Venezeula, where they found the pieces to acquire Randy Johnson (Freddy Garcia and Carlos Guillen). And brilliantly, they had had found a market inefficiency that was working: short pitchers. Roy Oswalt, Kirk Saarloos, Carlos Hernandez were all having success, and this appeared to be a forward-thinking organization that could adapt to changing markets. Success beyond the Bagwell and Biggio era seemed a foregone conclusion as the newest Killer B, Lance Berkman, became a star.

Talk about regression. Fast forward seven years, and you find an organization that lost their dibs to the Venezuelan market, to short pitchers, and to Drayton McLane’s wallet. I think 2007 will always represent the rock bottom for the organization: while the Major League team stumbled to 73 wins (in Biggio’s final season), the scouting department’s first signed draftee was fifth-round pick Collin DeLome. Their first round picks in the three previous drafts were Max Sapp, Eli Iorg and Ralph Henriquez. Yikes. So when the Astros get back into contention — and I can’t see it happening until 2013, at least — they will look back to the revamping of the scouting department, starting with the hire of scouting director Bobby Heck in October 2007, as the moment when the tide shifted.

Heck learned how to rebuild a farm system from the ground up under Jack Zduriencik in Milwaukee, who succeeded whilst the Brewers won less than 75 games for seven straight years from 1998-2005. These things take time, and we have to give Heck credit for choosing his Best Player Available without fail, never pausing to consider their ETA. This insulation mentality of drafting began immediately, when Heck took Jason Castro from Stanford ten to twenty picks before anyone thought he would go. But we were wrong, because Castro is going to be a very solid Major League catcher to guide this team into their next era. With quick feet and good contact skills, Castro has the essential foundation for Major League success. So while Castro reinstated Heck’s credibility, the director has not gone back to that well — Castro represents the only college player he has drafted in the first three rounds (totaling nine picks).

With the other seven that he’s signed, Heck has opted for raw talents: big, projectable right-handed pitchers and quick-twitch position players. It’s not a bad strategy in practice, but it’s also loaded with risk in an organization with little margin for error. The pitchers are all still getting rave reviews, with Jordan Lyles the front-runner ahead of Ross Seaton and Tanner Bushue. The best position player draftee still appears to be 2009 first rounder Jio Mier, a shortstop whose reports read like Alexei Ramirez‘ when he came from Cuba (Mier’s seem less exaggerated). In the later rounds, Heck’s best finds have been college outfielders, though it’s hard to tell how much of the success of T.J. Steele, Jon Gaston and J.B. Shuck should be credited to Lancaster, California.

After 2012, Carlos Lee is off the books, along with Roy Oswalt, Brandon Lyon. Berkman and Wandy Rodriguez come off after 2011. By then, the meat of Heck’s first drafts will be ready for the Major Leagues, perhaps just as Hunter Pence and Bud Norris are ready to hit their peak. Before that happens, it’s going to get worse in Houston. A lot worse.

In terms current talent — ability to win games and potentially reach the playoffs in 2010 and 2011, irrespective of contract situation — the Houston Astros rank in the bottom fifth. The FANS project them to win just 72 games, and other projection systems, CHONE, THT and CAIRO, similarly see them as a low-70s team, if not worse.

The talent on the current roster is underwhelming. There are probably only four players who can be considered solidly above average (projected to be worth over 2.5 wins): Lance Berkman, Hunter Pence, Roy Oswalt and Wandy Rodriguez. Berkman and Oswalt, 34 and 32, respectively, almost assuredly have their best years behind them and are more likely three- or four-win rather than five- or six-win players. Also Berkman might not even be ready for opening day, with upcoming surgery to remove loose particles from his knee. Pence is a good, three-win corner outfielder. Rodriguez had a great 2009 with a sub-four FIP and over 200 innings pitched. He is arguably the team’s best player and a four-win season is with in the realm of possibility. These four guys are good players, but none is a true superstar, and collectively they form too small a core of good players.

After those four players, Carlos Lee and Michael Bourn are both projected at about two wins each by CHONE, with the FANS a little more optimistic. With Pence they form an okay outfield. But after that there is little talent on the roster. Joining Berkman in the infield is all-glove, no-bat Pedro Feliz; not-much bat, not-much glove Kaz Matsui; and Tommy Manzella, who is projected to play just below replacement level. If Berkman misses some time he will be replaced by another near-replacement leveler Chris Shelton.

The back three-fifths of the rotation is slightly more inspiring. After Rodriguez and Oswalt the Astros will go with Brett Myers and two of Bud Norris, Brian Moehler and Felipe Paulino. As Carson pointed out Paulino and Norris pitched fairly well last year, with xFIPs of 4.10 and 4.38, respectively, and even with likely regression, they would form a not terrible back end of a rotation. But the Astros might go with Moehler, who is likely a worse pitcher. The bullpen, led by Brandon Lyon and Matt Lindstrom, and bench are poor.

This is a team with just very little talent. The team lacks a top-tier superstar, has few solidly above average players, and is going to start too many at- or near-replacement-level players in 2010. There are few teams, maybe just one or two, with worse talent or a smaller chance at reaching the playoffs in 2010. And the talent on the team in the second half of 2010 and 2011 could be even worse as a trade of Oswalt or Berkman, or both, is not a bad idea – except for the meddling owner may not allow it.

In about 15 minutes or so, you’ll see the first of 90 posts that will make up the FanGraphs 2010 Organizational Rankings. We ran these on the site last year, but I’ve wised up and gotten the whole crew involved this time around. We’ll break down each team’s present talent, future talent, and the overall health of the organization, at least as we see it.

Let me get a few things out of the way up front.

1. By its nature, this is subjective. If your favorite team isn’t placed where you think they should be, well, nothing in life has really changed, right? Disagree all you want. Explain why you disagree. That’s what the comments are for. But try not to get personally offended. We’re not out to anger anyone. This is supposed to be fun.

2. In a lot of cases, there’s very little difference between spots in close proximity to each other on the list. There’s a pretty huge blob in the middle, for instance, where a bunch of teams are very even, and the fact that one team is #13 and another is #18 doesn’t mean that we’re much higher on the former organization.

3. Having a chance of winning it all this year is great. Having a great farm system is great. Having a forward thinking management staff is great. But by themselves, none of those things are enough to earn a high grade overall. We’re really trying to highlight the balance between winning now and winning in the future. There will be teams that are high on the list because of how good they may be in 2011 or 2012, while teams that are better in 2010 will be behind them. It’s not just a short term thing, and these aren’t projected order of finish for 2010. It’s our perspective on the total health of where each team is, relative to their peers, going forward.

With that out of the way, we hope you enjoy the 2010 version of the FanGraphs Organizational Rankings.

Andrew Miller has two articles linked on his page. One directs to a RotoGraphs piece written by the Talented Mr. Bendix and clicking the other will lead to a detailed look at the tallest rotations. This is not what most people had presumably predicted would headline on Miller’s page back when the Tigers selected him sixth overall in 2006. The first place Tigers pulled the draft equivalent of a heist by popping the North Carolina ace over signability concerns. Miller provided plenty of reasons to be excited. For one, being a tall lefty with a live fastball and plus breaking pitch naturally gains you status amongst the baseball folk. He inhaled strikeouts and exhaled weakly hit grounders.

18 months later, the Tigers traded Miller to the Florida Marlins to acquire Miguel Cabrera. Since then, Miller settled on the brink of irrelevancy. The most notable thing about his off-season is being placed in the Arizona Fall League to work on his altered delivery (as detailed by Keith Law) and whether he’ll make the Marlins’ rotation out of spring. Since joining the Marlins he’s struck out a little over seven per nine while walking nearly five. He’s a groundballer, which allows for some leniency on the walks, but still, that’s not a great ratio. It’s also worth noting that a high BABIP has lead to a below average strand rate.

Over the last two seasons he’s appeared in 49 games for the Marlins while totaling a little shy of 190 innings. If that doesn’t seem like a lot of time that’s because it’s not. The biggest knocks on him right now are inconsistent control and health; a combination that usually leads to frustration and a transition to the bullpen. Miller actually finished last season in the pen while the Marlins rolled with a six-man rotation. Pitchers with high strikeout and walk rates are generally more successful after transitioning to relief, so writing Miller off based on his previous relief work is laughable with the current sample size.

Normally options wouldn’t come into play with 2006 draftees. Even if the player reached the Majors in 2008, they would still have at least one option remaining. Because of a clause in Miller’s contract which dictated he be promoted to the Majors at the end of his first professional season, he burned one of those options almost immediately. The Tigers then optioned Miller to the minors to begin 2007. That’s two seasons, two options used. The Marlins did not option Miller in 2008, but did send him to the minors in July 2009, which normally would mean Miller could not be sent to the minors without passing through waivers. However, since he does not have five professional seasons yet, the Marlins will hold a fourth option year.

That gives Florida the ability to send Miller down to New Orleans where he can continue to work on his new delivery and wait on the inevitable Anibal Sanchez injury. Such a predicament all but guarantees Miller will remain a starter. However, if the injury and inconsistency bugs continue to harvest on his ability, it could be inevitable that Miller winds up in the bullpen.