Adrian Gonzalez is the new Roy Halladay. Given his agent’s statements that he is not willing to give San Diego a hometown discount and sees Mark Teixeira’s contract as the comparison for what his player expects, there is essentially no chance that the Padres end up keeping him. He will be traded, the only question is when and where. So, prepare yourselves for a never ending rumor mill, which was so much fun the last time we had one of these…

But, that’s not the point of this post. Since Gonzalez’s agent wants to draw comparisons to Mark Teixeira, I thought, so should we. Let’s get back to our roots a little bit and throw up some graphs. This is Teixeira and Gonzalez’s performance by age, plotted against each other.

As you can see, the comparison isn’t a bad one. Teixeira walked a little bit more until last year, when Gonzalez took 100 free passes for the first time in his career. Their contact rates have basically been the same. Teixeira showed significantly more power at 24 and 25, but Gonzalez caught him at 26 and sustained the power burst last year. That allowed him to close the early career gap in wOBA, and for the last two years, Gonzalez has matched Teixeira’s development path. He got off to a slower start, but his more recent performances make this comparison valid.

So, Paul Boggs has a pretty good case when he says he wants a Teixeira like contract for his Gonzalez, since they are pretty similar, right?

Wrong.

There’s one huge difference that was a significant factor for Teixeira ending up with $180 million that won’t be a factor for Gonzalez – the Yankees. Put simply, it’s quite unlikely that New York will spend the money to have Gonzalez DH when they already have huge money committed to Teixeira long term. And, as free agents out found out this winter, when the Yankees aren’t involved, your ability to demand a huge contract dries up. Yes, the Red Sox will almost certainly be interested in Gonzalez when he hits free agency, but if they’re not getting pressured by the Bronx Bombers, they simply won’t have to try and compete for his services with their bitter enemies. And that will hurt Gonzalez’s ability to demand a mega contract.

I’d imagine Boggs is fully aware of this, so my guess is that Gonzalez will never get to free agency. Whatever team is willing to give up the truckload of prospects it will take to get him will also want a contract extension as part of the deal. Whether its Boston or somewhere else, I’d expect Gonzalez to be signing a long term contract this winter, but for significantly less than what Teixeira got. His agent can talk up that $180 million comparison all he wants, but at the end of the day, if the Yankees aren’t in the bidding, that’s not a realistic number. Expect him to settle for quite a bit less.

Yesterday, I covered why Tony Bernazard’s strategy of emphasizing opposite field hitting is a bad idea. The report which broke the story mentioned that this strategy had surfaced at the MLB level. If so, we should be able to examine the profiles of Mets hitters and see if this strategy actually affected their production, and if so, if it was positive or negative.

However, when we deal with pull-push splits, we’re purposefully reducing the size of our data set, leading to the type of issues that we encounter with batter-pitcher splits, although not at quite the same magnitude. Toss in the issues that the Mets had with injuries, and it becomes even harder to establish solid conclusions. With only David Wright reaching the 600 PA mark, we will be dealing with both players without an established level of major league production as well as small sample sizes.

As mentioned yesterday, power, as measured by ISO, is much, much lower when the ball is hit to the opposite field. As such, one possible effect of this strategy would be a team-wide drop in ISO. Although the Mets team ISO did drop by about 20 points from 2008 to 2009, this can be almost entirely attributed to the loss of talent due to injury. We can still look at individual players. Here are David Wright, Fernando Tatis, and Carlos Beltran’s ISO numbers for their career.

Clearly, this trio had a power dip in 2009. This is consistent with the idea that power dips when more balls are hit to the opposite field. However, there are multiple factors at work here. Park factors are not accounted for, and Citi Field appears to play as a pitcher’s park. Beltran lost much of his year to injury and barely accrued 300 PAs. Tatis also did not reach 400 PAs, and also spent much of 2007 and 2008 in the minor leagues, meaning we don’t have full data as far as his trends go. We also miss the effects of aging.

The power dips for Beltran and Tatis are unsurprising given their respective ages of 32 and 34. Tatis actually pulled more pitches in 2009 than he did in 2008. Beltran had a lower pull rate as a LHB relative to 2008, but a similar one as a RHB. It doesn’t seem to be enough to definitively say that it affected his power significantly. Either way, given all the factors at work here, it is pretty easy to dismiss front office strategy as a reason for decline, at least with these two.

With Wright, it’s not so clear. He’s a young player a should have been entering his peak in 2009, and yet his ISO dropped off a cliff. In this case, we do indeed see a large difference in his splits. In 2009, he was nearly even in L/C/R hitting, whereas his pull rate was about 1.5 times his up-the-middle rate and 1.6 times his push rate in 2008. He did perform better according to wOBA on balls hit up the middle and to right field in 2009, but that seems to be entirely a function of high BABIPs, as there was still minimal power to be found in either split. It seems safe to claim that Wright did not pull as many pitches in 2009 and that this drop in pull rate is at least partially responsible for his drop in power.

A claim that we can’t make, however, is that the Mets strategy is to blame for Wright’s drop in power and productivity in 2009. Even though we see data that suggests a decreased pull rate resulted in less power, we don’t know that it was intentional or merely noise. If it was intentional, we don’t know if it was merely a change in approach brought about by a slump or if it was brought about by management. This doesn’t change the intelligence of the strategy – we just can’t make blanket statements about its effects on the 2009 Mets, due to the sample sizes and other mitigating factors at work.

Much like Shaquille O’Neal in his prime and/or the libidos of our nation’s politicians, one can’t stop the All-Joy Team, but only hope to contain it.

Yes, we here at the Fidrych Institute (the country’s pre-eminent joy-related think tank) have had our fingers in all manner of multimedia pies recently (comme ci, commme ca), but the luminous mystery of the All-Joy Team has never been far from our minds.

To recap, in our latest episode, we’d just elected Kelly Johnson and Adam Rosales to All-Joy status, bringing the current pre-season roster to its current state:

C	Kurt Suzuki
1B	Brian Myrow
2B	Kelly Johnson
SS	Ben Zobrist
LF	Chris Heisey
CF	Ryan Sweeney
RF	Daniel Nava
UTIF	Adam Rosales

SP	Billy Buckner
SP	Jason Godin
RP	Brandon League
RP	Kevin Jepsen

The reader will notice that, with the exception of a few positional omissions, the above bears a shocking resemblance to a field-able baseball team. Exciting, is the only word for that. Now, let’s see if we can’t clean this up.

Today, you get a third baseman; tomorrow, a designated hitter.

3B: Alex Gordon, Kansas City

Basketball analyst John Hollinger has coined the term “second draft” to describe the acquisition of players who (a) have, at one point, been considered prospects, (b) have fallen from prospect status, (c) have played out the duration of their rookie contracts, but (d) are still young enough so’s to make good on their early promise. Because of the extent of control that MLB organizations exert over their players, this entire cycle can actually occur before the young player escapes his arbitration years.

The Rise and Fall and Other Rise of Alex Gordon is a bad name for a book. But I think, before his tenure in Kansas City is through, it’ll be an accurate one. Even just three years ago, Gordon was receiving Wieters-esque attention from people who know what’s what. It was in that year, 2007, that Gordon was number one overall on Kevin Goldstein’s Top 100 Prospects list, number one on John Sickels’ Top 50 Hitting Prospects list, and the second overall prospect on Baseball America’s list — behind Daisuke Matsuzaka, which is kinda cheating, seeing as the latter had already been a star for a while in Japan and was 26 years old.

In light of the hype, Gordon’s freshman campaign was a relative disappointment, although still good enough for a 2.1 WAR. In his second season, he improved his batting mark to a 109 wRC+ from the 89 wRC+ he posted in his rookie season. Even with a drop in UZR and 30 fewer PAs, he still improved his WAR to 2.4. Last year he hurt his hip early in the season, and his end-of-year numbers suffered predictably. But look here: you still have a guy with at least a league-average bat, most likely an average glove at third, and a great pedigree. He’s turning 26, which means he’s got some projection left, and CHONE likes him to post a 114 wRC+ this season with exactly league-average third-basing — good for a 2.6 WAR in only 479 PAs. Not earth-shattering, sure, but good.

Gordon does have one proverbial strike against him, in that he’s a Royal. Though I don’t know of any hard evidence to support this, there’s something to be said for organizational culture, and my sense is that — and again, I’m speculating wildly — but my sense is that some players will underperform their talent level in certain situations. Obviously, Gordon’s teammate Zack Greinke is a glaring example of the exact opposite phenomenon. But I also think of a player like Felipe Lopez, who did some interesting things in Cincinnati before moving to the uber-woeful Nationals, where he proceeded to play like Willie Bloomquist*. Then, as you probably know, Lopez was sent to St. Louis, where he once again began hitting and playing like a legitimately talented player. Ditto last year, during which he posted a career-high 4.6 WAR in stints with Arizona and Milwaukee. I’m curious as to whether the baleful effects of Kansas City’s mediocrity could affect Gordon’s ability to realize his potential so long as he’s there.

*No exaggeration here. From 2006 to 2008, Lopez had a -0.1 WAR in 1354 PAs with Washington. Over the same stretch, Bloomquist registered a 0.8 WAR in 663 Mariner PAs. You could make the argument that he was protected from certain, tougher pitchers or whatever, but still.

At some point we will all experience what I have found to be the worst feeling for a baseball fan, a favorite prospect busting. It’s what prospects do best. Many of us, and I’m willing to wager most of us, have already experienced this. It’s like sustaining a concussion. The initial blow, seeing a player whom you spent so much time hyping fail at the major league level, hurts enough. The lingering effects can be even worse. You’ll continue to follow your team’s prospects, but after that first bust you view everyone with extra caution. No one wants to get bopped on the head a second time.

This added caution sometimes causes us to dismiss players before they’ve run their course. A prime example of this is Chris Young, the No. 23 prospect in baseball for the 2006 season. He has played three full seasons now, batting just .235 with a .307 OBP. In terms of results his 2009 was the worst among them, as he posted a .314 wOBA and 0.1 WAR. A ground injury sustained in June impeded him, perhaps making his season look a bit worse. Even so, after underwhelming performances prior to 2009 it’s tough to remain excited about Young’s potential.

Despite the likely disappointment we’ll feel by getting excited over Young, here are three reasons he just might turn things around in 2010.

1. His walk rate is rising

Through his 1,068 minor league plate appearances, Young walked about 12 percent of the time. During his first two years in the bigs that rate was much lower, at 6.9 percent in 2007 and 8.9 percent in 2008. He improved that again in 2009, walking 11.8 percent, or just a fraction under his minor league rate. He also saw more pitches per plate appearance than in his previous two seasons, 4.11. THis probably results from him swinging at fewer pitches outside the zone, just 18 percent, 13th lowest among MLB hitters last season. Perhaps his increased patience is the first step to better production.

2. He’s swinging at more pitched inside the zone

Eno covered this back in December. In comparing Young to Mike Cameron, he noted that the latter swings at more pitches inside the zone. Young is working towards that, though. Not only did he swing at fewer pitches outside the zone, he also swung at more pitches inside the zone in 2009, up to 61.3 percent. The percent changes on both his swings out of the zone and swings in the zone are about the same. They’re not huge, around 2.5 percent each, but it’s something on which he can build. One aspect he’ll need to work on in this regard is making contact with those pitches in the zone. He did that just 82.1 percent of the time in 2009, below his numbers from the previous two years and 5.6 percent below major league average.

3. He’s not the only one

I love historical comparables, especially with struggling players like Young. Using B-R’s Play Index, I searched for players, starting in 1980, who posted an OBP below .310 and struck out more than 250 times in their age 22 through 25 seasons. As expected, there are some disappointing names on that list, including Corey Patterson, Alex Gonzalez (the one drafted by the Blue Jays, not the one who currently plays for them), Juan Samuel, and Jim Presley. Jeff Francoeur also showed up.

There is one name on this list gives Young hope: Dean Palmer. From age 22 through 25 Palmer hit .231/.307/.452, which almost mirror Young’s numbers. Over his next five seasons, from age 26 through 30, Palmer hit .273/.339/.507, posting one more strong year before declining and eventually retiring.

By reducing the strikeout requirement I found another interesting name: Sammy Sosa. From ages 22 through 25 he hit .260/.305/.456, a bit better than Young in terms of average but almost identical power numbers. The difference is that by age 25 Sosa was already starting to murder the ball, as he hit .300/.339/.545 that season, and went on to hit .278/.343/.567 over the next five seasons. Some good news for Young: Sosa led the league in strikeouts in three of those seasons.

Keep your helmet on

If you don’t want to suffer a case of prospect concussion I suggest you keep your helmet strapped on at all times, or else forget about Chris Young as a legitimate MLB player. If you want to hang on, and comprehend the consequences of doing so, there are a few glimmers of hope that he might put together a quality 2010 season. The odds are long. Disappointment looms. But isn’t that the case for all prospects?

As we roll into March, I thought it’d be interesting to see what kind of team you could put together with the remaining free agents. Here’s the 25-man squad.

Catcher: Paul Bako
First Base: Hank Blalock
Second Base: Rich Aurilia
Shortstop: Ramon Martinez
Third Base: Joe Crede
Left Field: Garret Anderson
Center Field: Darin Erstad
Right Field: Jermaine Dye
Designated Hitter: Gary Sheffield

Bench: Rob Bowen, Rocco Baldelli, Ryan Freel, Chris Gomez

Starter: John Smoltz
Starter: Pedro Martinez
Starter: Jarrod Washburn
Starter: Braden Looper
Starter: Bartolo Colon

Closer: Kiko Calero

Bullpen: David Weathers, Joe Beimel, Ron Mahay, Eric Milton, Duaner Sanchez, Troy Percival

Not surprisingly, the team is weak up the middle, as catchers, shortstops, and center fielders have generally found jobs. The Martinez-Aurilia double play combination would be the worst in the game by a country mile. Erstad as a regular center fielder isn’t exactly anyone’s idea of a good time either.

At the corners, though, this team could give some other clubs a run for their money. At least in name value, if not so much on the filed. Blalock, Crede, Dye, Anderson, Sheffield… you could do worse, honestly.

But, the strength of this team would be pitching. In fact, I’d dare say that the rotation might actually be league average, at least when those five are all healthy. They’d run into problems due to a lack of depth, but just on paper, it’s not a terrible rotation. The bullpen wouldn’t be a disaster either.

Just eyeballing projected WAR for this group, I’d think you’re looking at something like a true talent level 60 win team. They’d be bad, no question, but given the premise of limiting yourself solely to free agents who haven’t signed even after spring training has already started, I’m actually a little surprised at how decent of a roster you could put together.

General Manager: Brian Sabean
Farm Director: Fred Stanley
Scouting Director: John Barr

FanGraphs’ Top 10 Prospects:
(2009 Draft Picks/International Signees Not Included)

The system has a couple monster prospects at the top of the list but the middle tier is pretty impressive too. Things drop off a bit after the seventh man on the list but all 10 prospects have a good chance of contributing to a big league team before too long.

1. Buster Posey, C, Majors
DOB: March 1987 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2008 1st round – Florida State University
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3

If all goes as expected, Posey’s minor-league stay was a short one. The catcher really has little left to prove in the minors after just one full season. The former college star hit .326/.428/.540 in 291 high-A at-bats in ’09 before skipping double-A and moving up to triple-A where he hit .321/.391/.511 in another 131 at-bats. Posey also received 17 big league at-bats at the end of the year. His hope of playing everyday in 2010 as the Giants’ primary catcher was dealt a blow this past off-season when the club re-signed veteran backstop Bengie Molina, but there is talk that he’ll see playing time all over the diamond, thanks to his solid athleticism. I’ve said it before, but count me down as someone who doesn’t like the idea. As a college convert to the position, Posey needs experience behind the dish to help iron out his receiving- and game-calling skills; his throwing was solid in ’09 (46% caught stealing).

2. Madison Bumgarner, LHP, Majors
DOB: August 1989 Bats: R Throws: L
Signed: 2007 1st round – North Carolina HS
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3
Repertoire: 88-94 mph fastball, slider, change-up

In two seasons, Bumgarner has yet to post an ERA above 1.93. His FIP, though, has not been quite as sterling, and it’s actually risen with each promotion: from 1.71 to 2.05 to 3.56 to 4.60 in a brief MLB trial in ’09. The lefty has lost some velocity from his prep days, but it hasn’t bothered him much in pro ball. He held his own in double-A last season by allowing just 80 hits in 107.0 innings of work. His walk rate of 2.52 was solid but his strikeout rate of 5.80 K/9 was low and he’s a borderline fly-ball pitcher. The lefty has a good shot at the No. 5 job in the Giants rotation in 2010 with his biggest competition being Todd Wellemeyer. At the age of just 20, Bumgarner is probably not ready to be an impact pitcher at the MLB level just yet. However, don’t be too concerned about the lesser velocity unless it keeps leaking; it’s possible that he’s sacrificing miles per hour for movement and/or control.

3. Thomas Neal, OF, Double-A
DOB: August 1987 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2005 36th round – Riverside Community College
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

Neal just keeps getting better. In fairness, his ’09 numbers may have been helped by a good hitting environment. Even so, the 22-year-old outfielder hit .337/.431/.579 in 475 at-bats. His ISO rate jumped from .168 in low-A in ’08 to .242 in high-A in ’09. Neal has also shown solid patience at the plate over the past three seasons, topping out at 11.6 BB% this past year. He did a nice job of trimming his strikeout rate by 4% over ’08’s 24.1%. It will be hard for Neal to improve upon his .444 wOBA from ’09 but he has the talent to be a star corner outfielder for the Giants. Defensively, his range is better suited for left field but he has the arm strength to play right field without embarrassing himself.

4. Dan Runzler, LHP, Majors
DOB: March 1985 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2007 9th round – UC Riverside
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3
Repertoire: 89-93 mph fastball, slider, curveball

A former ninth-round (under the radar) pick, Runzler has found a lot of success as of late thanks to his solid fastball – especially for a lefty – and his outstanding ground-ball rates. Playing at four minor league levels in ’09, the southpaw produced an eye-popping 64.7% ground-ball rate, as well as an incredibly-low 5% line-drive rate. After all that traveling in the minors, Runzler was rewarded with a trip to the Majors where he posted a 1.04 ERA (but 4.14 FIP) in 8.2 big league innings. He struck out 11 batters but showed that he still has some work to do with his control by walking five batters. The former UC Riverside hurler has gone from little-known middle reliever to a potential MLB closer down the road.

5. Roger Kieschnick, OF, High-A
DOB: January 1987 Bats: L Throws: R
Signed: 2008 3rd round – Texas Tech University
MLB ETA: Late-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

After not getting into game action in ’08, Kieschnick made up for lost time with a solid pro debut in high-A ball. He hit .296/.345/.532 and showed the plus power that he was known for in college (.236 ISO). The outfielder did have some troubling plate rates, though, with a low walk rate of 6.4% and a high strikeout rate of 25.1%. On the plus side, he has little pro experience so he has room (and time) to improve. The left-handed hitter did a nice job of handling southpaws by posting a .933 OPS on the heels of a .400 BABIP. His OPS against right-handers was .832. Kieschnick is a hustler on the base paths and in the field despite average speed. He also has the arm strength for right field.

6. Brandon Crawford, SS, Double-A
DOB: January 1987 Bats: L Throws: R
Signed: 2008 4th round – UCLA
MLB ETA: Mid-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

Crawford is an interesting prospect because people either love him (and see him as a regular big league contributor) or they hate him (and see him as a big league utility player at best). Not really known for his bat in college, Crawford had a lot of success in the lower minors and hit .371/.445/.600 in 105 high-A at-bats to being the ’09 season. The shortstop had a more difficult time in double-A, though, and hit .258/.294/.365 in 392 at-bats in a much more difficult league to hit in than the high-A California League. At the heart of Crawford’s problems at the dish are his plate rates. His walk rate dipped to 4.7% in double-A and his strikeout rate was 25.5% (while his power dipped from .229 to .107 after his promotion). Crawford may not hit for a high average in the Majors, but he could slug 15-20 homers and play above-average defense. At worst, I see him developing into former Blue Jay and Cub Alex Gonzalez.

7. Ehire Adrianza, SS, Low-A
DOB: August 1989 Bats: B Throws: R
Signed: 2006 non-drafted international free agent
MLB ETA: Mid-2013 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

A gifted fielder, Adrianza can take his time developing his raw skills thanks to the presence of Crawford ahead of him. The slick Venezuelan showed some improvements at the plate in ’09 at low-A ball by hitting .258/.333/.327 in 388 at-bats. He clearly does not have much power right now (.070 ISO) and he also does not steal many bases (seven successes in eight tries) so Adrianza is currently a singles-hitter. As such, he currently projects as a possible Gold Glove infielder who will hit eighth in a National League lineup. He clearly tired late in ’09 and hit below .220 in August and September.

8. Clayton Tanner, LHP, High-A
DOB: December 1987 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2006 3rd round – California HS
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 86-89 mph fastball, slider, change-up

Tanner isn’t flashy and he doesn’t have a great fastball, but the southpaw has been very successful in the minors. He posted a career-high 4.15 FIP in ’09 but he was pitching in the hitter-friendly California League (for the second straight year). Tanner showed improvements by reducing his hits allowed (132 in 139.1 IP) and he improved his strikeout rate to 7.82 K/9 while also showing solid control (2.71 BB/9). He was, though, hurt by the long-ball with a HR/9 rate of 1.16. With his narrow margin for error, it would be nice to see him improve upon his 46.5% ground-ball rate. He certainly performs better again left-handed hitters (0.96 vs 1.28 WHIP) so he should have a career in the bullpen at the very least.

9. Francisco Peguero, OF, Low-A
DOB: June 1988 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2006 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Mid-2013 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

First the good: Peguero, 21, has hit like a mad man in North America, including a .340 average in low-A in ’09. Now the bad news: His walk rate was 2.0 BB% and his BABIP was .396. Moving back to positives, the outfielder also stole 22 bases in 27 tries in ’09. A solid defensive outfielder, Peguero is goes all out in the field and at the plate, which helps to explain his low walk rate. His arm strength is also off the charts. Along with his over-aggressive approach, Peguero needs to learn to drive the ball more consistently.

10. Waldis Joaquin, RHP, Majors
DOB: December 1986 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2003 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2
Repertoire: 91-95 mph fastball, plus slider, change-up

The 10th man was a difficult decision and I went with a good arm, but one that projects as a reliever. Joaquin has been kicking around the system for more than seven seasons but he’s still just 23 years old. The right-hander still struggles with his control but he did a nice job of missing bats in both triple-A and the Majors in ’09. He also did not give up a homer last year until he reached the big leagues (zero in 64.0 innings), in part due to solid ground-ball rates (50% in ’09). The fastball-slider pitcher averaged 96 mph with his heater in the Majors. Despite relying on the slider and showing questionable control against them (5.86 BB/9), Joaquin dominated left-handed batters by holding them to a .140 batting average.

Up Next: The Texas Rangers

Because Craig Calcaterra is a smart guy, he’s written a lot of smart things over time. Yesterday he wrote something glaringly smart about Barry Zito at Hardball Talk:

But there’s every reason to think that he can be a useful part of the Giants rotation for the next several years. He’s durable, reliable and if last year is any indication, he’s showing that he can learn to pitch without his young man stuff. Indeed, he even flashed some genuine brilliance in a couple of starts against the Rockies late in the season. Plus, seeing he’s lefthanded, there’s every reason to think that Zito could chug along for many, many more years and wind up with well north of 200 wins.

That doesn’t make him an ace or anything, but the mere fact that Brian Sabean decided to grossly over pay him doesn’t render him a punchline.

Calcaterra is right. Zito will never be worth the contract or the hype. He did actually pitch decently last season too, posting a xFIP of 4.46 which is an improvement over his previous seasons of 5.34 and 4.98 pitching. Calcaterra is also right about the unfair criticisms Zito has received due to his personality. The very same surfer dude persona that was treated like the antidote to pressure is now the poison.

This isn’t really about Zito, though, even if he does play the role of Mister Misunderstood convincingly. The truth is that any time a player signs a big deal he’s opening himself up to unfair criticism. As if Zito should have known better than the people paid to make the baseball personnel decisions and told Brian Sabean, “No sir, I’m not worth this contract. Halve it, then I’ll sign.” Beyond the money, players really can find burdens placed upon their shoulders by outside influences at a startling rate.

The media turned David Eckstein from a short dude who can ball into a 152 centimeter messiah with a heart made of titanium baseballs that pumps pine tar and Gatorade. Carlos Silva might be fat, but nobody found his spare tire damning until he began receiving paychecks that grossly overestimated his worth. Yuniesky Betancourt is really bad at baseball, but any player who asks for his removal from the lineup is begging to be taken out of the game in an entirely different manner.

And on it goes. Being a player has its own set of perks. Achieving what so many dream about and so few accomplish must be exhilarating. Sometimes clouds do creep into sunny spring days, though, and this seems to happen for players more than anyone else in the game. Managers, umpires, and front office personnel get theirs too, but the players are the main attraction and praise, like criticism, finds them as easy receptacles. That’s life and it won’t change.

One thought in conclusion: Should we really mock players for making prudent financial decisions when we praise management for doing the same?

Who has the best bullpen in baseball? Boston’s is the most famous, filled with big arms and a big personality at closer, but the Red Sox have some competition for the title down in San Diego, where the Padres have four guys coming off ridiculous 2009 seasons, even if you may not have ever heard of them.

Okay, so, Heath Bell you know. He’s been an all-star and racked up 42 saves a year ago after spending several years as a premier setup guy. But before you get to Bell, the Padres throw out three no names, each of whom was terrific last year, and are among the hidden gems in baseball; Mike Adams, Luke Gregerson, and Joe Thatcher.

Among relievers who threw at least 30 IP last year, Adams had the third lowest xFIP (2.57) of any pitcher in the game, behind just Jonathan Broxton and Mariano Rivera. Gregerson (3.11) came in at #14, while Thatcher (3.31) was #27. In fact, all three actually had higher strikeout rates than Bell, the all-star closer, though when you’re picking between four guys with a K/9 over 10.00, you can’t really go wrong.

Perhaps most interesting of the group is Adams, who has battled through health problems but been dominant of late when on the mound. He racked up some crazy numbers in the 37 innings he managed to throw a year ago: 1.95 BB/9, 10.95 K/9, 50.6% GB%. Rarely do you see a guy who can miss so many bats while also throwing strikes and getting ground balls.

But, Adams is unique in another way; throughout his short major league career, he’s actually demonstrated a reverse platoon split.

Vs LH: 323 TBF, 2.39 BB/9, 9.11 K/9, 49.3% GB%, 5.6% HR/FB, 2.56 FIP, 3.15 xFIP
Vs RH: 371 TBF, 3.13 BB/9, 9.10 K/9, 36.7% GB%, 10.7% HR/FB, 3.84 FIP, 3.80 xFIP

The walk rate is significantly lower and the ground ball rate significantly higher, yet he has suffered no corresponding drop in strikeout rate when facing opposite handed hitters. It’s not like they’re hitting rockets off of him when they do make contact either, as his lower HR/FB rates show. If you didn’t know better, from looking at this line, you might think Adams was a lefty. His results would suggest that, at least.

But no, Adams is an RHP. He isn’t your typical situational reliever, though, as he mixes in five different pitches, including two breaking balls and a change-up in addition to his fastball and cutter. This expanded pitch mix gives him weapons against both RHBs and LHBs, and from the results, it seems like the pitches he features against lefties are a bit more advanced than his standard fare.

Given how well he’s able to control hitters from both sides of the plate, Adams is a natural fit for the 9th inning. If the Padres fail to contend, as expected, they’ll almost certainly be shopping Heath Bell at the deadline. As long as Adams’ arm is still attached to his body, expect him to end up as the Padres closer. Given his performance as a setup man, expect him to not only succeed, but to thrive.

As best I can tell – using the B-Ref Play Index – there have been nine catchers in history to play at least 50% of their games at catcher carrying Jesus Montero’s size. If we needed something else besides scouts’ wishes to project a move from behind the plate, precedent is clearly behind that notion. The problem is, in the Yankees organization, the only other position available is Designated Hitter, as Mark Teixeira is firmly entrenched at first base until 2016. And deservedly so.

The overwhelming rhetoric is that Montero can support a move to any position, even one that only asks its occupants to hit the ball far and often. His size, his power, his contact skills were near historic levels last season, as he split his age-19 season between High-A and Double-A. However, to be thorough, I went through the Baseball America archives and looked for top 25 prospects that were only ranked on the prowess of their right-handed hitting. I tried to self-edit the players that drew even modest praise for their athleticism or defensive ability, eliminating Drew Henson and Derrek Lee (Andy Marte and Miguel Cabrera) for attempts at even-handedness. In 20 years of ranking prospects, I found 11 similar examples: Billy Butler, Conor Jackson, Brian Dopirak, Jason Stokes, Mike Cuddyer, J.R. House, Pat Burrell, Paul Konerko, Dave McCarty, Tim Costo, Todd Zeile.

This is surely not the most inspiring list for Yankees fans, who probably wonder why Frank Thomas could not have been ranked higher by BA in 1990, or why I eliminated Cabrera. But I think it does a nice job of highlighting the potential risks we have with Montero, and also shows the obvious All-Star upside as well. Two examples stick out as the most poignant: Billy Butler and Paul Konerko. Both are bad-bodied mashers, and Konerko is a guy who had to move from behind the plate young in his career. Butler and Montero split their age-19 seasons between High-A and Double-A, with these results:

Name      PA    K%   BB%   XBH%   BABIP
Butler   549  17.9   8.9   12.9   .374
Montero  379  12.4   7.4   11.4   .352

This is defining XBH% as XBH/PA, so these are big-time power numbers. I didn’t include Konerko, who didn’t take off until his age 20 season. But, I think Yankee fans would be happy if Montero followed Konerko’s path for his age-20 and -21 seasons, in Double and Triple-A, respectively.

Konerko   PA    K%   BB%   XBH%   BABIP
Age 20   572  15.2  12.8    9.6   .313
Age 21   560  10.9  11.4   12.3   .305

Now, let’s fast forward into Butler and Konerko’s Major League reality, using B-Ref’s per 162 games feature, accounting for Butler’s career up to this point, and Konerko’s first seven full big league seasons (1999-2005):

Name      PA   2B  3B   HR   BB   SO   BABIP
Butler   653   42   2   18   51   93   .318
Konerko  656   30   1   32   60   81   .285

Pick the middle ground, and I think this gives us a nice idea of what Montero might be able to do offensively. He’ll align closer with Butler in terms of BABIP and BB, closer with Konerko in strikeout rate and extra-base hit allotment. Overall, a player in the .290/.350/.500 range for his team-controlled seasons. Essentially, the player Konerko was in 2002 is what I envision for Montero. This .369 wOBA would have put him on par with Robinson Cano in last year’s Yankee lineup. He would be worth about 25 batting runs above replacement.

That is, choosing the Butler/Konerko path for Montero – which I think nicely middles the Dopirak/Stokes path and the Thomas/Cabrera path – means that Montero is +25 runs, +0 fielding, +20 replacement and -15 for positional adjustment. Overall, we’re looking at a 3-win player.

You’ll have to look 82 places lower in Baseball America’s Top 100 prospects list to find the Yankees catcher of the future, Austin Romine. But what if Romine spends his team-controlled years getting 520 plate appearances (17.3 above replacement) from behind the plate (+9.7 positional adjustment). If my projection for Montero holds water, and Austin Romine can manage to put up a .340 wOBA and average defensive performance — no stretch at all for a top 100 prospect — then Austin Romine projects as a more valuable asset to the New York Yankees than Jesus Montero.

There are alternate realities for Jesus Montero, in which he gets traded and becomes a plus defensive first baseman down the road. There is a reality that he manages to stay behind the plate, and becomes something resembling Mike Piazza. There’s another where he splits time between back-up catcher and designated hitter, almost negating a positional adjustment in the process. This is a big season for Jesus Montero. If he shows scouts that he won’t do too much damage catching 50 games a season, his value as a top ten prospect stands. But if he stays in this organization, and moves from behind the plate like many scouts believe, Montero quickly becomes one of the game’s most overvalued prospects.

One of the more interesting nuggets to pop up in the blogosphere was this piece from John Harper in the New York Daily News on Monday. Outlined in that article is the recently fired Tony Bernazard’s strategy for Mets hitters. Simply put, the strategy is to hit the ball to the opposite field.

To put it bluntly, this strategy is downright stupid, and for a multitude of reasons. Our splits data reveal a telling story. Here are the averages among all players for the 2009 season:

Looking at the two “pull” rows (L to Right, R to Left), we see markedly higher power, even though lefties tend to get more hits to center field. Pulling the ball does result in far more ground balls than fly balls, whereas pushing the ball has an opposite effect. Normally, fly ball hitters are better, as fly ball hitters have more power.

That’s not true in this case, as about 10 times as many fly balls leave the park when pulled as opposed to pushed. Add in the fact that more ground balls fall in for hits than in-play fly balls do and it’s clear that pulling the baseball leads to far better offensive results than pushing the ball. According to wOBA, the difference between pulling and pushing comes to about 43 runs for left handed batters and a whopping 73 runs for righties – this is perhaps a result of shifts employed against left handed sluggers, but that is a topic for another time.

Pulling the ball is not going to work every time. Many of the pulled ground balls that we see are easy outs to the shortstop or second baseman on balls on the outer half of the plate that should be hit to the opposite field. Mechanically, however, it just doesn’t make sense to make pushing the ball the other way a general strategy on more than just outside pitches, especially for MLB hitters who already have tremendous plate coverage abilities.

In order to generate the kind of power needed to produce runs in the major leagues, the hips need to be able to open up and “lead the hands to the ball,” creating power through bat speed. Try and swing a bat without moving your hips, and then let your hips rotate as part of the swing – the difference is clear. Removing the hip turn takes away the power of the lower body. The action of rotating the hips drives the bat towards the pull side of the field, resulting in a pulled ball. That’s why pulled balls are generally hit more powerfully. This is particularly true on inside pitches, which allow for more extension of the arms and rotation of the hips prior to contact as they are closer to the batter’s body.

On the other hand, to hit the ball the other way, the rotation of the hips has to come after the point of contact. Since this rotation is coming later, the bat speed won’t be as high. This also results in a deeper optimal point of contact, and thus the ball will be hit to the opposite field. It’s necessary to make this sacrifice on outside pitches, as early rotation would either result in poor contact or a miss, as the ball is farther away from the batter’s body.

Essentially, to focus on hitting the ball the other way is to sacrifice power, both in the sense of home runs and in the sense of speed off the bat. The amount of weak ground balls hit to the pull side may decrease, but we would expect to see more infield fly balls to the push side (as supported in the split data) and fewer home runs overall (again, supported by the split data). Although with certain individuals, this strategy may win out, it will almost certainly lose at the team level, where the hitters as a whole will profile as close to average.

Regardless of your point of view, a scouting or mechanics perspective or a data-oriented perspective, there is simply nothing there to support this strategy. The fact that a team in the most competitive baseball league in the world would consider this strategy not only as a team-level strategy but also as an organizational philosophy is mind-blowing. The fact that Tony Bernazard’s idea became Mets dogma is indicting of the upper management as a whole. With good, smart leadership, this strategy is never even discussed, much less employed.