Now that we’ve completed our journey through the positional power rankings for the upcoming season, I wanted to give an overview of each team’s forecasts for each spot, and then their overall forecast. Keep in mind that simply summing the linear weights contribution of each individual player is a very crude way to project a team’s performance, since it leaves out things that a good projection system should forecast, such as strength of schedule and the non-linear interactions that effect run scoring. However, for being a crude back-of-the-envelope calculation, it also works pretty well, so as long as you take these in the spirit they’re intended and not as the gospel truth, this kind of exercise can give you a lot of information about where teams stand heading into the coming season.

So, here’s the total results for each team’s forecast WAR from the Positional Power Rankings, and the conversion from that into projected wins.

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Not all that long ago, I wrote about Gio Gonzalez striking out a ton of opposing pitchers. Though Gonzalez set a modern-day record, the achievement itself was not entirely surprising: Gonzalez is a durable pitcher who gets a lot of strikeouts, and pitchers strike out a lot as batters. This is because pitchers are by and large terrible batters, dragging down the offensive numbers of the National League. What was more surprising, to me, was something I noticed about R.A. Dickey, which I included in the post as a note.

Dickey is a knuckleballer, and the league’s only knuckleballer worth a damn. He became a regular with the Mets in 2010, and as a Met, he threw more than 600 innings. Over that span, Dickey faced 2,344 non-pitchers, and he struck out 19% of them, or at least 19% of the guys who didn’t sac bunt. Over the same span, Dickey faced 172 pitchers, and he struck out 17% of them, or at least 17% of the guys who didn’t sac bunt. In other words: with the Mets, R.A. Dickey struck out a lower rate of pitchers than position players.

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Table of Contents
Here’s the table of contents for today’s edition of Daily Notes.

1. Crowdsourced vs. Actual Contract Values, Nearly Complete
2. Table: The Four Remaining Crowdsourced Contracts
3. Raw Image: Lance Berman, Licking His Chops

Crowdsourced vs. Actual Contract Values, Nearly Complete
Before the end of the season, FanGraphs asked readers to project what sort of contracts the league’s free agents would receive, both in terms of years (Yrs) and average annual value (AAV). With the recent signing by Milwaukee of right-hander Kyle Lohse, only four crowdsourced free agents remain unsigned.

Below are the (sortable) results for the players who’ve received contracts. The headings preceded by a lower-case c designate the crowdsourced results. The headings preceded by a lower-case a designate the actual results. Finally, headings with a lower-case d designate the difference between the crowdsourced and actual results, wherein a positive result represents those instances where a player’s actual contract was higher than the crowdsourced value.

So, for example, the crowd estimated that Lance Berkman would receive $7.7 million annually, while he actually received $11.0 million — i.e. $3.3 million, or 42.6%, more. Positive numbers in the right hand column, therefore, represent instances in which the crowd was pessimistic relative to reality; negative numbers, instances of optimism.

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Earlier this month we rolled out the FanGraphs Top 100 Prospects list. Today, we’re looking at 15 sleeper prospects — one for each National League club — who could break out in 2013 and find their way into the 2014 Top 100 Prospects list. The players — who possess a wide range of potential ceilings — were chosen after speaking with scouts and talent evaluators from within various big league organizations.

ATLANTA: Chase Anselment, C
How Acquired: 2012 17th round
Predicted 2013 Level: A+
In a Perfect World: An offensive-minded catcher
What Could Go Wrong: His defense may not develop
Big League ETA: 2015

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A victim of what amounts to one of the deeper stables of starting pitching, Chris Young opted out of his contract with the Washington Nationals with the hopes that he could find a major league role in another city. The Nationals could ostensibly retain Young’s services should he fail in that pursuit, but it’s plausible that there will be several organizations interested.

Young, 33, is not so young anymore. The hulking 6-foot-10 right hander has had two shoulder surgeries in the last four seasons, limiting his major league innings from 2009 through 2011 to just 120. His 2012 comeback was a mixed bag, as he posted a 4.50 FIP, a 16.2% strikeout rate, and the characteristic high fly ball rate, flirting with 60%. His fastball has been in steady decline since he broke into the league in 2004, averaging just 84.6 mph in 2012 and almost all reports out of Spring suggested he was sitting in the 80-82 mph range frequently.

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Bronson Arroyo has won 115 games in the past nine seasons. He’s also come up big in the postseason. But none of his success has come thanks to overpowering stuff.

The Cincinnati Reds’ right-hander is a craftsman. His fastball rarely reaches 90 mph, and his breaking pitches are more varied than they are exceptional. His strengths are deception and guile. Featuring a high leg kick and multiple arm angles, he delivers a cornucopia of offerings that more than make up for his lack of velocity.

Arroyo talked about his cerebral approach to pitching — and his ability to mix and match with the best of them — last week in Goodyear, Arizona.

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David Laurila: How do you get guys out?

Bronson Arroyo: It’s never simple, but that’s just the nature of the game. There’s such a fine line between a pop-up to center field and a home run 40 feet over the wall. It’s all about the precision of the bat on the ball, and because of that, there’s nothing concrete about the game. You can never say, “If I throw this breaking ball at 78 mph, on the outside corner at the knees, it won’t get hit hard. “ It might get hit out of the park.

Pitching is kind of like making educated guesses. Where are the places I can go in the strike zone to beat this guy? Where can I go where he’ll do the least amount of damage? And sometimes that changes. You can have the bases loaded in the bottom of the last inning and not be able to afford to give up one run. Sometimes it doesn’t matter if you go to his weak spot, because he ends up hitting a blooper over second base and you still lose. It’s a very tough game, because it never stays the same. There are so many variables.

I’ve been successful over a long period of time by mixing and matching pitches a little differently than most guys. I pitch backwards a lot. I throw a lot of off-speed stuff in fastball counts. I’m also aware of my surroundings. I’m pitching, sometimes — not on a hunch, but on calculations based on a guy’s body language, his eyes, what he did to me last time. He’s watching a videotape of the last time I faced him, and I’m watching the same videotape. I know he’s making adjustments and I have to make them too. Who is going to beat the other to the punch?

It’s this whole mental game for me. I’m not physically dominating. I can’t go out there like Homer Bailey and Johnny Cueto and throw 94-95. I’m throwing 87. It’s harder for me to beat people with brute physical ability, and for that reason I have to spin the ball a little different. Read the rest of this entry »

Ben and Sam answer listener emails about PECOTA’s projections for the Yankees and Blue Jays, how the amateur draft and free agency would work in an auction format, and whether teams should offer players like Bryce Harper and Stephen Strasburg $100 million lifetime contracts after drafting them.

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For an explanation of this series, please read the introductory post. The data is a hybrid projection of the ZIPS and Steamer systems with playing time determined through depth charts created by our team of authors. The rankings are based on aggregate projected WAR for each team at a given position.

Over the last couple of weeks, we’ve been going position by position around the sport. We finish up the series with bullpens today, but it’s worth noting that these projections follow a slightly different structure than the rest.

For one, projecting specific innings totals for relievers is a taller task than projecting playing time for position players or even innings totals for starters. There are numerous outside factors impacting bullpen usage, including things that we can’t really predict like the distribution of runs scored and allowed by each team. One team might play in a bunch of blowouts and rarely need their closer, while another could end up in a continuous stream of one run games and ask their best few arms to carry a lion’s share of the workload. Beyond that, the health of a team’s rotation is going to be a factor, as some relievers are also reserve starters who might be pressed into duty mid-season. And the depth charts are continually evolving, as injuries and acquisitions move guys into differing roles that come with different usage patterns.

So, for the relievers, we’ve simply assigned IP totals to each slot on a depth chart. Closers and primary setup men get 65 innings each, with the 3rd/4th relievers getting 55 innings each, and then the rest have their innings allocated in descending order according to their placement on the depth chart. And, in order to make each team’s total number of innings pitched (both starters and relievers) equal out to 1,458, we’ve added in a set for each team that makes up the missing innings in the projections. The performance projection is the same for each team, and is set to be around -0.1 WAR per 100 innings, on the assumption that the 10th or 11th reliever a team uses throughout the season is probably a little bit below replacement level. The statline in the table is just there as a placeholder – those numbers aren’t actually affecting the calculation beyond just setting innings equal and being included in the WAR sum.

Also, since we don’t have separate ZIPS/Steamer projections for guys as starters and relievers, guys who were projected as starters but are going to pitch in relief will likely be under-forecast. Aroldis Chapman, for instance, is getting his starter projections prorated to reliever innings totals, and he’ll almost certainly pitch better in relief than he was projected to do as a starter. There aren’t a lot of those types, but for guys like that, adjust their numbers upwards accordingly.

One final note: we’ve mentioned this on the other lists, but it is worth emphasizing here – the gap between many teams is so slim that you shouldn’t read too much into a team’s placement in the ordinal rank. The gap between #12 and #22 is +0.7 WAR. That’s no difference at all, really. There are good bullpens, okay bullpens, and a couple of bad bullpens, but don’t get too caught up in whether one team is a few spots ahead of another team. With margins this small, the specific placement on the list is mostly irrelevant.

On to the list.

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