2015 Positional Ball-In-Play Retrospective – SS

As we count down the days until spring-training games begin, let’s continue to take a position-by-position look back at the ball-in-play (BIP) profiles of 2015 semi-regulars and regulars to see if we can find any clues as to their projected performance moving forward. We’ve already looked at first and second baseman; today, let’s go all the way to the “good” end of the defensive spectrum and examine the shortstops.

First, some ground rules. To come up with an overall player population roughly equal to one player per team per position, the minimum number of batted balls with Statcast readings was set at 164. Players were listed at the position at which they played the most games. There is more than one player per team at some positions and less at others, like catcher and DH. Players are listed in descending OPS+ order. Without further ado, let’s kick it off with AL shortstops.

Most of the column headers are self explanatory, including average BIP speed (overall and by BIP type), BIP type frequency, K and BB rates, and BIP by field sector (pull, central, opposite). Each player’s OPS and Unadjusted Contact Score (CON) is also listed. For those of you who have not read my articles on the topic, Contact Score is derived by removing Ks and BBs from hitters’ batting lines, assigning run values to all other events, and comparing them to a league average of 100.

Cells are also color coded. If a hitter’s value is two standard deviations or more higher than average (the average of all players in the league, not just at the player’s position), the field is shaded red. If it’s one to two STD higher than average, it’s shaded orange. If it’s one-half to one STD higher than average, it’s shaded dark yellow. If it’s one-half to one STD less than average, it’s shaded blue. If it’s over one STD less than average, it’s shaded black. Ran out of colors at that point. On the rare occasions that a value is over two STD lower than average, we’ll mention it if necessary in the text. As you might expect, there’s an awful lot of blue and black in the table above; certainly not the expanse of orange and red that was present in the first base tables. Many shortstops have everyday jobs in spite of their bats.

The top four players represent the future of the shortstop position in the AL. On balance, they hit the ball much harder than their peers, hit the ball the other way, have fairly pronounced ground-ball tendencies, and most importantly, played the 2015 season at age 25 or younger. The top three were 22 or younger.

At age 20, Carlos Correa was the puppy of the group. He’s a very large man, with room to fill out and get stronger, and already hits the ball harder than the AL average for all positions, not just shortstops. How good can he become? Well, he’ll hit the ball harder, for one, and his fly ball and pull tendencies leave plenty of room for power development. His K and pop-up rates are already controlled, his BB rate already above average. So, no real weaknesses need to be addressed. He could be positively A-Rod-esque, and soon.

Francisco Lindor is a somewhat miniaturized version of Correa. He doesn’t hit the ball quite as hard, but strikes out less to compensate. He too will grow into more power as his fly-ball rate rises, and his batting average should stay elevated because of his ability to hit the ball hard to all fields. There is quite a bit of Derek Jeter in his offensive game, though Lindor’s glove is drastically better.

The emergence of the two aforementioned rookies obscured the continued progress shown by Xander Bogaerts last season. He whacked his K rate down by a full one-third, and cut his pop-up rate materially as well. His fly-ball rate did decline by a fairly dangerous margin, capping his power upside. He too showed a more nuanced opposite-field stroke in 2015, after pulling the ball much more the previous year. That generally is a very good thing over the long haul, but in Fenway, a righty can get a huge offensive boost by selectively pulling in the air. His 2015 adjustments gave him a viable offensive foundation; his next tweaks could make him great.

Yes, Brad Miller deserves to be in the discussion, at least offensively, with the three names at the top. He’s a little more unconventional and erratic with the glove, but possesses the necessary tools to be serviceable at the position. Despite being shuttled around the diamond by the Mariners, Miller showed offensive progress last season, utilizing the entire field, cutting his pop-up rate sharply, and hitting the ball harder than all of his AL shortstop peers. He has enough bat to still be an offensive asset if he changes positions, but his new employers in Tampa Bay realize how valuable he can be if given 500 at-bats at shortstop. That Contact Score of 99 was limited quite a bit by Safeco Field; expect it to race well past 100 moving forward.

Asdrubal Cabrera switches leagues in 2016, taking over at shortstop for the Mets. He has mined about every bit of offensive value from his skill set. Excluding pop ups, he had more fly balls than grounders last season; that correlates strongly with next-year decline. He’s also an extreme pull hitter who derives much of his offensive value from dead-pull homers down both lines. His average BIP authority was below average in 2015 after three straight seasons above average. I’m guessing that the Mets will be disappointed by the return on their investment in Cabrera.

You truly can throw a net over the rest of the AL shortstops’ offensive capabilities. Expect a downturn in Eduardo Escobar’s performance in 2016. There was an awful lot of luck involved in his 107 Contact Score last seas Both his BIP authority and liner rate were below average; an elevated fly-ball rate contributed to his .445 SLG and 12 homers, levels I’m not sure he’ll ever to be able to match.

There weren’t enough colors in my palette to adequately reflect Jose Iglesias‘ low BIP authority and fly-ball rate, which were both over two full standard deviations below the average of all AL regulars. The only things keeping him afloat offensively is his low K rate, which he cut by almost 40% last season, and his ability to spray the ball the other way. That said, his offensive floor is extremely low; I’ll go out on a limb and say he’ll never again post an OPS+ mark of 100 or higher.

Marcus Semien makes Brad Miller look like Ozzie Smith defensively. That said, the A’s have a strong incentive to see if they can make him an average shortstop defender. His average fly ball/line drive authority is high for his position, and he does possess a knack for hitting the ball in the air. There are some big risks, however: his K/BB profile is subpar, and he hits the ball very weakly on the ground. That air/ground authority disparity is a drag on batting average. There’s no guarantee that high liner rate will carry forward; liner rates fluctuate widely for all but the best hitters. On balance, the risks seems to outweigh the potential rewards.

Looks like the Jays got out from under Jose Reyes at the right time, for a multitude of reasons. The numbers cited above cover his full season, in both Toronto and Colorado. His pop-up rate has gotten away from him in recent seasons, and his average FLY/LD authority is over two full STD below average, worst among his shortstop peers. That’s a bad combo. His speed has also gone from impact level to simply good. His minuscule K rate keeps him viable, but his days as a true threat are over.

Elvis Andrus has a tick more offensive upside than most of the shortstops surrounding him in the rankings. Last year, he cut his K rate, elevated his overall BIP authority, and got his fly-ball rate off of the floor, all good things. He has also shown signs of successfully selectively pulling in the air for power. I wouldn’t be shocked by a 10-homer, .400 SLG season in the next year or two.

I wouldn’t give up on Jose Ramirez just yet. He’ll never be a mauler, but if he can address his elevated pop-up rate and fairly extreme pull tendency, he can approach league average offensively. He’ll only be 23 in 2016, his liner rate should positively regress, and his K/BB profile is quite strong. Might not have enough bat for third base, but could be a nice trade target for someone looking to buy low on a shortstop lottery ticket.

Alcides Escobar is what he is with the bat, and that’s a bit better than his actual 2015 performance. His overall BIP authority is actually over two STD below average, and he swings at everything. His liner rate generally has been above average, he uses the whole field, can run well and makes consistent contact, making him a leading candidate to bat an empty .280 in his good years.

Overall, AL shortstops had an average 92 OPS+ and 89 Contact Score in 2015. They didn’t strike out as much and hit the ball with less authority and on the ground with greater frequency compared to players at other positions. The youthful newcomers should push the average production higher moving forward. Next, let’s take a look at their NL counterparts.

It’s not surprising to see Brandon Crawford’s name at the top. His authority relative to the league has steadily improved over time, and his profile lacks any glaring weaknesses, a trait that stands out in this glove-first crowd. His average FLY/LD authority is the best of any middle infielder in either league, nosing out Robinson Cano. He’s got plenty of room for more pulling in the air, meaning more power upside. He’s the game’s most anonymous star.

I would recommend selling high on any Eugenio Suarez stock you might own. He actually posted the highest Contact Score (131) of any shortstop in either league, and luck was a major factor. His K/BB profile is terrible, second worst to Ian Desmond among shortstops, and his authority profile, while fine for his position, is nothing special. A low pop-up rate is the only true positive, with most of his pop derived from an inflated fly-ball rate that is likely to correct downward moving forward. His inability to hit the ball hard on the ground is another bad sign. He’s a contributor moving forward, but not a building block.

Jhonny Peralta has exhibited metronome-like consistency over the years. His high liner rates are an annual phenomenon: he had an 82 liner rate percentile rank in 2015, his sixth consecutive mark of 60 or higher. His BIP authority has waned of late, and he’s had to pull more to tap into any measure of extra-base power. He’s a high-floor, increasingly low-ceiling guy who is fading, but still reliable.

Troy Tulowitzki’s numbers above include both his tenure in Colorado and Toronto. Injuries were a factor in his nondescript 2015 performance, but haven’t they always been with Tulo? Fact is, he’s declining, and doesn’t have the mile-high air to hide it anymore. His K/BB profile collapsed last season, his average BIP authority dropped into the average range for the first time since 2008, and his always high pop-up rate continues to climb. Worst of all, he’s devolved into a pull-at-all-cost type, potentially placing his batting average under extreme duress. There’s a very real chance that he’s nothing better than an average offensive player moving forward.

Wilmer Flores is no great shakes, but did the Mets really need to spend on what is at best a minimal upgrade to Asdrubal Cabrera at shortstop? Flores made tons of contact — at respectable authority for his position — at the tender age of 23 last season. He’s not even arbitration eligible yet. The extreme pop-up rate is a big turn off, as is the low walk rate, but I would have taken the 90-95 OPS+ projection at a premium position and spent the Cabrera money elsewhere.

Obviously, Andrelton Simmons‘ calling card is his impact defense. How good could this guy be with a league-average offensive arsenal? The raw materials are there. He never strikes out, and his walk rate has crept up over the years, so his OPS+ should always outstrip his Contact Score. For his position, his BIP authority isn’t bad, either. There are two big problems, however. The first, his extreme grounder rate, will be tough to shake. The other, his extreme tendency to hit the ball to the middle of the field — over two STD more often than average — could be addressed with a greater focus on selectively pulling in the air. Great defenders, like Ozzie Smith and Yadier Molina, to name two, often take time to figure out the offensive end, but they tend to eventually do so. His best years with the bat are ahead of him.

Kudos to the Yanks for buying low on Starlin Castro. From 2010 to 2014, his liner rate percentile ranks were above average every year, ranging from 58 to 92. Last year, it was 7; it will positively regress. Also expect modest improvement in his walk rate, which fell through the floor last year. He will bounce back with the bat in a big way in 2016.

The real problem with Ian Desmond’s offensive game started in 2014, when his K rate ramped up by a third. The situation intensified last season, when his liner rate, which has never been a strength, totally cratered. Desmond has always hit the ball harder than his positional peers, but has struggled to add any nuance to his offensive game. He’s never hit many fly balls, and his poor K/BB profile means he has to run a 125 Contact Score or better to have a chance to post even a 100 OPS+. The timing of his decline has cost him a ton of money, and he’s now faced with possibly having to move to third base to land a job for 2016, which only raises the offensive bar.

Not sure what the Diamondbacks’ plans are for their middle infield. We covered Chris Owings and his bleak offensive outlook earlier this week. Nick Ahmed and Jean Segura also possess dismal projections. Ahmed has nothing going for him with the bat: poor authority, too many pop ups and weak fly balls, an ordinary K/BB profile and a fairly extreme pull tendency. He’s not going to hit. Segura can fly, at least, and uses the entire field. He hits tons of grounders, and strikes them with reasonable authority. His liner rate has been consistently low, so regression is unlikely there. He needs scads of infield hits, like he had in his first full season in Milwaukee, to even appear to be a viable offensive player. It will be a defense-first operation up the middle in Arizona.

NL shortstops combined for an average 86 OPS+ and 89 Contact Score in 2015, just a tad less productive than their AL peers. The biggest difference between the two groups was the NL shortstops’ higher K rates.