2016 Hitter Contact-Quality Report: NL Second Basemen

With the Winter Meetings on the horizon, our position-by-position look at hitter contact quality continues, using granular exit-speed and launch-angle data as our primary guides. On Monday, it was the AL second-sackers’ turn; today, we turn to their senior-circuit counterparts.

The players below are listed in Adjusted Production order. Adjusted Production expresses, on a scale where 100 equals average, what a hitter “should have” produced based on the exit speed/launch angle of each ball put in play. Each player’s Adjusted Contact Score, which weeds out the strikeouts and walks and states what each player should have produced on BIP alone, is also listed. Here goes:

Most of the column headers are self-explanatory, including average BIP speed (overall and by BIP type), BIP type frequency, K and BB rates, wRC+ and Adjusted Production, which incorporates the exit speed/angle data. Each hitter’s Adjusted Contact Score (ADJ C) is also listed. Adjusted Contact Score applies league-average production to each hitter’s individual actual BIP type and velocity mix, and compares it to league average of 100.

Cells are also color-coded. If a hitter’s value is two standard deviations or more higher than average, the field is shaded red. If it’s one to two STD higher than average, it’s shaded orange. If it’s one-half to one STD higher than average, it’s shaded dark yellow. If it’s one-half to one STD less than average, it’s shaded blue. If it’s over one STD less than average, it’s shaded black. Ran out of colors at that point. On the rare occasions that a value is over two STD lower than average, we’ll mention it if necessary in the text.

It should be noted that individual hitters’ BIP frequency and authority figures correlate quite well from year to year, with one notable exception. As with pitchers, individual hitters’ liner rates fluctuate quite significantly from year to year, for all but a handful of hitters with a clear talent (or lack thereof) for squaring up the baseball.

Projecting performance based on BIP speed/angle opens us up to a couple biases that we didn’t need to address when evaluating pitchers. Pitchers face a mix of pull- and opposite-field-oriented hitters, more and less authoritative hitters, etc. Hitters are who they are each time they step up to the plate, and we must choose whether or not to address their individual tendencies.

I have adjusted the projected ground-ball performance for hitters who meet two criteria. First, they’ve recorded over five times as many grounders to the pull side than to the opposite field and, second, they exhibit a resulting deficiency in actual versus projected grounder performance. Such hitters’ projected grounder performance was capped at their actual performance level. Such hitters’ Adjusted Contact Scores and Adjusted Production figures are in red fonts.

I have decided not to adjust for the other primary factor that can skew actual versus projected performance based on exit speed/angle — namely, player speed. We’re attempting to assess hitter contact quality here; let’s keep speed/athleticism separate. As a result, we’ll see some slow, hard-hitting-to-all-fields sluggers overperform on this metric, and some more athletic players underperform. Contact quality is just part of offensive baseball; let’s attempt to isolate and evaluate it on its own.

NL second basemen had the exact same average Adjusted Contact Score (99) as their AL brethren in 2016, but posted higher Adjusted Production (104 to 98) due to superior strikeout and walk rates. More had half of this group features materially lower-than-average K rates, with four of the top five overall performers clocking in over a full STD lower than the NL average.

The metamorphosis of Daniel Murphy appears to be complete. Always a relatively low-K guy, he sharply raised his contact rate in 2015, and didn’t give too much of the reduction back this season. He’s also jacked up his fly-ball rate to about as high as you want to go without creating a real risk of regression, and has learned to selectively pull the ball in the air without becoming an extreme grounder-puller in the process. It’s kind of the best of all worlds. There’s likely nowhere to go but down in the future, but his decline phase should be smooth and productive.

DJ LeMahieu does not get enough credit as a hitter. Coors Field batters tend to get painted with a broad brush, but some Rockies get a lot more help from their environs than others. As an extreme ground-ball hitter, LeMahieu gets almost no assistance. He has very quietly cut deeply into his K rate over time, and his liner-rate percentile rank has been in the 90s in three of his four years as a regular. He just might be one of those guys with a true knack for squaring up the baseball. He’s ramped up his average authority over the years and really smokes the ball on the ground, a trait that ages well. I’d keep him around long term if I were Rockies’ management, something I’d almost never say about a Colorado position player.

Neil Walker is what he is what he is. His overall authority has been in the average range for years now, but he’s gradually edged his fly-ball rate upward to tap deeper into his power potential. He’s gone about as far he can go, as his pop-up rate is now creeping into the danger zone. There are no red flags in his profile that would indicate a near-term plunge, but I would expect a gradual decline starting immediately. His average might come under pressure from his poor grounder authority; his power, from fly-ball-rate regression. He’s in the latter stages of his peak period.

Jean Segura is a very interesting case, and a topical one as well, given his recent trade to Seattle. He’s had two good and two really bad seasons over the last four years, but there are some signs of real progress in his 2016 profile. His overall authority was over a full STD below average as recently as 2014, but now he has arrived in the average range. He’s been able to increase his still quite low BB rate over the same period, without a corresponding increase in his K rate. His fly-ball rate has room to grow, and he experienced 2016 success while running a fairly low liner rate, which should regress upward moving forward. All good stuff. His defensive contribution will likely take a hit as he moves to shortstop in 2017, but I’d expect at least league-average offense from Segura in 2017.

Look at the lack of shading in Ben Zobrist’s authority and frequency profiles. His greatest strength, besides his versatility, is his utter lack of weaknesses. He has developed a significant grounder-pulling tendency, incurring a penalty in the process, but his status as one of a very small number of MLB regulars who walks more than he whiffs affords him plenty of margin for error with regard to contact quality. His fly-ball authority (76 Adjusted Contact Score) is slipping away from him and will eventually cause his demise, but he’s got some time as a solid offensive player yet. Oh, and Cub fans, as for Javier Baez and Kris Bryant, they’ll appear with the third basemen and left fielders, respectively.

Ryan Schimpf’s profile is beyond ridiculous. He’s the only player on this list with above-average fly-ball and liner authority — and, in both cases, he’s over a full STD above average. On the other hand, his fly-ball and liner rates are cartoonish, over three STD higher than average, and his grounder authority was nearly three STD below average. He’s the only player here with a materially above-average K rate, and it too is over a full STD higher. He’s an extreme grounder-puller who batted .120 AVG-.120 SLG (24 Unadjusted Production) on the rare occasions he hit the ball on the ground. Despite an extreme 255 Adjusted Fly Ball Contact Score, his Adjusted Production was only 111.

So what gives moving forward? Well, the Ks likely remain, a lot of the fly balls go away, and his projected production falls off of the table. Players like this simply don’t last. He did what he had to do to finally get his chance, and is likely to have at least a limited role with the Padres this season, but this hard-fly-ball and weak-pulled-grounder profile is that of an old player scrambling to stick around, a la Raul Ibanez‘ last productive year.

Jedd Gyorko is a much less exaggerated version of Schimpf. His fly-ball rate is high, nearly maxed out, and is likely to regress in 2017, hampering his power production. He hits the ball very weakly on the ground, and almost exclusively pulls those grounders; he batted .124 AVG-.146 SLG (29 Unadjusted Production) on them, with his production capped at that level as a result. He moderated both his K and BB rates in 2016, a positive development. Consider 2016 a best-case scenario; I’d expect a power-before-hit player with projected production drifting under 100 in the near term.

Joe Panik was better than his traditional numbers last season. He unluckily batted .533 AVG-.640 SLG on his liners (61 Unadjusted Contact Score, adjusted upward to 86 for context). He rarely strikes out, meaning he can withstand light contact and remain reasonably productive. His overall Unadjusted Production was adjusted upward to 76 for context (mostly that liner deficit), which actually makes him an above-average offensive player (102 Adjusted Production). His floor is high, and while his ceiling is modest, it’s higher than his 2016 benchmark, as his liner rate should move upward going forward.

Like Panik, Jace Peterson is a high-floor, relatively low-ceiling player. He hit zero infield pop ups in 2016, a real positive, and he draws a lot of walks for a hitter that shouldn’t instill much fear in pitchers. All he needs to do to be a league-average offensive player is run an Adjusted Contact Score in the 80-85 range, something he should do with his ability to avoid the pop up and strike his fly balls (92 Adjusted Contact Score) at a respectable authority level.

The 2016 campaign was likely a best-case scenario offensively for Cesar Hernandez. His speed, in part, enabled him to bat .275 AVG-.319 SLG (140 Unadjusted Contact Score, adjusted down to 96 for context) on the ground. That’s responsible for the difference between his 108 wRC+ and his 96 Adjusted Production. Moving forward, there are a couple of positives. His walk rate has trended up despite his utter lack of long-ball power, and his liner rate has been elevated in both of his seasons as a regular, at least raising the possibility that he’s one of the few who can accomplish this feat over the long haul. Ultimately, a guy with a 46 Adjusted Fly Ball Contact Score can only be so good, and 2016 Hernandez was up against his ceiling.

Zobrist fans can look to Chase Utley’s decline phase as a prototype. Utley’s average authority slipped from over one-half STD above average in 2014 to the average range in 2015 to over one-half STD below in 2016. His walk rate has trended downward as the amount of respect afforded him by pitchers has declined. With all of that, Utley is still quite useful as the heavy half of a second-base platoon. Selling out for pull power might allow the former Phil to go out with a blaze of glory, but I wouldn’t bet on it, given his low-key, substance-over-style persona. He’ll be an interesting Hall of Fame case.

From a purely offensive standpoint, Brandon Phillips‘ decline is likely a year more advanced than Utley’s. He’s gone from average authority in 2014 to over one-half STD below in 2015 to over a full STD below in 2016. He was worse than his traditional numbers this season, as his Adjusted Grounder Contact score of 87 was well below his unadjusted mark of 109. He makes a ton of contact and is still athletic and durable enough to provide some defensive and baserunning value, but his Adjusted Fly Ball Contact Score of 54 combined with his ultra-low BB rate are deal-breakers. The rebuilding Reds should find a market for Phillips while it exists.

Here’s our overrated player of the day: Scooter Gennett. He isn’t “rated” all that highly, so that’s saying something. His home park pumps up his power production significantl: he batted .406 AVG-.934 SLG (132 Unadjusted Contact Score) in the air, while his granular data supports a much lower 52 mark. He lacks positional flexibility and, despite some improvement versus lefties, remains largely a platoon option. Expect the Brewers to try to find him a new home this offseason.

Josh Harrison’s overall authority has dropped from above to below average since his career year in 2014, a big deal given his ongoing elevated fly-ball rate. A number of those flies have moved from the just-enough homer category to the upper bound of the fly-ball “donut hole,” where careers go to die. I wouldn’t write off Harrison just yet; he’s been a liner machine in years past, and could regress upward in that department moving forward. His ability to keep his pop-up rate low while hitting a ton of fly balls is also a positive.

Dee Gordon’s overall, fly-ball and liner authority levels are over two full STD below average. His 2016 decline, early-season suspension notwithstanding, was a very easy one to call. His wRC+ exceeds his projected production because of his speed; he batted .298 AVG-.351 SLG (156 Unadjusted Contact Score, adjusted down to 62 for context) on the ground. Still, with Adjusted Contact Scores of 28 in the air and 73 on a line, it’s tough to survive, let alone thrive, over the long haul. I’m not buying a big bounce back.