I’ve long been greatly interested in Jonathan Lucroy, so now I find myself greatly interested in his situation with the Brewers. The Brewers, as you know, are bad, and they’re prepared for being bad, and though Lucroy is decidedly not bad, he’s got just two more seasons of control, and he’s coming up on 30 years old. It makes sense for Lucroy to be on the market, therefore, and this is something I wrote about a month ago for Fox. It’s a complicated spot for Milwaukee, given Lucroy’s up-and-down year and concussion, but Lucroy should be able to bring back a haul.

The team I’ve heard connected most often is the Rangers, who are a clear contender, but who could use some more affordable help. Robinson Chirinos is a fine-enough catcher, but Lucroy is better, and he could also spell Mitch Moreland at first when there’s a lefty on the mound. The Rangers would love to have Lucroy on what’s left of his cheap contract. The problem to this point: from what I’ve heard, the Brewers have been asking for entirely too much. The ask has been a non-starter, so Lucroy remains where he’s been.

Yet, let’s make an assumption: MLB executives are reasonable people. So they can arrive at reasonable deals, and the Brewers surely understand there’s some risk in keeping Lucroy around into the year. What this post is about, then, is trying to find a fit between the Rangers and the Brewers. It’s not like the Rangers are the only interested team, but they might be the most interested. Let’s run through some possibilities, together. How might the Rangers and Brewers be able to pull something off?

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Ben and Sam talk to FanGraphs legal analyst Nathaniel Grow about a number of baseball-related cases working their way through the courts.

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Episode 624
Nathaniel Grow is a contributor to the electronic pages of FanGraphs and also a doctor of jurisprudence, by virtue of which latter distinction he serves as a professor at the University of Georgia. Here he discusses certain issues wherein baseball and the law meet — including, but not limited to, the class-action suit which challenges Major League Baseball’s practice of assigning exclusive local broadcast territories and also the recent case of Chris Correa, the Astros’ Ground Control database, and the hacking of the latter by the former.

This edition of the program is sponsored by Draft, the first truly mobile fantasy sports app. Compete directly against idiot host Carson Cistulli by clicking here.

Don’t hesitate to direct pod-related correspondence to @cistulli on Twitter.

You can subscribe to the podcast via iTunes or other feeder things.

Audio after the jump. (Approximately 47 min play time.)

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Ben and Sam banter about Chris Davis and burning ships, then answer a listener email about how to make Mike Trout matter to non-fans.

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Yesterday I wrote about Carter Capps, who last year was on his way to an almost impossible season before elbow trouble sent him off. The idea was to remind you of just what Capps was able to do over 30-odd innings, and in support of that, I noted that Capps had baseball’s most unhittable pitch if you set the minimum to 100 of a given pitch type thrown. That’s important — Capps’ slider is one of the very best sliders, on account of what he can do with his fastball.

But, we talked about how minimums are arbitrary. You can set them wherever you want, and, you know, 100 pitches is plenty, but you could look for more. For fun, why don’t we double the minimum? Here are the most unhittable pitches last year, for pitches thrown at least 200 times:

1. A.J. Ramos changeup, 34.8% swinging strikes
2. Will Smith slider, 29.5%
3. Carlos Carrasco curveball, 28.3%

At the 100-pitch minimum, Capps had a lead of about six percentage points over Ramos. At the 200-pitch minimum, Ramos had a lead of more than five percentage points over Smith. Ramos isn’t a freak in the way that Capps is a freak, but you could just as easily argue Ramos is more impressive since he doesn’t do anything to challenge the rules. A.J. Ramos just pitches, pretty quietly, and pretty quietly, he’s thrown a changeup as good as almost anyone else’s.

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It’s mid-January, a time when the baseball calendar is usually dominated by the arbitration process and the lead-up thereto, the excitement of the exchanging of figures, pre-hearing settlements, etc. Not in 2016. Material free agents remain unsigned, from Justin Upton, Yoenis Cespedes, Dexter Fowler and friends on the position player side to Yovani Gallardo and Ian Kennedy among pitchers.

Recently, we discussed the respective statuses of Gallardo and new Marlin Wei-Yin Chen in this space. Today, it’s Kennedy’s turn in the barrel. Only very recently has even a hint of a whisper of the recent Padre’s name been uttered in the rumor mill. As we speak, the Royals appear to be homing in on Kennedy. What is his appropriate market value, and is Kansas City a destination where he can thrive?

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There is enough literature out there to debunk the theory that players generally play better in the year prior to free agency. Anecdotally speaking, this season, we saw top pitchers like Johnny Cueto, Zack Greinke, and David Price have solid years in line with their established levels. Jason Heyward and Justin Upton also produced seasons that resembled their career numbers. Meanwhile, Ian Desmond, Jeff Samardzija — and, to a lesser extent, Alex Gordon and Jordan Zimmermann — did not quite live up to prior years. The two biggest examples of players with out-of-the-ordinary walk years, Yoenis Cespedes and Chris Davis, remain unsigned into the middle of January. Out of the top 11 free agents, just two had abnormally strong walk years. Just because the walk-year performance is a myth, that doesn’t mean that players who do perform extraordinarily well receive less in the way of compensation than their more consistent counterparts.

Examining recent contracts, we can attempt to determine if those players who had big jumps in their walk-year performance were paid more than those with more consistently strong performances. Over the past ten offseasons, 39 hitters have received contracts in excess of $50 million. While a broader look at all free agents might reveal a few more interesting players, I set a floor to examine only those free agents who could have benefited substantially from big walk years, as well as similar contracts for those without the same leap in performance during the final season of their contracts.

To establish those players with big walk years, I performed a simple, Marcel-like calculation (weighting seasons by multipliers of 5, 4, and 3) of the WAR of a player’s three previous seasons to establish a base of expectations for their walk-year performance. Then, I looked at the player’s walk-year performance as a comparison. Due to survivorship bias, this group does not represent an appropriate dataset to debunk the walk-year myth, given that most players who would perform poorly (e.g. Ian Desmond) in their walk year have already been purposefully removed. It is interesting to note, however, that only 15 of 39 (38%) players had big jumps in their walk years. Eighteen players (46%) were fairly close to their expected WAR, while another six (15%) had down years (defined here as a 40% drop or worse) ahead of free agency. On average, the group of 39 players was just 0.7 WAR (18%) better in their walk year despite the survivorship bias issue.

Below is a chart with the players who exceeded their expected WAR by 50% or more in their walk years, including Yoenis Cespedes and Chris Davis. Players are sorted in order of percentage by which they exceeded their expected win totals (denoted as % Over Exp. WAR).

Given the nature of big free agents, it would be easy to suggest that teams ought to avoid paying big money to players who have huge walk years. On the other hand, that wisdom is relevant to all free agents, as many fail to return complete value for the signing team. Many of the deals above are still ongoing. The Adrian Beltre contract has been fantastic, while Nelson Cruz and Russell Martin have been solid deals thus far.

One easy way to determine if the members of the above group are being paid more than they would have been in the absence of their giant walk year, would be to simply add up the years and salaries and compare the totals to those produced by the player who didn’t produce unexpectedly strong walk years. The above group’s average contract went for 5.9 years and $109.5 million, for an average of $18.6 million per year. Removing the six walk-year underperformers, we are left with 18 players who were within expectations in their walk year. Those 18 players received contracts averaging 5.6 years and $102.8 million, for an average of $18.4 million per year. A slightly higher guarantee in a group of players this small could lead to the conclusion that the big walk year provides some extra benefit. However, this could also be mitigated by the fact that the big-walk-year group had an average WAR of 5.5 during the walk year, while the other group’s average WAR was 3.8 in the walk year. Given that number, it might be fair to say that the walk year is of no benefit.

The evidence so far would lead you to believe that players who have unexpectedly big seasons in their walk year do not see a benefit from that great year. However, we can delve a bit further. Just because they receive the same amount of money, and just because their WAR was higher in their respective walk years, that does not necessarily mean their talent level and expected production over the course of the contract was necessarily higher. By creating an expected contract based on their present talent level, we can better compare who is getting paid more relative to expected production.

To calculate these expected-contract terms, I first set about determining the level of production one could expect from each player in the first year of his new contract. To do this, I used the same method as above, taking each player’s previous three years and weighting them (5, 4, 3 with normal aging). Then, using the first year WAR total, I projected WAR totals over the life of the contract using standard aging curves (-0.5 WAR/year age-31 to age-36, -0.75 WAR/year at age-37 and beyond). That WAR was translated into dollar figures by using $8 million per WAR this season and subtracting $250,000 every year for the value of a win at contract start date. Over the course of the contract, 5% inflation per year was used when valuing a win. Note that for contract years I’ve used the same figures as each player actually received. While it is possible to create an expectation for more or fewer years, using the same length for each expected contract allows for easier overall comparison.

The projected dollar figures overshot the actual dollar figures by about 15%, and there are certainly a few valid reasons for this: (1) it is possible that high market hitters are slightly undervalued when compared to all of free agency, especially pitchers and those who take mid-sized deals, (2) it is possible that the dollar-per-win estimates used are a bit high, and (3) some regression toward the mean might be necessary. While not necessarily solving the above problems, but helping to more easily show the difference between the big walk year group and the rest, the expected figures were downsized to meet the totals actually handed out.

The average expected value of the contract for the average walk year players was higher than those that had a big walk year, but as we know from above, the players with the big walk year got paid a bit more. To be clear, the average walk year players are not players who are average relative to Major League Baseball, but put up a performance that was average for them in their walk years. The chart below shows the difference between the groups.

The walk year decliners have been included mainly to separate themselves from the players who had average years. With just six players who had surprisingly poor walk years, not much can be shown, but the decline did not appear to have had much of an effect on the individual contracts in that group. As for the players with the big walk year, the difference in expectations between those players who produced a typical year is nearly $18 million over the life of a contract.

In looking at the individual numbers, which I will show in full below, there is a major outlier in Jason Heyward, whose projection had him getting a massive $300 million payday. A few other players are out there, but not quite to that level. Even taking Heyward away, there is still a difference between groups.

Admittedly, 39 players is not a lot of data — nor is the addition of Cespedes, Davis, or Upton likely to move the needle much this offseason unless they end up taking less than $100 million. Looking into the individual numbers, over the last ten years, the players who had a big walk year were more likely to be overpaid relative to expected production and highly unlikely to be underpaid.

While it is not definitive, there is some evidence to suggest that players benefit from having big walk years compared to similarly situated free agents.

*****

Here’s the full chart of free agents in their walk years. Note that Victor Martinez appears twice; he signed two contracts.

On Monday, we released our first projected standings of 2016, with the Cubs unsurprisingly looking like the best team in baseball heading into Spring Training. More controversially, though, the Steamer projections — which is what our Forecasted Standings are based on currently, and will be until we add in the full ZIPS projections — see the Boston Red Sox as the second best team in baseball at this point, forecasting them for a 92-70 record.

That would be a 14 win improvement over last year’s 78-84 mark, which also notably came after the projections expected big things from the club. Understandably, there’s a decent amount of skepticism surrounding the idea that the Red Sox are really the AL’s best club on paper, so let’s look a bit deeper into the nuts and bolts of the forecast to see what’s really driving Steamer’s belief that Boston’s roster is ready to contend.

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There were only four of them. Blown saves, that is. I presume you’ve read the title. Zach Britton blew four saves last year, which actually isn’t a particularly noteworthy fact. Britton blew four saves in 40 tries, which is great, but it certainly wasn’t the best, and Britton blew four saves the year before too, in one more try. It’s great but not spectacular, especially relative to Britton’s season as a whole, which was both great and spectacular and plenty of other adjectives like awesome (in the literal sense of actually inspiring awe) or remarkable or astonishing or breathtaking or historic. Britton struck out nearly a third of all batters he faced and posted the highest ground ball rate in history. That’s spectacular. “History” in this case dates back to just 2002, but Britton stands alone at the top by a comfortable margin, 3.5 standard deviations above the mean and a full standard deviation above the guy in third place. History doesn’t reach back super far in this instance, but given the magnitude of his lead, we can expect Britton’s place in history to continue for some time, given Britton doesn’t go and break his own record.

The save is a mostly silly statistic anyway, which by proxy makes it’s cousin, the blown save, equally frivolous. But what if I told you that simply by watching how Zach Britton blew his four saves in 2015, you’d come away knowing more about Zach Britton, more about the nature of saves and blown saves, and maybe more about other things, too? Well, you’d either continue reading the blog post or you wouldn’t. That’s what would happen if I told you what I just told you. I’d prefer that you continue reading the blog post, but let’s be honest it’s 2016 and you’ve probably got a phone to look at, so really you could just scan the moving pictures and get the gist. I’m not gonna lie to you. Just know that my words would feel left out and sad. 🙁
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