A Case for the Astros Signing Shin-Soo Choo
The 2013 Winter Meetings came and went without a team reaching an agreement with Shin-Soo Choo, the best free agent outfielder available, at least after the signing of Jacoby Ellsbury. During the meetings, reports were coming in from various sources who report on such things that the Rangers, the Reds, and perhaps the Mariners were all kicking Choo’s tires. All of this makes sense. Those were three reasonable destinations for Choo at the time. But the rumors were just that, and nothing was doing on that front as the Winter Meetings came to a close. Then, as the meetings were winding down and people were boarding planes home, USA Today’s Bob Nigtengale tweeted this:
One veteran GM believes that the #Astros will wind up to be the landing spot for Shin-Soo Choo.
— Bob Nightengale (@BNightengale) December 12, 2013
Other people on Twitter responded with some very reasonable questions, namely “What?” and “Why?”. But, sure enough, other reporters started saying that they had heard the same thing — the Astros were at least thinking about Shin-Soo Choo. Certainly, at first blush, a bad team spending big money on a free agent seems a little out of sorts. This was a big argument with the Robinson Cano deal. But the Cano signing has layers beyond that, and so would a hypothetical deal with Choo and the Astros. While it might seem farfetched and ill-advised now, the Astros bringing on a big name and big talent like Choo could seem very reasonable quite soon.
For the sake of argument, I’m going to start with what the FanGraphs crowdsourcing project came up with in regards to Choo’s contract. There have been rumblings from at least one writer — who, shall we say, has been known to herald players represented by Choo’s agent Scott Boras — that Choo’s camp might be looking for a Jacoby-Ellsbury-type deal. If that is the case, all bets are off. That would not be a very good deal for the Astros. Or any team, really. The FanGraphs readership pegged Choo for five years, $81 million. Six years sounds more reasonable, and something the Astros would probably have to offer to get a very good free agent to join their young upstart club. So let’s say six years and $100 million, just to make it a nice round number.
| Age | Salary (Million) | WAR | $ (Million)/War |
|---|---|---|---|
| 31 | $16.66 | 4.7 | $3.54 |
| 32 | $16.66 | 4.2 | $3.97 |
| 33 | $16.67 | 3.7 | $4.51 |
| 34 | $16.67 | 3 | $5.56 |
| 35 | $16.67 | 2.3 | $7.25 |
| 36 | $16.67 | 1.6 | $10.42 |
| Total | $100.00 | 19.5 | $5.87 |
The above table uses a standard .5 WAR yearly regression through age 33, then a .7 regression thereafter. Looking at it again, this seems low. This would be too team-friendly of an offer, and Boras is too good of an agent, for this to be the final number. If a club can get Choo for this, good on them. That would be a relative steal. Jeff Passan has recently reported that the Yankees offered Choo a seven-year, $140 million deal. Choo and Boras reportedly turned that down. That could be for money reasons, it could be for other reasons. Choo is rumored to be considering his move very seriously, and how it will affect his happiness and that of his family. Perhaps New York just isn’t the place for him. Or, maybe he just wants an Ellsbury deal. But if he were to accept that offer from another club, this is what the breakdown would look like.
| Age | Salary (Million) | WAR | $ (Million)/War |
|---|---|---|---|
| 31 | $20.00 | 4.7 | $3.54 |
| 32 | $20.00 | 4.2 | $3.97 |
| 33 | $20.00 | 3.7 | $4.51 |
| 34 | $20.00 | 3 | $5.56 |
| 35 | $20.00 | 2.3 | $7.25 |
| 36 | $20.00 | 1.6 | $10.42 |
| 37 | $20.00 | 0.9 | $22.22 |
| Total | $140.00 | 19.5 | $8.21 |
This deal starts to go south sooner, and ends quite badly in the last two years, even adjusting for price-per-win inflation. There are some other things to consider, however. First off, Choo’s WAR this year was slightly deflated due to the Reds’ insistence on playing him out of position in center field. UZR pegs his best position as left field, and if he had played there, his 2013 value (the basis for the regression) could have seen a slight uptick. Not a huge one, certainly, but a non-negative defensive number would have brought up the baseline a little. What might make a bigger difference in this equation is Choo’s impressive 15.7% walk rate. That was good enough for second best in the league in 2013, behind Joey Votto. According to aging curve research done on this very site, we can see that BB% declines with age, but not a whole lot. Plate discipline ages well, and Choo would be looking at about a 1% decline between the beginning and end of our hypothetical contract. Which would leave him at a 15.54 BB%. That, in 2013, would still be second best. Looking at the aging curve for isolated power, Choo would drop down to about .167. For reference, a 2018 Shin-Soo Choo is projected to walk like a 2013 Mike Trout and hit for power like a 2013 Adrian Gonzalez. Could be worse. He has a chance to slightly outperform this standard aging regression given the skill set he’s starting with. How much so is up for debate, but let’s say his decelerated regression leads to him decreasing .5 WAR all throughout the contract, rather than .7 after his age-33 season.
| Age | Salary (Million) | WAR | $ (Million)/War |
|---|---|---|---|
| 31 | $20.00 | 4.7 | $4.26 |
| 32 | $20.00 | 4.2 | $4.76 |
| 33 | $20.00 | 3.7 | $5.41 |
| 34 | $20.00 | 3.2 | $6.25 |
| 35 | $20.00 | 2.7 | $7.41 |
| 36 | $20.00 | 2.2 | $9.09 |
| 37 | $20.00 | 1.7 | $11.76 |
| Total | $140.00 | 19.5 | $6.99 |
If this can be seen as a viable road map, and Choo stays relatively healthy, he will be serviceable enough in his later years to justify the value gained at the top of his contract. This would be good for the Rangers or the Reds, let’s say, but is it good for the Astros? The Astros lost 111 games in 2013. If they added two Shin-Soo Choos, they wouldn’t magically change into a playoff contender in 2014. But signing Choo, at least for Houston, wouldn’t be a move for 2014. It would be a move for 2015 or 2016, when he would still be providing a high relative value and the rest of the team was coming together around him. I don’t know if you’ve heard, but the Astros have been reinforcing their farm system quite a bit as of late. And pretty soon, some of these players will have to be brought up. When they are brought up, and it’s time to see if this grand experiment worked, it would be nice if Houston had a cornerstone already in the lineup. According to MLB Trade Rumors, here is the list of corner-outfield free agents available in 2015.
Melky Cabrera
Chris Denorfia
Brett Gardner
Jonny Gomes
Tony Gwynn Jr.
Scott Hairston
Ryan Ludwick
Darnell McDonald
Mike Morse
Seth Smith
Alfonso Soriano
Vernon Wells
Josh Willingham
Norichika Aoki
Michael Cuddyer
Torii Hunter
Nick Markakis
Alex Rios
Nate Schierholtz
Ichiro Suzuki
The pickings, they are slim. By “wasting” a year on Choo in 2014, the Astros would still have a productive left fielder to pair with their young core the following year. They’ve already added Dexter Fowler and Scott Feldman. They’ve started to bolster their historically-bad bullpen. 2014 won’t be their year, but that could start to change as soon as 2015. It seems a little silly to project a 2015 roster, especially when so much of it will be filled by current minor-leaguers, but here is a speculative one just for the sake of argument, with Choo installed.
C: Jason Castro
1B: Jonathan Singleton
2B: Jose Altuve
SS: Nolan Fontana
3B: Matt Dominguez
LF: Shin-Soo Choo
CF: George Springer
RF: Dexter Fowler
DH: Chris Carter
SP: Scott Feldman
SP: Mark Appel
SP: Mike Foltynewicz
SP: Jarred Cosart
SP: Brett Oberholtzer
Astros fans — there are still some out there, I checked — are intrigued right now. Not because of my fictitious-roster construction skills but because they’ve seen these names before. They’ve read about the potential of some of these young men. They want to see them on a major-league field. Adding a veteran on-base machine to mix only makes it better. It’s a pie-in-the-sky prediction, no doubt, to say that five prospects will progress enough to make the opening day roster in a year and a half, but there are always possibilities for short-term stopgaps or surprising surges from current roster members. It’s an idea more than a factual statement. It’s an idea that, with proper development mixed with a little bit of luck, the Astros can be relevant sooner than some may think. This doesn’t need to be a roster of world-beaters. It needs to be a roster that consists of more average or better players than last season’s roster did. Shin-Soo Choo, Jason Castro, Jose Altuve and a group of fill-ins and raw talent probably aren’t going to make a run at a championship, but it’s a better-than-decent team and a large step in the direction of releasing the Astros from their role as league punching bag and the butt of so many jokes.
Shin-Soo Choo would make this team better — unquestionably. The monetary cost of that is a big concern. The Astros have been watching their pocketbooks as of late. Their entire 2013 payroll was $26 million and $5 million of that was to Wandy Rodriguez, who was playing for the Pirates. It made sense for the Astros to save money. There was not a whole lot of difference between 91 losses and 111 losses when the goal was to remake this dumpster fire of a team. Save the money, and spend it when the time is right. On the grand scheme of things, though, there are other costs besides monetary ones — karmic costs, good-will overhead — that need to be considered.
I started a project at the beginning of the 2013 season in which I would follow the Astros for a year. That project is still ongoing. It seems like an exercise in masochism, but it was more of a social study. To see how the other half lives. The very, very depressing other half. As a result of this I, willingly, watched about 130 Houston Astros games. It was actually a very enlightening experience, and one I wouldn’t give back, but I did begin to feel — especially toward the end, as the team closed out the season with a 15-game losing streak — like I understood a little of what Houston fans were feeling. It was rough. Rougher than I thought. There’s something cosmically unsettling about being sure of a defeat, watching the contest anyway, and being right the whole time. It drains a person. Hope can only fuel someone so far. The Astros are in a position to throw something the fans’ way, to repay for some of these many lost hours.
The thing of it is, this wouldn’t be one of those eye-roll inducing signings meant to strictly placate the fans or bring people to the ballpark. This isn’t Montreal signing Pete Rose, or basically every move by the Rays’ first front office. It’s a right-minded baseball move, it’s just one Houston has to make a year or two early. Shin-Soo Choo, in name or skill, will not be available in 2015. That’s the way it goes sometimes. But by making the deal, by installing a quality major-league player that is sure to bring you a handful of good years and probably some average-ish years at the end, Houston can build a better team and start to mend some relationships at the same time.
The Astros, in the end, probably aren’t going to land Shin-Soo Choo. A team will probably end up overpaying for him when it’s all said and done. And if, indeed, Choo will end up with an Ellsbury deal, the Astros would be smart to stay away. But if all the stars align — if Choo is on the market long enough to bring his asking price down to a somewhat-manageable level — Houston has a chance to bump themselves back into the big time. There are certainly smarter ways to spend $140 million, but when a team has lost 498 games in the past five seasons, it makes sense to spend a little bit more today to give fans a better outlook on tomorrow.
David G. Temple is the Managing Editor of TechGraphs and a contributor to FanGraphs, NotGraphs and The Hardball Times. He hosts the award-eligible podcast Stealing Home. Dayn Perry once called him a "Bible Made of Lasers." Follow him on Twitter @davidgtemple.
This should go great. They’ve been missing that “veteran presence with rapidly declining defensive skills” ever since Carlos Lee left.
Also, is anyone else confused why Oliver projects Shin-Soo Choo to have his first positive defensive season since 2007? It’s an… ambitious projection, to say the least.
Update, I am now convinced that Oliver’s defensive projections must be broken on Fangraphs. No reasonable metric would assume a 5-year projection of +2 Runs of defense for Choo. I’m assuming we’re missing age-adjusted defensive adjustments entirely, and relying on something from his younger years.
umm because a slightly negative defensive CF is likely to be a Slightly positive defensive LF. The projection assumes a move back to LF.
but then again he was worse than slightly negative in Cf with -17 UZR. So it does seem like a stretch he would be a positive LF. more like a slightly negative LF. Of course houston can always DH him in his later years.
On a side note, how does one find out what position Oliver is actually projecting a player to play? If it’s not using any positional adjustments, that would be fairly important, wouldn’t it? I could project Youkilis as probably -5 runs or -20 runs per 150 games, depending on if I put him at 1B or 3B. Same deal with Choo, but probably closer to -5 for a corner and -15 for a CF.
I believe there is something wrong with them. Loney has a defensive projection of -10.7 for each of the next 5 years.
” but probably closer to -5 for a corner and -15 for a CF.”
Choo was a -15 in RF two years ago. He’s not going to be a -5.
You’re reading it wrong. The dashboard factors in positional adjustments. Choo put up positive UZR both in 2010 and 2011.
Ahhha. That is a good point. Though it raises the question why the main summary column shows a defensive stat with positional adjustments (all his prior performances) with a stat that apparently is not applying positional adjustments (Oliver). It also makes very little sense why Oliver would project no decline in defense over the next 5 years, nor why mildly positive performances in 2010/11 would outweigh terrible ones over the last two years. Something is still pretty weird…
All of the Oliver five year projections I’ve looked at use the same UZR for all five years. Kind of silly really.
this! 4.7 WAR projected for next year? That sounds pretty hopeful to me. I think 3-4 WAR is more reasonable, and there is much less room for age-related decline in that case.
Yeah, this whole piece is really optimistic and never seems to realize it.
That’s why I’ve kind of been nit-picking the projections. The 4.7 WAR projection next year is from Oliver. Steamer projects only 3 WAR next year. That’s a vast difference. Additionally, that difference is almost entirely on his defense (17.5 run difference) and not on his offense (0.4 difference). In short, these projections are relying on an extra 1+ WAR that assumes defense that Choo probably does not have anymore, then decaying from that unrealistic starting point.
Not to detract from the rest of the article, but the logic that signing a corner outfielder is more necessary now because of the lack of corner outfielders available in the future assumes that for some reason the Astros are restricted to signing a corner outfielder rather than a good free agent something else.
Excellent GIF summary of the Astros 2013!
This would not make sense. I’m surprised you guys would write a column like this after ripping the Royals to shreds for going for it and saying the Mariners moved too early on Cano considering the makeup of their team. This would be a huge gamble for pretty much no reason, and likely when their farm was ready to start producing ML ready talent Choo’s best years would be behind him and thus you’d have an albatross hanging around your neck that wouldn’t come off until your young talent started hitting arbitration.. This doesn’t make sense on all levels unless they got him for 5yr 80 which we all know won’t be happening.
The main difference between this and what the Royals did was that if the Astros were to sign Choo, it’s just money. The Royals gave up talent that would have helped them in 2013 to get Shields, which is plain stupid if you are “going for it.” The more apt comparison is the Cano signing. It is a gamble, but not an insane one. You can at least follow the logic. Since I’m a fan of teams trying to get better, and I don’t see where else they would likely spend the money to get better, it’s an acceptable risk.
The Astros have very few long-term salary commitments. Feldman for three years, Chad Qualls for two years, Altuve for four years and that’s it for players signed beyond 2014. Even if a hypothetical Choo contract winds up being a waste of money, they have the payroll room to absorb that without wrecking their franchise.
Yea but why absorb it? The Mets were smart in that despite fan pressure, they did not make any long term signings until they were about ready to start competing (which they believe is likely 2014 or 2015). The Astros will not be a good team in the either of those years without a huge payroll spike combined with some prospects making leaps to good MLB players. Signing Choo by itself is useless, unless they make other supplemental moves to put themselves to compete by 2015.
Sure, but they have a full year to make those supplemental moves. The Feldman signing already extends into their (hopeful) window of contention. If the hypothetical Choo signing is one piece in a larger process of building a contender, it’s worth the risk of doing so one year early.
The Royals traded a great prospect….all the Astros would “spend” here is money. There is a HUGE difference.Also, there is not a “fangraphs” opinion, there are opinions of each author……
Finally, what else would you have them do with the money?
Good post. It is always weird to hear other peoples’ disapproval in the form of “They are a terrible team. Why are they signing this good player.” It always makes think (to paraphrase the late Mitch Hedberg): It’s like some weird-ass quiz where he reveals the answer first.
I’m sorry, but anyone who thinks Choo will be a positive defender moving him to LF is just naive. He’s a terrible outfielder.
The last time he played meaningful LF innings was in 2009, which was before all his defensive metrics started falling off the earth.
He played 1300 innings in RF in 2012, and put up a -15/150 UZR. In 2011, he was basically average.
There’s very little reason to believe hes going to be anything other than a terrible defensive outfielder. He’s a DH or 1B at this point. He can’t run well, and his arm is going downhill.
Minute Maid is like Fenway…. It has a tiny left field porch. Defenseive woes are somewhat mitigated. I’ve seen shortstops catch popups in “deep” left field.
Also, per Major League rules (or maybe it’s the CBA?), teams that are receiving a lot in revenue sharing have to show some kind of effort to use that money to improve their play on the field. Perhaps they’ve done enough of that with the moves they’ve already made, but a Choo signing would definitely indicate they’re using those funds to improve their team.
You miscalculated $/WAR values in the second table.
Looks more like a copy/paste mistake in the WAR total for that one. It should total 21.4, not 19.5.
Urf, typo, or rather the total for the second table should be 20.4.
And the third should have a WAR total of 22.4.
Isn’t it a poor idea to project Choo for his massively career high BB% from last year? He hit 15.7%, but that is with a career 12.2% walk rate, and his BB% has held in the 10%-12% range. Shouldn’t we expect something more like regression towards that number, instead of a decline from 15.7%?
Is it just me or does 6/100 for Choo a steal compared to the 7/153 Ellsbury got? I know Choo is a year older, but he has a much better walk rate and hits for much more power. Aside from Ellsbury’s outlier year, he has been perfectly average offensively and gets all of his value from defense.
He did total a pretty average 52 stolen bases in 56 tries last year. What a bum. Career slash of .297/.350/.439 seems pretty average as well. Yeah, no offensive value that I can find in Ellsbury.
297/350/439 for a whopping career wRC+ of 109+. 08 and 09 wRC+ of 91 and 98, respectively. 2012, albeit cut short due to injury, wRC+ of 84.
08 and 09 are a long time ago, and pretty much irrelevant.
“gets all of his value from defense”
*shudder*
how dare he. How dare he produce positive run differentials for the team in a way other than hitting.
Defensive runs saved = offensive runs produced. There is literally no difference in outcome.
It does make a bit of sense, though, when we factor in aging. BB% skills age a lot better than defense from what we have seen..
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/yankees-sign-jacoby-ellsbury-bet-on-speed-aging-well/
true, BB% ages well, but so do players of ellsbury’s type, so I don’t think that totally holds up.
I do not believe that I said value from defense is a bad thing. My argument is that 7 year $153mm deals for him is absurd.
no, but that is what you said. he gets all his value defensively, so paying the market price for that value, the same market price for that value as if it had come offensively, is foolish. Lowballing a prediction for the next 7 years puts him around 17 WAR, which is a totally reasonable thing for the yankees to pay 153 mil for in an offense-first player, so why not a defense first player?
I like the interesting argument, however it fails to consider the loss of a high second round pick for the Astros. Those picks and the slot available to sign draft picks is not a nothing value. Sure 2nd round picks are not as valuable and I guess it would come in around number 42 or so, but that pick could provide some value.
The Astros are at least 2 years and maybe three away from contending. At that point the risk that something happens to Choo is even greater and it is possible his decline isn’t as steady as projected.
If the Astros have their eyes on contention in 2016 (hey, it’s possible), a 2014 second-round draft pick is highly unlikely to help them much. Granted, any given draft pick is more likely than not to bust, but even if that player works out he’ll probably need more than 1.5 years in the minors.
I’m not sold on Choo being a 4.7 WAR player. The average of the Steamer and Oliver projections is 3.85 WAR in 2014. If we start with that figure instead of 4.7, Choo only produces 14.4 WAR over the next 6 years and the $/WAR change significantly.
Well said. The article is a good attempt to justify an Astros signing of Choo but it works from far too high of a baseline. Choo was only worth 2.4 wins in 2012 and 1.3 in 2011, so we shouldn’t just assume he’ll be a downballot MVP candidate in the early years of any deal.
Apparently Choo turned down 7/140 mil from the yankees, so I think it’s safe to say that all bets are off
I can barely believe the Yankees offered him that much; I can’t believe he turned it down.
It sounds like a rumour that his agent planted.
I’d say that projecting Choo to be worth 12.6 WAR in his age 31-33 seasons when he was worth only 8.9 in his age 28-30 seasons seems a tad optimistic. Especially when he was already brutal in right field as a 29-year-old, and part of his offensive value in 2013 came from being drilled by many baseballs.
What if Houston paid Choo most of his money up front? With their ridiculously low payroll right now, they could pay him $40 million, or 50 or 60 million, in 2014 and still finish miles below the luxury tax threshold. In fact, this would be borrowing heavily from the present to finance the future. Usually, big contracts are back-loaded, because this allows contenders to sign more good players during their window, and pay for it later. In this case, the reverse would be occurring. Let’s say, for the sake of argument, that the Astros offer a 6-year, $110 million deal. They pay Choo $60 million in 2014, and then $30 million in 2015 (when we still expect them to have a young, cost-controlled core, leaving payroll space for such ridiculous overpays).
That leaves them with a 4-year contract, for 20 million. During those 4 years, we have a projection of about 10 WAR. Right now, that’s worth 50-60 million, or at least 30 million of surplus value, all this without taking into account win-price inflation. It’s a gamble, so let’s look at what happens if Choo provides half of the expected production. That’s still 5 WAR for 20 million-a good deal, even better with the expected/certain inflation in the price of wins.
Any money spent in 2014 that can help the club contend in 2015 and beyond is a win. Right now, it’s not as if they have anywhere else to invest the money.
The one caveat is this: maybe Choo pushes the Astros not to .500, but into 65-70-win territory. The lower draft position might cost them dearly, if they miss out on a superstar able to provide more production than Choo, for 6 years of below-market value salary. After all, look at the last 5 number 1 picks-Stephen Strasburg, Bryce Harper, Gerrit Cole, Carlos Correa, Mark Appel. The first 3 are looking like household names for years to come, though it’s early to judge Correa or Appel.
There’s a reason why you’d see a lot of back-loaded contracts but no front-loaded ones; simple economics and laws of inflation dictate that money now is worth more than money later. I do concede that front-loading would be conceivable for Astros in this particular case, but not at granting him $60, or even $35~40 million in the coming year.
It’s got very little to do with that, and more to do with the fact that the luxury tax doesn’t care.
Luxury tax is calculated on per-year average value of the contract.
The 6 year 110M deal you give Choo counts as 18.3M each year, no matter which year you actually give them the money.
This. I’ve been wondering for a while now why this hasn’t been done. Pay out the nose for the first few years and not so much later on….
“Right now, it’s not as if they have anywhere else to invest the money.”
They can always put it in a money-market account and use it later. It’s not like money vanishes if they don’t spend it on players.
Luxury tax space does though.
Total WAR in the 2nd chart should be 20.4 which changes the $WAR Values which are calculated wrong in the first place.
Gardner and Rios are looking to be slightly worse versions of Choo in that next free agent batch that will probably sign for a lot cheaper; sure Choo is the ideal but for a bad team having a decent player instead of a very good player isn’t going to be crippling.
Guess not.