A Series of Fortunate Pitching Decisions
Baseball is a game all about decisions. Some are minuscule, micro-level decisions that everyone will forget about after they happen. Should I sit fastball on this pitch? Should I take off for second base? Meanwhile, some are much larger, macro-level decisions felt over the course of one or multiple seasons. Should I try to lift the ball more? Should I change the grip of my slider? Everyday games over the course of a long season let us keep track of these larger trends, but no one could possibly analyze every substitution or pitching change over a 2,430-game regular season. So, instead, I’ll look at just three. In a midweek series last week, the Phillies and Giants put on a clinic of cat-and-mouse strategy and mostly excellent pitching. Let’s take a look at both the small- and large-scale decisions that contributed to this excellence on the mound.
Game 1 was a relatively high-scoring affair in which neither starter shined. There was nothing interesting to report from the Phillies side, as backend starter Taijuan Walker completed six innings but allowed as many runs. Opposite him was the struggling Blake Snell, who, in his typical inefficient fashion, lasted just four innings before being removed. To begin the fifth, manager Bob Melvin turned to rookie Randy Rodríguez, a sensible choice given his consistent multi-inning appearances to provide length to the Giants bullpen. In his first inning, Rodríguez retired the heart of the lineup in order on just 10 pitches, making him the easy choice to come back out for the sixth, due to face a pair of Phillies platoon hitters inserted into the lineup to face Snell.
Name | ZiPS OPS vs. LHP | ZiPS OPS vs. RHP |
---|---|---|
Brandon Marsh | .653 | .743 |
Cristian Pache | .726 | .585 |
Bryson Stott | .672 | .706 |
Whit Merrifield | .678 | .657 |
Pache and Merrifield really aren’t guys you want hitting against a righty, especially one as nasty as Rodríguez, whose absolute hammer of a slider creates a difficult look for same-handed batters. Despite Marsh and Stott, the regular starters, ready to pinch-hit, Phillies manager Rob Thomson elected to keep them on the bench in a one-run game. His reason was the man standing on a bullpen mound beyond the center field fence: Lefty Erik Miller was warming up for the Giants.
While the Giants could have sent in Miller in response to a pinch-hitter, I still think using Marsh and Stott would’ve been the correct decision for Thomson. First, given Pache and Merrifield’s futility against right-handed pitching, almost any other scenario would have been more favorable. Indeed, the two managed a fly out and groundout against Rodríguez, combining for an xBA of .090. Furthermore, with lefty sluggers Kyle Schwarber and Bryce Harper at the top of the lineup (with a 91 and 72 point gap in projected OPS, respectively, between their splits vs. right-handed and left-handed pitchers), it would’ve been wise for Thomson to force Melvin to burn one of the two lefty relievers in the Giants bullpen, which could’ve led to more favorable matchups later in the game. Because Thomson decided not to make any substitutions, Miller wasn’t needed until the next inning, a scoreless effort in which he allowed just one hit, the popup single in front of home plate that Ben Clemens wrote about in Friday’s Five Things column. Marsh and Stott did eventually hit in the ninth, as did lefty bench bat Kody Clemens, but only after Philadelphia’s deficit had ballooned to four runs.
The fact that Miller only threw one inning in Game 1 became significant the next day, as he was fresh enough to slot in as the opener for bulk man Spencer Howard, a former Phillies top prospect who stalled upon hitting the majors and entered play with a career ERA north of seven. Thomson rolled out the lefty-heavy lineup hoping to feast on Howard’s mediocre fastball shape, so for the second day in a row, Miller faced the Phillies’ top three without allowing any damage. In traditional opener games, Howard would come out next and make his start as normal. Instead, Melvin went a different route, delaying Howard’s entrance in favor of bringing in Taylor Rogers, the only other available lefty he had. It’s not the first time a team has used multiple openers, but it’s certainly unorthodox during the regular season, with few off-days to rest the staff. The left-handed Rogers twin breezed through two scoreless innings, turning the lineup over before handing the ball off. Howard still had to get the job done, but Miller and Rogers lessened his load by nine outs, taking out a lefty-vulnerable lineup that wouldn’t turn to pinch-hitters so early in the game. Howard turned in four scoreless frames, and his team needed every bit of it, as they won 1-0 in extras.
Melvin’s management of his staff made the most of his available, although depleted, personnel. Under ideal circumstances, teams wouldn’t use emergency bulk arms, multiple openers, or an entire staff composed of swingmen, but an open rotation spot due to injury forced the Giants to scrap together innings by any means necessary. While Melvin’s tactical decisions were the best use of his limited arms, the opposite side of this matchup showed a fully operational, elite rotation at its finest. The Phillies currently have the best starting pitching in the league by every measure, and it’s not particularly close.
Team | WAR | ERA- | Innings Per Start |
---|---|---|---|
Phillies | 8.2 | 66 | 5.93 |
Royals | 6.8 | 77 | 5.70 |
Orioles | 6.0 | 82 | 5.49 |
Red Sox | 6.0 | 77 | 5.15 |
Nationals | 5.7 | 98 | 5.39 |
Tigers | 5.7 | 94 | 5.48 |
Braves | 5.5 | 91 | 5.58 |
Yankees | 5.3 | 71 | 5.70 |
Dodgers | 5.1 | 87 | 5.27 |
Mariners | 4.9 | 92 | 5.82 |
Most of that value comes from four excellent arms, two of which appeared in this series. First, in the second game, it was Zack Wheeler, who has continued his run as baseball’s most consistently excellent starter over the past half-decade. Even with his velocity finally starting to show signs of age, he’s on pace for career bests in ERA (2.32) and xERA (2.60), and his 29.0% strikeout rate is just below the career-high 29.1% mark he posted in 2021. Much of his success has come from an eagerness to change his approach and arsenal over time – first emerging as a Cy Young finalist after embracing the power of the elevated fastball, then adding a new pitch to his arsenal in each of the last two seasons. In 2023, a sweeper became his breaking pitch of choice; this season, like many other pitchers, he’s added a splitter. Wheeler now throws six pitches with regularity, a re-invention of his style from just a few years ago.
In dominating the Giants, Wheeler demonstrated the complementary power of his sinker and new split, with the former earning called strikes at a 29% clip and the latter inducing four whiffs on just 10 uses. The splitter has above-average run just like his two-seamer; it even spins on the same axis after adjusting for seam-shifted wake. It’s almost as if Wheeler precision engineered his splitter to travel on the exact same tunnel as his sinker for the first 40 feet of flight before diverging, making it extremely difficult for batters to tell them apart. The brand-new splitter is already Wheeler’s best secondary offering by run value, and it’s also helped make his sinker considerably more effective, with a 40-point drop in xwOBA compared to last season.
Wheeler put together one of his best starts of the season, striking out nine San Francisco hitters across six scoreless innings, but he couldn’t outdo his opponent’s parade of openers and was saddled with a no-decision. The next afternoon, in the series finale, Cristopher Sánchez enjoyed a Phillies offensive outburst that was absent from the first two games. In last year’s breakout campaign, the lefty Sánchez put up above-average numbers over 19 appearances, but what held him back from excellence was an abysmal showing against right-handed hitters, who ran a slugging percentage that was more than double their that left-handed counterparts. He’s leveled up this year, currently holding a share of the NL lead in FIP. And while he still runs an exaggerated platoon split, he’s been able to limit the power of opposite-handed hitters, as seen on Wednesday against a daunting all-righty Giants lineup.
The calling card of Sánchez’s arsenal is a changeup with few comps in terms of movement, boasting 97th percentile drop and 95th percentile run. This exceptional pitch generated gaudy whiff numbers during his time as a prospect, and has only continued in the big leagues. The problem is that Sánchez’s sinker, which he uses to set up the changeup, gets absolutely hammered, especially by righties. Drastically cutting his sinker usage wouldn’t be the solution, because that would allow batters to sit on his change and make it more hittable. So, rather than shelving the sinker, Sánchez made a change to when he used it.
Sinker | Changeup | Slider | Cutter | |
---|---|---|---|---|
1st Pitch of PA | 50% | 4% | 42% | 4% |
After | 32% | 47% | 11% | 10% |
Sánchez took advantage of the Giants’ passivity on first pitches by throwing juicy sinkers to 12 of the 24 batters he faced; none of them were put into play. In fact, over a third of his sinkers in the game were taken for called strikes, his highest mark of the season. After getting ahead in the count, Sánchez then let the changeups rain down, racking up strikeouts and groundouts. By the end of the start, Sánchez’s sinker — a pitch that had allowed loud contact like no other in the past — surrendered zero barrels and zero extra-base hits. Like Wheeler the day prior, Sánchez turned in six scoreless innings, while the Philadelphia bats knocked around the surprisingly hittable Kyle Harrison. The vulnerability of Sánchez’s sinker likely caps his upside as a mid-rotation guy, but certainly one more than capable of starting playoff games for his contending team.
The Giants won the series, taking two games out of three. They showed they could win even with a starting rotation depleted by injury and underperformance, tilting the odds in their favor with crafty personnel decisions that kept the Phillies’ offense guessing as to who would come out next. (Of course, over the weekend, the Giants were swept by the Yankees in San Francisco, perhaps displaying the limitations of a team with a shaky staff.) On the other side, Philadelphia’s buzzsaw of a rotation was created by decisions as well, albeit ones made on the more macro level. From arsenal tweaks to command improvements, these changes demonstrate why this team is top dog right now in the National League.
Kyle is a FanGraphs contributor who likes to write about unique players who aren't superstars. He likes multipositional catchers, dislikes fastballs, and wants to see the return of the 100-inning reliever. He's currently a college student studying math education, and wants to apply that experience to his writing by making sabermetrics more accessible to learn about. Previously, he's written for PitcherList using pitch data to bring analytical insight to pitcher GIFs and on his personal blog about the Angels.
This was fun to read. I’m having trouble understanding why Erik Miller’s existence should mean allowing Christian Pache and Whit Merrifield to bat at all, and especially against a righty. Both are last resorts.
Wheeler is emblematic of Dombrowski’s ability to identify high end talent and choose wisely among high priced FA. Zaidi may be better at identifying underappreciated players like Lamonte Wade but that usually matters less.
Agree. A fun read and I really like the scale of a series rather than a single game or a full season. Indeed, I think I’d like to see more managerial decisions made at the series level rather than just the game/inning level. That micro-level decision making seems to result in too much micromanagement. Maybe that’s also a consequence of sabermetrics – once you have numbers at hand, there is a compulsion to make decisions using those numbers.
One would think series level managing would happen more in postseason but that seems even less true
You can’t afford to give away games in the post season the way you can in the regular season. Everything is “win today somehow, figure tomorrow out tomorrow.”
There are also more off days which allows you to use pitchers however you want, and the other team has the exact same schedule once the series starts. You can get through a 7 game series with 4 starters and 3 or 4 relievers, so your 5 worst pitchers get exposed very little and and you never find yourself coming off a 13 inning game where your starter only went 3, then you had to hop on a plane, and now you are facing a team in the middle of a homestand that had yesterday off.
Believe it or not Wheeler was a Klentak signing
not only that he wasnt necessarily a high end talent (at least production wise) at the time. i recall a fangraphs article from that offseason prior to his signing that in part touched on how much meat he was leaving on the bone w/r/t fastball usage/location
Oops I forgot Klentak
Dombrowki’s done great with fringe players.
Guys like Jeff Hoffman, Eduardo Sosa, Jose Alvarado, Matt Strahm, Spencer Turnbull, and a few others.
The big problem’s been big FA’s like Castellanos and Taijuan Walker. Wheeler, Harper, and Realmuto were all Klentak acquisitions.
So you have things backwards.
Yes I did. And it’s likely to happen again