Angels Can’t Help Falling In Love With Yusei Kikuchi

Enlightenment era poet Alexander Pope famously wrote, “Fools rush in where angels fear to tread.” His words imply that angels are the opposite of fools. If that’s true, I wonder if it wouldn’t be such a bad thing for angels to give rushing in a try every once in a while. Could that be precisely what Perry Minasian is thinking?

Including the piece you’re reading right now, the FanGraphs staff has written about four trades and three free agent signings this November. Five of those seven transactions have involved the Angels. It started with the first major trade of the offseason: Before the Dodgers even held their parade, the Angels flipped Griffin Canning to the Braves for Jorge Soler. Then they signed free agents Kyle Hendricks, Travis d’Arnaud, and Kevin Newman. Along the way, the Halos also picked up Scott Kingery and Ryan Noda, and dropped Patrick Sandoval (among others) ahead of the non-tender deadline.

On Monday morning, the Angels continued getting an early start on the offseason – this time in more ways than one. At 5:38 AM PST, news broke that they had agreed on a three-year, $63 million deal with left-hander Yusei Kikuchi. I’m imagining the news came out so early in the morning because Kikuchi is in Japan right now, and given Kikuchi’s well-known sleep schedule (and the 17-hour time difference), Minasian only had a brief window in which both he and his top target were awake. Like MacGyver racing to deactivate a time bomb, Minasian cut the right wire just in time and successfully negotiated the biggest free agent deal of his Angels tenure.

Indeed, Kikuchi’s $63 million guarantee surpasses the $58 million Minasian gave Raisel Iglesias during the 2021-22 offseason. It’s the largest sum the Angels have shelled out for any free agent since Anthony Rendon in 2019-20 and the largest for a pitcher since C.J. Wilson in 2011-12. From Kikuchi’s perspective, it’s the most lucrative of the trio of deals he has signed in his MLB career. It’s also slightly more lucrative than most of us expected. Ben Clemens predicted a three-year, $51 million deal, while the median response from our contract crowdsourcing participants was three years and $54 million.

ZiPS is significantly more pessimistic about Kikuchi’s value, projecting he’ll be worth just $31 million over the three years of his contract. Here are the full projections from Dan Szymborski:

On the other hand, the Steamer projections have Kikuchi producing 2.9 WAR in 2025. For the sake of comparison, let’s knock off half a win each year and presume he’s projected to produce 2.4 WAR in 2026 and 1.9 WAR in 2027. If we apply the same dollars per WAR estimate Dan used to get that $31 million figure, Steamer (with my aging curve estimation) values Kikuchi at just under $59 million on a three-year contract. That’s not so far off from the deal he landed. What’s more, it’s crucial to point out that projection systems like ZiPS and Steamer are intentionally blind to midseason adjustments. If the Angels believe Kikuchi made real and lasting improvements this year, it stands to reason they’d give him a larger contract than any projection system would expect.

Here’s another way to think about Kikuchi’s contract: For all intents and purposes, it’s identical to the three-year, $63 million deal former teammate Chris Bassitt earned from the Blue Jays two years ago. Like Kikuchi, Bassitt was entering his age-34 season when he signed his deal. Kikuchi had a higher WAR in his walk year, but Bassitt had a more traditionally successful campaign. By and large, they were coming off pretty similar seasons:

However, Bassitt easily had the better track record. Here’s how the two stack up if we look at the three seasons that preceded their walk years:

After accounting for two years of inflation and the fact that Bassitt was saddled with a qualifying offer, Bassitt did slightly better for himself than Kikuchi. Still, the fact that Kikuchi landed such a similar contract despite a far more tumultuous track record is strong evidence of how much he must have impressed the Angels (and presumably some other suitors) with his performance in 2024. So, let’s talk about that performance.

Most of what you’ll read about Kikuchi will be focused on his phenomenal showing with the Astros after the trade deadline. That’s not without reason. Over 60 innings, he pitched to a 2.70 ERA and 3.07 FIP. Houston won nine of his 10 starts. Even in his worst outing, he went six innings, striking out six, walking none, and giving up just four earned runs to a relentless Diamondbacks lineup. For two months down the stretch, he was nothing short of spectacular.

With that being said, I can’t ignore the reason the Astros wanted Kikuchi so badly (and gave up so much to acquire him) in the first place. His 4.75 ERA with the Blue Jays was unsightly, but Kikuchi showed a lot to like before he left Toronto. In fact, his first 10 starts with the Blue Jays were just as good, if not better, as his final 10 with the Astros:

In other words, Kikuchi’s success with the Astros wasn’t a breakout or a transformation. More accurately, it was a return to form after a rough patch in the middle of the season. That’s critical to understanding how teams might have evaluated the southpaw as a free agent. Over his first 10 starts, he proved he can pitch like a front-of-the-rotation starter. Over his final 10 starts, he doubled the evidence.

That’s not to say we can overlook Kikuchi’s struggles in the middle of the season. Over 12 starts from late May to late July, he pitched to a 6.87 ERA and 4.69 FIP. His strikeout and walk rates weren’t much different from his first 10 starts, and his whiff rate was actually way up. However, his opponents were elevating the ball more often and doing so with authority, slugging their way to a .459 xwOBA on contact and a 12.1% barrel rate. Kikuchi gave up four home runs and 14 extra-base hits over his first 10 starts. He gave up 13 home runs and 24 extra-base hits over his next 12. That’s not good. His 3.62 xFIP and 3.56 SIERA over those 12 starts were somewhat reassuring, but take those numbers with a grain of salt. He has historically underperformed his xFIP and SIERA; both metrics presume his high HR/FB is less sustainable than it has proven to be.

More genuinely reassuring, however, were Kikuchi’s pitch modeling numbers. Those are often the most reliable data when we’re dealing with such small samples:

These numbers suggest nothing was wildly off with Kikuchi’s pitches. Instead, the problem must have been how he was using them. Presumably, that’s what the Astros were thinking when they acquired him despite his midseason struggles. Immediately upon his arrival in Houston, Kikuchi started throwing more sliders and fewer fastballs, particularly on the first pitch and when he fell behind in counts. The results were remarkable; no American League pitcher had a higher run value on sliders from the trade deadline through the end of the year. He had also begun to reduce his curveball usage in Toronto, and he continued to do so in Houston. As it turned out, the pitch was far more effective with less use. Only one AL pitcher (min. 50 pitches) had a lower wOBA or xwOBA on his curveball over the final two months of the season.

In addition to changing up his pitch mix, Kikuchi tinkered with his locations. For one thing, he threw more pitches outside the zone with Houston, specifically in even counts or when the batter fell behind. He also induced more swings against those pitches. Thus, hitters chased 12.5% of his pitches with the Blue Jays and 15.7% of his pitches with the Astros. That’s more than a 25% increase in swings outside the zone.

Interestingly, the only pitch Kikuchi wasn’t trying to induce more chase with was his slider. Instead, he threw more sliders on the lower outside corner of the strike zone against both right- and left-handed batters. The result was a ton of weakly hit groundballs; opposing hitters had a .176 wOBA when they swung at Kikuchi’s slider and a .240 wOBA when they put it in play.

It’s never a bad sign when a pitcher has the kind of success Kikuchi enjoyed with the Astros, and it’s even more promising when that success corresponds with meaningful changes in his pitch mix and location. Still, it’s worth coming back to the point that the difference between Kikuchi’s performance in Toronto and Houston wasn’t as dramatic as the surface stats make it seem. His .325 wOBA with the Blue Jays was 85 points higher than his .240 wOBA with the Astros, but the difference between his .309 xwOBA with the Blue Jays and .276 xwOBA with the Astros was only 33 points. Pitching+ suggests his pitches were just as good with the Blue Jays (105 Pitching+) as they were with the Astros (105), while PitchingBot ERA actually thinks he was significantly better with Toronto (2.92 botERA) than Houston (3.66). Ultimately, what’s most important is that all those numbers agree that Kikuchi was a highly effective pitcher over the course of the 2024 season, warts and all:

There’s little doubt Kikuchi has the stuff to be a front-of-the-rotation pitcher. His biggest drawback (and it is a big one) is that he’s never put it all together over a full season. So, the $63 million question is if he can finally do just that with the Angels.

Perhaps Kikuchi made meaningful adjustments during his time with the Astros that helped him become a true ace. But if that’s the case, it’s fair to wonder if he can continue to pitch at that level in a new organization, especially one with less of a reputation for using data to help pitchers thrive. Alternatively, what if the Astros didn’t transform Kikuchi into a completely new pitcher? After all, his stuff looked just as good at times in Toronto. In that case, we have to grapple with the question of why he struggled so badly in the middle of the season. Was it the pitcher equivalent of pressing as he tried to compensate for a deficient Blue Jays offense and a dreadful bullpen? If so, it’s fair to wonder if he’ll face the same problems all over again with the Angels.

The Angels might fancy themselves dark horse contenders heading into 2025, but turning a 63-win team into a postseason-caliber club is no small feat. Suffice it to say, Kikuchi, Soler, d’Arnaud, and Hendricks aren’t going to add 25 wins. Minasian still has about $34 million to spend before he reaches the first luxury tax threshold, but even with all the additions he’s made, plus a full season from Mike Trout; reasonable steps forward from young players like Zach Neto, Logan O’Hoppe, and Ben Joyce; and whatever else $34 million can buy, you have to squint to the point of tears to see this team as a Wild Card contender. The offense needs everything to go right to be any better than average, the only trustworthy arm in the bullpen is a 24-year-old with 34.2 professional innings under his belt, and the rotation behind Kikuchi is a collection of back-end starters and question marks.

None of that is to say the Angels haven’t improved. They’ve made some good moves in good time; it’s just that they still have a long way to go. Nevertheless, this team already looks significantly better than it did a month ago, and Kikuchi is the most impactful addition yet. Signing Kikuchi may not be the move that puts the Angels over the top, but the closer he looks to the best version of himself, the closer the Angels will get.

As of press time, none of Kikuchi’s new teammates have planned a sushi party for 50+ people to celebrate his signing.