Are Nick Anderson’s Fifteen Minutes Up?

Did you know that Andy Warhol didn’t actually say “In the future, everyone will be world-famous for fifteen minutes”? I was shocked to learn the truth. Apparently, two museum employees invented the quote when they were working on a Warhol exhibit. That makes the saying more interesting to me, actually: two anonymous people creating the work of someone famous for the democratization of art is enjoyable. But I digress: the point of bringing that quote up is that Nick Anderson is well into his second fifteen minutes of fame, and I’m pretty sure that this, too, is something Warhol would approve of.
It’s hard to imagine a better pitcher getting a worse contract than the one Anderson signed this offseason. He was one of the best relievers in baseball, period, from his 2019 debut until tearing his UCL in 2021. Heck, he was top 15 in reliever WAR from 2019 to ’21, and he basically didn’t play in one of those years. Sub-3 ERA, sub-3 FIP, the fourth-highest strikeout rate in baseball (39.6%) — Anderson was an elite closer, and the Rays used him accordingly. The Braves are paying him only $875,000 this year. That’s some kind of bargain.
As Esteban Rivera detailed last November, there were reasons to doubt that Anderson would come back strong. He looked diminished in his last few appearances before hitting the IL; his biggest weapon, a fastball with excellent carry that left batters flummoxed, lost its usual carry. Vertical approach angle is all the rage in pitch design these days, and that’s the case because it neutralizes the biggest weapon hitters have: power on contact. You can’t hit a home run if you can’t hit the ball, and flat-angled four-seam fastballs are great at doing just that.
Again leaning on Esteban’s work, there was a problem: when Anderson got hurt, his delivery stopped working. More specifically, he stopped generating a flat angle with release point, because he started releasing the ball higher. Just like that, his fastball went from great to average. Throw in a heaping helping of injury uncertainty, and I’m not shocked that risk-averse front offices weren’t lining up to offer him a huge deal.
Right, then; let’s check in on Anderson’s 2023 season:
| Year | K% | BB% | ERA | FIP | xFIP | xERA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 41.7% | 6.8% | 3.32 | 2.35 | 2.44 | 2.90 |
| 2020 | 44.8% | 5.2% | 0.55 | 1.35 | 3.04 | 2.13 |
| 2023 | 29.8% | 3.2% | 3.20 | 2.44 | 3.04 | 3.21 |
Oh look, he’s fixed! Or, well, maybe we can’t say that with any certainty, but he’s certainly pitching well. I decided to look into the raw measurables of his fastball to see if the change he’s going for is working, and to add in small-sample 2021 so we can compare pitch shapes to when he was hurt. Is he back to a lower release point and more extension? Nope:
| Year | VRel (ft) | HRel (ft) | Extension (ft) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 6.56 | -0.7 | 5.9 |
| 2020 | 6.36 | -0.68 | 6.4 |
| 2021 | 6.65 | -0.82 | 5.9 |
| 2023 | 6.63 | -0.53 | 6.1 |
Huh, weird. Well, is he back to inducing a ton of vertical break, which makes for a flatter approach angle? No and no:
| Year | VMov (in) | VMov (w/gravity) | VAA |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 19.9 | -10.3 | -4.87 |
| 2020 | 18.9 | -11.4 | -4.56 |
| 2021 | 18.3 | -13.5 | -5.12 |
| 2023 | 16.8 | -14.0 | -5.52 |
In fact, Anderson’s fastball is inarguably worse than it was at his peak. Whether we’re talking chase rate, whiff rate, swinging-strike rate, or just raw velocity, 2023’s version can’t hold a candle to how the pitch looked when he was at his best (this time, again, I’m excluding 2021):
| Year | Chase% | Whiff% | SwSt% | Velo (mph) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 37.9% | 26.7% | 15.8% | 96.0 |
| 2020 | 47.0% | 27.8% | 17.8% | 95.2 |
| 2023 | 41.1% | 14.6% | 8.2% | 94.0 |
Anderson clearly knows his fastball isn’t up to its previous excellent standard. How can I tell? He stopped throwing it. He’s a two-pitch guy, with a gyro breaking ball and a fastball, and he’s leaning on that gyro breaking ball more than ever. He’d thrown it just under 40% of the time in his career before 2023. This year, it’s up to a robust 50%.
Luckily for Anderson, his breaking ball has been up to the task. It’s a strange pitch, deceptive because it hardly breaks at all. He throws it off of his fastball; he does a great job of mirroring release points between the two pitches. Even as his fastball comes out higher and higher, it still looks just like the curveball (or slider, systems disagree) coming out of his hand.
If you wanted to, you could finish this analysis right there. It’s pretty clear that Anderson’s fastball is worse. It’s equally clear that he’s compensated for that decline by throwing his secondary pitch more frequently. Hey, neat thought, everyone should do that. But as much as I hate to say it, I don’t think this is the end of the story. Much as I want to, I can’t give Anderson a clean bill of analytical health. I think he’s a few batter adjustments away from turning back into a pumpkin.
Why? Two reasons, really. First, he isn’t throwing that breaking ball as hard as he used to. He’s averaging 80.4 mph on the pitch this year, down from 83–84 at his peak. In fact, the fastest one he’s thrown this year has only been 83.2 mph, slower than his 2019–20 average for the pitch. Velocity is a huge part of the game for this kind of pitch; giving a hitter less time to distinguish between a fastball and something that vanishes is the best thing it has going for it. Our two stuff models both think that the pitch is objectively worse this year.
Higher usage also feels like a double-edged sword for a pitch that gets plenty of its value from being a change of pace. When Anderson was at his best, he was drawing chases 40% of the time with his curveball and running a gaudy 25% swinging-strike rate on the pitch. This year, those numbers have plummeted: a 33% chase rate and 16.6% swinging-strike rate. That’s because batters are swinging less at it overall and also making more contact.
For me, there’s a clear connection here. “Throw more secondaries” is one of the biggest lessons of modern pitching theory, but it works better when your secondaries have a ton of movement. I’m not saying Anderson’s curveball is a bad pitch — it’s clearly not — but particularly at its current speed, it’s more solid than exceptional, and it has to do a lot to cover for his fastball.
You can see this effect throughout his game, but here’s a clear way of thinking about it: Anderson has thrown 22 first-pitch curveballs outside of the strike zone this year; batters have offered at three of them after swinging twice as frequently in 2019 and ’20 combined. In a similar vein, he’s drawing fewer chases and fewer swinging strikes with the pitch when he’s ahead in the count, at least on a rate basis. That tracks, really; batters are more keyed in on the pitch because he’s throwing it more often.
For Anderson’s sake, you’d hope that batters paying more attention to his curveball would make them late on his fastball. But that hasn’t been the case: he ran a 19% swinging-strike rate with the pitch when he was ahead in the count before his injury, but that rate has been cut in half this year, even as he’s shifted his pitch mix away from relying on so many fastballs.
The result is an unstable equilibrium that I don’t think will work out in Anderson’s favor in the long run. His fastball used to be the foundation of his game. Take that building block away, and everything else feels more unsettled to me. It’s hard to take a previously fastball-dominant game and adapt it to suit an average fastball, particularly when you only throw two pitches.
So far this year, Anderson has made it work. He’s generating a ton of popups, limiting opposing contact quality with his fastball, and also racking up more grounders than ever before. He’s also walking almost no one; a 3.2% walk rate can make up for a lot of problems. Heck, he’s still striking out 30% of opponents, though I’m skeptical that will continue; he’s missing an average amount of bats, and it’s hard to run strikeout rates that high without more empty swings than Anderson is creating.
The worst part of this for me personally is that I really want to be wrong. Anderson’s first year in the majors was my first year at FanGraphs, and he was one of the first players I “discovered” as a writer. I wrote about him three different times in 2019, most notably when he reeled off a 74% strikeout rate in his first six games with the Rays. I’ve never met him, but I feel a strange connection to him anyway.
That’s how I feel, but it doesn’t change what I think. Relievers are notoriously mercurial; they can be dominant one day and gone the next. Anderson might have been one of the best relievers in the game in Tampa Bay, but that doesn’t make him immune to the regression monster. Pretty much every reliever is a few slight changes away from dominance, but also a few changes away from losing their edge. Anderson hasn’t quite hit that point yet, but despite his solid numbers this year, I can’t shake the feeling that the good times won’t last. Enjoy his performance while you can, Braves fans; relievers, like fame, are ephemeral.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
Another fantastic article as usual, Ben, thank you. But Anderson’s CSW% is just as high as those halcyon days of 2019. I’m wondering if his command would somewhat mitigate the diminished velocity and movement on his fastball. Thoughts?
Am I allowed to laugh when I read that the “rising” fastball, excuse me, “fastball with excellent carry” is all the rage in pitching in today’s game? Even if I am ridiculed I am going to laugh at the idea that the pitch I faced when I was a pretty darn good player in the 1950’s has suddenly become the “latest” thing while I wait to hear some talking head ruminate that this pitch pairs well with a breaking ball low and away. .
if you’re your age and reading fangraphs articles you can do whatever you want, you’re way way ahead of the curve. but i think the point is more so that pitches are now engineered to get a specific spin axis and are thrown with a higher velocity than ever before. back when you played, there was no driveline or state of the art pitching labs at universities. if you were throwing a flat VAA riding 4 seamer 75 years ago, you were probably doing it by chance
Anything but! The pitchers didn’t need to have all the physics in their heads to know that a ball thrown at the letters from a low arm angle was very hard to hit. High Heat has been an integral part of this game since long before most of the fans on this site were born. The saying “Impossible to Hit but Impossible to Lay Off” was around back when I was playing. A better question is why did this great pitch, the backbone of arsenals from Walter Johnson, Bob Feller, Bob Gibson and many more, disappear from the game for so long only to be “found” again in the 21st century. This idea that many of the younger fans on this site have that they are finding new things has been quite interesting to see develop as I have spent many pleasant years here with a group of like-minded baseball fans, which i didn’t know had a time or age requirement.
Because for a large portion of that time in history, anything above the belt wasn’t called a strike, so batters just stopped swinging at it.
There was also a stretch in the late 90s-early 00s where the sinker was all the rage as teams were trying to figure out how to contain all the dingers.
Your comment relates, correctly to Cam78’s comment. During the sinker, slider era, which was forced on the game by the pitcher’s union, when the belt was the top of the zone this famous pitch was relegated to the closet waiting for baseball to return, yet again, to the game I first played and fell in love with.
I meant umpire’s union.
I was asking a question that I knew the answer to and your response is the right answer. I compliment you and, as I have said many times on this site, that was not a shining era in the history of baseball either. It is just more proof that baseball, even when The Lords of Baseball do all they can to damage the game cannot do too much lasting damage, and it continues to fascinate in so many ways.
You’re…..90 years old?
Only 82.
Holy shit dude. Congrats. My dad is 76 and just learned how to text a couple years ago.
I don’t think it’s fair that you’re comparing 23 Anderson to peak (19-20) Anderson. Peak Anderson’s number were unstainable anyways.
Compare him to league average: K%: 29.0% (LA: 22.7%). BB%: 3.0% (LA: 8.7%). O-Swing: 36.3% (LA: 31.5%). Contact%: 74.6% (LA: 76.4%). SwStr%: 12.4% (LA: 11.0%).
The Braves aren’t expecting him to be 2019-20 Nick Anderson, they just want him to be effective. He has been effective and all signs point to him continuing to be effective.
but the point was that the amount of swinging strikes he’s getting isn’t really up to par with the amount of strikeouts he’s getting, and that he probably won’t keep getting called strikes at this rate because his stuff isn’t this good
Where does it say that in the article?
“Heck, he’s still striking out 30% of opponents, though I’m skeptical that will continue; he’s missing an average amount of bats, and it’s hard to run strikeout rates that high without more empty swings than Anderson is creating.”
The crux of the article is not
‘2023 Anderson is not as good as he was in 2020-21’
but rather
‘2023 Anderson has been effective, but there are signs (diminished stuff, low chase rate, etc.) point to him being unlikely to continue being effective.’
But he’s not missing an average amount of bats, he’s missing an above average amount of bats. So that’s an incorrect statement.
And no, the article is all about comparing 2023 Anderson to 19-20 Anderson. There is one paragraph (the one you referenced) that kind talks about 2023 Anderson and his overall effectiveness with his current stuff. So the crux sure seems to be 19-20 vs 23
Are you just going to downvote or are you going to actually address what I’m saying?
Amazing how many of the guys we cheer for are guys we think are punching above their weight. No idea what the future holds for him but the last little while has been fun if you are an Atlanta fan. I have always felt that guys who could locate their pitches had a shot. And he is not walking people which is a very good thing.
The projections have him as above-average+ RoS. He’ll be fine.
15 minutes in the form of several years?
When are we going to get an article about Jordan Lyles? We aren’t even halfway through the season and he’s 0-11; that has to be some sort of record, no? I’m extremely curious to hear the story of why he’s still pitching and what they Royals – at year 8 of their rebuild – are trying to accomplish.