Attempting to Rationalize the Shelby Miller Trade
With the title of this post, I have given myself an admittedly difficult task, given most comments about this trade since it went down. Arizona traded two top-100 prospects, including one player in the top 25 (at least), as well as a proven major league outfielder in exchange for a somewhat inconsistent pitcher, albeit one coming off a three-win season and with three more years of control. For the most part, everybody is beating up on the Diamondbacks — and for good reason: we don’t know the internal valuations the Diamondbacks possess on their own players and players outside their organization, but there is a general consensus that whatever those valuations are, they do not match up the rest of baseball. As a result, they have undersold their assets compared to the rest of the market. If we take out the external valuations of players like Dansby Swanson, Aaron Blair, and Ender Inciarte, can we make a case that, internally, the decision might have been sound?
What I am trying to get at is this: the trade value on the open market for Dansby Swanson, Aaron Blair, and Ender Inciarte is much greater than one Shelby Miller, but if you are the Diamondbacks and presented one choice and one choice only, how do we get to a spot where you choose Shelby Miller over Dansby Swanson, Aaron Blair, and Ender Inciarte?
One thing up front before we get to the player evaluations: Arizona is making money with these moves. San Diego fielded a mostly bad baseball team in 2015, but drew 265,000 more fans than they did the previous year after “winning” the offseason. The White Sox did the same and drew 100,000 more fans in 2015 than they did in the 2014 season. Signing Greinke and trading for Miller is very likely to bring more fans to the park just as the Diamondbacks $1.5 billion television deal begins. Ultimately, they will have to win to keep and expand those gains — as attendance increases for the Toronto Blue Jays, Kansas City Royals, and New York Mets all suggest — but these moves should help the short-term bottom line of the Diamondbacks.
On the player side, we can start with a few simple evaluations to put dollar values on the players involved. You might have seen our contract tool used a few times at FanGraphs, and below it will show a few values based on current Steamer projections and the years of control for the major league players involved in the deal.
| Year | Age | WAR | $/WAR | Est. Value |
| 2016 | 25 | 1.7 | $8.0 M | $13.6 M |
| 2017 | 26 | 1.9 | $8.4 M | $16.4 M |
| 2018 | 27 | 2.2 | $8.8 M | $19.4 M |
| Totals | 5.8 | $49.4 M |
Value: $8M/WAR with 5.0% inflation
Aging Curve: +0.25 WAR/yr (18-27), 0 WAR/yr (28-30),-0.5 WAR/yr (31-37),-0.75 WAR/yr (> 37)
| Year | Age | WAR | $/WAR | Est. Value |
| 2016 | 25 | 0.9 | $8.0 M | $7.2 M |
| 2017 | 26 | 1.1 | $8.4 M | $9.7 M |
| 2018 | 27 | 1.4 | $8.8 M | $12.3 M |
| 2019 | 28 | 1.4 | $9.3 M | $13.0 M |
| 2020 | 29 | 1.4 | $9.7 M | $13.6 M |
| Totals | 6.3 | $55.8 M |
Value: $8M/WAR with 5.0% inflation
Aging Curve: +0.25 WAR/yr (18-27), 0 WAR/yr (28-30),-0.5 WAR/yr (31-37),-0.75 WAR/yr (> 37)
We can see why this trade was so problematic. Inciarte will get four years of arbitration versus Miller’s three, but their payouts in arbitration are likely to be similar as Inciarte is likely to receive less per year.
Using the figures from above, the trade is even before we even get to the prospects. In my post comparing the cost of Zack Greinke and Cole Hamels, I used dollar figures for prospects based on recent studies that estimate production depending on prospect status. The values I used are reproduced in the chart below.
| Tier | Number of Players | Avg. WAR | Surplus Value |
| Hitters #1-10 | 53 | 15.6 | $102.4 M |
| Hitters #11-25 | 34 | 12.5 | $81.7 M |
| Hitters #26-50 | 86 | 6.8 | $43.8 M |
| Hitters #51-75 | 97 | 5.0 | $31.8 M |
| Hitters #76-100 | 96 | 4.1 | $25.8 M |
| Pitchers #1-10 | 18 | 13.1 | $85.7 M |
| Pitchers #11-25 | 47 | 8.1 | $52.4 M |
| Pitchers #26-50 | 77 | 6.3 | $40.4 M |
| Pitchers #51-75 | 94 | 3.4 | $21.1 M |
| Pitchers #76-100 | 105 | 3.5 | $21.8 M |
Dansby Swanson, last year’s top overall pick, is one of the best prospects in Major League Baseball. As Jeff Sullivan noted in his analysis of the trade, MLB.com has him currently at number 10, but for the purposes of this evaluation, we can use the ranking of Kiley McDaniel, now with the Braves organization, who put Swanson at number 24 in his mid-season list. Based on the chart above, that would place Swanson’s value at $81.7 million. Aaron Blair was number 59 on McDaniel’s list heading into the season, and given the many graduations last year, there is an argument to move him up the list. That said, his 2015 season wasn’t outstanding and MLB.com had him at number 61, so the preseason ranking should still hold. Adding another $21.1 million to Swanson’s number and Enciarte’s number, we have the Braves roughly $110 million ahead of the Diamondbacks.
If we want to close that gap, the first thing to do is get a little more bullish on Shelby Miller. Steamer seems a little down on Miller after the latter posted a 3.4 WAR season, cutting that number in half, and calling for an increase in a home run rate that was suppressed last season. Miller could be much better next year, and Dan Szymborski ran ZiPS projections for Miller last night and found a three-win pitcher. If we get a tad optimistic, look at Miller’s age-24 season, and increase by 0.25 WAR like our contract tool does, we can start Miller at 3.7 and repeat the tool.
| Year | Age | WAR | $/WAR | Est. Value |
| 2016 | 25 | 3.7 | $8.0 M | $29.6 M |
| 2017 | 26 | 4.0 | $8.4 M | $33.2 M |
| 2018 | 27 | 4.2 | $8.8 M | $37.0 M |
| Totals | 11.9 | $99.8 M |
Value: $8M/WAR with 5.0% inflation
Aging Curve: +0.25 WAR/yr (18-27), 0 WAR/yr (28-30),-0.5 WAR/yr (31-37),-0.75 WAR/yr (> 37)
Miller now has some pretty tremendous value. It’s tough to apply and equal and opposite pessimism to Inciarte, given that he’s projected at roughly one win. So, leaving his value at the same spot, we have to adjust the prospects. While it’s possible that the Diamondbacks had soured a bit on Blair after he posted an 18.5% strikeout rate and 7.8% walk rate in the minors this season, it would be difficult to place him outside the top-100 prospects. As a result, we’ll leave his value the same. We can knock Swanson down to the 26-50 range, although it does seem a bit harsh.
Adding those totals up, we can come to an internal calculation that still finds the Diamondbacks $20 million in the hole. We could chalk that up to the draft pick the Diamondbacks would receive, but if we are doing internal Diamondbacks calculations, we know that is not the case. For the Diamondbacks to have made a fair trade, we need to think less of Swanson and believe that Miller will produce 4.5 wins next year, moving up to five wins in the 2018 season. In the initial numbers at the beginning of this piece, Miller would need to be a six-win pitcher from day one, making the Braves haul fairly close in value to something that might have landed Jose Fernandez or Carlos Carrasco’s five years of control.
The Diamondbacks are betting big on the success of Shelby Miller, and at the top of the Diamondbacks organization is Tony LaRussa, who once saw Miller’s potential as a minor leaguer while both were still in the Cardinals organization. It isn’t wrong to make big bets on the players a team acquires, but the problem lies in failing to compare internal evaluations with external values and then exploiting the differences between the two. The Diamondbacks might believe the package they sent for Shelby Miller was fair given their expectations for him and the players they gave up, but they are overpaying market prices.
The team wants to contend now — not unlike the Tigers over the past decade. The Tigers farm system was never great, making it difficult to overpay in prospects, but they certainly used the prospects in trades the best they could and spent as much money as possible on the open market. The gambit more or less worked for the Tigers, as they have contended over the last decade. The Diamondbacks want to win, but do not yet have big money to spend, so they are limited to overpaying in prospects. This plan might work to get them to the playoffs, but long-term their failure to understand the market is costing them precious assets that could be used to build a sustainable winner.
Craig Edwards can be found on twitter @craigjedwards.
Diamondbacks acquire another ace!
So… yeah, that’s a thing that some people might think, however mistakenly.
The analysis doesn’t make a lot of sense because it assumes the trade was in a vacuum. The Dbacks didn’t mortgage their future because they have about 8 solid pitching prospects projected to be middle of the rotation starters. So, they can afford to lose one. The also have three short stops prospects that are hitting the majors ahead of Swanson – two that they got from the Braves when they Braves supposed “stole” J Upton (Brandon Drury and Nick Ahmed) and Chris Owings. Swanson was blocked anyway. So, their future is set there. Plus, they have an abundance of outfielders and they all can’t play this year so they were likely going to trade one. Inciarte is a nice player but is real value is his defense not his power so he help the most at centerfield. Guess what – the Dbacks already have all-star in centerfield. What they didn’t have is another top of the rotation starter beyond Grienke and now they do. So spare me the “they mortgaged the future” nonnense. One of the middle infield prospects, outfielders and pitching prospects was going to be traded regardless. They offered the package to the Marlins who turned it down so it apparently is not a valuable as you all think. So, we know the market for a top of the rotation starter. Nobody got fleeced in this deal. It is good for both teams.
lol, the d-backs didn’t get fleeced, they got taken outside and whooped. they lost this trade so hard that their mom’s woke up crying about it.
The problem with the analysis done on trades like this is it starts from a flawed premise.
Baseball teams aren’t solely built with “surplus value” and while it is a good starting point to understand a deal, it leaves much out. Not only are many of these wrong (eg All Royals moves) but they don’t try to put the deal in perspective from each respective side. Dave stewart has a win today mandate, not a build slowly mandate. Given that, how does he address the holes in his current mlb roster – given he may not be the GM in four years. The “market” for cost controlled #2-3 starters is fairly thin and therefore inflated. He has to do something. So from his perspective he trades a marginal valued 4th outfielder who is replaceable, and two guys with actually ZERO value. In four years if Dave is successful and has won with this roster, no matter what happens with the trade it will have been a success. Its not a model for a tampa bay or A’s but it is a model that can work for his purposes.
I think a better model to analyze these trades is a bit of surplus value, a bit of risk analysis with the prospects (eg bust rate or WAR range by year) and a bit of why each side made the deal, taking into account strategic intent.
Your objections to the article have nothing to do with the author’s conclusion: Edwards is not saying [like the rest of the world] that the DBacks got fleeced–he’s saying that even if the Backs feel they won the trade, they got no where near what they could have for the resources they gave up; Edwards is saying that a more thorough internal examination of the deal very easily would have revealed that today’s market would have born more for what they received.
The underlying sentiment is that it’s fine if the DBacks like the deal, but it’s poor management because they quite obviously should have been able to get more for the players they gave up. It’s more a slap at the management than the deal itself.
This article would only make sense if the Dbacks had not shopped their package around the league. However, they apparently did.They were linked to several different pitchers around the league. We know that the Dbacks offered the same trade to the Marlins for Jose Fernandez and the Marlins turned them down. The Marlins wanted Corbin and Drury in addition. In other words, the Dbacks could not have gotten more for the package than Shelby Miller despite the hypothetical value assigned to them in this article. The real values are determined by the market. I could appraise my home at some high price as well and when somebody makes me an offer that is lower, I could write an article explaining why the value of my house is much higher. But, unless someone actually offers me my asking price, it isn’t worth what I say it is. It is all about supply and demand.
So the Diamondbacks offloaded a top-25 prospect in all of baseball for way less that he is worth simply because there are other prospects at his position that are ahead of him? That would be absolutely horrible logic from Arizona’s front office. It’s certainly not how any business in their right mind would value and trade their assets.
And such logic would be even more misplaced in the baseball world. Shortstops can play any position on the field besides pitcher and catcher. This idea that teams can have too many middle-infield prospects is beyond laughable.
I think your grasp of basic economic principles is in serious question. Do businesses ever have sales to off load extra inventory, that would otherwise lose value over time? Does supply and demand not enter into economic considerations? With all due respect, your near total lack of understanding of economic realities seems to be the laughable factor here.
Mark, you sound like a novice fantasy football owner trying to trade 3 wide receivers for a starting running back and can’t figure out why nobody will take your offer. “These wide receivers put up way more value than your one running back, I can’t believe you won’t do the deal.” This article is fantasy baseball. Real baseball is going on in the Winter Meetings. In real baseball, people don’t trade top shelf starting pitching. When other teams heard the Dbacks were offering Swanson, in your world, other teams would have all lined up to trade their pitching to the Dbacks. In the real world, the Marlins wanted a heck of a lot more.
Oh and shortstops can technically play any position in the field defensively but nobody in their right mind is going to play a short stop at the corners (1B, 3B, LF, RF) unless they have real power, which most shortstops don’t. So, SS are limited to short and 2nd where defense is a premium. If your logic made sense Gregerious would still be playing for the Dbacks instead of the Yankees.
Maybe you are right that the price of starting pitching is just much higher than we think.
But I’d have much rather they ask about a bunch of other better young pitchers first (Rodon, Secerino, Sale, Iglesias, Caarasco, Salazar) before going right from Fernandez to Miller.
I like all those guys better than Miller AND they might have been cheaper.
Sale could have been cheaper? What?
He’s under control longer and for cheap.
White sox weren’t trading quintana/sale or rodon. Quintana was probably the best bet and I’m not sure the Sox do that deal for Quintana.
The Diamondback’s #1 priority was obviously bringing parity to he National League East at any cost. The Force Awakens in one week!
Dansby Swanson is Gordon Beckham 2.0.
I agree that the league may have valued him higher, but he was a mistake at #1 last year.
Maybe Dave Stewart is actually an evil genius. Maybe he took a look at last year’s draft class and didn’t like anyone he saw. He then cleverly drafted the worst player highly regarded by the rest of the teams. By choosing him #1 he artificially inflated his value to set up a future trade. In this scenario, Stewart is happy to part with him because he knows he will never produce any value.
Yeah, too bad that the Diamondbacks already paid the $6.5 million dollar signing bonus when Swanson signed. Then the “inflated value” theory would have made a lot more sense. It’s still $6.5 million flushed away whether Swanson ever plays an inning in the majors, to say nothing of getting zero return on any value he provides while actually playing in the majors.
Eh. The #1 overall pick is going to get a big signing bonus either way. Perhaps they could’ve gotten someone to sign for a few million less, but given that it doesn’t affect the MLB payroll, it’s very close to meaningless.
Will you stop with this- the signing bonus is a sunk cost- its gone. It is also budgeted every year and therefore a cost of doing business. Business mistakes are made all the time with this logic….but we have spent so much money already on this….
Are you from the future??? O_o
Mmhmm.
I don’t really see how Inciarte could reasonably project for 1 win, even. Kiley McDaniel is probably even more effervescent than usual right now.
Why is Inciarte’s defense projected as slightly negative next year by Steamer? He was +19 and then +10. Unless you think he’s losing 10 runs on defense every year, this makes no sense. I could see projecting +10 or MAYBE +5 this year, but -.2 is really odd.
While steamer does ok league wide, it consistently underrates D Backs hitters. Must be something about the park factors, either minors or majors.
I just want to say I like Psy and his new album.
The article should have been titled “Attempting and Failing Spectacularly To Rationalize The Shelby Miller Trade”
I especially enjoyed the handwave about how it isn’t about the package’s “market” value, since that’s obviously way higher, so, er, let’s talk about something else instead
How does one measure the cost/value of winning? If the Dbacks make the playoffs once, (or twice or thrice) during the Miller era how does that quanify in these evaluations vs not making the playoffs?
What if the Dbacks are in the 1 game wildcard playoff and Miller is the one that wins the game, how is that measured?
I am a Dbacks fan and I hate this trade not because Miller is a bad player, but because of the gross overpay. The problem is that even though it is considered gross overpay, which other team was willing to trade one of their top young starters for this package? The problem is that there are very few teams in full dismantle mode, and thus it is a supply and demand issue, and this is the market value. I don’t like it one bit, but if A’s were giving Gray, or Tampa was giving Archer, or Mets giving one of their pitchers etc, then this deal would be gross overpay. If no one was willing to part with an equivalent player to Miller, then this is the price.
The question is what is worse, signing Cueto and dealing with 2 aging contracts in 4-6 years and handcuffing the team financially (and thus not able to resign Goldy or Pollack), vs giving up prospect value, maintain financial flexibility, and keep some of our stars beyond 3 years from now? Maybe the cost of winning is the latter?
Actually, I think that this would be a fairly reasonable trade for Syndergaard. I think that we’re saying that the three pieces going to Atlanta have about $158.6 M (55.8 for Inciarte, 81.7 for Swanson, 21.1 for Blair), and if you use a 5% inflation rate, Steamer’s projection for 2016 with the +0.25 WAR/year growth rate that FG uses, and 5/10/15/20 arb prices for Thor (he’s a Super-Two), he’s worth $153.9 in surplus value.
But that’s Noah Syndergaard, who has insane value. The others probably are not worth as much.
But, do we know that the Mets make this trade? They want to win now as well.
I’m with Xero, don’t want to give this package up. But Mets are not trading Syndergaard for these players. Who else was realistically available, considering you hold onto Goldy and AJP?
Maybe. They need an outfielder desperately, and Inciarte would look great in center. Plus, they aren’t going to be able to pay all 5 starters (Degrom, Thor, Harvey, Matz, Wheeler), so why not pick and choose now?
Desert Rat otm. Rule out CLE and NYM b/c they’d be looking for talent that’s useful now; rule out MIA b/c they’re not seriously shopping Fernandez (see e.g. demand from Dodgers); rule out CIN, MIL, PHL b/c they don’t have any comparable assets. You’re left with: SD (Ross, Cashner), ATL (Teheran, Miller), OAK (Gray), and CHA (Sale, Quintana). Safe to rule out Teheran, Cashner, and Sale as being either substantially less or more good than Miller to make him something other than what AZ thought they needed. Leaves Gray, Ross, and Quintana realistically attainable. Gray’s arguably no better than Miller (and perhaps without the same upside); Quintana probably demands more than this package; and Ross is quite substantially older.
Which isn’t to say, of course, that this is a good-value swap, nor that AZ shouldn’t have thought about ratcheting up marginally for a Quintana or down for a Teheran. But our modeling assumes a very frictionless trade market that doesn’t exist. If AZ wanted this type of pitcher now — and we can disagree about whether they should have pursued one, though once they added Greinke to Goldy/Pollock they were all-in on the next few years — it’s not clear to me they could have landed anyone substantially better with this package. Perhaps they could have gotten someone comparable for a lesser package, though only time will tell if Preller/Beane are willing to part with Ross/Gray for anything less. It wasn’t that long ago, ofc, that we were all shocked by Mr. Beane himself for parting ways with a top-5 prospect and top-100 throw-in for a worse-performing, older SP with fewer years of control. (Even if that had the deadline premium to go along w it.) Perhaps it is we who need to readjust our valuation of SPs and prospects on the trade market.
No, there’s no way the Mets are going to try to do something like that, I wouldn’t think. It was a thought experiment. I was just trying to think about whether the package that got Miller could have acquired them something more valuable. I started with the guy I figured was the most valuable of the group you identified, and found that he was still an overpay, but just barely. It basically validates your point that this package is an overpay for just about anyone (save Fernandez and perhaps one or two others), although in the case of Thor it’s not an excessive overpay.
Jarbl, I would much rather have Iglesias or Rodon than Miller. They birth have more Ks and better upside. And I bet they’d both be cheaper.
So the attempt failed? The only way it can be rationalized is if Swanson’s name was a misprint. Is Dave Stewart the new Jack Z — i.e., the GM you call up to take advantage of? For that price, they should have pushed the Marlins for Fernandez.
Maybe he did and the Marlins just laughed.
They did and Loria just cackled or whatever he does to show amusement.
The Marlins didn’t laugh. They reportedly insisted that Corbin be added this package.
“Nick Piecoro of the Arizona Repbulic tweets that the package the D-backs sent to Atlanta to pry Miller away — Swanson, Ender Inciarte and Aaron Blair — “would not have come close” to what the team would’ve needed to acquire Fernandez from Miami, citing D-backs officials.“
Hah…Jack Z!
#6Org
Fangraphs love baby
I’m ashamed to admit I spent far too much time trying to figure out what ‘Nuber of Players’ meant.
A minor maybe not minor point, but Dave Duncan is there and knows Miller as well.
I gotta agree with your bottom line: even if AZ is correct as to valuation, they still overpaid because no else was as bearish as they were… Or as bullish on Miller…
The one caveat being that there could have been no other trade for a similar or better pitcher available. Which is unlikely to say the least.
This is the third trade I can think of off the top of my head where the Diamondbacks traded away a player for what seemed like way under market value. In hindsight it was probably correct to trade away Upton and Bauer. I imagine the public’s opinion of Arizona’s front office would change dramatically if they got a more “fair” return for those players at the time of their trades.
I’d throw the Arroyo/Touki deal into that pile, too. That one was also thrown under the bus pretty immediately.
Neither of those trades was made by the current front office.
You are correct of course, but we can’t really know how much the organization or its philosophy turned over in the regime change.
“In the initial numbers at the beginning of this piece, Miller would need to be a six-win pitcher from day one…” Miller was a six-win pitcher last year, and with better luck, he could easily be a 13 win pitcher next year. Give him decent offensive support and a winning team, someday he could even win 20 games!
He meant WAR.
i think he knows
Woooosshhh…
Here’s something I’ve been turning over in my head:
Maybe prospects, especially first round draft choices, are like cars. The moment a car drives off the lot, it loses a fair share of its value, as its now a used car, not a new car. Perhaps prospects are actually at their most valuable when their ratio of potential to actual is highest, particularly when they have little professional experience. Think about someone like Justin Upton, another number one overall pick, and how if a GM had traded him, the day after he was drafted for a package equivalent of what people thought he’d become, they might have actually come out ahead, as Upton has been merely pretty good. And that’s not even the worst case scenario when it comes to prospects. Now, I’m not saying that excuses this trade. If you’re going to use as valuable as a trade chip as Swanson, do better than Shelby Miller. But maybe the notion of trading away a guy you just made the number one overall pick before actual large sample-size professional experience gets in the way of his evaluation isn’t so crazy.
I think this makes sense, up to a point. The problem is that even if we just talk about #1 picks, Justin Upton hasn’t quite become a superstar, and Josh Hamilton was a disaster for the Devil Rays. But what about Harper? Correa? Strasburg? Price? Cole?
I would think the possibility of a 1-1 pick turning into one of those guys has to be factored in. I don’t think every front office would just assume they’d all reach that ceiling.
But I do think that a guy’s faults are more likely to be exposed (or believed) after he’s had a year or two in the minors. But if he doesn’t really have faults (like the guys above) then his price would go up, not down.
This is a bad trade because I live in Arizona and like saying “Inciarte”. “Miller” – pfah.
I think people are overrating how important Aaron Blair and Ender Inciarte are. They’re both decent enough useful players, but guys like them are replaceable via trade/free agency, especially if targeting older players that have less hype surrounding them (older = less theoretical upside = lower cost).
So I think of this more as a Shelby for Dansby straight up trade than most will probably consider it. If Shelby turns out to be a good #2 SP I doubt the D-Backs fans will complain much. And if he can continue with his 2015 improvements it’s possible he could be a fringy #1 starter. Three years of that at a below-fair value cost is a pretty big deal and if the D-Backs extend Miller early at a reasonable price to take control of some of his UFA years then all the more reason for D-Backs fans to be happy with this trade.
Swanson will probably be a very good ballplayer one day – could easily be an all-star several times – but I don’t see him as having a future MVP type of upside. Even if he was a #1 overall pick (in a weak draft year). I guess time will tell.
The problem with calling Blair and Inciarte replaceable is you actually have to replace them. As you said yourself, you can replace them through trade or free agency, but that’s going to cost you. Why pay for something you already have?
If this was Swanson for Miller straight up I don’t think it would be hard to rationalize this for AZ. But it wasn’t, so you can’t pretend it was.
I don’t want to say it wasn’t an overlay because it was but I wonder what the true value of a Shelby Miller is on the open market now. I will admit I’m more bullish on Miller than Steamer and others. Since he moved away from the curve and started throwing more sinkers he looks to me like he could finally realize his ace potential. Not to mention Dave Duncan and Tony Larussa worked magic with guys with way less stuff like Chris Carpenter and Woody Williams by getting them to make a sinker a plus pitch. I actually think Miller will average 4- 41/2 WAR a year over the next 3 years.
If I’m correct I would much prefer him over Samrdzjia who SF just gave 90M a year and surrendered a first round pick for. Free agent costs for quality starting pitchers has sky rocketed which means trade values for cost controlled good young starters has also probably gone up as well. To what we’re not sure and probably won’t gauge better until a Gray, Carrasco or Fernandez is moved. You also have to take into account the Dbacks window. I realistically think they have a legitimate 3 year window to go toe to toe with LA. I actually disagree w what Dave said earlier. I actually like the Dbacks today better than LA. Better lineup and rotation right now. I hate LA’s options after Kershaw right now. ? After ? In my opinion. If the don’t upgrade it things could go sideways quickly. Overpay yes but we’ll have to see how it plays out.
I’m not convinced none of those guys above could be had for this haul or this haul + a little more (low level prospects). If I’m going to overpay, I’d rather it be for a really great pitcher instead of a merely good one.
I don’t think this package would have landed Fernandez. If insiders are to believed they asked for this package plus Corbin. Who knows if it would have gotten Gray. I give up trying to figure out what Beane values anymore. Although it would be fun to see Beane and Stewart work a trade. They’re definitely the two most unpredictable GMs. I also don’t think the Indians would have done this trade for Carrasco. They want impacts bats for 16 if they trade one of their pitchers.
Is Tomas (of the negative WAR last year) replacing Inciarte (who had 3+ WAR) in the OF?
I would imagine so. It’s possible, then, that Inciarte and a replacement level pitcher will be more valuable over the course of the season than Miller + Tomas.
Theoretically speaking of course. We must uncritically accept the underlying assumptions in WAR calculations, such as positional adjustments or defensive valuations, to believe that conclusion. If we are going to be thoughtful yet, we should probably expect some regression to the mean for all players involved. Which would likely land Thomas on the positive side of the WAR ledger. We also have to incorporate the possibility of AZ having other readily available replacements for Inciartes production should Thomas stumble (In the words of Socrates (Brito),”I drank what?!?). Then of course we should remember that, as nothing more than a league average bat with some fairly significant platoon issues, almost all of Inciartes value comes from his defense. Then we might want to recall that defensive metrics used in WAR calculations can sometimes fluctuate wildly from one year to the next. Perhaps it would be prudent to remind ourselves that defensive excellence is a skill that diminishes with age more quickly than most others. So if we think about your equation more critically I think it likely we can safely conclude:
Miller + Thomas > Inciarte + scrub pitcher.
I’m not sure uncritical hot takes do anything to further our understanding of the current trade market for pitchers and prospects.
Nice post. Inciarte is a distraction. He’s not that good or that valuable to AZ.
Hi Craig,
Are those valuations on prospects the “surplus value” (ie. the market value of the projected production over team control years minus the projected salary paid to the players in those years) or the “market value (of a hypothetical contract for that player)”. It looks like you’ve updated from the numbers from the $6.5 mil/WAR figure used in the referenced study at Point of Pittsburgh, but your surplus values are more than double theirs. Also, if it is correctly labeled “surplus value” and you’re comparing the prospect’s surplus value against Miller’s market value, that seems like a problem. Thanks.
Thanks for the comment:
As to Miller’s value, I made the assumption that 3 years of arb for Miller works be the same as 4 fit Inciarte, canceling each other out in the final tally.
As to the second point, yes those are surplus values. Switching from present value to future value made a huge difference along with the 8 million per win plus inflation. I calculated arb salaries the same way as the study (2/3 value of wins times 60%).
We’ll only know for sure in four years but I think Miller’s WAR over the next three doubles Inciarte over the next four. 15 was an outlier for him. He’s not that good. I’d be shocked if he ever put up a 2 WAR year again.
He put up 2.8 in ’14. Maybe he’s not going to match that, but putting up > 2 WAR isn’t an outlier – it’s what he’s done every (both) year of his major league career so far.
Missed that you weren’t discounting the values. Makes sense. Thanks.
Just to point out the obvious… if Inciarte produces the WARs contained in your projections over the next few years (and chances are his production won’t be anything like linear because most of it’s tied up in defense, but betting on two seasons at or below 1.5 WAR is a great wager to take) he’ll be non-tendered in 3 years.
I know what the math says, but the values for the prospects are insane. Maybe that’s what they end up being worth over time (on average), but do you think there’s any way a team would give Swanson $80M for a hypothetical 6-year contract that begins whenever he’s ready? No way. Now consider that the $80M number is purported to be *excess* value – that is, value on top of his earnings, which implies that a team should pay $80M just for his rights (and then also pay his salaries, which could add up to $20M or more before free agency). Of course that’s not happening.
What would he get? Moncada got $63M (well, he got much less of course, but the Red Sox paid $63M. By all accounts, Moncada is a signficantly better prospect than Swanson. Hard to say how much, but if he’s getting $63M, it’s hard to see Swanson getting more than $40M (again, for his rights – just think of it as a signing bonus).
Anyway, this doesn’t change too much – even with that reduced number, there’s still no way to really justify this.
Jon, I agree with you.
It also seems notable how big the calculated value drop-off is from the #11 to #25 hitters ($81.7 million) to the #26 to #50 hitters ($43.8 million).
That’s the nature of surplus value. It’s not about whether a team “would” or “should” pay $80M up front. In fact, the point is precisely that they don’t have to. Prospects in that range produce, on average, $80M worth of value (if you buy the $/win ratio, which isn’t a given), some much more some much less. To complain that a team would never pay that much for a prospect is to name the very market incentive that gives this model legitimacy.
This comment makes no sense. What Moncada got was a signing bonus (he gets salary on top of that). And it was so high because the international market is less regulated than the domestic one. The relevent comparison would be the $63M Moncada got to the $6.5M Swanson got, but then only as an illustration of the depression of amateur signing bonuses by the current draft structure.
So to break it down, Boston will spend $63M signing bonus + $1.5M (3 years minimum wage) + 3 arb years for Moncada if they play it as most teams do. You don’t think that will equal ~$80M over the 6 years (i.e. you don’t think Moncada will make ~$16M in 3 years of arbitration)? I’d say that confirms that most teams value talent as described above, not the opposite.
The problem with all the analysis is that analysts don’t know many key things. For instance, we don’t know what ownership has told TLR to do. I suspect they have been told – try to win at all costs for the next three years. This would explain all of the supposed craziness from last year to this year.
I also suspect that no ones knows what other moves are planned. A signing of Johnny cueto would materially change your view of the miller trade because you’ve just built a playoff team.
Contrast that with the Reds who are sitting on a huge Joey Votto contract but no chance of competing now or in near future. I applaud the D-backs for trying to win. Your chances are only 1/30 every year on a level playing field, adjusted for being a small market team, maybe 1/75. So they will have 3 legitimate shots at glory especially if they add another horse in the rotation.
Much better than being 83-79 every year and having BA rank you as a top 15 farm system.
Finally, if they could have gotten a better cost-controlled pitcher than Miller they would have – assuming these GMs don’t talk is kinda stupid
For a hamburger today, I will gladly give you two hamburgers on Tuesday. They sold the future for today. They will get more WAR next year than their trade partner.
How sure are you? It’s safe to say that Swanson and Blair won’t play. But are you 100% sure Inciarte won’t be worth more than Miller next year?
Inciarte’s averaged about 3 WAR over the past 2 years; Miller has averaged 2.
If we give Inciarte his 2014 numbers again and good, but not great defense (+5 to +10), he’s still worth 2 wins. That’s his realistic floor (barring injury or some quirky BABIP bad luck).
Miller’s realistic floor is much lower, more like HIS 2014. His ceiling is quite a bit higher, too, but I’d say it’s 50/50 of who is worth more next year.
Come on man- blindly using WAR is not the way teams value players and doesn’t even accurately predict team results. (I seem to believe the red sox were top in projected WAR last year). Enciartes value is defense related which is volatile and actual mlb teams don’t trust it. He is also replaceable on the d’backs roster, wheres a #2-3 starter is not. Miller has much more value to the d’backs than a 4th outfielder that may have better or equal internal options available.
Thanks for bringing some rationality to this discussion. I tried to make the same points on Jeff’s article yesterday, but no one seemed to buy it. I’ve spent the last day in a state of disbelief that none of these analysts seems to be considering the marginal value of Miller and Inciarte to the D-Backs. Even if you have 5 outfielders who provide 3+ WAR, you can still only play 3! I’m willing to bet the D-Backs FO feels good about Tomas+Brito coming into this year and thinks any possible loss of value from Inciarte to that pair is more than countered by the value of having Miller instead of another one of the AAA/#5 starters.
Maybe there’s a “lemon factor” applied to a situation like Swanson that lowers his trade value significantly below what the “chart” indicates?
In other words, yes, he was the #1 pick, but he doesn’t yet have an extensive track record in the minors. Other teams therefore discount his value rather heavily, thinking, “what negatives do the Diamondbacks know about him that we don’t?” This sort of thinking could of course be applied to all prospects, but perhaps it’s even more true for one with a high implied value due to pedigree but lack of a minor league track record. In other words, it’s easier for an acquiring team to agree on the “chart’s” valuation for either (i) a top prospect in the upper minors (more track record and more years of scouting) or (ii) a lesser prospect in the lower minors (lower value, so the cost of a bust is much less).
The implication of this reasoning is that the Diamondbacks shouldn’t have entertained trading Swanson unless they truly are very negative on his potential, because no other team is likely to offer back $80 million of value for him. So either the whole idea of trading him at all was a mistake, or they really are very negative on his potential.
Or we could suggest that valuing Swanson at 80 million $ is a theoretical construct created inside someone’s head that has as much to do with reality as say, unicorns.
It also places no value whatsoever on risk and variance and it assumes all that teams care about is the mean. and this is becoming a bgger and bigger shortcoming in the SAB community as very few writers really think about the variance in the #’s they are usng (and a hat tip to Craig for at least trying to account for some of the variance in this article!)
Is a player or prospect that you know will be in a 3-4 WAR tange worth the same as one that will be in the 1-6 WAR range if the mean projections match up?
Just speculation but I think the floor (at whatever pecrentile you define it) is valued in trades. And some GM’s may value ceiling in other regimes like say two players that are projected at 1 WAR but one has a tail with a low probabiliy outcome with a very high WAR total
Is a prospect ranked at #8 in A ball really worth the same in trade value as a #8 prospect in AAA ball (let’s assume they are tied in my hypothetical). In theory the ranking takes risk into account, but does it do so accurately?
Those are good points by Hank.
In thinking about how GM’s make decisions, it’s probably also worth noting that making big bets on high variance players is a good way for a GM to look foolish and get fired. Valuing a player in low “A” ball at $80 million makes a GM look great if the player ends up being Carlos Correa, but the GM loses his job if he puts that value on a couple of Tim Beckham’s. And a GM only has the resources to make so many $80 million bets – even if the cost is trading talent instead of paying money – so the fact that a portfolio of 10 or 20 high variance bets should work out OK isn’t that much consolation.
Of course, if the owner is connected with Goldman Sachs he can just get a tax writeoff for Cueto and others.
Where is the perp walk for the felony fraud Phillies ownership?
Google and searsadfh;owi43n.pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
I don’t mean to be rude, but nobody cares.
Maybe he got electrocuted by a surge in his mom’s basement.
It’s a bit pointless to speculate when we don’t know what La Russa/Stewart offered for Fernandez/Carrasco if they even engaged in discussions.
Shelby Miller might have been the best option given what teams wanted for cost-controlled young SP with upside.
Also, it’s already been mentioned that La Russa/Stewart don’t place the same value in prospects/picks as most MLB GM’s. That doesn’t make them wrong, their valuation process is just different.
Perspective is key here. They needed to shore up SP and have done that without giving up Pollock. That was probably their only goal here.
If the package that got Shelby Miller would have fetched Fernandez, don’t you think the D-backs would have done it?
I’d argue that if I pay $5,000 for a $1,000 guitar, my valuation process is “wrong.” Similarly, if most other GMs feel the Dbacks didn’t get enough back for what they gave up, their process is “wrong.”
This assumes $1,000 guitars are readily available to be moved for that price. A more apt comparison would be paying $5,000 for a $1,000 (arbitrary numbers, the price paid just needs to be higher than the sticker), but it was the only $1,000 guitar available for the foreseeable future and your ability to play guitar will be gone in the next 4 or so years.
You’re also assuming that the guitar has a fixed, objective “true” value, or that the market is stable enough to achieve consensus about its value. In a marketplace where no one REALLY knows how a given guitar will perform or how much other guitar players are willing to pay for it, your analogy becomes simplistic.
You could also add context to the scenario. As some have argued AZ may have a win-now mandate, so too in this example there could be a band about to play a show where a shot at a record deal is on the line. The lead guitarist breaks his guitar, and trying to play with it would all but ensure no record deal. Only one person in the building is willing to part with their guitar, but for $5,000. You are fully aware though that that you can buy this guitar on eBay for $1,000. You can either keep your money and try to play a show with no guitar, and maybe hope for another shot at a record deal in the future. Or you could pay the inflated rate, and make a run at the opportunity presented before you.
Your valuation process maybe perfectly fine, however given the context you may see it as paying $5,000 for a record audition instead of a guitar.
Let me introduce you to my two friends, supply and demand.
Fair points and I agree. But you need to go further and assume that there were no other pitchers of better quality available, right?
Has anyone replicated the Creagh/DiMiceli Study using different buckets? The difference in value between the 25 and 26 hitting prospect and 10 and 11 pitching prospect creates a huge range of potential value for these prospects.
For guys on the cusp of a bucket like that, it’s probably best to just average the two buckets.
Agreed for a quick and easy look at things. I’m just curious as to how well 15-35 and 20-40 or something similar would line up with these values.
Honestly this trade doesn’t strike me as all that bad for the D-backs. I guess part of that is I don’t know anything about Blair, but based on his performance he doesn’t look like something to fret about losing. 6.55 k/9 and 3.16 bb/9 doesn’t exactly scream ace, or anything near a top 100 pitching prospect. So they’re trading Inciarte, who they don’t need, and a guy who is years away from the majors at best, for an upgrade to their rotation in a year they’re trying to contend. If they win now and get more revenue, what’s the loss of Swanson? Even if he turns into a really good player 3 years from now, if they make a run in the playoffs that they otherwise wouldn’t have, or just stay competitive in the division, that’s extra money they can throw at a free agent. Maybe it’s too much for Shelby Miller, but where were their alternatives? You can say they could’ve got a Carlos Carrasco but there is no way Cleveland would have been interested in this package, it would be a pretty steep present-day downgrade for Cleveland. Supposedly they inquired about Danny Salazar but Cleveland wanted AJ Pollock back. The number of teams that they could swing a trade with based mainly on prospects, and get a pitcher back, is pretty limited. The Braves, Marlins and …
Reds (Iglesias), white Sox (Rodon)
White Sox not trading Rodon. get off it.
Swanson likely to be a fast mover. Would not surprise me at all if he actually got 2016 September cup of coffee. Thats not likely, but wouldn’t surprise me. I’d bet a fair amount he sees major league playing time by 2017 latest. Technically it’s “years” because it’s more than one, but he’ll be in the majors withing 1.5 seasons.
Meanwhile Swanson’s production at the MLB level for his first season or two most likely won’t be stellar or worthy of starting on a playoff roster. So call it 2019 before he kicks it into gear and we see the #1-1 pedigree show through.
We’ve been spoiled by these uberprospects lately.
You do realize that Blair pitched last year in the minor league equivalent of Coor’s Field (and probably worse). The fact he held his own is impressive, and his prior years’ numbers were much more impressive.
I don’t know anything about Blair. Not sure how where he pitched impacted his pedestrian K and BB rates though, he had a good ERA in AA but again K and BB rates were not impressive. Based on number, he looks more like a back of the rotation type. I think that Inciarte and Blair are being a bit overrated. I think it’s quite possible that AZ is correct to value Tomas above Inciarte. I mean, in a vacuum it IS clearly an overpay, but so is every single free agent signing. You are going to have to overpay to get a cost controlled pitcher in a trade, even if the pitcher is more like solid middle-of-rotation than an ace. The danger in his trade I think is primarily Inciarte vs. Tomas and Miller, if Inciarte actually performs significantly better than Tomas this year, then it’s a bad move. Or if the D-backs just suck, or Miller sucks, then it’s a bad trade. If they have similar performances or Tomas performs better, and Miller has a 3-4 WAR year, and those 3-4 wins push AZ into the playoffs, then regardless of what Swanson becomes, it’s hard to see it being a BAD move. There is significant financial value in contending vs. non-contending, and I think that is being underrated here. If Swanson becomes a good player, then that’s some cheap performance AZ will need to replace in the future, but they may very well have the money to do that.
Are the White Sox sellers? I don’t think they’re giving up Rodon. The Reds don’t have any established pitcher like Miller.
“The Diamondbacks might believe the package they sent for Shelby Miller was fair given their expectations for him and the players they gave up, but they are overpaying market prices.”
Welcome to the proper way to approach fantasy baseball too. Find the gaps between your perceived valuations and the market’s prices. That probably has something to do with why I virtually never pay top dollar at fantasy auctions too…
This is a great article and comments. Really enjoying this discussion. What stands out to me is how small the sample size is, and how many different moving parts are involved here. Did AZ sell high on Inciarte or fail to see the value of defense? We really don’t know what the market value is of tradable pitchers and prospects because there are so few transactions and so little public knowledge, so we use rough approximations, like the average value of future productivity. It seems to reveal that teams sacrificing present production for future production can reap a huge bounty. So then, why don’t more teams enter into full-on rebuild mode to capture this value that is sitting there on the table?
Maybe the real criterion is not the dollar overpay so much as whether the trade is sufficient to push a team over the top to make the playoffs? That allows us to continue disliking the 2012 Royals trade for Shields, for example, since the 2013 team was a middling one several wins away from the wild card, while leaving open the possibility that this AZ trade could (theoretically) be seen more positively if the Diamondbacks make the playoffs in 2016.
For example, we can only say that Inciarte is ‘worth’ about the same as Miller on ‘the market’ if we could secure proprietary knowledge that ATL would have been willing to do a one-for-one swap had AZ driven a harder bargain, or similarly, that some other team would have been willing to offer a decent pitcher instead. And even then, his worth doesn’t exceed Miller’s in 2016. Swanson’s and Blair’s production value is even further into the future. A fundamental characteristic of markets is that the way a significant amount of overpay is handled is by not having transactions in the first place. That requires walking away from a deal to be an acceptable outcome. So the more desperate party (the buyer in this kind of case) may be willing to overpay some finite amount due to the negative consequences of not making a deal.
It’s a bit like the market failure created by intellectual property with computer software or pharmaceutical drugs. Companies such as Microsoft and Pfizer get their customers to overpay by enormous amounts in dollar terms because there are use cases where not buying the product is worse than overpaying for it.
I really hate the “Inciarte is just as valuable as Miller” bs.
Teams quite obviously don’t really trade WAR for WAR. If that were the case then we could reasonably say Ender Inciarte is worth peak-level Mariano Rivera because they both put up 3 WAR/year. Yeah, that notion ought to strike anyone as ridiculous, because it is.
TALENT gets traded. Inciarte is roughly in the Aoki/Span/Parra mold, though younger and controlled for more years, but that doesn’t suddenly give him a pedigree anywhere near Miller’s.
In fact I’d bet anyone that in 3 years when Miller hits FA, AZ or ATL or both will have found an Inciarte clone ready to contribute, so I doubt AZ or any team really gives a crap about years 4-5 of Inciarte. He is for all intents and purposes “just a guy” to the front office.
As for Swanson–if Shelby Miller, with his MLB resume, were eligible in the draft he would no doubt have been the consensus #1-1 and Swanson (or Brendan Rodgers, or Alex Bregman) a distant #1-2. Through this lens I have no problem conceiving of the gap between two such players to be worth Inciarte and Aaron Blair.
Hire this guy!
I’m curious to see how players are overpaid in free agency and in trade markets. Samarja and Porcello are getting paid 90+ million for 5 years(AV ~20 mill) and JA Happ got 36 mil for 3 years. All seem like overpays but in free agency not trade market. Miller has had better results (era vs FIP) than Porcello but Pocello is always expected to do better that his results. I picked these recent deals because the two Miller evaluations above come out at 99 mil and 49 mil which is relatively close. AZ would have had to pay that to get a worse pitcher, Imo, or trade for one. If Miller had Porcello’s first 2 years added to his resume and was a Free agent now, he would get at least Zimmerman money. In the FA market you have to overpay to get good players. The same is true in the trade market.
In my head I imagine AZ shopping this package around saying “What can I get for these guys”. And Miller was their best response.
Dave did and article on the markets available for improving your team before. I think he should revisit that because they do not involve the same valuation process.
One thing I don’t understand: Point of Pittsburgh has the surplus value for Hitters #1-10 at $48.4M while this article has it at $102.4M. Where did that extra $54M come from?