At some point yesterday afternoon, I decided that I wanted to look into Starlin Castro on a historical basis. I go to Baseball-Reference and enter the filters required to get the desired results from the Play Index tool — notably shortstops, age 20, who played in at least 50 games and played at least 50% of those games at short. Nothing too strict, really, and naturally that query only returned 22 seasons. That within itself should give the impression of how rare Castro’s situation is.

Actually, we’ve been spoiled with 20-year-old shortstops: Castro this year, Elvis Andrus last, Jose Lopez in 2004, and Jose Reyes in 2003. If you reach into the 1990s, you have Edgar Renteria and Alex Rodriguez, with Gary Sheffield missing by a year. Between 1930 and 1950, only one joined the ranks (Arky Vaughan) – presumably the whole World War thing played into it – and it wasn’t until the 1970s when this sort of thing became an every-few-years phenomenon.

The question of importance is how Castro is performing against his peers. The answer is quite well. Throw out Rodriguez’s ridiculous 36 home runs, 1.045 OPS season in ’96 and Castro stacks up well against everyone else. Obviously, OPS+ is not the best measure of hitting performance in the world, but it does a worthwhile job here:

Rodriguez 160 OPS+
Vaughan 113
Jim Fregosi 108
Reyes 102
Travis Jackson 102
Whitey Witt 100
Castro 95
Garry Templeton 91

Everyone else had OPS+ below 90, including Ed Brinkman in 1962: he played in 54 games and his OPS+ was a mere 25. Nonetheless, Castro is in good company. Rodriguez is bound to join Vaughan and Jackson in the Hall of Fame, and Fregosi as well as Templeton appeared in numerous All-Star games. Truthfully, there are worse careers to mimic than Witt’s too. Sure, he was out of the league shortly after turning 31, but he appeared in more than 1,130 games and had a career OPS+ of 97.

Moreover, he had a name to compete with Starlin DeJesus Castro, too, as he was born Ladislav Waldemar Wittkowski.

Lastings Milledge is one of those players who always seemed destined for more than he could accomplish dating back to his days in the Mets’ system. After the 2007 season, the Mets traded him within the division to the Nationals, and last summer the Nationals traded him to the Pirates. At age 25, Milledge’s time in baseball was quickly becoming an artifact of his promise rather than a statement of his performance.

Milledge started 2010 as poorly as one can start a season. In April he hit .229/.281/.289. He kicked things up a notch in May by hitting .269/.360/.346. An improvement on a sober April, definitely, but ultimately a teaser for a hot June and volcanic July. His wOBA in June hit .394 thanks to nine extra base hits in 80 plate appearances; Milledge had 10 extra base hits in the previous 179. In his first 36 July plate appearances, he had four extra base hits – including two homers, doubling his season total.

A July wOBA over .400 pushed me to ask Pirates’ radio personality Rocco DeMaro for his thoughts on Milledge’s recent success. DeMaro tweeted in response that Milledge has been “Getting more backspin on his flyballs,” and that he “seems to be hitting fewer grounders.” DeMaro added that Milledge is showcasing a good line drive stroke as of late and has definitely made some adjustments. DeMaro, by the way, is a bright guy and he’s correct. Milledge was hitting more grounders in April and May than he has in June and July; his line drive rate is similarly up as well.

Offense is really the only area in which Milledge provides value. He’s a mundane fielder and a poor baserunner despite his short stature. Milledge is not much of a threat to steal bases – his career success rate is sub-70 – and he rarely takes an extra base. In fact, he has made more outs on the paths during his career (22) than extra bases taken (20), and that doesn’t include his caught stealing tallies, either.

The recent heat has balanced with the early frost to make Milledge’s overall numbers appear league average. A league average bat that doesn’t play defense too well nor run the bases isn’t overly valuable. As such, Milledge’s value really comes down to whether you believe his bat can play up or not. The expectation from those who believe in his tools is that this latest surge is the come up. The expectation for those who do not believe in his tools is that this latest surge is a front. In the end, ultimately Milledge’s bat is fit to play the part of the Sword of Veracity, thus illuminating the truth to all who seek it.

Many pundits (myself included) applauded Boston’s contract with Adrian Beltre this past off-season. The one-year deal (with a player option) teetered on the balance of risk minimization and upside maximization perfectly. If Beltre performed well in 2010, he would appear underpaid. On the flip side, if Beltre had the worst season of his career he wouldn’t be paid too much in excess and given the cheap rate of his 2011 option, he would have the chance to even out any losses endured.

Even the added incentives are a stroke of well-placed foresight; Beltre’s 2011 option increases to $10 million with 640 plate appearances this season. Beltre has recorded at least 640 plate appearances three times in his career. His average (not per 162 games, per season) plate appearance total as a Mariner was 612. Even with the assumed bump thanks to an improved run environment, Beltre would only reach that total by staying healthy and performing well. And you know what, if he did that, and if that $10 million option were exercised as a result, he’d probably still be underpaid.

David Golebiewski covered Beltre under a more analytical tone a few weeks ago. I’ll defer in that aspet to him while quoting one of the more impressive feats offered:

In Boston, Beltre is enjoying his best season since that double-digit WAR total back in ’04. After a four-for-four night against the Rays, he’s batting .349/.387/.561 in 310 trips to the plate, with a .410 wOBA that ranks ninth among qualified major league hitters. He’s flashing the leather again, too, with +12.9 UZR/150. Beltre has already compiled 3.8 WAR this season, trailing only Justin Morneau, Robinson Cano and Carl Crawford among position players. With $15.1 million in Value Dollars, he has already more than justified Boston’s investment.

Perhaps the most fitting moment of the season occurred when Beltre hit a home run off Ben Sheets last night. You see, the Athletics lusted after the third baseman too. Some reports even had Oakland offering more financial security than Boston. Yet, Beltre spurned the added fortune for Boston. In the aftermath, Oakland gave that money to Sheets. That home run won’t make Ken Burns next baseball documentary or anything; for Oakland it’s just proof that the ways of the universe are sometimes utterly cruel.

And for Beltre it’s proof that sometimes betting on yourself is a worthwhile venture.

Padres’ beat writer Corey Brock tweeted yesterday afternoon that the team has interest in Miguel Tejada. Truthfully it’s hard to understand why. Tejada could potentially take third base or maybe shortstop. Right now, the Pads are using Chase Headley and Evereth Cabrera at those positions with a sprinkle of Jerry Hairston Jr. at shortstop. In name value alone, Tejada reigns supreme. Name value isn’t helping to solidify the Padres’ playoff chances though.

Tejada turned 36 in late May and his wOBA is bordering the .300 mark. He does not walk much (nor does he fan constantly) but his power seems to be on the heavy decline, making him a pretty limited offensive contributor. Headley has a park unadjusted wOBA of .321. ZiPS projects their bats to play about equal from here forward, but you have to assume the upside is higher with the player a decade younger. Even if the two are equal at the dish – and there is reason to believe they are not – Headley is a superior baserunner and a better fielder too.

Cabrera is having a rough season. He’s hitting .207/.268/.297 with a decent – if below modest expectations – batting average on balls in play. His walk rate is down and his strikeout rate is up. Even still, it is hard to imagine the Padres replacing him with Tejada. The Orioles are as void of shortstop talent as Keanu Reeves’ jean pockets and even they can’t be bothered to play him there and call up Joshua Bell on a permanent basis. Maybe Baltimore is simply clueless when it comes to evaluating defense, or maybe Tejada’s time as a big league shortstop has passed.

Acquiring a righty with pop and a more reliable shortstop makes sense for San Diego. Realistically Tejada can no longer be counted on to fill either of those holes. Consider it a minor upset if the Padres trade for Tejada at anything but closeout prices. Even then, the Friars’ time could be more wisely spent asking Baltimore about Luke Scott and Ty Wigginton.

The Seattle Mariners’ inability to score runs is no secret. Entering Sunday’s affair with the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, the club had played 91 games and scored 309 runs; a 3.4 runs per game average. The Mariners scored two runs (and won) but it took extra innings. So much attention has been paid (and rightfully so) to how Seattle prevents runs and not enough on how they score them – or rather, how they could increase their scoring without resorting to sinning such as rosterbation or promoting Dustin Ackley before he’s ready.

One of those ways is taking more risks on the basepaths. Not just stealing bases but the other aspects of risk in baserunning; namely attempting to take extra bases on hits. Take one of the most common situations in the game: a single with a runner on second base. As the runner runs the 90 foot path between second and third, the third base coach must make a quick calculation on ball placement, runner speed, the fielder’s arm strength and accuracy, the score, and the base-out state before deciding to put on the brakes or send the runner barreling home.

One of the ways we analyze when (or if) the Mariners should be taking risks on the basepaths is by looking at run expectancy charts and empirical data. Using a Markov Chain to generate a run expectancy table we can then figure out the break-even points for various out states surrounding the aforementioned situation. The Markov Chain gives us a BaseRuns estimated 3.9 runs per game figure for Seattle, one that actually happens to be on the high side when faced with reality. That’s because the Markov Chain doesn’t account for outs on the bases – it’s just not designed to do so. This is not a projection and there are no regression or adjustments made to the team’s numbers. Here is the generated RE chart for the Mariners to date:

They’re a low scoring team in a low scoring environment. Simply put: that means that making an out isn’t as taboo as it would be in a higher run scoring environment (almost anywhere else in baseball) because it would be unlikely that the runner scored anyways. On one hand, this means the break-even point for going second to home is lower than it would be for almost any other team in baseball. On the other, well, they aren’t scoring many runs. That’s a problem.
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Billy Wagner turns 40 on the 25th of this month. His left arm, attached to a 5’10” frame, has tossed more than 870 innings and more than 8,300 pitches since 2002. The used car of free agent closers, the Braves allowed Mike Gonzalez to walk and traded Rafael Soriano for a crack at Wagner. Further, they even gave up their first round pick to sign Wagner to a one-year deal with a club option for 2011. A year ago, it would not have been the least bit surprising if Wagner retired. Right now, he could be fishing or resting that arm for good. Instead, Wagner is shining with the opulence of a newly christened game-saving prince from the nicest of Bobby Cox’s ninth inning dreams.

Velocity is a measure of speed that holds no grasp on age. That much is apparent from Wagner’s mid-to-upper 90 MPH heater. Depowering batters since the middle of the 1990s, Wagner is 39 appearances into the campaign and holds the best ERA through that mark of his career. ERA is hardly the best earmark of a good pitcher, but it works for a trivial purpose like this:

1997: 1.54
1998: 2.79
1999: 2.18
2001: 3.00
2002: 3.14
2003: 1.85
2004: 2.55
2005: 2.23
2006: 2.59
2007: 1.52
2008: 2.25
2010: 1.17

FIP supports that Wagner has pitched extremely well. His 2.12 figure would actually be the second best seasonal total of his career, which is a bit breath-taking within itself. Wagner gets lost in the shuffle with Mariano Rivera doing his thing as the premier salt-and-pepper whiskered closer, but he’s right there with him. Evidently Wagner is talking about retiring at season’s end.

Braves fans should convince him to reconsider given how he’s pitching.

Young players in baseball are always expected to improve. If a player falters from year one to year two, then the phenomenon is labeled a “sophomore slump” rather than what it likely is; a regression towards the player’s true talent level. For an example of what people think of as the textbook definition of a young player improving, take a certain member of the Reds. This is Jay Bruce’s third big league season. He improved from year one to year two and has since improved even more from year two to year three. At age 23, he seems to be on the right track towards projected stardom.

The most glaring improvement for Bruce is his offense. His wOBA in 2008 was .328 and in 2009 he raised that by a single point. In 2010, though, he’s up to .338. In large part because of a BABIP that sits .102 points higher than last season. Think about that for a moment: 10.2% more of Bruce’s balls in play are turning into hits. What a silly thought and reality.

Bruce appears to be a good fielder too. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of his game is on the basepaths. No, he’s not much of a basestealer. In 2006 he stole 19 bases in 117 games. Since then, he’s stolen 30 in nearly 500 games spanning multiple levels. That’s not the surprising part. Instead it’s Bruce’s ability to take the extra base. Baseball-Reference tracks this measure and the definition of what constitutes and extra base is pretty simple: it’s any advancement where the lead runner isn’t forced by the player behind him. Say Bruce is on first base when a single is hit into right field, if Bruce takes second and third during the run of play, he’s credited with an extra base taken.

Take the speediest runners; guys like Carl Crawford (47%), B.J. Upton (53%), and Ichiro Suzuki (42%) and they don’t compare to Bruce’s season. Take the most heads-up baserunners; like Scott Rolen (51%), J.D. Drew (46%), and even Pete Rose (49%) and they don’t compare. That’s because Bruce is taking the extra base 70% of the time this season. Incredulously Bruce only ranks fourth in the majors of players with at least 150 plate appearances to date behind Cameron Maybin, Seth Smith, and Alexis Rios (and just ahead of Chase Utley).

Baseball Prospectus keeps track of similar numbers and offers a run value of 2.1 (eighth best in the bigs) on Bruce’s hit advancement plays. All told, Bruce’s baserunning is valued at a little under a run because of a huge penalty in other areas of advancing; such as running after a ball is caught by an outfielder or scoring from third on a sac fly attempt. Given his ability advance otherwise I checked the rest of the Reds’ numbers to see if this might be a team-wide philosophy (i.e. don’t risk getting doubled up on one play) but that doesn’t seem to be the case.

So Bruce is good when it comes to taking an extra base on hits, but awful when it comes to taking a base on outs. Unless he has no confidence in his ability to accelerate (which makes no sense given his other numbers) or he’s getting a heavier than expected distribution of easy-to-advance on hits I really can’t think of an explanation.

What have the Reds fans in the crowd noticed?

The regular season got back underway last night, putting an end to the most miserable stretch in the schedule from an inaction standpoint. With that, the Twitter suggestion/reader appreciation week comes to a close, too, but not before I do one more … sort of.

Steve Slowinski jokingly suggested a post about Casey Fossum and how he ties everything in the universe together. (Slowinski is a Fossum fan and the finest writing talent DRaysBay has ever produced for those unaware.) This got me to thinking about Fossum, about his razor thing margins, awful facial hair, and his brief stint as a reliever with the Rays. And also about the Fossum Flip – his version of the eephus.

When a pitcher throws a lollipop like the Fossum Flip he has to hold an inordinate amount of luck that the batter hasn’t the faintest clue that the pitch is coming, otherwise it’s all over. We’ve all experienced the feeling of luck. Hell, Joe Posnanski often describes how one day in college he just up and quit accounting only to be covering events for his local paper shortly thereafter. Posnanski only got that gig because a sports editor gave him a shot to see if he had any chaps for the business. That’s luck. We’ve all benefitted from that luck, but still luck.

I consider a large part of my success luck and I don’t feel any the lesser for it. To be surrounded by these writers who dwarf me on a daily basis (I’d be less of a writer and certainly a lesser person without Carson Cistulli around). That we’re writers plodding the same soil rather than pitchmen or sales people is one of the best things about this place and to have David Appelman’s and Dave Cameron’s brilliant leadership to guide everyone is luck too.

And you know, that we all have you folks reading on a daily basis is luck too. You could easily find other things to do with your time rather than perusing, sharing, and commenting our thoughts on baseball, but you choose against it, and that means a ton.

So thank you – really — and here’s to a great second half.

Earlier this season I mused that life was unfair because Bruce Chen had a bullpen job and Russ Springer did not. Today, life is still unfair as Chen has a rotation spot. Springer, though, is back in the thick of matters too, signing a contract with the Cincinnati Reds for a little less than $1 million. He’ll be up to the big leagues probably around the trade deadline, which probably shouldn’t affect the Reds’ plans too much, but who knows.

Springer is basically a right-handed specialist. Against lefties he has a FIP of 5 since 2003 while righties have only walked, homered, and struck out their way to a 3.22 FIP against him. While it’s a nice signing in the sense that the Reds will get a reliever who has posted FIP of 2.83, 3.51, and 4.06 over the last three seasons who is ever so familiar with the National League Central, it’s just … well, he doesn’t really fit their ballpark.

A byproduct of extreme flyballers is that some balls will clear the fences. Springer has held his home run per flyball percentage mostly in check over the last three seasons, but that’s while spending time with the St. Louis Cardinals, Oakland Athletics, and Tampa Bay Rays. StatCorner has park factors by the batter’s hand and suggests that the parks Springer has succeeded in recently and the one he’s about to enter are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Here’s how those three home parks factor for right-handed batters’ home run rates:

TB: 96
STL: 73
OAK: 73

You know what Great American Ballpark’s figure is? 133. Springer had a decent career in Houston — albeit not like his past few seasons — and the park factor for RHB HR there is only 117. He’s about to enter an environment that just won’t suit his talents for at least half the games. He may succeed still, but if he doesn’t, I won’t be surprised. Of all the ballparks to pitch in, he just had to choose this one. Life just isn’t fair.

More Twitter giveback. This time from Ramedy. The topic: Ben Zobrist’s on-baseness.

The 2009 season was unusual for Ben Zobrist. He started the season in a super-sub and pinch-hitting capacity where he become synonymous with extra base hits late in games – earning the nickname “Late Inning Lightning” from Tommy Rancel. As the season shifted and Akinori Iwamura was injured, he took over at second base and made the All-Star game in part because of his power and in part because of his ridiculous defense. The entire Rays’ infield (minus catcher) actually made the All-Star game despite finishing the year in third place; Zobrist basically led the Light Brigade.

In 2010 that power is all but gone. Ben Zobrist walked in 13.7% of his first half plate appearances. He held a .113 ISO. Of the 15 batters with higher walk rates only two had ISO below .150 (little blue pill Chipper Jones and Daric Barton) and none below .120. That’s not to say Zobrist is some endangered species of bird; Ian Kinsler has nearly identical figures and Chone Figgins isn’t far off with far less power. It is to say it would be no surprise if the March of Dimes began sponsoring Zobrist’s Baseball-Reference page.

That ability to get on base has kept Zobrist amongst the Rays’ most valuable hitters. His .362 wOBA is third behind only AL MVP candidate Carl Crawford and Evan Longoria — just ahead of a similar batter in John Jaso. He’s still playing tremendous defense at second and right field. He even filled in at center for a span, although he looked rather out of place and only his athleticism allowed him to overcome some rather putrid routes.

Despite the solid walk rate, Zobrist has actually expanded his zone this year. He’s offering at pitches out of the zone more often than before and while is contact rate has actually improved, it’s up to anyone’s guess whether the increased willingness to fish is residual from his power show or simply Zobrist being more aggressive because he felt the pitch was hittable.

Regardless, coming off a season where he looks destined to receive his own collection of Louisville Slugger advertisements, Zobrist has proven he’s a hopeless romantic who enjoys 90 foot walks on paved dirt and that’s enough to make Rays’ fans swoon.