Author Archive

The Ones That Got Away: American League Central

Chicago

Best positional player: Placido Polanco (1993: Round 49, Pick 1,357) was part of the infamous Bud Smith for Scott Rolen package. Remember when Smith threw a no hitter?

Best pitcher: Jeff Weaver (1997: Round 2, Pick 62) needs to allow 15 more home runs to take the record for most homers allowed by a Fresno State pitcher in the majors. Otherwise, it doesn’t appear he’s going to catch many records, including those set by Dick Ruthven, like wins (22 away) or innings pitched (300 away).

Honorable mention: J.J. Putz (1995: Round 3, Pick 84) the division really was enamored with Putz, as we’ll see later.

Cleveland

The Indians are in the rare position of not really having a mentionable positional player who they failed to sign. Instead there was Luke Scott, who they traded for Jeriome Robertson, and Ryan Church, who was traded (with Maicer Izturis) for Scott Stewart.

Best pitcher: Tim Lincecum (2005: Round 42, Pick 1,261) does anyone really need to be notified as to why this (1) was mentioned; and (2) isn’t as bad of an indictment on the Indians.

Detroit

The Tigers have a boring draft history too with regards to non-signs.

Best pitcher: Matt Thornton (1995: Round 27, Pick 742)

Honorable mention: Kiko Calero (1994: Round 41, Pick 1,142)

2010 draft connection: Barrett Loux is the Texas A&M righty whom Keith Law had going in the 20s in his latest mock draft. The Tigers took Loux in the 24th round of the 2007 draft and obviously did not sign him.

Kansas City

Best positional player: Jacque Jones (1993: Round 31, Pick 861) accounts for 1,302 games out of the 2,117 by Kennesaw State University alumni. Willie Harris has another 806 of those. Kennesaw State isn’t quite the baseball hotbed you’d assume it would be.

Best pitcher: Matt Guerrier (1996: Round 33, Pick 979)

Honorable mention: Chris Sampson (1997: Round 41, Pick 1,231) they just don’t pick that many interesting players without signing them.

Minnesota

Best positional player: Jason Varitek (1993: Round 1, Pick 21) the most insane thing about this is that you know who pick 20 was? Torii Hunter. You know who made that pick? The Twins. They almost had two of the five or six best players in the first round with back-to-back picks in the 20s. Good drafting there.

Best pitcher: J.J. Putz (1998: Round 17, Pick 499)

Honorable mention: Adam Lind (2002: Round 8, Pick 242) fun fact: Jason Kubel and Lind both went to Highland High School, only halfway across the country apart. Okay, maybe that’s not all too fun after all.


The Ones That Got Away: National League East

Atlanta

Best positional player: Tony Gwynn Jr. (2000: Round 33, Pick 1,000)

Best pitcher: Scott Downs (1994: Round 12, Pick 342). Of course this isn’t the most famous non-sign in Braves history as far as left-handed pitchers go. Some guy named Randy Johnson was drafted but not signed too, he’s just no longer active.

Honorable mention: Mark Hendrickson (1992, 1994: Rounds 13 and 32, Picks 369 and 902). Yes, they drafted him twice, no he never signed. In fact, he was drafted by a team every year between 1992 and 1997. He was too busy playing basketball to care.

Florida

Best positional player: Adam LaRoche (1998, 1999: Rounds 18, 42, Picks 550, 1,254). Like Atlanta with Hendrickson, the Marlins drafted LaRoche twice and failed to sign him either time. Naturally he wound up with Atlanta.

Best pitcher: Cliff Lee (1997: Round 8, Pick 246). Yep, they too tried tasting the Lee fruit and were denied.

Honorable mention: Bob Howry (1993: Round 45, Pick 1,269). Not because Howry is anything special, but because the Marlins’ draft history is pretty boring.

New York

They actually deserve their own list:

Mark Grudzielanek (1989: Round 17, Pick 450)
A.J. Burnett (1995: Round 8, Pick 217)
Aaron Rowand (1995: Round 40, Pick 1,113)
David DeJesus (1997: Round 43, Pick 1,281)
Garrett Atkins (1997: Round 10, Pick 300)
Jeremy Guthrie (1997: Round 15, Pick 450)

Philadelphia

Best positional player: J.D. Drew (1997: Round 1, Pick 2). Oh come on, you knew it was coming. Drew didn’t sign and then re-entered the draft to be selected by the Cardinals a year later.

Best pitcher: Joe Saunders (1999: Round 5, Pick 156)

Honorable mention: Brad Ziegler (2003: Round 20, Pick 595). He actually did sign with the Phillies on June 17, 2003. They released him on March 28, 2004.

2010 draft connection: Brandon Workman is projected to go in the first round. The Phils nabbed Workman with their third round pick in 2007 but let him scamper away to the University of Texas. Keith Law’s latest mock draft has him going to the Rays at 31 and his scouting report suggests he could be a number two starter some day.

Washington
Best positional player: Russell Martin (2000: Round 35, Pick 1,035). The Expos’ 2000 draft was a thing of beauty and actually produced each of their three representatives here.

Best pitcher: Wes Littleton (2000: Round 7, Pick 195). No, really, there are no other choices.

Honorable mention: Jason Bay (2000: Round 22, Pick 645). This before trading Bay to the New York Mets for Lou Collier in 2002. The Mets would then trade Bay months later for Jason Middlebrook and Steve Reeds.

You know who else the Expos drafted in 2000? Fred Lewis, Jeff Karstens, Grady Sizemore, Shawn Hill, and Cliff Lee. None of them were as good as Justin Wayne though.


The Ones That Got Away: American League East

With the draft days away I decided this would be as good of time as ever to revisit players drafted by a team who they didn’t sign with. Mostly to play the “What if …” game. This series will include active players only and will focus on unsigned players, although a few mentions of players signed then quickly traded or released will be scattered. And no, the intent is not to slam a team for not signing a player or question their process. Obviously not every pick is made with the same intentions in mind, particularly those in the latter rounds.

Baltimore

Best positional player: Michael Young (1994: Round 25, Pick 699) did not sign out of high school and instead attended the University of California, Santa Barbara. Three years later the Toronto Blue Jays would draft him in the fifth round, where he would spend three seasons until being traded to the Texas Rangers for Esteban Loaiza.

Best pitcher: Cliff Lee (1998: Round 20, Pick 609) also did not sign and went to the University of Arkansas. Lee raised his stock enough to be a fourth round selection in 2000 by the Montreal Expos. He would later be traded to the Indians alongside Brandon Phillips, Grady Sizemore, and Lee Stevens for Bartolo Colon and Tim Drew.

Honorable mention: Jayson Werth (1997: Round 1, Pick 22) who actually signed with Baltimore. Three and a half years later they traded him to Toronto for John Bale.

Boston

Best positional player: Mark Teixeira (1998: Round 9, Pick 265) this was, of course, before Teixeira went to Georgia Tech and eventually became the best college hitter in the 2001 draft. The two sides weren’t far apart in talks, yet at the end of the day Boston let him walk, only to try and woo him in free agency during the winter of 2008. (History sort of repeated itself when the Red Sox failed to sign Pedro Alvarez years later. Bryan Smith even notes that the international scouting director attempted to give the amateur department his money to sign Alvarez, but ownership disallowed the move.)

Best pitcher: Aaron Harang (1996: Round 22, Pick 661) if Harang plays another three-to-four years, he should surpass Buddy Black as the San Diego State University pitcher with the most innings thrown in the major leagues.

Honorable mention: Pat Burrell (1995: Round 43, Pick 1,194) again, before Burrell went to the University of Miami and before being the top pick.

New York

Best positional player: Casey Blake (1995: Round 45, Pick 1,259) is from Wichita State. That’s about the only interesting factoid about his drafting here.

Best pitcher: Brian Tallet (1997: Round 13, Pick 409) Tallet would later be selected by the Indians in the 2000 draft and in 2006 they would trade him to the Blue Jays for a minor leaguer named Bubbie Buzachero. That is a real name. That person actually exists. (Mark Prior should also get a mention here, he’s just not entirely active.)

Honorable mention: Brad Ausmus (1987: Round 48, Pick 1,152)

Tampa Bay

Best positional player: Jacoby Ellsbury (2002: Round 23, Pick 674) most notable because that is the same year and round that Bubbie Buzachero was drafted.

Best pitcher: David Bush (2001: Round 4, Pick 109)

Honorable mention: Mike Pelfrey (2002: Round 15, Pick 434)

Toronto

Best positional player: Brad Hawpe (1997: Round 46, Pick 1,344) the catch here is that Hawpe was actually drafted as a left-handed pitcher.

Best pitcher: Chad Qualls (1997: Round 52, Pick 1,444)

Honorable mention: Ryan Franklin (1991: Round 25, Pick 666) besides the fact that Franklin went everywhere Pat Gillick went – Toronto, Seattle, and later Philadelphia – the pick number earns him a spot here.


The Dodgers’ Improbable Victory

Some losses make fans curse, others laugh, and in the rarest of cases, people can’t help but ask if such absurdity really happened. The Diamondbacks’ faithful are probably still lost in blank-stare mode this morning. For those who were asleep as the East Coast flirted with the midnight hour, here’s how the bottom of the ninth inning played out in the D-Backs/Dodgers game.

With the score knotted at four, James Loney drew a leadoff walk from Esmerling Vasquez. Casey Blake then singled, raising the Dodgers’ expected win percentage to 80.5%. Here’s where things get tricky. Russell Martin would show bunt, causing third baseman Mark Reynolds to jog towards the plate, thus allowing Loney to take a larger secondary lead. Martin would not make contact with the ball and the entire scene seemingly acted as a dress rehearsal for the next pitch … or at least it would’ve been, if Reynolds didn’t wander a little too far inwards, giving Loney what he perceived as an opening to take third base. Loney would go a little over halfway before deciding to throw it in reverse, and thus, allowing the Diamondbacks to execute a rundown for the first out in the inning.

To Loney’s credit, he did allow Blake to advance to second base. Martin would then hit a grounder to the right side of the infield, allowing Blake to reach third. With a 2-2 count, Blake would make a move towards the plate, albeit not an overly convincing one, but a move good enough to cause Vasquez to lose his composure on the hill and commit a balk. That allowed Blake to score the game winning run in truly rare and ridiculous fashion.

If that’s not enough, the only reason the Dodgers were even in the position to win is because Diamondbacks’ starter Rodrigo Lopez blew a two-run lead in the eighth inning with two outs after an error by Kelly Johnson. Prior to that play, the Dodgers held an 18.2% win expectancy; after the error, that number shot up to 54.7%. And to think, all of this came just minutes after their win expectancy had dipped to a game-low 7.8%.

For such a seemingly simple and occasionally repetitive game, it sure does find ways to keep shocking and entertaining us throughout the season year after year. Dap to Alexander Cartwright.


More on the Rays’ Offense

A few weeks have passed since Dave Cameron wrote about the Rays’ offense and its affinity for hitting with runners on. They’re now hitting .284/.357/.435 with men on – which gives them the seventh best OPS in that predicament – and .236/.316/.390 without anyone on – seventeenth best. Most of the success with runners on has been locally attributed to new hitting coach Derek Shelton’s “GTMI” mantra; standing for Get The [Man] In. Yes, a mantra.

Steve Slowinski recently looked at the difference in results and there’s some interesting tidbits that come out from all of this if you dig deep enough. For instance, while researching this post I found out that the Rays have the second lowest percentage of double plays batted into given their numerous opportunities – behind only San Diego — but I think one thing is missing from the numerous analyses out there and that’s a focus on the batting average on balls in play.

The team’s BABIP is .308, but the individual breakdowns shed more light on why the Rays are struggling without men on. Below is a look at the BABIP and the projected rest of season BABIP for the regulars, excluding those with fewer than a full season’s worth of plate appearances for obvious reasons (namely, complete regression to league average without taking minor league track record into account skews the numbers):

 
Player	To Date	RoS	Delta
Pena	0.207	0.263	0.056
Navarro	0.213	0.263	0.05
Aybar	0.242	0.272	0.03
Barty	0.266	0.314	0.048
Upton	0.272	0.318	0.046
Kapler	0.291	0.274	-0.017
Zobrist	0.363	0.305	-0.058
Craw	0.366	0.335	-0.031
Longo	0.373	0.318	-0.055

The Rays have had a few batters outperforming their expectations by quite a bit, but they also have four players expected to gain BABIP success from here on out compared to their first two months of the season. Revivals by Carlos Pena and B.J. Upton* in particular would be a much welcomed sight to the lineup. Both have become increasingly aggressive under Shelton, with Pena swinging at 43% of first pitches seen and Upton at 42% (good for third and fifth most in the American League with Crawford at seventh). Jason Bartlett’s struggles are notable too, since he was the fulltime leadoff hitter until just days ago, with manager Joe Maddon inserting Zobrist into the leadoff spot versus righties.

Nevertheless, the talk about needing to acquire more bats may be premature. For one, there’s potential BABIP regression on the way. But more importantly, outfielder Matt Joyce should be in the majors at some point in June and catcher Kelly Shoppach isn’t too far behind. Joyce figures to take a roster spot from either Sean Rodriguez (who would go to Triple-A) or Hank Blalock (who would go wherever bad baseball players go) meanwhile Shoppach should spell the end for Dioner Navarro. Navarro and Rodriguez are the only two Rays with wOBA below .290, so it’s not like Joyce nor Shoppach have to be world-beaters in order to mark improvement either.

If the Rays do pursue another bat, it would presumably be someone on the Luke Scott side of the spectrum rather than Adrian Gonzalez or Prince Fielder.
Read the rest of this entry »


A Comparison

Offense
Seattle: .238/.311/.348, 1.6% PA/HR, 9.3% BB/PA, 29% XBH/H
San Diego: .241/.321/.360, 1.8% PA/HR, 9.7% BB/PA, 30% XBH/H

Defense
Seattle: 27 DRS, 7.6 UZR
San Diego: 35 DRS, 19.9 UZR

Rotation
Seattle: 3.78 ERA, 3.99 FIP, 4.39 xFIP
San Diego: 2.88 ERA, 3.66 FIP, 4.08 xFIP

Bullpen
Seattle: 3.70 ERA, 3.75 FIP, 4.27 xFIP
San Diego: 2.91 ERA, 3.14 FIP, 3.19 xFIP

Record
Seattle: 18-28
San Diego: 28-18

Okay, to the commentary.

No, I’m not saying Seattle and San Diego are equals. I do think Seattle will play better than they’ve played so far – which is to say better than one of the worst teams in baseball – and I think San Diego will play worse than they have so far – which is to say worse than one of the best teams in baseball – and I think most people would agree with that.

Seattle and San Diego are basically playing with the same blueprint: good-to-great defense, above-average pitching, and an offense that chronically struggles to scrap out a few runs per game. And it’s working beautifully for one and horribly for the other. Obviously, the comparison using raw statistics is imperfect. Safeco is tough on batters, but Petco is tougher. The Padres are without access to a designated hitter and that has the tendency to affect offensive statistics.

My point is, though, that Seattle’s paltry offensive efforts are well-publicized and mocked. San Diego’s efforts aren’t much better, and would do little to inspire that certain poultry staple of the area. Seattle has a number of struggling batters right now that seem unlikely to be this bad going forward. Jose Lopez, Milton Bradley, Casey Kotchman, and Chone Figgins, for starters, and maybe not all of them come around like we’d expect, but by the end of the year, Seattle should end up outhitting San Diego. That’s largely irrelevant though, since both are below average offenses.

Teams can compete without hitting for a lot of power or hitting a lot in general. Ask San Diego. They’re just doing what a lot of folks thought Seattle would do.


Gil Meche’s Issues with the Stolen Base

Needs explaining by folks who watch Gil Meche more often than myself.

Meche allowed 29 steals between 1999 and 2007. Those 29 gave opposing baserunners a 45% success rate. Running on Meche was a chore rather than a pleasure. Since 2008, though, Meche has allowed 42 steals at an 88% success rate. The basepath between first and second has essentially become a runway.

Three hypothesizes came to mind:

1) The Royals changed his delivery

Maybe they did, but teams didn’t start abusing Meche until the 2008 season, his second in Kansas City. That means either teams sat on the change for a full season or Meche didn’t make a change until 2008. This would seemingly be where the Royals fandom that regulates the site can chime in. Did Meche start taking longer? Did he work out of the windup with runners on? Did he add a hitch to his delivery? Anything, nothing, something?

2) Quality of catcher/runner

The stealing rates by Meche and then the rest of the pitching staff in each of his seasons since 2005:


SB%	Meche	Team
2005	50	70
2006	42	68
2007	44	76
2008	86	73
2009	94	72
2010	83	71

Suffice to say that’s not it. The quality of runner argument is dampened by this too. If the runners really were more talented, then either the team’s catchers are elite or it’s just not true.

3) The injuries

Meche has had numerous shoulder and back injuries, but they all came in 2009 and later … which doesn’t explain his 2008 numbers unless he was hurt then too.

So, Royals fans, I ask, what’s changed with Meche?


Elvis Andrus, Jason Heyward, and Walks

To piggyback off Dave Cameron’s earlier post.

Jason Heyward and Elvis Andrus are two of the game’s youngest everyday players, known for their upside more than anything. Perhaps the most underrated aspect about either’s game is their affinity for the walk. Heyward (20-years-old) is walking the sixth most amongst all major leaguers and Andrus ranks just outside of the top 30 walk rates. The updated ZiPS projections have both finishing with 63 walks.

Surprisingly – or perhaps not – that total wouldn’t rank within the top 35 for most walks in a season by a player younger than 22-years-old.

Here’s a quick rundown of the top five:

T5. 103 BB by Jimmie Foxx – 1929 Philadelphia, 21-years-old, 638 plate appearances (16.1%)
T5. 103 BB by Mel Ott – 1930 New York, 21-years-old, 646 plate appearances (15.9 %)
3. 107 BB by Ted Williams – 1939 Boston, 20-years-old, 677 plate appearances (15.8%)
2. 113 BB by Mel Ott – 1929 New York, 20-years-old, 674 plate appearances (16.8%)
1. 117 BB by Rickey Henderson – 1980 Oakland, 21-years-old, 722 plate appearances (16.2%)

Two things noticeable: 1) Each of those players are in the Hall of Fame and 2) only one of those seasons came within the last 30 years, while three of them were within a span of two seasons. If the year range is shortened from the turn of the 20th century until 1950, then only one season with 100+ walks remains – that being Henderson’s, of course – with the only other players topping 90 walks being Eddie Matthews and Joe Morgan – two hall of famers as well.

If the scope is narrowed to view history from 1990 onwards, this is what the top 10 looks like:

1. Ken Griffey Jr. 71
2. Albert Pujols 69
3. Miguel Cabrera 68
4. Delino DeShields 66
5. Ken Griffey Jr. 63
6. Ryan Zimmerman 61
7. Adrian Beltre 61
8. Alex Rodriguez 59
9. Melky Cabrera 56
10. Adrian Beltre 56

Notice the quantity of walks dropping, but not only that, only 28 players aged 21 or younger had enough plate appearances to qualify. A smaller time frame between 1920 and 1930 registers 22 players. This should not be a shock, given the development and expansion of farm systems and free agency. Teams simply aren’t fielding that many 20- or 21-year-olds because they don’t have to and because disincentives exist for rushing a potentially elite player to the majors. At least if the plan is to keep that player through the years presumed to be his statistical prime.

Back to Heyward and Andrus though. If either (or both) can simply add, say, 10 walks to their projections, then whichever accomplishes that will be the new leader in the post-1990 clubhouse. That doesn’t necessarily guarantee a bust in Cooperstown, but it will ensure them a place in modern history.


As an aside, you can read more about Heyward (from me) at Wired’s Playbook blog. It’s mostly talk about his usage of Twitter, but there’s some quotes from smart people too.


Of Pedroia and First Pitches

Last night, we looked at Franklin Gutierrez and his metamorphosis at the plate. Dustin Pedroia was mentioned on the chart of first pitch takers and it made me wonder aloud: is Pedroia simply selective or passive? Now that question could be phrased about just about anyone – well, okay, not Vladimir Guerrero or Delmon Young – but Pedroia is interesting. He makes contact more than 90% of the time he swings, yet he actually has the ability to drive the ball, unlike the aforementioned slap-hitting mafia.

Pedroia is taking about 90% of the first pitches he sees this year, which is less than last year (93%) but more than 2008 (85%). He’s swinging 9% of the time, as opposed to 7% and 15%, but he’s making contact more than in those seasons. In fact, in 18 swings this season, he only has one whiff. That’s a 94% rate, higher than the 87% and 94% from the previous two years. What’s interesting, though, is that Pedroia has only seen 39% 1-0 counts this year, significantly lower than the 47% of last year and a touch below 42% of 2008.

That is to say, pitchers seem to be throwing him strikes more often this season than in the past. They’re also throwing more fastballs than usual, albeit barely (74% compared to 72% and 70%) and a quick glance at the called strike location for all pitches shows that the most common placement is down and away. Not a surprise, given that’s where conventional wisdom seems to suggest is the ideal location for pitchers to attack.

The most interesting thought to come from those numbers is guessing when Pedroia will begin to swing more often since he’s (probably) noticing that pitchers are attacking the zone more often than before. Nobody knows the exact percentage of the time that a hitter will watch a strike on the first pitch before becoming aggressive — to claim otherwise is to be that batter himself — so all we can do is assume at some point the coaching staff will notify Pedroia that he should probably start being more aggressive early on. At the same time, teams can’t just sit outside of the zone; otherwise he’ll swing even less often.

Given a career-low BABIP and a wOBA in line with what we’d expect, it might not matter too much either way.


Franklin Gutierrez’s Patience

View Franklin Gutierrez’s player page and the offensive numbers will be overshadowed by gaudy UZR and DRS totals that cement his place as one of the finest flycatchers in the game. Not until one downright inspects Gutierrez’s production with the bat does the best kept secret about his game become transparent.

You see, Gutierrez just doesn’t swing that often. To date, he’s actually swinging the bat fewer times – roughly 39% of the time – than ever before. When it comes to swinging on the first pitch, Gutierrez actually is the least aggressive hitter in baseball, tied with David Eckstein. Unlike Eckstein and the usual suspects of the slap-hitting mafia (Brett Gardner and Luis Castillo included), Gutierrez hits for power, which makes him more like Bobby Abreu and Kevin Youkilis, only with more patience:

With that said, mentioning Gutierrez’s career high walk rate is a given. Last year, his first in Seattle, Gutierrez managed to increase his walks while keeping his strikeouts static. That hasn’t been the case this season, with his strikeout rate swelling to over a quarter of his at-bats, but the increase in walks outweighs the shift in punch outs.

In 2008, Gutierrez went the entire month of June with a single walk. Thus far in May 2010, he’s recorded as many walks (15) as hits. Expecting Gutierrez to keep up such a torrid pace of free passes is unreasonable, just as trying to assign how much of this newfound appreciation for the walk can be attributed to a weak supporting cast and how much credit belongs to Gutierrez and his devices.

One thing is for sure: though Gutierrez may be the master of creating outs on defense, he’s anything but at the dish.