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Welcome to the start of another offseason. As is customary, now that the World Series has concluded, FanGraphs is releasing our ranking of the top 50 free agents available on the market this winter. A number of writers have helmed this list over the years: first Dave Cameron, then Kiley McDaniel, Craig Edwards, and most recently me. This is now my fifth year curating these rankings, and as always, my real superpower is collaboration. The FanGraphs staff contributed mightily at every step along the way.

Below, I’ve provided contract estimates and rankings of the offseason’s top free agents, along with market-focused commentary for the top 25 players. That could be a sketch of likely suitors, a discussion of how qualifying offers might affect a player’s thinking, or even just statistical analysis dressed up as market analysis for Halloween – I’m a baseball nerd at heart, what can I say? A collection of FanGraphs writers – Davy Andrews (DA), Michael Baumann (MB), James Fegan (JF), Jay Jaffe (JJ), David Laurila (DL), Eric Longenhagen (EL), Kiri Oler (KO), Esteban Rivera (ER), and Dan Szymborski (DS) – have supplied player-focused breakdowns for the entire top 50, designed to provide some context for each player at this particular point in their career. Huge thanks go to Meg Rowley for acting as a sounding board throughout the process, Eric Longenhagen for his extensive contributions to my evaluation of the international players, Jason Martinez and Jon Becker for their market knowledge, and Sean Dolinar and David Appelman for technical assistance.

The players are ranked in the order in which I prefer them. That’s often the same as ranking them in contract order, but not always. In some cases, I prefer a player I expect will get less money over one who stands to make more. I’ll generally make note of that in the accompanying comment, but just to reiterate, this list isn’t exclusively sorted by descending average annual value or anything like that. Read the rest of this entry »

This postseason, FanGraphs is continuing its tradition of writing report cards for the on-field decisions made by playoff managers. Excluding the managers who lost in the best-of-three Wild Card Series, we cover every round of the playoffs for all eight managers. It’s detailed enough that I’ve begun enlisting some help. So far this year, I have graded the efforts of A.J. Hinch, Aaron Boone, Craig Counsell, Rob Thomson, and Dan Wilson. Dan Szymborski scrutinized Pat Murphy’s performance. Yesterday and today, I’m taking a look at John Schneider. The Blue Jays played enough games that we decided to split his report into two. Michael Baumann will follow with a review of Dave Roberts. It takes a village to get the kind of in-depth coverage we aspire to provide you.

Our goal is to evaluate each manager in terms of process, not results. If you bring in your best pitcher to face their best hitter in a huge spot, that’s a good decision regardless of the outcome. Try a triple steal with the bases loaded only to have the other team make four throwing errors to score three runs? I’m probably going to call that a blunder even though it worked out. Managers do plenty of other things — getting team buy-in for new strategies or unconventional bullpen usage behind closed doors is a skill I find particularly valuable — but as I have no insight into how that’s accomplished or how each manager differs, I can’t exactly assign grades for it.

I’m also purposefully avoiding vague qualitative concerns like “trusting your veterans because they’ve been there before.” Playoff coverage lovingly focuses on clutch plays by proven performers, but guys like Trey Yesavage and Addison Barger were also excellent this October. Forget trusting your veterans; the playoffs are about trusting your best players. George Springer is important because he’s great, not because of the number of playoff series he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been around a long time; when I’m evaluating decisions, “but he’s a veteran” just doesn’t enter my thought process.

I’m always looking for new analytical wrinkles in critiquing managerial decisions. For instance, I’ve increasingly come to view pitching decisions as a trade-off between protecting your best relievers from overexposure and minimizing your starters’ weakest matchups, which means that I’m grading managers on multiple axes in every game. I think there’s almost no pitching decision that’s a true no-brainer these days; there are just too many competing priorities to make anything totally obvious. That means I’m going to be less certain in my evaluation of pitching than of hitting, but I’ll try to make my confidence level clear in each case. I tackled the offensive portion of Schneider’s managing yesterday, so now it’s time for the pitching part of his report card. Let’s get to it, shall we? Read the rest of this entry »

This postseason, FanGraphs is continuing its tradition of writing report cards for the on-field decisions made by playoff managers. Excluding the managers who lost in the best-of-three Wild Card Series, we cover every round of the playoffs for all eight managers. It’s detailed enough that I’ve begun enlisting some help. So far this year, I have graded the efforts of A.J. Hinch, Aaron Boone, Craig Counsell, Rob Thomson, and Dan Wilson. Dan Szymborski scrutinized Pat Murphy’s performance. Today and tomorrow, I’m taking a look at John Schneider. The Blue Jays played enough games that we decided to split his report into two. Michael Baumann will follow with a review of Dave Roberts. It takes a village to get the kind of in-depth coverage we aspire to provide you.

Our goal is to evaluate each manager in terms of process, not results. If you bring in your best pitcher to face their best hitter in a huge spot, that’s a good decision regardless of the outcome. Try a triple steal with the bases loaded only to have the other team make four throwing errors to score three runs? I’m probably going to call that a blunder even though it worked out. Managers do plenty of other things — getting team buy-in for new strategies or unconventional bullpen usage behind closed doors is a skill I find particularly valuable — but as I have no insight into how that’s accomplished or how each manager differs, I can’t exactly assign grades for it.

I’m also purposefully avoiding vague qualitative concerns like “trusting your veterans because they’ve been there before.” Playoff coverage lovingly focuses on clutch plays by proven performers, but guys like Trey Yesavage and Addison Barger were also excellent this October. Forget trusting your veterans; the playoffs are about trusting your best players. George Springer is important because he’s great, not because of the number of playoff series he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been around a long time; when I’m evaluating decisions, “but he’s a veteran” just doesn’t enter my thought process.

I’m always looking for new analytical wrinkles in critiquing managerial decisions. For instance, I’ve increasingly come to view pitching decisions as a trade-off between protecting your best relievers from overexposure and minimizing your starters’ weakest matchups, which means that I’m grading managers on multiple axes in every game. I think there’s almost no pitching decision that’s a true no-brainer these days; there are just too many competing priorities to make anything totally obvious. That means I’m going to be less certain in my evaluation of pitching than of hitting, but I’ll try to make my confidence level clear in each case. Let’s get to it – well, at least, the hitting half of it. Read the rest of this entry »

Game 5 of the World Series was a rematch between two pitchers, Blake Snell and Trey Yesavage, who each left Game 1 of the series unhappy with their form. That game devolved into a bullpen battle, and surely neither starter wanted a repeat of that. With the series tied at two, whichever pitcher bounced back better was likely to send their team to Toronto with a 3-2 lead and the inside track on the title. Both starters went deep into the game, but in the end, the Blue Jays got the best of Snell. They snuck in a few runs early, broke through late, and held the Dodgers at bay en route to a 6-1 victory that put them a win away from their third championship in franchise history.

For the first three rounds of the playoffs, Snell went directly at hitters, overwhelming them in the strike zone and pitching deep into games as a result. He tried a new strategy to begin the World Series, though. The Blue Jays present a maddening problem to opposing pitchers. They look for pitches to drive early in the count, and they take big, extra-base-seeking swings when they can. They’re also frustratingly patient outside of the strike zone. In Game 1, Snell tried to work the edges of the zone early, only to pay the price in baserunners and pitches. He limited the damage for a while, but wore himself out and gave Toronto far too many free baserunners in the process.

On Wednesday, he had a new plan. A direct approach had served Snell well all month. Going away from it did him no favors. He’d been so afraid of Toronto’s power that he dinked and dunked himself out of the game. No more of that. Snell’s first pitch of the game was a fastball, belt high to Davis Schneider. It was a statement pitch. Schneider turned it into an exclamation point, tucking it 373 feet over the wall in left. Read the rest of this entry »

John Schneider loves intentional walks. He intentionally walks Aaron Judge more than anyone else. He intentionally walked Cal Raleigh with the bases empty in the ALCS. So he must have felt very strange when the first two games of the World Series passed without a single intentional walk of Shohei Ohtani, a man who has been intentionally walked repeatedly this postseason even though he was mired in a deep slump early on. Now that he’s hotter than the sun, Schneider was no doubt ready to go to his preferred tactic as soon as the situation presented itself.

And oh, did it present itself! Yesterday, the Dodgers and Blue Jays played 18 innings to settle Game 3. Ohtani opened the game with a double, a home run, another double, and another home run, the last hit a game-tying solo shot in the seventh. That second homer set up a perfect storm. Extra innings with the Dodgers batting in the home half meant that Ohtani represented the tying run every time he came to the plate the rest of the way, and you don’t have to roll out the red carpet for Schneider; he’s always ready to deploy some tactics. Ohtani had five more plate appearances in the game; Schneider intentionally walked him in four of them. I did the math to see whether those were good decisions, and how much they affected the outcome of the game. Read the rest of this entry »

This postseason, I’m continuing my use of a new format for our managerial report cards. In the past, I went through every game from every manager, whether they played 22 games en route to winning the World Series or got swept out of the Wild Card round. To be honest, I hated writing those brief blurbs. No one is all that interested in the manager who ran out the same lineup twice, or saw his starters get trounced and used his best relievers anyway because the series was so short. This year, I’m skipping the first round, and grading only the managers who survived until at least the best-of-five series. So far this year, I have graded the efforts of A.J. Hinch and Aaron Boone, as well as Craig Counsell and Rob Thomson, while Dan Szymborski scrutinized Pat Murphy’s performance. Today, it’s Dan Wilson’s turn.

My goal is to evaluate each manager in terms of process, not results. If you bring in your best pitcher to face their best hitter in a huge spot, that’s a good decision regardless of the outcome. Try a triple steal with the bases loaded only to have the other team make four throwing errors to score three runs? I’m probably going to call that a blunder even though it worked out. Managers do plenty of other things — getting team buy-in for new strategies or unconventional bullpen usage behind closed doors is a skill I find particularly valuable — but as I have no insight into how that’s accomplished or how each manager differs, I can’t exactly assign grades for it.

I’m also purposefully avoiding vague qualitative concerns like “trusting your veterans because they’ve been there before.” Playoff coverage lovingly focuses on clutch plays by proven performers, but guys like Bryce Miller and Addison Barger have also been great this October. Forget trusting your veterans; the playoffs are about trusting your best players. Josh Naylor is important because he’s great, not because of the number of playoff series he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been around a long time; when I’m evaluating decisions, “but he’s a veteran” just doesn’t enter my thought process. Read the rest of this entry »

This October, the biggest-spending, best-run franchises in baseball have been flexing their muscles. Case in point: The team with the largest TV audience in the game, one with a monopoly on an entire country’s fandom and a huge payroll to match, a team that takes over opposing stadiums on “road trips” — that team is headlining the World Series. There, on the biggest stage in the sport, they’ll take on the Los Angeles Dodgers.

Oh, you thought the Toronto Blue Jays were David facing the Dodgers’ Goliath? Get out of here. The Jays are a Goliath, too. They have a top five payroll, just like the Dodgers. Of the nine hitters, four starters, and three relievers I expect to play the biggest roles for Toronto this series, just four are homegrown. They’ve filled in the gaps with canny additions in free agency and made excellent trades to bolster their roster even further. Their ace and their leadoff hitter were both high-profile free agents. They have literally Max Scherzer, the embodiment of a well-paid veteran.

That’s not to say that Los Angeles is punching up here. The Dodgers’ best players need little introduction. Shohei Ohtani. Mookie Betts. Freddie Freeman. Blake Snell. I could keep writing one-name sentences for quite a while before I ran out of stars to highlight. Sure, all of Canada roots for the Jays, but all of Japan roots for the Dodgers, and Japan is three times as big by population. California is the size of Canada, for that matter, and there are a few Dodgers fans there, too. In fact, the Dodgers are an even bigger Goliath than the Jays, but that doesn’t make Toronto any less of a big-market club. Read the rest of this entry »

Yesterday, I published the first half of my votes for this year’s Fielding Bible awards, which will be released at 2 PM ET today. This morning, I’m going to cover my ballots for the three outfield positions, as well as the pitchers, multi-positional defenders, defensive player of the year, and defensive team of the year. Update: the awards have been handed out. Winners are denoted below by an asterisk.

If you’re curious about the methodology I used to help guide my voting, you can read about it in yesterday’s article, but here’s a bite-sized refresher: I used a weighted blend of DRS, FRV, and DRP (the three flagship public defensive metrics), with the weights based on how well each metric did on reliability and consistency. I created different weights for catcher, first base, the non-first-base infield positions, and the outfield. That gave me an initial rough order. From there, I used my own expertise, both in terms of deeper statistical dives on individual players and the copious amounts of baseball I watched this year, to assemble my final rankings. I deferred to advanced defensive metrics when the gaps were big, but for close calls, I leaned heavily on my own judgment.

That’s the kind of explanation that I have to put in front of any article outlining my ballot; if you don’t know what I’m looking for, my votes wouldn’t make as much sense. With that out of the way, we can get to the good stuff: the actual players who played the defense I’m writing about. So let’s get right to my last seven ballots — it’s a voluminous set of awards! Read the rest of this entry »

Last year, Mark Simon of Sports Info Solutions asked me to vote on the Fielding Bible awards. If you’re not familiar with them, they’re my preferred defensive award, created by John Dewan and SIS in 2006. They’re a Gold Glove equivalent for the major leagues as a whole, with one award given out per position. Members of a panel made up of a variety of baseball experts vote for five players at each spot; there are also additional awards for best multi-position defender, defensive player of the year, and defensive team of the year. I’m happy to say that Mark was kind enough to ask me to participate again this year. The results will be released tomorrow, October 23, at 2 PM ET. Update: they’ve now been handed out. Winners are denoted below with an asterisk.

Voting for a national award is a prestigious honor, and this particular award carries extra meaning for me. The list of panelists is a who’s who of the writers and commentators who got me into baseball. Peter Gammons is a frequent voter, for goodness sake. Bill James, the godfather of sabermetrics, was an inaugural panel member. The founder of Strat-o-Matic votes! I absolutely wouldn’t be doing this job today if I hadn’t spent whole summers as a kid playing my All-Stars against my dad’s squad in that formative simulation. Voting for this award has been a dream come true.

Last year, I spent some time talking to MLB Chief Data Architect Tom Tango about the proper way to think about the constellation of reputable advanced defensive metrics I had to choose from when assessing players. It’s a veritable acronym soup out there. There’s DRS, FRV, and DRP, as well as legacy and component metrics like UZR, OAA, RDA, and Total Zone. Each of these systems attempts to measure defense quantitatively. All of them have their merits, and all of them do a fairly solid job of what they say on the label, as it were. On the other hand, they don’t always agree. As an example, Zach Neto was either 13 runs above average (DRS), three runs below average (FRV), or roughly average (DRP) in 2025. Confusing!

Neto is hardly the only player to fall into this camp. That’s part of the reason there are so many defensive systems, in fact; if they all said the same thing, there would be no need for this dizzying array of options. Each system has its own methodology, and measures success and failure using its own definitions. A holistic, overarching view of defense requires weighting each of these metrics carefully and then coming to an overall view of each player based on each system’s particular merits. To make matters even more confusing, each “system” is itself multiple systems specialized for individual positions. The first base model and the left field model clearly can’t be the same, and don’t even get me started on catching.

I’ll spare you the nitty gritty of how I handled this difficult puzzle (last year’s version of this article offers a deep dive into my methods if you’re interested), but I created weighted ranking scores for each position based on the relative stability of the metrics and used that to create my initial rankings. From there, I used my own expertise and judgment to move players around from their initial ordering. I tried to have a light touch overall, though. No amount of eye test vibes could overrule the fact that Heliot Ramos grades out as one of the worst defenders in the major leagues (for the record, his defense fails the eye test, too). I considered past defensive value because I know that single-season defensive statistics are noisy, but mostly as a tiebreaker; I’m attempting to vote for the best defenders in the major leagues in 2025, not the best defenders of the last few years.

I think this process did a good job of combining the best information that publicly available defensive systems can produce with a critical, evidence-focused eye on the game. I watch a ton of baseball, and I also spend quite a bit of time thinking about how to measure player skill, and the limits of doing so. I’m just talking my own book here, but I really do believe this is the best way I can determine who played the best defense in baseball this season. So without further ado, let’s look at my infield ballot. Read the rest of this entry »