Earlier this week, I published my findings about the relationship between when free agents sign and the size of their contracts. As a quick refresher, in recent years, the last 20% or so of free agents to sign have been settling for contracts meaningfully lower than pre-offseason expectations. But that finding raises more questions, some of which I hope to answer today.

First, there’s an obvious question: Did the free agents who got those late, discounted deals perform worse than expected during the following season? In other words, did their low-dollar-value deals foreshadow lower-than-projected production? To examine this, I took the upcoming season’s projections for the players ranked on my Top 50 Free Agents list in each of the past three years, 150 players in all, to come up with a projected WAR for each segment of players. I then compared it to how they actually did in the ensuing year. There is indeed a drop-off for those who signed late:

First things first: Every group underperformed its projections. That comes down to playing time. Our projections use Depth Charts playing time, which approximates the most likely distribution of playing time across a given roster without accounting for the likelihood of injuries. Just as an example, non-catcher batters were projected for an average of more than 600 plate appearances in this dataset, and they came in closer to the mid-500s in practice. So don’t pay too much attention to the absolute numbers; the relative differences are what to look at here.

The last 10 free agents to sign saw huge shortfalls in production relative to expectations. One reason: They played less. The average hitter in this group of 150 free agents batted 70 times less than projected. Hitters signed among the last 10 free agents in their class batted 100 times less than projected. Likewise, the average pitcher in the group came up 25 innings shy of projections, but pitchers among the last 10 players signed came up 40 innings short.
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Look, I get it. You’re up in arms about the Roki Sasaki deal. The rich got richer and we’re all tired of the Dodgers signing every free agent (even you, Dodgers fans) — can they at least make it seem like it’s a level playing field? If that’s how you’ve been feeling this week, though, I’ve got some bad news for you, because I think the two moves the Dodgers have made since signing Sasaki might be bigger deals for 2025. Over the weekend, they signed the top reliever on the market, Tanner Scott. Now, they’re reportedly working on an agreement with Kirby Yates. As Yates’ signing is still pending a physical and has yet to be finalized, let’s cover Scott first, then ruminate on Yates at the end.

Scott’s deal, for four years and $72 million, befits an elite reliever, and that’s exactly what he is. He’s compiled a 2.04 ERA (2.53 FIP) across 150 innings over the last two years, using a lights-out slider and excellent fastball in roughly equal measure. We’re not talking about smoke and mirrors here; both of our pitch models think his fastball is one of the best handful in the game. His gaudy swinging strike rates provide supporting evidence. He sits 96-98 mph and touches 100. Sure, he walks his fair share of batters, but he’s a reliever – that’s just part of the bargain you accept sometimes.

If you’ll recall, the Dodgers leaned heavily on their bullpen in the 2024 postseason. Some of that was because of injuries to the starting rotation, but plenty of it was by choice. The Dodgers assembled a unit with four late-game options, and they used those options aggressively and opportunistically. Best opposing hitter up in the sixth inning? Send in a closer. Starter in a jam and the game on the line earlier than you expected? Send in a closer. Save situation? Fine, sure, we have a few left over anyway, send in a closer. Read the rest of this entry »

Last week, Michael Rosen wrote about Jack Flaherty’s delayed free agency market. Michael advanced a number of theories about why Flaherty hadn’t yet signed a deal, and what that might mean about his fastball, teams’ perceptions of his fastball, and the trajectory of his career broadly speaking. I found that piece really interesting – and I also started thinking about what Flaherty not having signed yet means in a larger sense.

You don’t have to look any further than last year to get an idea of what could happen to Flaherty. Blake Snell and Jordan Montgomery both waited a long time before settling for short-term deals. The year before that, Carlos Correa’s multiple failed physicals kept him on the market until the very end. In 2022, Correa, Kenley Jansen, and Trevor Story all found themselves looking for employment well into March.

All of those players came into the offseason expecting a major contract, and all of them ended up getting less than anticipated, bringing to mind some classic FanGraphs articles from Travis Sawchik, back in the halcyon days of 2018. Those articles drew on a study by Max Rieper that separated free agents into pre- and post-New Year’s signings and found a large discount for the latter group. Read the rest of this entry »

Earlier this week, I threw some numbers together on the value of productive outs. I focused on Corbin Carroll, and rightly so: His electric skill set is a perfect entry point for explaining how hitters can add (or subtract) value relative to average even when making an out. Putting the ball in play? We love it. Avoiding double plays? We love that too. The Diamondbacks are a team full of speedsters, and Carroll’s productive outs gave their baserunners a chance to show off their wheels.

A quick refresher: I calculated the difference in run scoring expectation between the average out and a specific type of out (strikeout, air out, non-GIDP groundout, double play) for each base/out state. Then I had a computer program tag each out made in 2024 with that difference. For example, the average out made with a runner on second and no outs cost teams 0.35 runs of scoring expectation in 2024. Groundouts in that situation only cost 0.25 runs, a difference of 0.1 runs.

Thus, on every groundout that occurred with a runner on second and no out, I had the computer note ‘plus 0.1’ for the “productive out” value. A strikeout in that situation, on the other hand, lowered scoring expectancy by 0.43 runs, a difference from average of -.09 runs. So the computer noted ‘minus 0.09’ for every strikeout with a runner on second and no out. Do this for every combination of base/out state and out type, add it all up, and you can work out the total value of a player’s productive outs. Read the rest of this entry »

Not every out is created equal. Take this fly out from Corbin Carroll, for example:

A lot of things can happen when you make an out with the bases loaded. You could strike out, leaving every runner in place. You could hit into a double play, an inning-ending one in this case. You could ground out some other way, or hit an infield fly. But Carroll’s here was the most valuable imaginable; with one out, he advanced every single runner, including the runner who scored from third.

Mathematically speaking, you can think of it this way. The average out that took place with the bases loaded and one out lowered the team’s run expectancy by a massive 0.61 runs in 2024. That’s because tons of these outs were either strikeouts (bad, runner on third doesn’t score) or double plays (bad, inning ends). But Carroll’s fly out was far better than that. It actually increased the run expectancy by a hair; driving the lead runner home and moving the trail runners up a base is exquisitely valuable.

That’s not the only way this could have gone. Consider a similar situation, a groundout from Aaron Judge:

Like Carroll, Judge batted with a runner on third and fewer than two outs. In this situation, the average out is bad, lowering run expectancy by 0.514 runs. But Judge’s was obviously worse. It cost the Yankees all the expected runs they had left in the inning, naturally, which added up to just a bit more than 1.15. Read the rest of this entry »

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The Blue Jays came into this offseason with one glaring need: relievers. Now, that’s not to say that they don’t need help elsewhere. The bottom of their lineup is thin. They’re probably a starter short of an optimal rotation, particularly given how uncertain Alek Manoah’s future looks. But they’re a playoff hopeful, and they had the worst bullpen in baseball in 2024 – 3.1 wins worse than the White Sox, if you can believe it. So the bullpen had to be priority number one, and voila:

OFFICIAL: We’ve signed All-Star RHP Jeff Hoffman to a 3-year deal ??

Welcome Back, @Hoff_23! pic.twitter.com/A1tN8zOGjV

— Toronto Blue Jays (@BlueJays) January 11, 2025

Jeff Hoffman might not be a household name, but he’s been one of the best relievers in baseball since joining the Phillies in 2023. He’s racked up 3.6 WAR in that time, but reliever WAR can get weird with the leverage adjustments, so let’s put it this way instead: He’s sixth in ERA and third in FIP over the last two years. His strikeout rate hovers around 33.3%, and he walks a thoroughly normal number of hitters. In other words, this doesn’t look like a fluke, and he’s not getting paid like a fluke, either. His deal is worth $33 million over those three years, with $6 million in available incentives. Read the rest of this entry »

In 2008, the first year of PitchF/X pitch tracking, 13.9% of all pitches across the major leagues were sliders. Ah, those were the days – flat, crushable fastballs as far as the eye could see. More or less every year since then, sliders have proliferated. Don’t believe me? Take a look at the graph:

Are you surprised? Of course not. You’ve seen Blake Snell pitch – and Lance McCullers Jr., Sean Manaea, five of your team’s best relievers, and pretty much anyone in the past half decade. Pitchers are flocking to sliders whenever they can get away with throwing one. It used to be a two-strike offering, then an ahead-in-the-count offering, and now many pitchers would rather throw sliders than fastballs when they desperately need to find the zone. Look at that inexorable march higher.

Only, maybe it’s not so inexorable anymore. Between 2015 and 2023, the average increase in slider rate was 0.9 percentage points year-over-year. The lowest increase was half a percentage point; each of the last three years saw increases of a percentage point or more. But from 2023 to 2024, slider rate stagnated. In 2023, 22.2% of all pitches were sliders. In 2024, that number only climbed to 22.3%, the lowest increase since the upward trend started a decade ago.

That’s hardly evidence of the demise of the slider. For one thing, the number is still going up. For another thing, it’s one year. Finally, 2024 marked the highest rate of sliders thrown in major league history. If I showed you the above graph and told you “look, sliders aren’t cool anymore,” you’d be understandably unmoved.

Not to worry, though. It might be January 9, but I won’t try to pass that off as genuine baseball analysis even in the depths of winter. I’ve got a tiny bit more than that. Raw slider rate is a misleading way of considering how pitcher behavior is changing. There are two ways to increase the league-wide slider rate. First, pitchers could adjust their arsenals to use more sliders and fewer other pitches. Second, the population could change – new, slider-dominant pitchers could replace other hurlers who throw the pitch less frequently.

For example, Adam Wainwright retired after the 2023 season. He threw 1,785 pitches that year, and only five were sliders. Plenty of the innings Wainwright filled for the Cardinals went to Andre Pallante, who graduated from the bullpen to the rotation and made 20 starts in 2024. Pallante actually threw fewer sliders proportionally in 2024 than he did in 2023 – but his pitch count ballooned from 1,139 to 1,978. Similarly, Michael McGreevy made his big league debut in 2024 and threw 311 pitches, 19% of which were sliders.

The numbers can lie to you. Pallante, the only one of our three pitchers to appear in both years, lowered his slider rate. But in 2023, Pallante and Wainwright combined for a 7% slider rate. In 2024, Pallante and McGreevy combined for a 17.1% slider rate. That sounds like a huge change in behavior – but it’s actually just a change in population composition.

The story we all think about isn’t Wainwright retiring and handing his innings to McGreevy and Pallante. It’s Brayan Bello going from 17.5% sliders to 28% sliders while pitching a similar innings load – something that also happened in 2024, just so we’re clear.

To measure how existing pitchers are changing their slider usage, we shouldn’t look at the overall rate. We should instead look at the change in each pitcher’s rate. That’s a truer reflection of the question I’m asking, or at least I think it is. And that answer differs from the chart I showed you up at the top of this article.

There were 315 pitchers who threw at least 50 innings in 2023 and 2024, and threw at least one slider in each of those two years. Of those 315 pitchers, 142 increased their slider usage, 24 kept their usage the same, and 149 decreased the rate at which they threw sliders. The story was similar from 2022 to 2023. There were 216 pitchers who fit the criteria in those years; 90 increased their slider usage, 19 kept theirs the same, and 107 decreased the rate at which they used the pitch. From 2021 to 2022, the effect went the other way; 122 pitchers threw sliders more frequently in 2022 than they did in 2021, 22 kept their usage the same, and 74 decreased their usage.

Put that way, the change is quite striking. The slider craze kicked off in earnest in 2017. From 2016-2017, 114 pitchers increased their slider usage and 89 decreased theirs. That rough split persisted in 2017-2018 and 2018-2019. Everything around the 2020 season is a little weird thanks to the abbreviated schedule, but the basic gist – more pitchers increasing slider usage than decreasing slider usage – was true in every pair of years from 2014-2015 through 2021-2022.

That sounds more like a trend than the overall rate of sliders thrown. Graphically, it looks like this:

Let’s put that in plain English. From 2015, the start of the spike in slider usage, through 2022, there were far more pitchers increasing their slider frequency than decreasing it. On average across those years, 1.3 pitchers threw more sliders for every one pitcher who threw fewer. In the past two years, that trend has reversed; more pitchers are reducing their reliance on sliders than increasing it. The population is going to continue to change – they don’t make a lot of Adam Wainwrights these days – but on a per-pitcher basis, the relentless increase in slider usage has halted.

I tried a few other ways of looking at this phenomenon. I held pitcher workloads constant from year one and applied year two slider rates to each pitcher (pitchers who only threw in year one obviously keep their rate unchanged). The same trend held – the last two years have seen a sharp divergence from the boom times of 2015-2022. I looked at the percentage of starters who started using a slider more than some other pitch in their arsenal and compared it to the ones who de-emphasized it; same deal. I also should note that I’ve grouped sweepers and slurves among the sliders for this article, so this reversal is not about pitchers ditching traditional sliders to get in on the sweeper craze.

No matter how you slice it, we’ve seemingly entered a new phase of pitch design. For a while, most pitchers took a hard look at what they were throwing and decided they needed more sliders. Now, though, it appears that we’ve reached an equilibrium point. Some pitchers still want more. Some think they’re throwing enough, or even a hair too many. Now splitters are on the rise, and hybrid cutters are starting to eat into sliders’ market share.

It’s far too early to say that sliders are on the decline. Factually speaking, they’re not. But to me, at least, it’s clear that the last two years are different than the years before them when it comes to the most ubiquitous out pitch in baseball. Sure, everyone has a slider now – but in the same way that four-seam fastballs were inevitable right until sinkers made a comeback, the slider is no longer expanding its dominance among secondary pitches. An exciting conclusion? I’m not sure. But it’s certainly backed by the evidence.

As of the time I’m writing this article, roughly half of our Top 50 free agents have signed new contracts this offseason. That sounds like a great time to take a look at how the market has developed, both for individual players and overall positional archetypes. For example, starting pitchers have been all the rage so far, or so it seems. But does that match up with the data?

I sliced the data up into three groups to get a handle on this: starters, relievers, and position players. I then calculated how far off both I and the crowdsourced predictions were when it came to average annual value and total dollars handed out. You can see here that I came out very slightly ahead of the pack of readers by these metrics, at least so far:

To be fair, none of us have done particularly well. The last two years I’ve run this experiment, I missed by around $1 million in average annual value, and the crowd missed by between $1 and $2 million. Likewise, I’ve missed by roughly $10 million in average annual value per contract, with the crowd around $18 million. This year, the contracts have been longer than I expected, and richer than you readers expected, though you did a much better job on a relative basis when it came to predicting total dollar outlay. We were all low on every category, though, across the board.
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Are there any Oakland Athletics fans reading this? If so, don’t worry, your team is doing its usual nonsense, there’s nothing to see here. You’re lucky they left, don’t feel so bad, those last few years can’t take away all the good times. You can go ahead and skip this one, great article, hooray. Now that that group is gone, and we’re left with Sacramentonians, new A’s fans, more general fans of the sport, and perhaps Vegas residents, let me say this: The A’s signing Brent Rooker to a five-year, $60 million extension is awesome, and I love it.

Rooker was a rare bright spot on a dismal 2023 A’s squad. Then he was downright excellent on the green-shoots-of-hope 2024 team, compiling 5.1 WAR, even with the punishing positional adjustment that comes from DHing, thanks to a scorching .293/.365/.562 batting line. That line is even better than you might think, coming as it did in the cavernous Coliseum, and it didn’t look fluky.

Rooker hits the stuffing out of the ball. He finished eighth in barrels per batted ball in 2024, just ahead of certifiably enormous guys Oneil Cruz, Kyle Schwarber, and Marcell Ozuna. He also elevates the ball more frequently than any of that crew. The two are intertwined, obviously, but any time you’re hitting rockets like the 2024 versions of Schwarber and Ozuna, you’re doing something right. You could hardly do better from scratch if you were trying to come up with an ideal power hitter; a vicious swing (78th-percentile bat speed) that frequently puts the ball in play at profitable launch angles (86th-percentile sweet spot rate) means plenty of barrels (97th percentile) and 39 homers even in a park that suppresses righty power mightily. Read the rest of this entry »