Michael King is really good. If you’ve been following the Yankees or the American League this season, you probably already knew that. He’s carving hitters up, to the tune of a 0.51 ERA over 17.2 innings so far. He’s striking them out (39.7% strikeout rate) and avoiding walks (4.8% walk rate). He’s doing it in long stints (six of his eight appearances have lasted two or more innings), but he’s excelled in short bursts too.

If you’ve watched King pitch lately, what he’s doing won’t be a surprise to you. His new breaking ball – a slider/curve thing he learned from Corey Kluber last year – is the star of the show. It’s a horizontally-sweeping curveball, or perhaps a slider with unique spin characteristics, or perhaps… look, maybe you should just see one:

For all the buzz around the sweeper, which the Yankees call a “whirly”, that’s not what King is doing. He’s throwing a curveball – he gets quite a bit of transverse spin on the pitch, which most sliders don’t, and uses Kluber’s curveball grip. Due to his low-slot delivery, however, “downward” break relative to his hand works out to more or less horizontal movement. Take a look at the direction of the spin he imparts on his pitches at release:

The blue lines are what we’re after – for a righty, that’s pure glove-side spin. You can think of it as sidespin. But look at his fastballs – sidespin in the other direction. How does that work? You can try it for yourself at home. Put your arm out straight sideways, then bend your elbow at 90 degrees, so that your hand is up above your head. Imagine an arrow pointing straight down from the bottom of your palm towards your forearm. If you impart spin on the ball that makes it move in the direction of that arrow – downward from the palm – it will break nearly straight downwards. Read the rest of this entry »

At FanGraphs, our headline WAR number for pitchers is based on FIP. Because of that, and because people enjoy debating and arguing, there’s a yearly refrain that you’ve probably heard. “FanGraphs pitching WAR only considers (X)% of what a pitcher does, how can that be used for value?” No one would dispute that year-one FIP does a better job of estimating year-two ERA than ERA does – or at least, not many people would – but the discussion around whether FIP does a good job of assigning year-one value is alive and well.

One reason for this view is pretty obvious. FIP considers home runs, strikeouts, walks, and hit batters to estimate pitcher production on an ERA scale. Our WAR does some fancy stuff in the background – it treats infield fly balls, which virtually never fall for hits, as strikeouts, and it adjusts for park and league. In the end, though, it’s estimating pitcher value using just three (well, actually four — HBPs always draw the short straw) outcomes. There are a lot of other outcomes in baseball!

In 2021, roughly 39% of plate appearances ended in a homer, strikeout, walk, hit batter, or infield pop up. One thing you could think, in recognition of that fact, is that FIP-based WAR doesn’t consider enough of a pitcher’s production. You wouldn’t use 40% of a hitter’s plate appearances to calculate their WAR, so why do it for pitchers? But that doesn’t actually make sense, as David Appelman pointed out to me recently. Assuming “average results on balls in play” is actually going to be pretty close for every pitcher, by definition. Read the rest of this entry »

Who’s the best reliever in baseball? There are multiple ways to go about answering that question. You could pick the guy with the lowest projected ERA; that’s Josh Hader, with Emmanuel Clase, Liam Hendriks, and Taylor Rogers close behind. You could pick the guy with the best reputation; I’d go with Hendriks or Hader, but if you’re a giant Raisel Iglesias or Aroldis Chapman fan, I wouldn’t hold it against you.

If you want to look at what’s happening on the field, though, the best reliever in baseball is clearly Ryan Helsley. It’s not “probably Ryan Helsley.” It’s not “Ryan Helsley is in the conversation.” It’s just Ryan Helsley. He’s been absolutely dominant to start the year, so dominant that I’m not sure I have the right words for it.

If you follow the NL Central, you’ve surely heard of Helsley. He’s been in the majors for parts of the last four seasons as a flamethrowing reliever, and that part isn’t changing. He topped out at 103 mph this weekend, the kind of heat that makes Pitching Ninja sprint to his computer and search for the right emoji (he used fire, if you’re keeping score at home). But that pitch reduces Helsley’s performance to “he throws hard sometimes,” which undersells him to a comical extent.
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Last week, when I was waxing poetic about Jeff McNeil’s ability to wait for a good pitch and then drop it into left for a single, I made an offhand mention to the player with the best swing decisions of 2021: Mike Tauchman, who doesn’t even play in the major leagues anymore. Then I moved on.

That wasn’t an accident. It’s what we in “the business” (no one calls it this) like to think of as a preview. I got multiple texts (another pro writer tip: “multiple” sounds better than “two”) from friends this weekend asking where the whole list of hitters was. That list is right here!

As a quick refresher, the idea here is to take every swing decision a hitter makes and compress them into one number. Every hitter who saw at least 50 pitches in each of the four attack zones (heart, shadow, chase, waste) is on the list. I took each of those rates and gave them league-average production for those decisions. The result looks like this, stated in terms of run value per 100 of the relevant zone/decision combination (take a waste pitch, say, or swing at a pitch in the shadow zone):

From there, I assumed a league-average percentage of pitches in each zone. Combined with each hitter’s swing rates, that let me produce an overall run value assuming an average rate of pitches in each zone.

Here’s a quick guide on how to interpret these numbers. For each hitter, there are three numbers. The first two are just the same statistic said different ways. The first metric, “RV/100,” is how many runs above or below average each hitter on the list would be, per 100 pitches, if they got exactly average results on every zone/decision combination. The higher the number, the better positioned a hitter is to succeed, by taking tough pitches and swinging at good ones.
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Jeff McNeil has been pretty good so far this year. He’s hitting .328/.388/.492, good for a 163 wRC+. He’s starting all over the field, making the Mets’ complicated lineup decisions easier. That’s great! That’s all good. Today, though, I’m more interested in the fact that he’s displaying strike zone judgment usually reserved for Juan Soto, Joey Votto, and God.

McNeil has always been one of the most aggressive hitters in baseball. That hasn’t changed this year. Here are the hitters who swing the most at pitches in the strike zone:

This is not news. From 2018-21, his career prior to this year, McNeil led baseball in zone swing rate. This year, he leads baseball in zone swing rate. He is continuing to do what he’s always done! More at 11.

But wait, there is more. You know how these swing-happy types work. Take a look at the list again. García has a career 6.3% walk rate and it’s heading lower this year. Anderson has a career 3.5% walk rate. Mountcastle hardly walks for a slugger. Seager – well, okay, Seager is just great. But swinging a lot at pitches in the strike zone also generally means swinging a lot at pitches outside of the strike zone.

Indeed, García and Anderson are the two hitters chasing the most pitches outside the zone. Mountcastle is in the top 15. Seager – yeah, still great. But McNeil is nowhere near that! He’s chasing only 29.1% of pitches outside the zone, a lower rate than the league as a whole and by far a career low. His in-zone swing rate, by the way, is a career high. Did Jeff McNeil crack the code? Read the rest of this entry »

Back in my day — the mid-2000s — baseball was a simpler game. Batters socked dingers, with or without the use of performance-enhancing drugs. Teams batted slap hitters second, fast hitters first, and aging sluggers third. Catchers were valued by their bat and their throwing arm, none of this framing nonsense. And pitchers? Pitchers helped everybody out by throwing fastballs all the time, particularly on the first pitch. Seriously, take a look at this graph:

Year after year, pitchers have examined the mix of pitches they throw to lead off at-bats and decided to lop a few fastballs off the top. It’s not quite monotonically decreasing; there have been tiny upticks in a few years, and 2008 was lower, potentially due to classification issues in the first year of data. But this is as close as a trend can get to slapping you in the face.

The first pitch of an at-bat isn’t always the most important one — in a 3–2 count, one borderline pitch can be the difference between a baserunner and an out — but the difference between a 1–0 count and an 0–1 count is huge. That’s why pitchers have historically leaned on fastballs, which are easier to control; throwing a pitch outside the zone is a sure way to end up behind in the count.
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MacKenzie Gore is scheduled to make his third start of the season today. He’s been excellent, if low on stamina, in his first two starts: 10.1 innings, 10 strikeouts, four walks, and two earned runs. In a year of low offense and young pitching, this would be an unexceptional beginning – if he weren’t MacKenzie Gore, erstwhile top pitching prospect in baseball.

Lead prospect analyst Eric Longenhagen has written about Gore extensively. If you’re looking for a deep, nuanced look at all the mechanical changes that have sent Gore from can’t-miss to passed over in favor of Jake Arrieta, Eric has you covered. If you’re looking for some data-driven speculation based on his first two big league starts, on the other hand, boy do I have what you’re looking for. Read the rest of this entry »

This is a story about persistence. I thought I had an interesting way of looking at the marked decline in scoring this year so far; as it turns out, I was wrong. A further investigation, however, revealed that another possible culprit was right around the corner. Does it explain the entire decline in offense? Most certainly not. But I’m interested nonetheless, and I hope you will be too.

If you’ve followed baseball in the past five years, you’re probably used to asking questions about league-wide offense early in the season. Major League Baseball has done itself no favors here; the composition of the baseball keeps changing, and home run rates fluctuate wildly as a result. The same is true this year: despite the adoption of a universal DH, offense is down across the board.

The usual suspects are certainly part of the problem. Pitchers keep throwing harder. Putting a humidor in every stadium affects home run rates in unpredictable ways and might suppress home run rates early in the season. The league used two different baseballs last year, and drag coefficient is up this year. Starters are going fewer and fewer innings, giving batters fewer looks at them a third time through the order.

I think that all of those things have something to do with bad offense. But I thought of another potential cause, one I could investigate without learning fluid dynamics. One of the side bargains between the league and the MLBPA after this offseason’s lockout was for expanded rosters early in the season. Teams are allowed to roster 28 players throughout the month of April. On May 30, that number will revert to the standard 26 — this deadline was recently pushed back from May 1. In addition, teams can carry any number of pitchers on their roster until May 1. After that, they’ll be limited to 14, and 13 after May 29.
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If you were looking for fast-paced, high-stakes baseball action, the tenth inning of Saturday’s Rays-Red Sox clash had everything you could ask for. Scoring? Five runs crossed the plate. Drama? There was a walk-off hit. Balls in play? The Red Sox hit a triple, and the Rays scored a run by combining a balk and a throwing error. Like home runs? It had one of them too.

If you were looking for grind-it-out, low-scoring, perfectly pitched baseball, the other nine innings would have been more your speed. Boston and Tampa Bay combined for two hits and seventeen strikeouts. They used ten pitchers. Runs? Only four runners so much as reached second base.

Which one is modern baseball? They both are. If you wish baseball had more balls in play, with more bunts and steals and plays at the plate, I can’t blame you. If you wish it had more dominant starting pitchers and more seven-inning starts that end with a mound conference and a manager talked into leaving his ace out there for just one more batter, I can’t blame you. But the game being played today is just as captivating, the performances just as impressive. They just come in different shapes and sizes.
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