We rightfully spill a lot of ink here chronicling the exploits of the game’s best pitchers; the Clayton Kershaws, the Felix Hernandezes, etc.. We also tip our collective hat towards pitchers with the “wow” factor, from Chris Sale To Stephen Strasburg to Matt Harvey and Jose Fernandez. All that said, who do you think was the AL’s top contact manager last season? It wasn’t Hernandez, or Sale, or even Garrett Richards who paced the circuit in that category for much of the season. It was the Astros’ Dallas Keuchel, and two starts into the 2015 season, the 27-year-old lefthander has quickly set out to prove that it wasn’t a fluke. Read the rest of this entry »

A player can become a poster child of sorts for his club’s offense. Edwin Encarnacion notwithstanding, I think of Jose Bautista and his pull power when I think of the Blue Jays. Mark Trumbo’s free-swinging ways embody the Diamondbacks, at least for me. Ben Zobrist hasn’t even played a game for the A’s yet, and his multipositional nature and OBP-centric skill set already makes him my go-to guy. The closest correlation between club and player, though, is an easy one for me. The Cardinals’ team-wide hit-it-hard-to-all-fields philosophy is most completely embodied by Matt Holliday. Read the rest of this entry »

The Miami Marlins’ outfield is one of the best and most exciting in recent memory. Giancarlo Stanton, Marcell Ozuna and Christian Yelich combine current tools and skills with ample future projection. At 25, Stanton is the oldest member of the group. You might have to go back to the early-’70s San Francisco Giants and their crew of Gary Matthews, Garry Maddox and Bobby Bonds to find a group of flycatchers who filled the stat sheet while turning heads with their tools at similar career stages. Today, let’s put the focus upon Yelich, and attempt to draw a bead on both his current true-talent level and his ultimate upside. Read the rest of this entry »

Last week’s article on Danny Santana’s 2015 projected offensive decline generated some interesting feedback, so I decided to circle back and focus on a couple more players whose detailed batted-ball info suggests significant 2015 decline. I couldn’t pick two more dissimilar players if I tried; this week’s subjects are the Orioles’ 2014 everyman-savior, Steve Pearce, and the Royals’ postseason breakthrough star, Lorenzo Cain. The eyes and the numbers tell markedly different stories for a variety of reasons, but for both players, a preponderance of the arrows are pointing downward for the upcoming season. Read the rest of this entry »

It’s that time of year, when baseball media members offer their respective takes on players who will either break out or break down this season. Most of the time those impressions are based upon a combination of objective and subjective criteria, from the “eye test,” to the numbers, to gut feel — and yes, even to spring training performance. I’m going to go on record stating that I have never, even been so sure about a player’s performance declining from the previous season as I am about Minnesota Twins’ shortstop Danny Santana. Read the rest of this entry »

This past offseason was one of the most tumultuous in recent memory in terms of player movement. A wave of GM turnover triggered roster implosions from Atlanta to Los Angeles, and particularly to San Diego. Domino effects roiled almost all 30 franchises, with only the Indians, Twins, Mets, Phillies and Giants not undergoing at least somewhat significant change. Many teams fancied themselves clear contenders, others, clear rebuilders. Then there were the Oakland Athletics.

At first, it appeared they going the rebuilding route, as evidenced by the megadeal with Toronto involving Josh Donaldson. In the ensuing days and weeks, onlookers were left scratching their heads, wondering what Billy Beane was up to this time, as Billy Butler and Ben Zobrist, two players not exactly made of rebuilding cloth, were brought to town to complement the A’s newly more youthful nucleus. The Butler transaction was particularly curious; why would the A’s spend $30 million over three years on a pure DH coming off of a poor season? Was there, as there usually is, a method to Beane’s madness? Read the rest of this entry »

Last season was a banner year for the Baltimore Orioles. The team won 96 games in the regular season and advanced to the ALCS despite a whirlwind of adversity: significant injuries to Matt Wieters and Manny Machado, and huge power declines from Chris Davis and J.J. Hardy. Hardy’s 2014 was quite interesting. He was hampered by back issues throughout the season, hitting only nine homers after clubbing a total of 87 his first three years in Baltimore, but it ended well, as he quickly signed a three-year, $40 million extension after the season ended. The scary thing is, Hardy’s offensive performance last season was quite a bit worse than his .268/.309/.372 line indicated.

Hardy was the Brewers’ second-round draft pick in 2001 out of Sabino High School in Tucson, Ariz., and quickly advanced through the minor leagues. He was given a challenging assignment in his first full pro season in 2002, opening at High-A and receiving a promotion to Double-A by season’s end. Each year, I compile an ordered list of minor-league position player prospects based on their OBP and SLG, relative to their league and level, adjusted for age. Traditional scouting techniques are then used to tweak the order. Hardy’s minor-league performances resulted in three top 100 rankings, quite unusual for a shortstop. His peak ranking was No. 20 after the 2003 season, when he hit 12 homers as a 20-year-old in the pitcher-friendly Southern League. Such rankings and performances projected a long major league career, with some offensive upside.

Hardy indeed has had a long run as a regular MLB shortstop, arriving in 2005 with only a couple of injury interruptions since. After hitting all of 29 minor-league homers — with that single-season high of 12 — Hardy has gone on to hit 167 as a big leaguer, clearing the 20-homer mark five times. In many ways, Hardy has tracked the performance of Jimmy Rollins, who hit 36 minor league homers — also with a single-season high of 12 — before hitting 215 in the majors through his age-35 season. Rollins also was a second-round high school draftee, and earned a ranking on my minor league position player prospect list four times, including two top 100 slots, with a peak at No. 44 in 2000.

They’re very similar defenders, as well: solid but unspectacular range, great hands and extremely accurate throwing arms. Both like to swing the bat, causing their respective OBPs to suffer as a result; but they grew into some power, and have extremely respectable 97 (Rollins) and 96 (Hardy) career OPS+ marks for shortstops. The big difference between them, of course, is Rollins’ speed, which separates the two into different tiers as players.

Enough about Rollins. Let’s get back to J.J. It’s tempting to chalk up the entirety of Hardy’s 2014 offensive struggles to his back injury, which primarily affected him in the early stages of the season. After all, he didn’t hit his first homer until June 21, and then managed eight more the rest of the way. That’s way down from his 2013 total of 25, but one can easily make the case that a healthy Hardy would have hit 15 or so. Once you dig a little deeper into the numbers, however, other disturbing items emerge. To get to the bottom of Hardy’s 2014 campaign, let’s examine his plate appearance frequency and production by BIP type data. First, the frequency info:
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Among the many significant trades that went down at last July’s trading deadline, the three-way deal among the Tigers, Rays and Mariners that centered around David Price was particularly unique. The Tigers and Rays’ respective goals were pretty clear; the Tigers wanted Price to bolster their rotation for what they hoped would be a World Series run, and the Rays were bailing on the race and restocking for the future with the acquisition of Drew Smyly, Nick Franklin and minor leaguer Willy Adames. The Mariners’ role in the deal was a little more understated but just as intriguing. In exchange for Franklin, they acquired center fielder Austin Jackson, filling an organizational void in the hopes of making a playoff charge of their own. They fell a game short of a wild card berth, and Jackson’s ineffectiveness played a role. Still, some interesting batted-ball data suggests that the M’s may get their money’s worth in 2015, if some targeted adjustments are made. Read the rest of this entry »

It’s the early days of spring training, with the exhibition games just kicking in, and “the best shape of my life” stories still fresh in our memory. It’s also the latter days of contract extension season, with many players expressing their desire to put such talks on hold once the real games begin. One potential extension candidate who may soon be locked up for the intermediate term is Twins’ second baseman Brian Dozier. His is an interesting case; this is no flashy, long-time high-end prospect we’re discussing here. Dozier has kind of crept up on people, quietly becoming a better major league player than he was a minor league prospect. Who and what is Brian Dozier, and is he the type of player to whom the Twins should make a major commitment?

One fact that is not in doubt is that Dozier was an exceptional pick in the 8th round of the 2009 draft out of Southern Mississippi, signing after his senior season. He was a starter from the get-go at Southern Miss, their regular shortstop his last three seasons. This was no tooled-out mega-prospect; Dozier was a ballplayer, the grinder type that a club hopes can learn to handle the wooden bat at the lower levels of the minor leagues. He was pretty young for his class, not turning 22 until May 15, a trait that has proven to correlate with professional success for both college juniors and seniors. Basically, the Twins were getting a junior age-wise, while paying him a discounted senior rate in the draft.

Though Dozier did bat a solid .298-.370-.409 in just over 1600 minor league plate appearances, those numbers aren’t quite as impressive as they seem. First, they’re influenced significantly by the gaudy .353-.417-.438 line he put up straight out of the draft in the rookie level Appalachian League. Even more importantly, in that and all of his other minor league seasons, Dozier was not among the younger players at his minor league level. He didn’t notch his first Double-A at bat until age 24, in 2011, though he certainly did perform well once he got there, unfurling a .318-.384-.502 line at New Britain.

Each season I compile an ordered list of minor league position player prospects based on their offensive performance relative to their league and level, adjusted for age. It basically serves as a follow list, with traditional scouting methods then utilized to fine-tune it. 2011 was the only year in which Dozier qualified for this list, at #185. Many defensively-oriented major league shortstops and catchers ranked near that level on my minor league list. Dozier was not seen as a future MLB shortstop in the minors, however, nor was he seen as particularly defensively-oriented. For him to start in the majors, his bat, and particularly his power potential, needed to develop.

And develop it has. Brian Dozier hit all of 16 homers in 1613 minor league plate appearances, but has already hit 47 in the major leagues in barely more major league plate appearances, hitting 23 in 2014 alone. How has he done it, and what is the near-term prognosis for his performance going forward? Let’s take a deeper look at his offensive game by analyzing his 2014 plate appearance outcome frequency and production by ball-in-play type data. First, the frequency information:

Though Dozier did strike out 129 times in 2014, he did so in 707 plate appearances, which ranked among AL leaders. His K rate percentile rank of 49, therefore, was quite acceptable for a reasonably powerful hitter. His ability to draw a walk is arguably his foremost offensive strength; he posted a 12.6% walk rate, good for a percentile rank of 92. He is not afraid to work a count, and put up a very low swinging strike rate of 5.9%.

His BIP frequencies, however, are just as unimpressive as his K and BB rates are impressive. He ranked among MLB leaders in popup rate at 14.4%, for a 97 percentile rank. Most big popup guys are big power guys, and with all due respect, Dozier doesn’t quite fit in that category. His line drive rate percentile rank is also quite low at 21. That isn’t a huge deal, as liner rates fluctuate much more than those of other BIP types, and he did post a 62 mark in 2013. What is a bit worrisome is the imbalance between his fly ball (72) and ground ball (16) percentile ranks. Dozier is on the verge of becoming one of the very few players in any given year to hit more fly balls than grounders; such hitters’ performance (such as Nick Swisher and Raul Ibanez in 2013-14, to name two) tends to decline significantly the next season.

To this point, we have not taken BIP authority or direction into account. As we shall see, both are pretty central to what Dozier is today and could be tomorrow. Next, let’s get a better feel for his BIP authority by taking a look at the production by BIP type data:

Dozier’s actual production on each BIP type is indicated in the AVG and SLG columns, and it’s converted to run values and compared to MLB average in the REL PRD column. That figure then is adjusted for context, such as home park, luck, etc., in the ADJ PRD column. For the purposes of this exercise, SH and SF are included as outs and HBP are excluded from the OBP calculation.

On the surface, Dozier’s actual 2014 performance seems to be fairly well supported by his batted-ball authority; the contextual adjustments for each BIP type are quite small. His actual 101 REL PROD on fly balls is adjusted slightly downward to 98 ADJ PRD, with fairly similar adjustments for liners (from 111 to 109) and grounders (135 to 127). For all BIP combined, his actual 97 REL PRD and 96 ADJ PRD marks are almost identical. Adding back the K’s and BB’s gives him a solid boost to a 113 REL PRD and 111 ADJ PRD. In a vacuum, Dozier’s actual 2014 numbers give a very accurate portrayal of the underlying granular data.

But there’s a catch. Brian Dozier has now established himself as one of the most extreme pull hitters in the game. I have developed a fairly simple statistic called “pull ratio”. It is calculated separately for fly balls, line drives and ground balls. For a righthanded hitter, it is (number of balls hit to LF + LCF)/(number of balls hit to RCF + RF). A typical righthanded hitter might have a pull ratio of a little over 1:1 on fly balls, about 2:1 on liners, and 4:1 on grounders. Dozier’s marks were 2.35 for fly balls, 3.17 for liners, and 6.20 for grounders in 2014.

Extreme pulling is generally a hallmark of a player harvesting power near the end of a career, when it’s basically all that he has left in his offensive game. The most comparable 2013 pull factors were posted by the likes of Jonny Gomes, Raul Ibanez, Chris Young and Andrelton Simmons; three guys who appeared cooked in 2014, and another who is struggling to find an offensive identity. Dozier didn’t become an extreme puller to extend his major league career; he did so just to have one, at least as a regular, in the first place.

What is the potential harm in this approach moving forward? It comes in several forms. First, even though he’s righthanded, infield shifts await Dozier. He batted .272 AVG-.333 SLG on grounders in 2014, above MLB average, and it was supported by solid BIP authority. That assumes a typical defensive alignment, however. At the very least, one would expect infield overshifting to cut Dozier’s grounder production to MLB average (.245 AVG-.267 SLG), which would cut his overall ADJ PRD from 111 to 106. A drop in grounder production to say, .200 AVG-.220 SLG, might be a perfectly reasonable expectation for an overshifted extreme puller; that drops his overall ADJ PRD even further to 99.

That isn’t the biggest risk related to his extreme pull tendency. First of all, let’s temporarily forget about the existence of LCF in the above pull ratio calculation. Ignoring that field sector, Dozier’s fly ball pull ratio would be 1.41, and his grounder pull ratio would be 4.60. He is an “extreme extreme puller” who hits an inordinate number of batted balls toward the LF line. Sit the third baseman on the bag, and his 10 ground ball doubles go away. Dozier hit an incredible 52 fly balls to the LF sector in 2014 — more than Miguel Cabrera, Giancarlo Stanton and Mike Trout combined. He hit 22 of his 23 homers to that sector, with the other one barely in the LCF sector. A great deal of them were of the “just enough” variety, in HitTracker parlance. This too, is the mark of a hitter whose power isn’t built to last.

Why is this a big deal? For part of the time I was with the Mariners, Jose Lopez was a regular infielder. He too hit almost all of his homers to the exact same spot, to his extreme pull side. Lopez had more raw and useable power than Dozier, Dozier a superior eye. Pitchers develop a book on such hitters, and over time will give them nothing they can pull for distance. Hitters must then adjust, or perish. Unfortunately for such hitters, extreme pulling is quite often their last adjustment. Dozier has not shown an ability to hit a ball even reasonably hard the other way in the air, on a line, or on the ground. Pitchers are going to pitch him away, and all Dozier is going to be able to do is draw a walk……for a little while at least, until that skill begins to decline as his ability to inflict damage erodes.

Every club needs Brian Doziers in their system. He is an overachiever who has constantly figured it out as he has advanced, through college, into the minors, and then into the major leagues. To become a starter at that level and have some success, he has had to totally sell out to the short term fruits of extreme pulling. Pitchers are now likely to have the last word. To borrow a contemporary nightly news sound bite, one doesn’t know whether a deal is bad until the particulars of that deal are known. There are certainly terms which would make a Dozier deal look good from the Twins’ perspective. Chances are, though, that a long-term deal for Dozier would look at 2014’s 23 homers and 4.6 WAR as a base expectation rather than the career peak that it more likely represents, and that wouldn’t likely end well for the Twins.

The FIP statistic was created because of the inherent shortcomings of ERA; so much that was reflected in the traditional pitchers’ statistic was totally out of their control, and the new metric credited and debited hurlers for that which they did. As it turns out, FIP isn’t perfect either, as not all types of batted-ball contract are created equal. Still, FIP is preferable to ERA in just about every way imaginable, and is a much better anchor upon which to base pitcher evaluations. In any given year, however, there are pitchers who are much better (or worse) than both their ERA and FIP, once you adjust for quality of batted ball contact allowed.

A couple weeks back, we looked at Jake Odorizzi and Drew Hutchison, two pitchers who were much better than both their ERA and FIP in 2014. Today, let’s look at the two ERA-qualifying NL starters who were most significantly worse than both their ERA and FIP in 2014: Cole Hamels and Henderson Alvarez. Read the rest of this entry »