We begin with a Shaun Marcum timeline. Marcum debuted in the majors in 2005, and he got progressively better through 2008. He missed all of 2009 due to Tommy John surgery. In 2010, as a Blue Jay, he started on opening day. Following 2010, he was traded to the Brewers for top prospect Brett Lawrie straight up. In 2011, he posted a sub-4 ERA over 33 starts. In 2012, he posted a sub-4 ERA over 21 starts, having missed time with elbow discomfort. But he pitched before the discomfort, and then he came back to pitch after it. Marcum’s a not-unreliable 31 years old. As a free agent, you’d think Marcum would be able to get himself a reasonably hefty contract. Instead, he’s signed with the Mets for a year and $4 million. He could earn an additional $2 million, but only if he hits his incentives.

As always, that counts as a hefty contract by our non-baseballing standards. Marcum will out-earn many CEOs! Such luxury! But for the sake of comparison, Mike Pelfrey signed for a year and $4 million, with $1.5 million in possible incentives. Scott Baker signed for a year and $5.5 million, with $1.5 million in possible incentives, and last season he didn’t throw a pitch. Kevin flipping Correia signed for two years and $10 million, and he’s Kevin Correia. On that basis alone, it seems like the Mets got themselves a pretty good deal. On that basis alone, it seems like Marcum should’ve had more of a market.

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According to Kevin Towers, a few days ago he was prepared to move on without having traded Justin Upton, as he wasn’t finding enough value on the market. In lieu of an Upton trade, the Diamondbacks presumably would’ve made a Jason Kubel trade, presumably with the Orioles. But things changed, and they must have changed swiftly — on Thursday, the Diamondbacks officially announced an Upton trade with the Braves, as Justin will join his brother B.J. in the Atlanta outfield. Or, this, in other words.

Dave already wrote about the trade overall, from both sides. Mike Newman already took a look at the prospects involved. I, personally, got curious about the brother angle. This was something Justin was hoping for; he turned down a trade to Seattle, hoping for a trade somewhere else, somewhere more familiar, somewhere closer to home. Speculation was that he wanted Atlanta more than anything else. It’s an odd quirk that Upton will play beside his own brother. But I found myself wondering if the psychology involved has any effect on performance. In short: historically, have players gotten better when they’ve been teammates with a sibling? On one hand, it would be surprising if they did; on the other hand, it would be surprising if they didn’t. Players are always talking about the importance of comfort. What could be more comfortable than playing with family?

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As of Thursday, an awful lot of people are happy. The Diamondbacks are happy, because they were able to move Justin Upton for value. The Braves are happy, because they were able to get Justin Upton for a good but not outstanding package. And Justin Upton is happy, because he gets to go play in Atlanta, instead of Seattle or somewhere else. Upton was hoping for a destination like this, if not this destination specifically, and now he can put his alleged malcontent days behind him and play alongside his brother. This is a move that felt like it had to be made, and now it’s been made, officially.

But from the Braves’ perspective, there are not zero concerns. For one thing, now they’re down a Martin Prado, and their third-base situation could be stronger than it is. And then there’s the matter of Upton, and the strikeouts that he brings. He’ll share an outfield with B.J. Upton, who strikes out, and Jason Heyward, who strikes out too. There’s been some degree of concern that the new Braves might strike out too often, which means there’s concern that the Braves’ offense might underachieve.

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This post is a follow-up to a post from last Friday night, entitled Calling Balls and Strikes Against Catchers. Given the timing, you might have missed that post, so you should read through it for some background. Or you can skip reading through it, since I’m about to give you a quick summary. Within that post, I presented some evidence, based on 2012 PITCHf/x data, that catchers were given more generous strike zones while batting than non-catchers. That is, umpires called fewer strikes on catchers than you’d expect, and the difference in rates for catchers and for non-catchers came out to about one strike per 100 called pitches.

I pursued it off a comment tip, and I found the results to be of some interest. However, there were also some potential sources of error. I looked only at 2012, and I didn’t even look at 2012’s complete picture, limiting myself instead to regulars and semi-regulars. I decided this was worth digging in a little deeper, so I called on Dark Overlord David Appelman to supply me with greater information. What’s presented below is far more thorough, and therefore, far more acceptable.

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FanGraphs keeps track of pitcher Pace, which you already knew. Here’s a definition of what pitcher Pace is, in case you need to brush up. The data comes from PITCHf/x timestamps, and while Pace doesn’t have any meaningful correlation with wins and losses — that is, it doesn’t make you better to speed up or slow down — it does have a meaningful correlation with what we might call “watchability”. While we’re all ultimately in it for the baseball, it’s a lot more fun to watch a game with a fast tempo than a game with a slower tempo. A game with a fast tempo makes the baseball more concentrated. Somebody just signed Miguel Batista the other day, and I’m not interested in looking up who, but that was a bad move as far as watchability is concerned. Batista, like other slow pitchers, can be dreadful to watch.

Pace is interesting, because it describes part of the viewing experience. So Pace can be fun to play around with. In late September, I decided to look at opposite extremes. What Pace tell us is that Mark Buehrle is the fastest-working pitcher, and Carlos Pena is the slowest-working hitter, because Pena has a whole routine he gets into. I was curious to see what the Pace would be in their head-to-head matchups. The results basically split the middle between Buehrle’s Pace and Pena’s Pace. Buehrle made Pena speed up, but Pena also made Buehrle slow down. Science!

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You know who don’t steal a lot of bases? Pitchers. Also big guys, but specifically, for our purposes here, pitchers. For one thing, pitchers are infrequently on base. For another thing, pitchers are infrequently well-trained at running the bases. For still another thing, there’s an injury risk, as attempted base-stealers can hurt their hands or their shoulders. In short, the potential costs are determined to outweigh the potential benefits, so pitchers stay put. We’ve written about this a little before.

National League pitchers bat somewhat often, but their steals are few and far between. Last year, three NL pitchers successfully stole bases. The year before, three again. The year before, three again. The year before, three again. NL pitchers haven’t accrued double-digit stolen bases in a season since 1989, when they combined to steal ten. American League pitchers bat far less often, and so their steals are even fewer and farther between. Last year, zero AL pitchers successfully stole bases. The year before, zero again. The year before, zero again. The year before, zero again. As a matter of fact, the last stolen base by an AL pitcher came in the summer of 2002.

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This is a post that necessarily begins with an embarrassing story. Friday afternoon, I was doing some research into strike zones called against individual hitters, and full teams. I was comparing actual strikes against expected strikes, just as I’ve done with pitchers in the past. I didn’t know if I would find anything, but that was the whole purpose — it was statistical exploration. After some time, I gathered all my results in a spreadsheet, and then I remembered I already did this in October. Like the exact same thing, for this very website.

Memory jogged, I read the old post, and I read the old comments underneath the old post. Everything looked fine; I didn’t know what I was checking. All the results agreed, with the only difference being that this time I used a denominator of 1,000 called pitches instead of 1,000 general pitches. Hardly worth an updated post. But part of one comment did stand out to me, both because it was interesting, and because it meant I might not have to throw away all my data:

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There are a bunch of things we know to be true about Aaron Cook, or at least things we have no reason to question. Aaron Cook played for the Rockies, and he recently played for the Red Sox. More recently he was signed by the Phillies. He is a man, and he is a man of more than 30 years, and he is a man who grows reddish facial hair when he wants to, and even when he doesn’t. Aaron Cook knows many things about the game of baseball. Last season, Cook posted one of the lowest strikeout rates ever.

Strikeouts, of course, have never been a big part of Aaron Cook’s game — when he’s right, he gets a bunch of grounders. When he’s wrong, he also gets a bunch of grounders, but the overall results of everything are worse. Cook, in 2012, didn’t post the lowest strikeout rate in baseball history. He did post the lowest strikeout rate since the strike, at 4.9% of all batters. There were 411 batters, and 20 of those batters struck out. When Cook was in triple-A in 2012, there were 153 batters, and 16 of those batters struck out, so this was predictable to some extent.

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A lot of analytical baseball articles today will make some sort of reference to catcher pitch-framing. References to pitch-framing will often make references to Jose Molina, and they will less often but still somewhat often make references to Livan Hernandez. References to Livan Hernandez often lead to recollections of the 1997 NLCS, and Eric Gregg’s strike zone in Game 5. Consensus is that Gregg’s zone was extremely favorable to Hernandez, and it was a big reason why the Marlins were able to get past the Braves and advance to the World Series.

Of course, that which is unusual has a tendency to become exaggerated, made extraordinary over time. Gregg’s Game 5 strike zone is today remembered as one of the worst umpiring performances ever in the game. One hyperbolic example of many:

Umpire Eric Gregg’s strike zone in this 1997 NL playoff matchup had viewers outraged. Pitches that sailed high over the heads of players were called strikes.

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