Francisco Rodriguez inked a three-year deal (with a fourth year option) with the Mets earlier today, but he is not the only closer that will wear a new uniform in 2009. Kerry Wood, who will likely forever be linked to the Cubs, reportedly signed a two-year deal with the Indians. The deal should be announced tomorrow, and once it is, just about everyone from the Bartman era will be gone. Wood will take over the closer’s role, which should offer some stability in the least. Last year, Joe Borowski struggled and was eventually released. Jensen Lewis then filled in for the remainder of a disappointing season for the Indians.

The exact details of the deal are not yet known, so this analysis will essentially be a work-in-progress, but we can definitely see what Wood should earn — his fair market value. In many ways, this signing is the opposite of K-Rod’s, in the sense that we have to adjust Wood’s projected FIP to be slightly higher, given the offensive superiority of the American League.

Marcel projects Wood at a 3.51 FIP over 61 innings. Moving to the junior circuit, though, a bit more should be tacked on. Let’s call him a 3.65 FIP pitcher in 61 innings. If a replacement level AL reliever is a 4.75 pitcher, than Wood is going to save a little over one run per nine innings. Extrapolated over the full 61 innings, Wood would be about eight runs above replacement level. The high leverage of his innings pitched then needs to be taken into account. Eight runs multiplied by an average LI of 1.8 comes out to +14 runs. According to these calculations, Wood would be worth a little less than one and a half wins next season.

1.4 wins * $5 mil/win equates to $7 mil. Wood’s fair market value would roughly call for a 2-yr/$14 mil deal. Last season, his base salary was $4.2 mil, though with incentives taken into account he earned just under $8 mil. We will have to wait and see what exactly Kerry signed for, but my initial inclination is that it will be more lucrative than an average annual value of $7 mil. As more details become available, we can determine just how much he was under- or over-valued, or if he was valued properly.

Then again, if he gets hurt, as has been customary for Mr. Wood, this all goes down the drain.

Throughout the baseball off-season, much focus is directed towards where the big name players will go. Will CC Sabathia sign with the Yankees? Do the Angels have enough to retain Mark Teixeira? Where will Derek Lowe end up? And who will give A.J. Burnett that elusive fifth year?

Then there are the lesser discussed moves, usually involving role players like Mark Loretta and Casey Blake. These players definitely add value to a team, generally sign for a fee lower than their fair market value, and help round out a roster.

After that, we have what I like to call “wonder trades” primarily because they really make us wonder either a) what was/were the GM(s) thinking? or b) what is the point of this trade? Now, I cannot speak for Walt Jocketty’s reasoning for pulling the trigger on this trade, but the swapping of Ramon Hernandez (and $1 mil) for Ryan Freel (and two prospects) definitely feels like it fits either part of the above definition.

For starters, I can understand that the Reds have a need for a catcher. Paul Bako and Javier Valentin are both currently free agents, meaning they either needed to acquire a veteran or use a prospect. What I don’t get, however, is how they took a look at Hernandez’s projected production and salary, and determined that he was the best fit. Or, for that matter, why trading for him made more sense than re-signing Valentin to a two-year deal. Hernandez is slated to hit .259/.323/.410 in 2009, with a .320 wOBA. Based on his numbers, he would be worth -5 runs below average offensively. It is very tough to quantify catching defense, but I would tend to think he is somewhere in the -5 runs below average range. Factor in his positional adjustment and adjustment for comparison to replacement value and we are looking at a potential +2 win player.

Valentin is projected to be -4 runs below average offensively, and I cannot imagine that he is so significantly worse behind the plate than Hernandez that the difference between the two would be extremely substantial. Combine the two projections and we see that Valentin is likely to produce along the same level as Hernandez. Add in that Hernandez is owed $8 mil in 2009 while Valentin would likely cost below $5 mil and this starts to look very odd.

Then we have Ryan Freel, a sparkplug utility fielder who talks to an imaginary voice named Farney. Freel has had several off the field issues, isn’t a particularly good hitter, but has a reputation for being a great fielder from making some great plays over the years. It is very tough to quantify Freel’s fielding because of his utilityness. With such small samples at several positions, it isn’t exactly clear what his true talent level will be. I cannot imagine he will be a starter with the Orioles, but rather a defensive replacement or spot starter. Normally, he would likely project to be an average corner outfielder, but if he serves as a defensive replacement in centerfield and pinch-runner, his value may actually increase; he wouldn’t be batting much.

Regardless of what Freel brings to the table, this trade just does not make sense to me for the Reds. I mean, honestly, what was the point? Do the Reds think that with Hernandez, and not Valentin or Bako, they will suddenly skyrocket to 90 wins? And is Ryan Freel really the missing piece to the Orioles puzzle? I understand that Weiters is the Orioles catcher of the future and unloading Hernandez is key, but Freel and prospects was all they could get? I’m all for the moves involving role players, but right now we are talking about a trade involving two severely declining role players whose added contribution to their new teams will be marginal at best. Going after a guy like Gerald Laird, as the Tigers did, would have made more sense, especially if the goal is to plug someone in as a cheap and effective stopgap.

But not Hernandez, especially not in the final, and most expensive year, of his contract, with an even more expensive club option for the following season. The Reds did not give up much in Freel, but they did not get much in Hernandez, especially considering there are cheaper and similarly effective alternatives, one of whom–Valentin–has spent significant time in Cincinnati. I’m getting a headache just thinking about this trade. Reds fans, I hope I am not offending you, but honestly, can anyone out there who is a fan of either team… even if you are a bit fanboy… truly justify this trade?

UPDATE: It is now being reported that the Orioles are giving the Reds $3 mil, which drastically changes my opinion on the trade. In that case, the Reds are trading away $4 mil in salary and getting $3 mil towards Hernandez’ $8 mil. Essentially, they are only adding $1 mil in the trade, which makes Hernandez worth it, even as a backup. It might not be pointless, but it sure is boring.

Jayson Stark at ESPN.com recently reported that the Dodgers and Casey Blake reached an agreement for 3 yrs and around $17.1 million. The exact details of the contracts are not known as of this juncture, though I will update when they become available. Blake, a third baseman who has dabbled at several other positions throughout his career, joined the Dodgers towards the end of July last season. In 58 games wearing Dodger blue, he posted a .251/.313/.460 line with 10 home runs. This resulted in a slightly below average .327 wOBA.

All told, his -3 runs on offense, +1.4 runs on defense, and positional adjustment for playing third base pegged him as a league average player over the final two months of the season. With injuries to Jeff Kent and Nomar Garciaparra, acquiring Blake allowed Joe Torre to shift Blake DeWitt to second base, stabilizing the defense and lineup, in a sense.

The average annual value of Blake’s supposed contract with the Dodgers is $5.7 mil, meaning that they would essentially be paying him to add about 1.15 wins above replacement per season. How does his 2009 projection look in this regard?

Marcel says Blake will hit .265/.336/.440, with 18 HR, and a .335 wOBA. His wOBA would basically represent the league average, and based on his projected playing time, he would be worth +1 run above average with the bat. He was -3.7 runs below average via UZR in 2007, and -4.7 in 2008. Let’s say, at worst, he is -5 runs at third base next season. Add in his +2.5 positional adjustment and +20 runs to represent value above replacement level, not average, and Blake is projected to be worth +18.5 runs in 2009. This easily converts to +1.85 WAR.

Assuming the going rate is around $5 mil/win this year, Blake’s fair market value for a one year deal is $9.25 mil. Factoring in a 10% discount rate for a multi-year deal, and an appropriate contract would be 3-yr/$25 mil. The Dodgers supposedly signed him for around $8 mil less than his projection calls for. Now, granted, Blake will be 36 by the end of the 2009 season, and when this contract ends, he will either become a utility bench player or retiree. Even with aging curves, though, there is little reason to think he will only be worth 3.45 WAR (the 1.15 WAR per year based don his $5.7 mil AAV) over the duration of this deal.

Having traded Andy LaRoche to acquire Manny Ramirez, it isn’t as if Blake’s signing will prevent a top-tiered prospect from earning playing time. He isn’t going to put the team over the top, or make up for Manny’s lost production if he signs elsewhere, but based on the committed money and his projected production, this looks like a very solid deal for the Dodgers.

On December 16, 1985, I entered this world. Less than a year later, on September 3rd, 1986, a rather scrawny right-handed pitcher named Greg Maddux made his major league debut with the Chicago Cubs. Though I did not realistically become a baseball fan until the age of seven, Greg Maddux has been in the major leagues for just about my entire life. He also happens to be my baseball idol, the pitcher I modeled myself after and tried to emulate throughout high school, and the only non-Phillies player whom I routinely watched. In fact, when the MLB.com computer broadcasts began, as well as the MLB package on digital cable, it became possible to literally watch all of his starts, a possibility of which I took full advantage.

Today, just a few hours after this article posts, Maddux will officially announce his retirement. An era is about to come to an end, and I don’t know exactly how I feel.

In many ways, I knew this day was coming for much of the 2008 season. Maddux hinted at retiring several times throughout the year, so when the story broke, the news was not exactly shocking. Still, it is a very weird feeling to know that he will not don a uniform at the start of next season. Or, for that matter, ever again. On one hand, I am glad that he made this decision, as his final season still resulted in an above-average 4.22 ERA, 4.09 FIP, and 3.27 K/BB ratio. On the other hand, however, it feels as if a chapter in my life is inching closer to its end, which is always odd to process.

Clemens is gone, as are Bonds, McGwire, and Sosa. Mussina already announced his retirement plans. Smoltz has become extremely injury-prone and does not likely have much left in the tank. Glavine is but a shell of his former self. Pedro, Unit, and Griffey have, at best two more years in them. And now Maddux is hanging up his cleats. With regards to sports, I’ve always said that you know you will feel old when players you grew up watching start becoming coaches. While this has only realistically happened with Joe Girardi and Ozzie Guillen, so far, it feels as if I am going to reach this point in no more than a few years.

My love for watching Maddux pitch dealt primarily with his crafty, technician-like approach on the mound. In every aspect of my life, I have been attracted to the technicians. Be it Maddux, Bret “The Hitman” Hart, John Stockton, Andre Miller, or any number of other players in different sports. Don’t get me wrong, I still like to watch the flashy players, but the technicians just seemed to have this aura about them that kept me hooked. Maddux kept a poker face on the mound, only breaking character during incredulous moments. He had the fielding skills that made you shout “how on Earth did he catch that?” And he had the smooth pitching windup that you just had to try and emulate.

As a Phillies fan, I was particularly spoiled this year with a World Series Championship. In Game Five of the NLCS, however, even though the Phillies clinched, arguably my favorite moment involved Maddux retiring Ruiz-Hamels-Rollins in the fourth inning. The Maddux of old has not been seen in almost five or six years, but he has still had moments during which he looked like his vintage self. This was one of them. He retired Ruiz quickly, on two pitches. Hamels then stepped in, and on a 2-2 count, threw the 2-seam fastball that is commonly referred to as “the Maddux fastball” for strike three looking. Jimmy Rollins came up next, and on a 2-2 count, was caught looking on the same Maddux fastball.

Hearing the stunned reactions from other bar patrons that night just made me grin. It wasn’t that I was glad that the Phillies were retired or anything of the sort, but this really felt like his final performance, and I took such pride in watching a glimmer of the pitcher who dominated baseball for most of my childhood and teenage years. The Winter Meetings begin tomorrow, and we will be covering moves throughout the day. The one move that will likely affect me moreso than all others, though, will be Maddux being traded away from baseball, to a life that will include watching son Chase in his baseball endeavors. Regardless, it is going to be very weird not having Maddux around next season. Goodbye, Greg, and from at least this devoted fan, thanks for the tremendous career.

During the latter part of this week, Dave has discussed defensive metrics and how they are, or should be, treated moreso as inferential statistics than descriptive; that the results should be treated as data points as opposed to concrete and isolated performance indicators. As odd as it sounds, defense is still undervalued today. And when I say undervalued, imagine me putting a ton of emphasis to really hammer home the point that defense just is not considered as important as offense. If I were to compare Manny Ramirez and Carl Crawford (as I will below), those who do not really consider defense to be valuable with scoff at the results.

Here are Crawford’s and Ramirez’s runs projections for 2009:

Manny Ramirez: +30 batting, -7.5 adjustment, +20 replacement, -15 defense
Carl Crawford: + 3 batting, -7.5 adjustment, +20 replacement, +10 defense

Put together, this puts Ramirez at +27.5 runs and Crawford at +25.5 runs. Converted to wins, that is a mere 2.75 to 2.55 advantage for ManRam, and that isn’t even including baserunning metrics such as BP’s equivalent baserunning runs. Now, for a second, imagine if I were to go on air at ESPN and discuss how Crawford in 2009 is almost just as valuable, all told, as Ramirez: can you imagine the type of criticism I would receive? In fact, I expect to get some here as well, even though our fanbase tends to value defense a bit more.

Even in my own head it sounds odd that Manny’s production is only two runs higher than Crawford. I hate resorting to arguments centering around how the media shapes our views of events, but this is definitely a big part of why fans focus moreso on offense, or consider offense as worth much more than defense. Only when a player is considered a defensive wiz is the run prevention with the glove deemed important, and in cases like that, people almost go too far, saying that offense doesn’t matter at all because of how solid the player’s glove looks.

Shows like SportsCenter only show the spectacular plays, and this is why our views on the defensive resumes of certain players (See: Derek Jeter) are warped. He has made some fantastic plays in his career, and we have seen them over and over again, but he is not a good fielding shortstop in any sense of the word. This doesn’t show up in the form of errors or fielding percentage, though. Even though innate flaws exist in new age defensive metrics and our perceptions of their usage, we can all agree that fielding percentage is awful. Jeter won’t make errors on certain plays, primarily because his range prevents him from making these plays.

Watching a game, we tend to evaluate defense solely on whether or not the play was made, not if the player had enough range to reach said ball. If Chase Utley bobbles a ball at second base, even though he showed more range to get to the ball than any other second baseman in the league, many fans would think of it as a poor play. Was it? I personally feel it would be a great sign because he was able to reach the ball, which boils down to a big point: fans are spoiled, and defense is honestly one aspect of a game where watching a game hurts our opinions and evaluations.

Shane Victorino has terrific range in centerfield, but because he scurries to a Flyball A and Carlos Beltran is able to glide to Flyball A, many people would consider Shane the better fielder. Beltran made the play look easy, and therefore it becomes expected. He is expected to make that play and those viewing the games get spoiled into considering this normal, when in fact it is insanely impressive fielding. When we see enough of something, it gradually establishes the norm in our minds, and everything is treated relative to that norm as opposed to the average for the league. This is why many fans will consider an average or slightly above average defender miraculous with the glove simply because his predecessor had awful range and displayed poor defensive abilities.

Even with all of the defensive metrics available today, this is an area that still isn’t concrete from an evaluative standpoint. This fact makes it tough to justify defensive importance when statheads like us are under intense scrutiny to mathematically and logically prove our points. I’m not sure how fans, myself included, can get past being spoiled or falling into a comfort zone with what we watch as opposed to how the average performer would perform, but until we reach that point, comparisons like Ramirez-Crawford from above will continue to look ridiculous. After all, how could Crawford’s defense and baserunning come even close to what Manny can do with the bat? Perhaps if a defensive metric comes out that leverages the importance level of the situation we could begin to show this, or one that, with very educated estimates, shows what hit would have been recorded had the ball not been fielded (as in, factoring in the run values of what would have occurred had the play not been fielded), but this is still a tough analytical facet to sell.

Defense is very important, but how important is still uncertain in the eyes of many fans, primarily because of how we value errors, and how we get spoiled watching certain players.

Earlier this week, both Dave and I discussed the importance of adding context to free agent and trade analyses. Baseball does not take place in a vacuum, where everything is equal, so a signing might make a lot of sense to one team while making little sense to another. Dave whipped out a neat spreadsheet that showed the average dollars per win a team could spend based on its payroll and desire to win 40 games above replacement level. The idea is that anybody could win 50 games at $12 mil with a team consisting of replacement players, so the ultimate goal would be to win 40 more games with (2009 payroll – $12 mil).

Following that, I put the context-analysis to work by evaluating how much money Ben Sheets would cost, at fair market value, and how that relates to the Brewers available funds and strategy. Updating that work, the Brewers, prior to today, would enter 2009 with $62,699,000 committed to players who combine for 35 WAR. Now, the projected Brewers payroll was initially considered to be $85 mil; however, factoring in their $20 mil/yr offer to CC Sabathia, the figure is probably closer to $90 mil. For the sake of this post and any Brewers signings moving forward, we will put them at $90 mil for 2009, meaning that, prior to today, they had $27.3 mil to spend in order to add five or more wins.

The Brewers just signed Jorge Julio to a 1-yr deal, so how does he fit into this mold? Well, the base salary for Julio is rumored to be $950,000, with another $950,000 available in incentives based on appearances and how many games he finishes. Based on his past, I will say that the $600k incentive will kick in but not the $350k. Therefore, Julio would likely be paid $1.55 mil in 2009. How much is he worth?

Marcel projects him to pitch 46 innings at a 4.27 FIP. That comes out to 22 runs allowed. A replacement level reliever would pitch 46 innings at a 4.75 FIP, for 24 runs. Essentially, with nothing else taken into account, Julio is worth +2 run above replacement, or +0.2 wins. Normally, we would add a few runs to factor in the leverage of the reliever’s appearances, but it isn’t likely that Julio will be called upon too often in a pinch. I’ll add another run, making him +0.3 wins above replacement for 2009. If wins cost around $5 mil right now, then the fair market value for Julio would be $1.5 mil. The Brewers are paying just slightly over that figure.

This would give the Brewers 35.3 WAR as opposed to 35.0, with $25.75 mil left to spend to amass those remaining 4.7 wins. This deal isn’t going to kill the Brewers, unless Julio vastly defies his true talent level, or he is used in the wrong situations, and it could prove to be a nice reclamation project of sorts. If the payroll is upwards of $90 mil, they could still sign Sheets to his fair market value of $14.7 mil, adding 3.2 wins in the process. This would put them 1.5 WAR away from the goal of 90 wins, with $11 mil leftover. What they will do remains to be seen, but Julio looks like a pretty good signing relative to his projected contribution, base salary, and the incentive likely to kick in.

In 2008, the Atlanta Braves had a very disappointing season. I know, thanks Captain Obvious, but still, many analysts pegged them to at least be competitive and they essentially fell short in that regard. Granted, they lost John Smoltz after five starts, saw 13 replacement level starts from Tom Glavine before losing him for the rest of the season, made up that difference with slightly above replacement level performance from Mike Hampton, and saw Tim Hudson fall prey to Tommy John Surgery. Whew. By the end of the season, the rotation was headlined by Jair Jurrjens and accompanied by Jorge Campillo, Jo-Jo Reyes, and Hampton.

Here are the values of the primary Braves starters from 2008. Keep in mind that this only includes their numbers as starters, not bullpen appearances:

NAME               IP       FIP      WAR
Jair Jurrjens     188.1     3.59     +3.6
Tim Hudson        141.0     3.83     +2.6
Jorge Campillo    137.0     4.27     +1.9
John Smoltz        27.0     2.32     +1.0
Jo-Jo Reyes       110.1     5.04     +0.5
Mike Hampton       78.0     4.94     +0.5
Tom Glavine        63.1     6.02     -0.3

Put together, these seven pitchers combined for +9.8 wins above replacement. Glavine is not very likely to return in 2009. Hudson will miss most, if not all, of the season recovering from his surgery. Hampton just signed with the Astros. Jo-Jo Reyes was initially rumored as part of the Javier Vazquez-deal, and though his moving did not come to fruition, I think it’s safe to say he is not necessarily part of the Braves 2009 rotation hopes.

That leaves Jurrjens and Campillo. Smoltz will likely return as long as he can physically throw a baseball, leaving two rotation spots open. One of them was filled the other day, as Frank Wren traded a package of prospects for Javier Vazquez. And, if the reports I have been reading are true, and the Braves are offering that guaranteed fifth year, it seems A.J. Burnett will soon round out that rotation. What would this rotation look like compared to last year?

NAME              IP     FIP      WAR
A.J. Burnett     190     3.90     +3.3
Javier Vazquez   200     3.92     +3.3
Jair Jurrjens    160     3.84     +2.9
Jorge Campillo   160     4.12     +2.4
John Smoltz       94     3.57     +2.0

Campillo’s projection was a tad skewed due to Jorge pitching out of the pen and lacking much major league tenure entering this year, as well as the fact that it does not slot him as a full-time starter in 2009. I adjusted it to something in between what the systems are calling for, taking his rotation spot into account. For Smoltz, this assumes he only pitches 2/5 of the season or so. Still, even with 40% of Smoltz, this rotation would be worth 13.9 wins above replacement, a four-win improvement from last season.

What happens if Smoltz comes back and pitches more than these 94 innings though? What if he logs 165 innings at a 3.45 FIP, which would actually be his highest such mark since 1994? In that scenario, Smoltz would be worth +36 runs, or +3.6 wins as opposed to two wins. In that scenario, the Braves would be getting a steal with Smoltz, because there is no way he will sign a 1-yr deal for his fair market value of $18 mil. It would also add another 1.6 wins to the projected 13.9, bringing the Braves potential rotation to +15.5 WAR, an improvement of almost six wins.

We don’t know if Campillo can build on his 2008 performance; if Jurrjens can avoid the sophomore slump; if Smoltz will return and/or stay healthy; or even if Burnett will end up as a Brave. If all of this comes to fruition, however, the Braves could realistically put out an extremely potent rotation.

The San Francisco Giants have been quite active so far in the off-season. They made a very early splash when signing Jeremy Affeldt to pitch out of their bullpen and added some reinforcement today, inking Bobby Howry to a deal. Brian Sabean has also been reportedly pursuing Edgar Renteria, a deal that could come to fruition very soon. Additionally, Sabes has been linked to Jorge Cantu, he of the 29 home runs for the Marlins in 2008. With the potential for a very new-looking Giants offense in 2009, I decided to compare their starting lineup from 2008 to what it may look like for the season opener.

First, if any Giants fans out there read this and would like me to factor in partial seasons for some players who received playing time due to an injury to a starter, let me know. Also, if you have reason to believe that they will feature a different starting first baseman in 2009, I will make the correction. For the 2008 lineup, I took those with the most starts; therefore, certain players with a small sample of playing time were not included.

2008 Giants        RAR     WAR
Bengie Molina     +35.0   +3.50
Rich Aurilia       +3.0   +0.30
Emmanuel Burriss  +22.4   +2.24
Jose Castillo      +4.0   +0.40
Omar Vizquel      +23.2   +2.32
Fred Lewis        +25.3   +2.53
Aaron Rowand      +10.0   +1.00
Randy Winn        +38.5   +3.85
John Bowker        -4.4   -0.44

Put together, these ten players combined for +157 runs above replacement, or +15.7 wins. Now, how does this stack up with the potential lineup in 2009 if they ink Renteria and Cantu?

2009 Giants         RAR     WAR
Bengie Molina      +31.2   +3.12
John Bowker         +5.0   +0.50
Emmanuel Burriss   +15.5   +1.55
Jorge Cantu        +15.0   +1.50
Edgar Renteria     +23.5   +2.35
Fred Lewis         +21.8   +2.18
Aaron Rowand       +19.5   +1.95
Randy Winn         +31.0   +3.10
Pablo Sandoval (3B)+33.0   +3.30
Pablo Sandoval (1B)+16.0   +1.60

Now, the above projections are based upon Bengie Molina sustaining about a half-win above average defense and slightly improving his offense to league average for a catcher; on Aaron Rowand improving offensively; and on Renteria bouncing back on both offense and defense. These projected wins amount to 16.3 above replacement, a half-win greater than a year ago. Therefore, adding Renteria and Cantu, and giving a full year’s worth of playing time to Burriss and Bowker will add just a half-win above what they accomplished last year.

Pablo Sandoval needs to be added to the mix. His weighted projection calls for a .362 wOBA in 419 PA in 2009. Assuming he is -5 runs defensively, since we don’t know much about his defensive prowess other than it is about average or below average at 1B, we’re looking at +11 runs on offense, -5 on defense, we’ll say -10 as a positional adjustment since he could split between 1B/3B, and +20 for replacement. The total of +16 runs, or +1.6 wins. This would bring the potential 2009 Giants offense to 17.9 wins above replacement, close to three wins better than this past season.

However, if we substitute Cantu for Sandoval at 3B, and remove Bowker for Ishikawa/Phelps in a platoon, things look much better. Sandoval would improve to +3.3 wins, and the Phelps/Ishikawa platoon would be worth +1.2 wins. This would result in +18.8 wins above replacement for the 2009 Giants offense, higher than if they get Cantu, and go with Sandoval/Bowker at 1B. Therefore, it would seem like the best bet for SF would involve signing Renteria, going with the Ishikawa/Phelps platoon at first base, and letting Pablo be the everyday third baseman.

After reading a wide array of comments either on recent threads here, regarding evaluating free agent signings, or on the forums that chose to link to the same articles, I felt compelled to briefly discuss a certain point of contention. A difference exists between signing a good player and signing a player to a good deal. As simple as that sounds, it is an aspect of analysis all too often forgotten amongst many types of fans and writers. What this means is that it is very possible to sign a bad player to a good deal or a good player to a bad deal.

Likewise, when discussing trades and returns on these trades, it is possible to obtain a good player even though the trade is deemed poor on your part. I don’t want to discuss Gil Meche any more than we have recently, but he seems like the perfect guinea pig on which to illustrate the point. When people discuss Meche and his contract, there are two camps: those who feel it was a great deal and those who still think it was a poor decision on the part of the Royals. Though both camps differ on the signing from the standpoint of a GM or franchise insider, each side is in agreement that he has performed quite well.

It is not as if those who feel the signing was poor derive their opinions from thinking Meche has been a bad pitcher in 2007 and 2008. Rather, their opinions are based on a plethora of off-the-field issues, such as the opportunity cost of his salary, or how his performance has done nothing to increase attendance or television ratings. Now, I do not want to start up another Gil-debate, but it is important to understand that when we evaluate free agent signings, we are looking at much more than simply the quality of the player being signed.

With trades, not only do salaries come into play, but also the return. I was not a big fan of the Joe Blanton deal earlier this year, even though they acquired a pitcher pretty superior to Adam Eaton or Kyle Kendrick. Add in that Blanton does not cost much, is durable, and is under control for another few years, and it seems like a solid move. What they gave up, however, I estimated to be worth more. Who knows exactly how that one will turn out, but the point is that I never felt that Blanton was a bad pitcher.

Nobody is going to debate that Alex Rodriguez is a phenomenal player, one of the best ever, and a clear first ballot hall of famer. However, his deal with the Rangers was largely considered a bad deal, because it hamstrung the team and vastly limited the number of teams to whom they could deal Madonna’s new beau. Along similar lines, Dave took a look at the Mike Hampton signing yesterday, and astutely showed that even though Mike has injury problems, is not durable, and is not worth much over replacement level, the small fee and commitment of $2 mil for just 1-yr is a pretty solid deal. This would be an example of a “bad” player signed to a good deal.

Again, I don’t want to start debates about certain players, but I see this mistake too often in comment threads and felt it needed a bit of clearing up.

For the last day or two we have begun to delve deep into the baseball economy and how it relates to fair market value, free agency, and context. This morning, our discussion centered around the necessity to add context in order to more accurately represent free agency analyses. This afternoon, Dave brought forth a great evaluative tool, showing average dollars/win figures for all 30 teams. The figures in the spreadsheet were arrived at after concluding that a team of replacement players would cost $12 mil and win 50 games; that the goal of each team would be to win 40 games above replacement; by subtracting the $12 mil from the estimated payroll; and finally by dividing that difference by the 40 wins above replacement.

The logical next step is to actually put this into action, combining an analysis of fair market value with the context of a specific team. With the news that the Brewers have decided to offer arbitration to Ben Sheets, he seems like the perfect person on which to test our new methods. To make the post a bit easier to read, I’ll break it up into different sections.

Brewers Payroll
Over the last three years, the Brewers have increased their payroll from $57 mil to $80 mil. If we factor in about a 5% markup, their 2009 payroll can be estimated at $84 mil. Therefore, they would have $72 mil ($84 mil payroll – $12 mil replacement payroll) to win 40 games (90 wins – 50 replacement wins). The quotient amounts to an average of $1.8 mil/win. Now, this is just an average, and does not imply that every signing the Brewers make has to be for $1.8 mil/win. However, every player of theirs that exceeds $1.8 mil/win will necessitate an adjustment in what they have left to spend.

Ben Sheets & Fair Market Value
Weighting the Bill James and Marcel projections for 2009 puts Sheets at 180 innings with a 3.60 FIP, very solid numbers. He might not be the guy who, in 2004, produced a 2.65 FIP, 2.70 ERA, and > 8.0 K/BB, but he still has the ability to dominate. A replacement level starter would log 150 innings with a 5.50 FIP while a replacement reliever would pitch the remaining 30 innings at a 4.50 FIP.

Ben Sheets:     180 IP, 3.60 FIP, 72 runs
Replacement SP: 150 IP, 5.50 FIP, 92 runs
Replacement RP:  30 IP, 4.50 FIP, 15 runs

All told, that would put Sheets at 72 runs and the replacement level at 107 runs. This +35 run advantage for Sheets puts him at +3.5 wins above replacement. Normally, we would add a quarter-win or half-win for the fact that the starter in question would pitch the innings and help save the bullpen. Sheets does not get this advantage from me, and given his inability to consistently make more than, say, 22 starts in a season, I’m actually going to dock him a quarter-win, bringing his value to a solid +3.25 wins above replacement.

The going rate right now is $5 mil/win, so if Ben were to sign a 1-yr deal, the appropriate fee would be $16.25 mil. Factor in a 10% discount for a multi-year deal, and his 3-yr deal would be worth $44 mil, an average annual value (AAV) of $14.7 mil. That AAV divided by his 3.25 WAR amounts to a fee of $4.52 mil/win, about two and a half times higher than the Brewers’ average of $1.8 mil/win.

The Contract & The Team
If we knew nothing else about the Brewers, other than that they were striving for 40 wins above replacement and had 73 mil left with which to accomplish the feat, then signing Sheets to this deal would mean they now had 37 wins to add with about $58 mil to spend. We do know about the Brewers, though, and thanks to the guys at BrewCrewBall, calculations about returning players and their salaries can be made.

According to their figures, the Brewers will have 16 players returning to the roster, at an approximate sum of $66,449,000. The link suggests the total is closer to $73 mil, but Salomon Torres retired, and I’m unsure what is going on with Craig Counsell, so they were both removed. Calculating the wins above replacement for all 16 players, the total comes to about 35 wins, at the $66,449,000. This means that the Brewers have $17,551,000 left to spend in order to accrue the five remaining wins necessary to reach 40 WAR.

If they signed Ben Sheets to this 3-yr deal at fair market value, which would be an AAV of $14.7 mil for three seasons, they would have 38 wins above replacement amongst 17-19 players, and about $3 mil left to spend. Because they are getting such great deals on Braun (an astrounding $149,000 per win), Hardy, Weeks, and Hart, they can use the money saved in those areas to afford the inevitable jump in arbitration for the likes of Prince as well as other potential free agent targets.

Based on the projections for those returning, the Brewers appear to be in a solid position for 2009, and with about $14-17 mil remaining, should be able to increase from 35 wins to 40 wins above replacement, bringing their projection to 90 wins. Signing Sheets would be nice, but doing so may necessitate the usage of prospects to fill out the roster, who, could add quality for the league minimum, but might not be very useful.

Moving Forward
The next step in these types of analyses is to evaluate the remaining money in terms of the spots that need to be filled. With their $17 mil remaining outside of those returning, it is quite different in signing starters as opposed to a LOOGY, long reliever, and backup infielder. So, Brewers faithful on the interwebs, what are the positions that are not returning next season? And, on top of that, would you prefer to sign Sheets to his fair market value and fill the remaining spots with farm players, or invest that $14-17 mil elsewhere to fill out the roster, all the while keeping the goal of adding at least 5 WAR to the team?