Baseball’s Middle Class Remains Embattled
One of the most remarkable news items of the offseason — is it still the offseason? — emerged towards the end of last week, as the calendar melted from February to March.
Neil Walker has produced seven straight seasons of 2.1 WAR or greater and ranks 61st in position-player WAR (11.7) since 2014. He also remains among the notable unsigned free agents in this slowest of offseasons. Last week, the Royals offered Walker what has to be the most insulting of deals for an unemployed player of his stature: a non-roster invitation to spring training. Our depth charts project Walker for a 2.6 WAR campaign and a 111 wRC+ — if he finds a job. Jay is trying to find him. He could help a number of teams. That he’s not employed as of March 6 is somewhat remarkable.
With Yu Darvish and Eric Hosmer having finally signed for relatively handsome sums, with spring camps opening and games being played, some of the claims of collusion and talk of the direst of offseasons for the MLBPA have quieted.
Craig Edwards found that the six free agents predicted to sign deals greater than $50 million have exceeded the FanGraphs’ crowd estimates by 6.2% this offseason. On the one hand, the crowd typically underestimates those deals; on the other, this is roughly the amount by which the crowd underestimates them. One could conclude, then, that the result has actually been typical.
And, in a sense, it has been a typical offseason — for the top free agents. But the top free agents are always going to do well.
We can debate whether Hosmer is a “top” free agent, but most outlets placed him within the top 10 of their offseason rankings and called for him to earn a nine-figure contract. Next winter, Bryce Harper, Manny Machado, and probably Clayton Kershaw are going to be immune from any devaluation of free agency that might be occurring.
For me, Walker is a symbol of this offseason. He is the face of a trend I examined last January — namely, that the middle class of free agents (which also represents the vast majority of free agents) is the demographic being pinched. The middle class of free agent is still a productive major-league player. But he is typically on the wrong side of 30 — Walker is 32 — at a time when front offices prefer younger talent and maximum payroll efficiency.
Walker, once the Pirates’ player rep, did not seem to foresee this problem — like much of the MLBPA — when he spoke to this then newspapermen back in 2015 about the players’ share of revenue perhaps showing indications of decline.
Are players concerned by the current revenue split? Not yet, said Pirates union rep, Neil Walker.
“We haven’t had much discussion about it,” he said, “and frankly at this point, we don’t see it as much of a concern.”
Just over a year ago, I examined how three groups of players were faring: the “wealthy,” the “middle class,” and essentially the pre-arb player. I defined as “wealthy” those players earning at least three times the average player salary for that year ($4.5 million last season). I considered the “minimum” earners to be compensated within 10% of the league minimum to cover most players with pre-arbitration status. All other players I combined into the “middle class” group. I employed USA Today’s salary database of Opening Day payrolls as the research source.
What I found is that the middle-class group had shrunk from including 68% of players in 1995, to 60% in 2006, to 57% in 2011, to 52% in 2016, while the “minimum” player population grew from 18% in 1995 to 39% in 2016.
Applying the same methodology to last season, the middle class shrunk by another point, to 51.0%, while cheap labor inched up to nearly 40% of the MLB workforce. We’re getting closer to a future — one in which the rest of the American workforce has already found itself — where the majority of the players will not occupy the middle tier of compensation.
The middle class of free agent has been particularly embattled this offseason.
Craig found that the crowdsource estimates in recent offseasons (2013-17) have tended to overestimate the contracts for the middle tier of free agents. For instance, for projected contracts between $10-$40 million guaranteed, the forecasts were 19.3% above the actual deals signed.
For this offseason, I looked at all the free-agent deals predicted to be worth less than $45 million among our top 50 free agents. (Players who beat the crowdsourced estimates are highlighted.)
| Top 50 Rank | Player | Crowd | Actual | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | CC Sabathia | $26.0 | $10.0 | -$16.0 |
| 13 | Todd Frazier | $42.0 | $17.0 | -$25.0 |
| 14 | Jay Bruce | $39.0 | $39.0 | $0.0 |
| 16 | Brandon Morrow | $18.0 | $21.0 | $3.0 |
| 19 | Addison Reed | $27.0 | $16.8 | -$10.3 |
| 20 | Jarrod Dyson | $16.0 | $7.5 | -$8.5 |
| 21 | Eduardo Nunez | $33.0 | $8.0 | -$25.0 |
| 24 | Bryan Shaw | $21.0 | $27.0 | $6.0 |
| 25 | Logan Morrison | $20.0 | $6.5 | -$13.5 |
| 26 | Joe Smith | $12.0 | $15.0 | $3.0 |
| 27 | Anthony Swarzak | $14.0 | $14.0 | $0.0 |
| 28 | Jaime Garcia | $36.0 | $10.0 | -$26.0 |
| 29 | Yonder Alonso | $20.0 | $16.0 | -$4.0 |
| 30 | Jason Vargas | $20.0 | $16.0 | -$4.0 |
| 31 | Juan Nicasio | $16.0 | $17.0 | $1.0 |
| 32 | Pat Neshek | $16.0 | $16.3 | $0.3 |
| 34 | Carlos Gomez | $24.0 | $4.0 | -$20.0 |
| 35 | Andrew Cashner | $22.0 | $16.0 | -$6.0 |
| 36 | Tony Watson | $12.0 | $8.5 | -$3.5 |
| 37 | Michael Pineda | $16.0 | $10.0 | -$6.0 |
| 38 | Jake McGee | $24.0 | $27.0 | $3.0 |
| 39 | Tommy Hunter | $12.0 | $18.0 | $6.0 |
| 40 | Steve Cishek | $12.0 | $13.0 | $1.0 |
| 41 | Jhoulys Chacin | $20.0 | $15.5 | -$4.5 |
| 42 | Lucas Duda | $18.0 | $3.5 | -$14.5 |
| 43 | Alex Avila | $16.0 | $8.3 | -$7.8 |
| 44 | Cameron Maybin | $16.0 | $3.5 | -$12.5 |
| 46 | Howie Kendrick | $16.0 | $7.0 | -$9.0 |
| 47 | Brandon Kintzler | $14.0 | $10.0 | -$4.0 |
| 48 | Welington Castillo | $18.0 | $15.0 | -$3.0 |
| 49 | Doug Fister | $8.0 | $4.0 | -$4.0 |
| 50 | Jon Jay | $8.0 | $3.0 | -$5.0 |
| Totals | — | $632.0 | $423.3 | -$208.8 |
The crowd predicted this middle tier of free agents — those who have signed — would earn $632 million guaranteed dollars on the open market this winter. Those players, meanwhile, have actually signed deals for just over $423 million guaranteed. Overall, the middle tier of free agents has signed for roughly 33% less than the crowd estimated
Moreover, mid-tier free agents like Walker, Jeremy Hellickson, and Jonathan Lucroy remained unsigned.
The top of the class did fairly well and is expected do very well next year, but the middle class remains embattled.
Darvish and Hosmer got paid. It is a player like Walker, however — one on the wrong side of 30, one who is useful but deemed highly fungible — that is affected. It is a player like Walker, who is stuck in the middle.
A Cleveland native, FanGraphs writer Travis Sawchik is the author of the New York Times bestselling book, Big Data Baseball. He also contributes to The Athletic Cleveland, and has written for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, among other outlets. Follow him on Twitter @Travis_Sawchik.
Interesting article Travis.
Couple of possible takeaways:
1) The contract values did not include any value for various opt-outs which have considerable value to the player. The actual value and the crowd expectations did not include and do not value these.
2) Perhaps going forward FG authors and articles that use $X per WAR will need to model/discount for where a player lies in the player spectrum? A “high end” player would be $X per WAR and a “middle-class” player would be $.7X per WAR?
Or better yet, we could stop using $/WAR as a fixed entity and instead ask: “What is $/WAR in this year’s free agent market?” And then update the number based on who signs and their Depth Charts projections. (you could also stratify or otherwise test for non-linearities too)
Its important to remember that $/WAR is descriptive and not predictive, its just what teams have spent per WAR in the past, not necessarily what they think a WAR is worth. That figure is gonna get inflated by bad contracts like, say, Pujols, we just don’t have any way to determine what the optimal $/WAR should be.
It isn’t intended to be used as a predictive tool for value, but more as a predictive tool for market behavior.
We don’t know if this means the market is getting more efficient or if the market is being artificially deflated.
Its actually what the value of an extra win is to the average team. FA can command that and not just 50% because their salary is subsidized by young stars making far less than that and that there is free and competitive market for their services (questionable today)
On average, players of all classes are paid collectively at half the $/WAR stated.
I agree, but if you want to ask what the market rate is at a given time, perhaps it makes sense to see how much teams are actually paying for expected production at a given time? Instead of continually throwing out $9million/win because there are enough guys like Pujols who unexpectedly sucked? (although I think he’s out of the time-frame Swartz uses now, and other lousy contracts are in instead).
It’s not a very good predictive tool for market behavior unless teams believe that number, and there’s not any real evidence that they do based on the projections (rather than the outcomes).
He’s on the wrong side of 30, he could really use a platoon partner, he has a serious back injury in his history, etc. One can pretty easily explain this.
But if we dive into this, I think there’s actually two related processes going on here that explain the divergence between the top and middle-tier free agents.
First, the best players often come up to the majors earlier since they need less seasoning in the minors. That means they hit free agency earlier, closer to the primes (or in their primes).
Second, the best players are worth a lot more in replacement value for a team looking to get over the top than the so-called “middle-tier” of free agents. Think of the Cardinals, for example. It never made sense for them to sign a Neil Walker because they’ve got similar players all over their roster. It only makes sense for them to go big-game hunting. I think more teams are starting to wise up to the fact that 2-WAR players are a lot easier to find than the 4-WAR players, and are going accordingly.
So what happens is the best players tend to have age on their side and are also just better. I think you’re going to see some pretty big contracts when guys like Ozuna hit the free agent market for this reason (and in his year, there are a ton of guys who will likely be free agents).
For all these reasons, I actually think that calling most of these guys “middle tier” free agents is misleading. These guys are actually lower-tier free agents, in the sense that they are fungible commodities. The guys we think of as “lower tier” free agents are really guys you would expect to get minor league deals.
Yeah, for years the $/WAR model has been very linear, and everyone pointed out how counterintuitive that was considering the scarcity of high end talent. It seems like this is a correction that everyone could have seen coming
Including Jeremy Hellickson certainly stretches the definition of “middle tier” to its breaking point.
Good point, Hellickson defines lower tier.
On your second point, it depends on the team. Astros from mid-2016 through 2016-2017 offseason signed Morton, Gurriel, Reddick, and Beltran to put them over the top. Biggest problem for the non-wealthy free agents is that $/WAR for free agents increases while the $/WAR for cost controlled players is flatter. As such, spending money doesn’t help as much as it did relative to playing internal options. Yankees/Dodgers saving money for next year and big gap between great teams and middle teams doesn’t help.
Bullpen usage going up (innings and the value of those innings) has caused a temporary shortage of relievers leading to more relievers being signed. The highlighted players in the last table are all relievers. Relievers getting a significantly bigger slice of the free agent spending cake has left guys like Walker left mumbling like Milton about how they waited and didn’t get any cake.
Is point one true or does it vary by skill set, position, etc? Interesting point you raise (as usual) but we’re seeing more impact players hitting free agency with looking for contracts that would take them post prime.
As long as we’re talking about classifying guys as “middle tier” or “lower tier”, why are we defining the “middle tier” free agent in terms of projected contract instead of projected WAR? There’s some circular reasoning going on that chart up above, since “middle class/tier” is posed as the independent variable and “contract size” is posed as the dependent variable.
Ideally, we’d separate them out to see whether players projected for 1-2 WAR are getting more or less than the crowd predicted (you’d want to stratify by position player, starter, and reliever most likely). Then you can say something like “players who fall in between backup and starter are getting less than the crowd predicted” instead of “players who got less money got less money than the crowd predicted” which doesn’t make much sense.
Good points as usual but I’m not sure Walker unwanted to be honest.
He’s a pretty normal 2 WAR FA IMO, as are Moustakas (though close to 3) and Lucroy. They all have issues, but that is of course what typically comes with a 2 WAR FA given that FAs have generally been around the block, picked up an injury or two, etc.
As for platoon issues- I agree he has them, but he’s a switch hitter with a career RC split of 120 v R and 91 v L: hardly extreme, although his split last year maybe indicates a developing problem with lefties.
I don’t think Walker is actually suffering from a lack of a market- I think he, Arrieta, Cobb, Lucroy & Lynn are all holding out for the exact same thing: 3 or 4+ years. Certainly that is what is holding up Arrieta and Cobb signing- moreso than a dispute about AAV. It’s already been reported that Walker passed up a market value 3 year extension- it’d be surprising if that offer or something near it were not still available.
This is such a tiny sample of quality FAs remaining in this hold out- the Jeremy Hellickson reference in the article is a chuckle-worthy indication of how labored the agenda-pushing on this PR meme has become.
All eight mid-tier players with higher than expected contracts are RP. Swarzak hit the target. Only two RP were below the crowd estimate. One, Reed, claimed he had higher offers but preferred to be in the Midwest. The relative value of experienced RP has went up. The number of roster spots for RP has also increased. That leaves less space for veteran hitters that can only play one position and have to be platooned.
I’m not saying this is a big reason for the value gap but it plays at least a small role.
I don’t have the research to back this up, but I believe that squeezing the middle class is an entirely natural effect of salary caps. It happens in the NFL, the NBA, the NHL, etc… The superstar FAs always get their money, and they always want just a bit more than the prior year’s superstar FAs.
At the other end, cheap players are always cheap. So to stay under cap and pay the mega-contracts for the stars, teams employ more cheap players. If you’re a middle class guy you have to deal with (a) not getting what you think you’re worth and/or (b) not getting a job at all.
Now. Baseball does not have a hard cap, and most of the teams are not even up against the soft cap. But the big spenders are, so they’re not spending. That ripples downhill where the medium spenders don’t have to spend as much to stay competitive. They’re not capped, exactly, but they also don’t need to spend more to chase the wild card. So they don’t.
I agree with this. Part of the MLBPA’s self-inflicted problem here is not pushing for larger year-to-year increases in the luxury tax limit, as well as a salary floor to prevent full blown “tanking”. To the extent a team is below the floor, they should have to forfeit the variance in the next year’s revenue sharing back to the pool, to be allocated to their competitors who receive revenue sharing money. that is, if the floor is $60 million, and Miami spends $50 million, they forfeit $10 million from their next revenue sharing allocation back to the pool.
I also agree with other commenters here that the incremental benefit in performance from signing one of these mid-tier FAs is usually small compared to an in-house, pre-FA option and it is defensible to say that signing the FA isn’t an efficient use of funds.
Since the issue for so many FAs seems to be a demand < supply situation, the easiest way to resolve it is to increase demand. The MLBPA should be advocating for expansion to 32 teams, or roster expansion, to produce additional demand.
As for the above table, can we also see projected vs. actual years for each contract, and in total? That is another reason the $$ are so low – teams aren't willing to commit as much on the decline phase as they used to be. This has the effect of returning more of these players back to the FA pool, increasing supply.
Don’t see a salary floor ever happening without a hard salary cap. We would lose at least 1 season before a change like that happened.
That’s why the NBA caps the max contracts that the stars can sign and has a salary floor, so it “forces” teams to spend on middle-class players.
The downside though is that parity is affected when stars cant get market value. They end up choosing a big market or an already strong team, making super-teams easier to assemble then the other North American sports leagues.
Yup. No one’s really figured out a perfect solution yet. The NBA has a situation where teams often CAN’T outspend one another for particular players. MLB has a situation where teams do not operate on equal financial footing. The NFL has non-guaranteed contracts where players get tossed aside like dinner scraps. The NHL has … I don’t even know 🙂
The NHLs ‘model’ is closest to the NBA’s. Lower cap and more players on a roster however . There can be buyouts at times, but contracts are guaranteed otherwise.
Not an economonist (clearly), but wouldn’t raising the minimum salary help the middle class of free agents?
Would more teams opt for mid tier free agents if the alternative cost two million dollars instead of 700k?
I don’t know. I’m not an economonist.
that seems doubtful. would just mean more of a team’s budget would be taken up by league minimum guys on the 40 man, leaving less to spend on FAs.
That’s the income effect. There’s also the substitution effect; i.e. a $3M veteran is now relatively cheaper compared to the pre-arb guys who are now $1-2M instead of $500G-$1M.
What you’re positing is the income effect is so strong that a rising price of minimum wage talent makes teams so poor, they have to buy more of them. That’s what’s called an “inferior good”.
The classic example used was the 19th century poor, and potatoes. Economists hypothesized that the poor spend so much of their income on potatoes, that if the price went up, they’d be even poorer, and have to eat more potatoes at the expense of better food.
Only one problem. No one has ever been able to show that inferior goods exists. All empirical work shows that the substitution effect tends to dwarf the income effect.
If you raise the cost of pre-Arb players, teams are highly likely to employ fewer of them, not more.
fair enough, i’ll defer to your knowledge. but even in your example, where the minimum salary is doubled or tripled, i find it hard to believe it would move the needle substantially for preference for veteran mid-tier players, given there are so many non-monetary reasons to prefer pre-arb ones. to hit that threshold, you’d think you’d need to up the minimum salary to the point where pre-arb players are getting paid more than equivalent veteran players.
@Snapper: a few corrections
Inferior goods do exist. An inferior good is a good that, as income increases, demand decreases. Such as McDonald’s.
You reference a Giffin good, the most extreme inferior good case. These likely do not exist, though there have been cases of potential sightings. These are inferior goods for which the income effect is greater than the substitution effect.
The short answer is yes. It would also help get them money earlier in their careers. However, it also means that marginal players under team control would like be out of the league even faster instead of playing out the team control and then disappearing.
Stephen Drew from the 2014 offseason says “hi” –
Hi, Stephen Drew from the 2014 offseason
What would the free agent market look like if the luxury tax limit was set at $240MM?
My guess is not too different. Dodgers perhaps sign Walker instead of Utley (though not sure of this as Walker would have a longer deal and block their prospect). Maybe the Yankees sign Arrieta or Darvish, and the Dodgers sign Darvish.
Because those are two of the only teams with the propensity to spend and clear upgradable positions they could greatly help through FA. (Giants for example have lots of ehh positions, but haven’t shown willingness to spend beyond $200 mill).
Good piece. Longer term, you can see how the combination of devaluing the age-based “middle class” and the club’s complete control over service time is going to substantially reduce costs for the teams. Hold a prospect down for an extra few weeks, maybe option him, and you can bring him to 29 by the time he’s a free agent. Use that leverage to get him to sign a cost-controlled extension and suddenly he’s in his early 30’s. Then tell him h on the wrong side of 30, and you can sign him cheaply–probably for less than he’d get in arbitration. It’s brilliant. The problem isn’t so much that the market is undervaluing early-30’s FA. It’s that the system allows the teams to put them in that position in the first place.
That sounds diabolical, but are guys who are out-of-options and barely hanging on to a roster spot really being cheated out of big FA pay days? I don’t think anyone played option games with Walker, he’s just been a slightly-above average player his entire career and teams don’t want to give multi-year deals to those guys in their age 32 seasons. Same problem apparently with Jarrod Dyson at 33 and Carlos Gomez at 32. Why shouldn’t Walker’s contract look only slightly better than those two?
Just thinking out loud. Part of the problem begins at the beginning–the service time calculations. You need six full years of service before you hit free agency–that’s time on the 25 man roster (or DL). And he needs a bit over two years of service before arbitration. So, a basically ready for the majors, if held in the minors for just a few weeks loses a year of FA. If you are kept down a little longer, you won’t make “Super 2” and qualify for earlier arbitration–meaning 4 years at MLB minimum. It’s too tempting for teams to pass up–and especially for the most talented players. The average/middle class player may take 8 years to get there, because he’s more likely to be optioned down. I’m not suggesting that Walker or any 2WAR player get paid like a superstar. I’m saying that their competition is unfairly squeezed in pay.
No, it’s not going to substantially reduce costs for teams. It’s just going to redistribute the pie to stars, pre-arb, and arb-eligible players.
We’ve already seen this. That’s why Lindor rejects a record-breaking extension, why Correa’s agent comes out and says Correa has no intention of signing an early-career extension, and why Paul DeJong just signed a record-breaking deal.
What drives total player costs is not the service-time status of individual players; what drives player costs is total baseball revenue/net revenue of teams.
When increasing service time directly increases salary… Yes, service-time status drives total player costs.
Did you read the article? These middle class FA are losing playing time because they’re being replaced by cheaper talent. Hence, total salaries are decreasing this year. The allocation of money is changing too, more to minimum and arb players.
Lindor and Correa are generational talents. DeJong’s “record” deal is cheap – calling it ‘record-breaking’ is extremely misguiding. 6 years at $26 million… not a single FA anywhere near DeJong’s skills would sign for that AAV.
Of course not a single FA would sign DeJong’s deal under the current regime. But if you changed the rules to allow far more players to reach FA earlier (thus increasing the supply of FAs), then the price for FA players will go down – indeed, it’s only because of this restriction in the supply of FA players that FAs make the money they do.
It’s a mistaken notion (repeated ad nasuem here and elsewhere) that players, overall, will make more money if comparatively more players reach FA sooner. That just shifts the pie around, it doesn’t increase it.
I believe it would.
By removing the pool of “in their prime” players at below market costs and replacing it with “in their prime” players AT market costs, with the assumption teams want prime years, the overall spending would increase.
You’d be replacing cost-controlled assets with non-cost-controlled assets of value. Many FA now are 31+ years old and on the decline. Why should I sign a 2 WAR 2B when I could get 1 War out of my minor leaguer at 1/20th the annual cost? Replace that with a 2 WAR 25 year old 2B… Who has yet to hit his prime… a team in contention would be all over that.
No, all that would happen is that “market” cost would change for individual players (current, older FAs would be paid less, and “in their prime” players who are currently paid less would be paid more). But total player costs paid by teams doesn’t change.
The union (and the economists and labor lawyers who work for them) know this, which is why the shrill calls seen in articles (and comments) about allegedly under-“market” pay to team-controlled players is not a pressing issue to address.
You have to consider rate pay versus absolute pay.
The rate of payment, such as the widely used $/WAR, likely wouldn’t change. The projected WAR these players would produce is much greater than their 31+ year old counterparts, so more money would be spent on them.
Hosmer versus Logan Morisson is a great example. Similar skillsets, but youth allocated a hundred million+ more dollars to Hosmer.
PS Love the discussion, enjoying the thought involved. Thanks for respectable back and forth.
The rate of payment for $/WAR would absolutely go down. That’s the whole point. Put it this way, the rate for $/WAR in the FA market is way higher than the rate for $/WAR for pre-arb players (and the rate for arb-eligible players).
You can’t increase the supply of FAs (by making arb-eligible players eligible for FA earlier) without causing the market rate for $/WAR in the FA market to go down.
You can’t compare current FA to the potential future FA. It’s apples and oranges.
If you randomly flooded the FA market with tons of 2 WAR, 31 year old Medicare defense, then yes. Your entire argument fits this condition.
Adding a NEW subset of available players, while adding MORE vacant roster spots, is a completely different market than what you are hypothesizing. We can’t say what $/WAR would do, but because its a rate stat, it shouldn’t change. Economically and mathematically, you can’t argue against that. It’s fact.
Judging by the downvotes and your upvotes, other people don’t understand economics either.
I actually don’t think you understand basic economics or math, so I guess we’re even.
I agree with JD. MLBPA’s share of revenues (excluding owner innovations like MLBAM) has remained relatively constant at ~50% over the past 5-10 years. Assuming it continues to do so (and MLBPA would correct it in the next CBA if it declined), then $/WAR simply increases by the MLB’s revenue growth rate and only the distribution of money changes if players reach FA sooner. Ie, elite players like Lindor & Correa receive big $ earlier which means more Frazier/Walker/Dyson/Hellickson types have their pay compressed further or retire early/go to Japan. Writers like Travis don’t understand that MLBPA’s revenue share stays roughly constant and write more articles lamenting the lack of demand for the “middle class” after writing articles that same season about the lack of demand for the Hosmer-types. Lather, rinse, repeat.
Why do all these articles about the free agents continue to talk about the past value of these players and complain about the lack of what you call substantial offers. There are a lot of projections available that predict the future value of the players. That is what the divide is all about, that the GMs today have realized that the best value of most players is when they are younger. Walker has had a good career, probably underpaid in the PAST. That is no reason to overpay for the future. I expect that if he takes the minor league contract, with the major league price imbedded in the contract, that he will be playing in MLB with a fair income. Wake up agents!
“Our depth charts project Walker for a 2.6 WAR campaign and a 111 wRC+”
You’re arguing against a strawman
Walker? Are you serious? He can’t hit LHP, he s a crappy defender, and he has a serious injury history. I wouldn’t even invite hit to camp. He has no value except for his ability to hit RHP, and that’s just not enough. He is more than just fungible, he can be readily replaced by a much younger player who is both better and cheaper.
Pick another hill to die for, as Walker simply isn’t worth it.
I looked for players who were similar to Walker ages 29 to 31:
*+/- 10% on PA
* +/- 0.5 fWAR/600PA
*+/- 5 runs for (BsR+DEF)/600PA
… and I got 9 players where their their age 29 season was within the last 20 years. All 9 were in the Majors the next year and they averaged 1.8 fWAR.
Here are all 16 ordered by age 32 fWAR:
4.0 JD Drew
4.0 Marlon Byrd
3.5 Jose Valentin
2.1 Victor Martinez
1.7 Angel Pagan
1.4 Denard Span
1.2 David DeJesus
-0.9 Travis Fryman
-0.9 Aaron Hill
Collectively , a pretty small chance of even being a bad 1/$10M deal.
What about a two year deal? Victor Martinez missed his whole age 33 season, so lets just count him as -1 fWAR
8.8 JD Drew
7.4 Jose Valentin
5.8 Marlon Byrd
3.5 David DeJesus
2.6 Denard Span
1.1 Victor Martinez
0.9 Angel Pagan
-0.8 Aaron Hill
-2.1 Travis Fryman
…to me looks like decent odds to make a killing on a 2/$15M [or less] offer. What about three years? Since Span’s age 34 season will be 2018, using his ZiPS projection and Travis Fryman retired, so will throw in a -1 fWAR:
11.0 JD Drew
9.6 Jose Valentin
4.8 Marlon Byrd
3.8 David DeJesus
3.3 Denard Span
2.9 Angel Pagan
1.9 Victor Martinez
0.3 Aaron Hill
-3.1 Travis Fryman
Would Walker take 3/$20M or less? If so, I feel like I’d be in a pretty good position to get a bunch of surplus value from a deal like that.
“I wouldn’t even invite him to camp”
You’re on a stats site… Try looking at stats before making outrageously wrong claims.
I did. He’s one-dimensional, and he has an injury history, and you’re too blinded by his one trick (BA vs RHP) to see it.
Walker posted 2.1 WAR last year and has been remarkable steady around 2.5 his whole career. Do you realize that only 135 position players produced 2 WAR last year. You need 255 guys to fill 30 starting MLB lineups. Don’t be stupid. Your comment is informed by the old “if you ignore what player X does well, he stinks) logic, well done.
When roster spots for batters are becoming more and more scarce it makes no sense at all to sign someone who has to be part of a two-man platoon.
That’s an interesting point. As teams move to 8 man bullpens (unbelievable to anyone past 40) there’s just less room for position players, even if they have decent projected value if used in proper roles. So, shouldn’t the better question be whether the emphasis on situational relief pitching is being taken to an unhealthy extreme?
Yes and no. As a thought experiment. Lets assume Michael Conforto is back and Dominic Smith is deemed not ready to take over at first and they’d rather him get regular PAs in the minors than sit on the MLB bench and A-Gon as flamed out and cut.
The regular OF might be Cespedes-Lagares-Conforto and Jay Bruce at first with Flores as the primary 1B backup.
Bruce at first with Flores on the bench: ZiPS has then projected at 110 and 103 wRC+ respectively.
But if you choose to platoon them, then vs RHP you have Bruce [118 wRC+ 2015-2017] and Flores vs LHP [157 wRC+]. Figuring about 70% RHP, that is an aggregate 130.
And as a bonus, when the opposition brings in a LHP with Bruce up, you have Flores ready to come in and mash and then vice versa.
A platoon isn’t wasting a roster spot as much as an optimized use of roster spots.
“And as a bonus, when the opposition brings in a LHP with Bruce up, you have Flores ready to come in and mash and then vice versa.”
I suppose only the vice versa is relevant here as with Bruce starting at 1B, you can still do this when the opposing team brings in the LH RP
You’re reading too much into last year’s platoon splits. As recently as 2016 Walker OPS’d 1.001 against lefties. Career is .691. He hits righties better (don’t most switch hitters?) but he’s not useless against lefties.
What I find most interesting about these articles that compare contracts to crowdsourced estimates is that they are predicated on the foregone conclusion that the crowd has a clue (not to mention that the estimates actually reflect their collective expectations – online polling is clearly not a very reliable method).
This is most certainly an educated audience and has likely had an impact on baseball operations in one way or another. And while it was mentioned that the crowd can be wrong, not nearly enough emphasis was given. But it seems to me that using these estimates as a basis for anything beyond a Jeff Sullivan-type “Hey, this is a thing that might not actually be a thing” article is disingenuous, at best, and almost to the level of a just creating “content” for the sake of it (which is not unlikely in such a, repetitively cited, “slow” off-season).
And that’s unfortunate given that this is an important topic, especially when put in the context of the shrinking of the middle class in general (an angle I particularly liked about this article).
Is Mike Moustakas a mid-tier guy, or is he just above it? Unlike Walker, who has age, injury and perhaps some production issues, Moustakas seems like a guy who has less questions but still isn’t signed. With news out today that he might wait it out until June so that the draft pick compensation goes away, the whole situation is baffling to me. Is he not worth a draft pick or the money involved?
Fangraphs’ Middle Tier of Writers Remain stuck on Boras Talking Points.
The Travis/Craig circular-citation, Boras-talking points series is the worst content fangraphs has produced. There are 4 weeks left before opening day, and despite a historic holdout by CAA/Boras clients refusing to take market+ offers, there are only 5 remaining 2-WAR FAs unsigned (Arrieta, Moustakas, Walker, Lucroy & Cobb).
All 5 are very likely to sign shortly to market or better deals- two of these players (Arrieta & Cobb) are already known to be sitting on market+ offers but holding out for more years (ditto for the best remaining reliever Holland).
There is no story here, but the Travis/Craig series is so invested in their circular click-bate, Newsweek approach, that the end of this series is likely still a long ways off. The labored attempt to label any player making less than $13.5m+ AAV as ‘middle class’ is arbitrary – while comparing their plight (i.e. having to wait on market+ offers while holding out for more years) to the american middle class is a laughably absurd PR meme.
And in what world is Jeremy Hellickson a ‘middle class FA,’ he’s projected for 0.3 WAR by Steamer and 1.3 WAR by ZIPS, with an ERA/FIP around 5. This series is really struggling to come up with names to suit the agenda, Jeremy Hellickson is a laugher.
As Jeff Sullivan has written several times- this offseason will look normal in hindsight in terms of spend, FAs, etc., except only for the delay.
Dude, your continued attacks against Craig and Travis are getting old and tiresome.
Did you even bother to read this article? Travis presented data to show that the middle-tier of free agents are getting squeezed, signing contracts for 33% less than the crowd sourced estimate.
And your counter to that is what? The definition of middle-tier is arbitrary? So what’s your definition? Whatever it is, I guarantee it will be equally arbitrary and make no difference to the results of the analysis.
So what else do you have? That Arrieta, Moustakas, Walker, Lucroy & Cobb are likely to get paid. Except that 3 of those players would likely be classified as top-tier free agents. And Travis has already acknowledged that the top free agents are likely to get paid.
And you don’t like Jeremy Hellickson being classified as a middle class FA. Well guess what? None other then Dave Cameron had him listed as the 45th best free agent this year.
Give it a rest already. Seriously.
Agree that the attacks are old and tired. And in some cases, they are below the belt, like when he or she accused Travis and Craig of writing articles that they do not believe in. Dissenting opinions are fine, but repeating the same arguments ad nauseam is obviously serving no purpose, and a little more civility would be appreciated.
It’s not uncivil to point out disingenuous work.
Agents plant stories in the media all the time, and fangraphs has a content partnership agreement with ESPN. Jeff Sullivan explains some of this in his chat, noting that alot of the ‘offseason/collusion’ articles this year were generated by agents planting stories in the media, and some journalists simply running with those talking points.
There have been very few undermarket deals this year, and there are only 7 roughly average FAs remaining (Arrieta, Moustakas, Cobb, Walker, Lucroy, Lynn & Holland)- and there are 4 weeks left before opening day. The only notable undermarket deals are Cozart, Frazier, and that’s about it. There hasn’t been anything close to an large discount in FA – this is very obvious when viewing tables of AAV, but is being hidden in the work above by focusing on total spend (when the real change is that, given the ever-younger age curves, clubs are committing fewer years).
It is not uncivil at all to point out these errors.
What is uncivil is putting out disingenous work with no substance- consider how many articles in this series accused Tony Clark of lying and being a poor union head, arguing falsely that the player share of net revenue was not 50/50. Then the Ringer article came out – by Jeff Sullivan’s podcast partner Ben Lindbergh- and demonstrated that player share of net revenue had remained right about 50-50.
Did the authors who cited Nathaniel Grow’s flawed work (again pointed out by Ben) issue a mea cupla? Did they stop the uncivil attacks on Tony Clark? Nope- instead we get an article titled ‘Did we get free agency wrong?’ which concluded “I don’t think we got FA wrong.”
Poor content is poor content and will regularly inspire comments like “this content is poor.”
Please see, by contrast, this excellent piece by the Ringer
https://www.theringer.com/mlb/2018/2/21/17035624/mlb-revenue-sharing-owners-players-free-agency-rob-manfred
“Baseball’s Economics Are Not as Skewed [as Travis and Craig are Writing]” where Ben Lindbergh controverts the Craig/Travis series with actual facts instead of a link to the flawed amateur accounting from the defunct ‘BizofBaseball’ website.
“It’s not uncivil to point out disingenuous work.”
You’re correct. Hence why almost every commenter points out your idiotic comments.
“It is not uncivil at all to point out these errors.”
If there were errors, yes. But you have more errors in each comment than the entire articles you’re whining about.
I’m not going to waste my time on correcting your blind claims, but here’s one example of your errors: “There have been very few undermarket deals this year.” Try reading an article for once. The table in this article disproves your claim.
Please either take your lies and idiotic claims away from Fangraphs or write a post/community article with EVIDENCE that there are the supposed errors you claim there are. Should be easy, if what you say is true…
@TB25
The table in the article does not disprove the claim at all.
Market is not defined by fangraphs crowdsourcing. These types of contracts are generally overestimated by crowdsourcing by 19%. Based on AAV, as my table above shows, the current crop of signed FAs had their AAV overestimated by crowdsourcing by 24%.
There have been about 12 under market deals this season, roughly proportionate to the number of over market deals. Using actual figures makes the situation much clearer than not.
I posted this exact same thing in another thread, but I was late to the game and I see you continue to echo the ESPN content partnership as a potential source of influence on FanGraphs:
“… You appear to be misinformed about our relationship with ESPN.
We do have a content partnership with ESPN. Once a week, one of our writers works with ESPN editors to provide content to ESPN Insider. The content that appears on ESPN does not appear on FanGraphs. We used to cross-post the content provided to ESPN on FanGraphs+ only (the /plus/ blog). We have not cross-posted content from ESPN since 2015.
Our content agreement with ESPN has been in place since 2010.
ESPN has never had any editorial input on any articles that are written for FanGraphs.”
Thanks – I appreciate the point and also that online media is a changing and tricky field to monetize. This site has changed the game for good, improved fan experience, and I and many others obviously think it is great.
I have not said anything incorrect about the partnership agreement with ESPN- I’ve never said that anyone at ESPN has formal editorial input.
It goes without saying, however, that the content partnership between fangraphs and ESPN provides revenue- whether via traffic alone or otherwise. To ensure that continued relationship, fangraphs has a natural incentive to make sure the articles feature well on ESPN. If a legal blogger in the energy sector has a content partnership with Fox News that increased the blog’s revenue- it might not matter whether or not Fox had editorial input- it would still provide the blogger with incentives to provide content that fit the platform: therefore you’d expect, for example, a pro fracking stance.
In this case, the anti-Tony Clark, pro “every team needs to spend in FA,’ narrative, incorrectly denying that the players share of relevant net revenue has remained around 50%: is exactly the same stance as ESPN, CAA, and Boras are putting out. Whether this is just agent spin as Jeff Sullivan wrote, or whether it is related to the incentives to provide ESPN suitable content, is a fair question IMO.
Fangraphs has taken a Newsweek pivot with click bait, ESPN style content. Constructive criticism is a benefit.
There is no ‘attack’ on any authors. This series of articles has been downright disingenuous, and the meme that it has pushed has been repudiated by none other than Jeff Sullivan.
The narrative that the ‘middle class is shrinking’ is put forward in an arbitrary manner and without context- but most problematically, it is put forward as a ‘problem in the game’ that somehow mirrors labor issues in the US market.
The reality is that, any time the average player age gets younger, there will be less post FA players getting playing time and contracts. This is axiomatic. The PED boom created an era of ‘old players’ getting paid, and this drove the very low numbers for the ‘lower class’ in the 90s and early 00s.
The differences in Travis’s table are quite small- the players making 3.5 times the league average roughly remained the same throughout the sample. The category put forward as middle class declined only 8% in the past decade- a number that would diminish greatly if controlled for age so as to incorporate the obvious driver of this shift: the younger average age.
Further, it is disingenuous to use ‘total contract value’ to illustrate that the crowdsourcing projections are %33 short. This is not true by AAV, where the shortcoming is much closer to the typical 20%. I say this is disingenuous because the authors know that the major agent-v-team dispute this off season is about years rather that AAV. As mentioned by other posters, there is also the issue of opt-outs: those those clauses are rare enough that the increased frequency of opt out clauses only explains a small % of the shortfall. I have AAV shortfall around 24% currently by quick math, and the slight uptick in opt outs explains a % or two: so basically, no statistically significant difference from years past on crowdsourcing.
Further, crowdsourcing can be heavily influenced by $/WAR concepts published on this site- if the authors repeat 9/WAR enough, it is no surprise that nearly all the crowdsourcing comes out 9/WAR (which is roughly what happened). Fair enough though, that is roughly what the market has so far paid, though admittedly on the under side.
Another factor not being considered, IMO, is the large increase in conditional MLB salary (if called up) for players being offered minor league deals. MLB has expanded the use of minor league deals with a MLB option – and the price of these deals falls within the definition of ‘middle class.’
Further, being ranked 45th on Dave’s list does not make Jeremy Hellickson a notable FA- it only indicates how weak this class is. Steamer projects him as about replacement level.
This series of articles is a pivot away from quality, objective, informative, neutral content, and towards ESPN/538 style clickbait and big money talking points based on poor analysis.
I think Thom argues strenuously, and rightly IMO, against Travis’ and Craig’s writings because they are so invested in the “collusion” narrative and do so by ignoring what Fangraphs has taught us over the years: that FA’s are not good investment. Thus, JDM/Darvish/Hosmer haven’t signed for $100M+…collusion! The Twins/Rockies/Phillies/(random 77-win team) haven’t signed a $100M FA…collusion!
Then when JDM/Darvish/Hosmer do sign, Travis pans the Hosmer signing and then moves on to the “middle class squeeze” narrative, which Thom rightly lampoons. To make his case, Travis’ chart above uses payroll distribution by # of players instead of using a $ distribution which I’m sure would have told the story that “middle-class” FA pay is compressing because more $ are going to Elite and Middle-Class players currently on teams and because rebuilders would prefer to see what they have in their prospects or spend $ on relievers. This idea wouldn’t occur to Travis because of his investment in the “collusion” narrative. His writing over the past few months has suffered for it.
I’m curious as to which articles you read that suggest collusion. Not a single Fangraphs article nor writer directly claims collusion.
Did you mistakenly reach bleacher report thinking it was Fangraphs?
Did you read the article?
“With Yu Darvish and Eric Hosmer having finally signed for relatively handsome sums, with spring camps opening and games being played, some of the claims of collusion and talk of the direst of offseasons for the MLBPA have quieted.”
Gotta love the passive voice there. And only “some of the claims,” so I guess there are more?
Yes, I read the article. Looks like you did too, albeit incorrectly. I suggest you learn how to understand writing.
“some of the claims of collusion… have quieted” directly addresses the claims of collusions others are making and in no way implies or suggests Travis is making these claims.
Once you learn how to comprehend simple English, we can continue this. Until then, good luck.
Why even mention “collusion” in this article then?
Travis has a habit of dropping in advocacy of more spending on FA’s in all his articles. On the Souza-Drury trade, he drops in that if the MLB had the NBA’s payroll floor, that number would be $130M. What does that have to do with that trade? Of course, Travis wasn’t saying the MLBPA has an inferior deal to the NBAPA, right? He’s just throwing it in for…why?
Sheryl Ring wrote that the head of MLB, Manfred, “lied” about player share of relevant net revenue keeping pace with the growth of revenue.
Ben Lindbergh then showed, with actual MLB data, that Manfred did not lie. Ring’s article/comments were then edited.
If the Commissioner, who acts as an authorized agent for MLB teams, lies about financials- that fact alone could establish a horizontal restraint of trade effecting collusion.
So you can slice the passively worded ‘claims of collusion’ phrasing as thin as you like, at least one fangraphs author has outright said that Manfred is lying about revenue, which is a form of collusion (a coordinated horizontal restraint on trade).
Definition:
Collusion is an agreement between persons or businesses that are apparently rivals (i.e. horizontal competitors) for some illegal purpose (such as lying about financials which is fraud) such as raising prices, restricting supply, dividing markets or allocating customers.
If Manfred lied about financials, as the authorized agent of all MLB teams, and if the purpose was to enable an effort to reduce spend by MLB teams- that would be prima facie “collusion.”
This supposed MLB-wrongdoing (MLB does tons wrong, but this particular Boras talking point isn’t accurate or in good faith) is what the fangraphs “FA spend series”
has cited when arguing that the players ought to go on strike: a stance taken by at least 4 fangraphs authors.
Given that the union actually has the financials, Manfred’s “lying” to the media about his interpretation of the financials is not evidence of fraud, much less a horizontal antitrust conspiracy. The union already knows the facts, so they cannot be misled by or rely on Manfred’s supposed false statements. It’s therefore not fraud (his statements weren’t capable of being “lies” anyway – again, at best, they were statements of his interpretation of the data).
Also, Manfred is an agent/officer of MLB – not of each individual club. And one can’t conspire with oneself.
I like your comments because you question the question-begging articles here, but your statements here about evidence of a per se horizontal antitrust conspiracy don’t hold up.
Since I’ve commented on the fact that Ring doesn’t know what the heck she’s talking about when it comes to antitrust (and she doesn’t), I might as well comment on the other side as well.
@Johnny Dickshot
You are probably right, but as far as I know, public disclosures of financial information by an authorized agent, acting for horizontal competitors, are regulated by competition law.
Now MLB’s anti-trust exclusion might make my point moot, and I don’t know the CBA well enough to know which portions of standard competition law are incorporated. But generally, if someone actually “lied” to the public about financials, it could run afoul of price signaling laws. I don’t think he lied so I agree generally that there is nothing to see here.
You point about the union having the info is notable, but the union does not necessarily share information with agents or even players, and may infact be prohibited from sharing the actual financials (although the Lindbergh piece seems to undermine that idea).
Lastly, I know the NFL commish the authorized agents for the league and individual teams, I suspect the MLB commish is as well.
I wouldn’t be surprised if you are right though, but fwiw I think a Manfred lie about financials could be unlawful price signalling in certain contexts.
Your first paragraph is incorrect. If you think about it, publicly-traded companies disclose financial information all the time. Those public disclosures are regulated (think “SEC” and securities regulations) but they are not regulated in any real way by the competition laws that would be relevant in an MLB collusion action (like the Sherman/Clayton Acts).
How do you believe what you post? It’s lacking in so much evidence, you have to be blind to believe it.
1) Sheryl v. Lingbergh. There are different data sources that lead to different conclusions. If you actually cared about the topic, you’d have read her edit and read follow up articles on other sites…
2) the fact it is passive means nothing. If he claimed it, he would claim it. But he hasn’t, and no one on this site has. Not. A. Single. Article. Players and agents have, so it’d be idiotic to ignore baseball-related topics and in-industry views.
3) FA spending has followed a somewhat predictable path for more than a decade. This is the first offseason it has veered away from that path. When the share of revenue going to the actual workers decreases, most of the time people advocate for a return to increasing. Boras’ words have nothing to do with these authors’ views, beyond allowing them to write about topics to prove or disprove them.
Like I said, either leave or write an article with evidence for your opinions.
Thom, thank you for continuing to post this unpopular dissent that just happens to be the most truthful portion of these pathetic posts by these union lemmings.
“Union lemmings?” Would that be the Fangraphs writers, the FG writers and any commenters who might agree, in whole or in part, on the contents of the article? Everyone pathetic for not sharing your and Thom’s opinions in full?
Care to clarify?
Not union lemmings imo- just lazy regurgitation of Boras/CAA and ESPN talking points.
In sports media, most ‘inside sources’ or ‘sources close to a club’ are agents or other ‘go-betweens,’ who leak information in order to plant stories. The Walker articles this week are a good example- coordinated articles throughout most of the heavily visited sports websites, all repeating the exact same thing (pretending that he only has a minor league offer, which is not true). Very few GMs or players-themselves, or coaches or execs, plant stories as often as agents and other ‘representatives’ do. The lowest common denominator in sports media is ‘agent spin,’ and fangraphs has pivoted hard to that style of coverage with this series.
And the gratuitous attacks on Tony Clark are anti-labor, pro big money talking points. The big owners, big clubs, big agents, and big media would love to have a salary floor and make poor clubs pay more for mediocre talent represented by big agencies. Big money apparel companies want to keep their endorsees relevant even if ever younger age-curves are putting strain on their long-term endorsement deals. There are a lot of different interests and agendas driving these talking points, and many good-faith journalists simply regurgitate them at face value, since agents push these stories to the press. Even if a particular writer is not speaking with agents- unless they do quality analysis to discover that a popular meme is nonsense- they will end up swimming in the wake of nonsense Buster Olney memes.
I’d love it if fangraphs would stop the Boras/CAA big money talking points and legitimately brainstorm mechanisms to help improve merit-based, effective compensation in baseball- remedying the manipulation of the lowest paid staff, players, minor league players, etc. I’d love to see fangraphs run stories about how pernicious 6+ years of cost-control can be, etc.- instead we have ‘we are all Jeremy Hellickson’ articles pushing a ‘plight of the middle class’ narrative.
It’s control at the bottom which is shaking the tree more than anything else. Basically a guaranteed 7 year stretch. FOs have figured out the cost controlled 1 WAR player is worth more than the 2.5WAR veteran free agent unless the vet brings you closer to a playoff game(s). The Fangraphs piece I’m looking for is to identify, say, ten quality FA vets and match them with openings that were filled by cheaper but demonstrably inferior choices.
“…the gratuitous attacks on Tony Clark are anti-labor…”
So this means one can’t be pro-labor but feel Clark is woefully unqualified for his position?
Yes, a person cannot be pro-labor and attack Tony Clark while using anti-facts gleaned from Nathaniel Grow’s faulty work. A person can think they are pro labor and do so, but their conduct is actually anti-labor.
As Ben Lindbergh pointed out with the actual MLB data- Nathaniel’s work was flawed. He didn’t account for bonuses (a fact that was immediately pointed out to him by WilliamNYY, who was dismissed by Nathaniel).
I can think that I am pro-environment, but if I am using incorrect information that makes me think that littering with my trash is better for the environment than locking it in a landfill, then my conduct is anti-environment no matter what I think.
Your arrogance is beyond belief. Writers with whom you don’t agree lack integrity, and you’re the arbiter of what people can legitimately believe?
What are you trying to accomplish with the constant negativity? The articles keep coming, so obviously your feedback is falling on deaf ears.
lol at union lemmings. These articles don’t even understand the union’s goals and positions.
I agreed with your dissent at first as I felt it was necessary, but now you’re just continuing the same narrative while barely acknowledging the content of the particular post you’re commenting on.
It’s clear to me now that your motivation is far beyond demanding good content. I’m urged to ask you where on a doll these two authors hurt you. I can’t imagine getting this continually angry about free content. Criticism is good, but this is just out of control.
Yeah it’s interesting how he claims to not be attacking Craig or Travis but then uses words like “lazy” and “disingenuous”.
While listing “disingenuous” lies in his reasons, being “lazy” with his research. Hypocritical.
@TB25
Your phrasing directed towards me includes lies, idiot, hypocritical etc., usually with ‘I won’t even bother to point out your errors’ conclusion. That’s a bit much, and it would add more to the conversation if you would point out my errors IMO.
IMO it is either disingenuous or lazy to continually cite Nathaniel Grow’s research when commentators were regularly pointing out the flaw. It is either disingenuous or lazy to use total spend in this article when AAV paints a ‘nothing to see here’ picture. It is disingenuous or lazy for Craig to respond to Ben Lindbergh’s article with a piece entitled ‘Did We Get FA Wrong’ and concluding ‘I don’t think we got FA wrong.’ It is either disingenuous or lazy to accuse Manfred of “lies” or to say that Tony Clark and the union have failed the players generally.
You’re lazy to copy-paste the same incorrect opinions on every article of certain topics.
It’s idiotic to continue to do this with no attempt to provide sufficient evidence.
You cry about their lack of evidence while refusing to provide your own.
I and many others point out your errors. Almost every time you post your opinion like this I ask you to write an article with evidence to support your claim. Seeing as people say you’ve posted 100+ times the same opinion, you are lazy in refusal to provide the evidence you need to have a legitimate argument. Every article you claim is lazy or disingenuous provides more evidence than you have in your entire crusade against Fangraphs.
I will scan the community research section waiting for your research on the dynamics of the free agent market and the relationship between the MLBPA and MLB.
@emh1969
Sure, those words aren’t necessarily “attacks,” though I’ll concede that it’s a semantic issue and arguably they are.
I certainly don’t regard your posts critiquing my comments as ‘attacks’ even though there might be a word or two that don’t flatter my stance. Instead I think your critiques provide substance and make some decent points- maybe language like lazy is too much, disingenuous is perhaps more justified as there really aren’t too many softer terms with equivalent meaning to allow me to express the opinion that I don’t think these writers even necessarily believe what they are writing: a very typical issue in the media when talking points and agendas come to the fore.
I apologize for the redundancy, but I think you are incorrect that I’ve failed to respond to the content of the post. I did the math for the whole table in the post- detailing AAV for each player. I responded to the substance as well as I could on nearly all articles in this series. Many commentators have agreed with me, even when I’ve written that this series is the worst content IMO that I’ve seen on fangraphs.
That doesn’t excuse clumsy language or being repetitive to the point of boredom, but there is a logical dynamic that if the same tired talking points are trotted out every single article (and Travis does generally push for FA spend in every single article), it makes sense that the critiques of such redundancy will themselves be redundant.
What is sad is this person’s need to repeatedly say the same thing over and over as if it matters. Make your point and shutup, which you did about 100 posts ago. It doesnt make your argument more effective by restating it 100+ times.
Neil Walker is a classic example of why a payroll floor is needed. Why pay him $10M/yr when you can pay a pre-arb player less than $1M? Teams can use the savings to add scouts and spend their entire international pool. As many readers have pointed out, he has a long injury history. He might generate 2 WAR, but he could be on the DL by May.
Walker was in discussions for 3/40, but didn’t close the deal.
Marc Carig
Verified account
@MarcCarig
Per sources, lot of back and forth between Walker and Mets later in offseason. One of several proposals was extension in range of 3/$40m.
There is no evidence that he is lacking market value offers.
May also be that older free agents who still have value like Walker does (let’s assume 2-2.5 WAR) are going to have to be a little more opportunistic. Contending team projected for 84 wins has a black hole at 2nd, Walker represents real value to them. Could be the difference between WC or not. Non-contending team with some bucks, at the right price, you buy to sell for prospects later in the season. Going no-where with no extra dollars, not a buyer. But there’s also a systemic question for the league. I get it that teams want to maximize their profits while they tank, but just how bad a product on the field are you willing to tolerate when better performance is their for the purchase?
Tanking has NOTHING to do with profit maximization. Teams crater when their veterans jump the shark and their prospects don’t meet expectations or they’ve traded them to add veterans for a playoff chase. Thus, when you’re team is over the hill and your farm system is depleted, you tank to rebuild the farm. Tanking works because any remaining stars on bad teams are best used to acquire prospects who add wins when the team becomes good again and the higher draft picks, of course. It’s difficult for teams to collect 15+ 2+-win players simultaneously, so when you’re sure you can’t you want to push your resources into the future.
A payroll floor doesn’t stop tanking since it’s an excellent strategy, though it will get the Neil Walker’s paid to allay Travis’ and many readers’ concerns. It just causes bad teams to pay guys that they don’t intend to play. See what the Chicago Bulls are doing with Justin Holiday & Robin Lopez right now.
“Tanking has NOTHING to do with profit maximization.”
Actually, it does.
If a team is tanking, they have no intention to win. why spend $100 million to get 65 losses when $50 million can do the same, where the difference ends up staying in owners’ pockets?
It’s amazing that Fangraphs readers can only see wins in the current year and not consider how can a team maximize wins over the next 3-5 years so they may, you know, make the playoffs. This is a team’s PRIMARY consideration: how do we get to the playoffs which is also where I MAXIMIZE PROFIT because I now sell 2.5M tickets and my TV ratings go up. This means I marshall my resources to when I’m in a playoff-ready mode.
Maybe I overstated NOTHING. It is pretty dumb to spend $100M on a 65-win team, though again readers here think it’s bad somehow if that payroll is cut in half to accomplish the same while adding prospects for the future.
Tanking is trying not to win. There is, of course, no evidence or logic to suggest that losing maximizes profits.
Limiting payroll, however, obviously does increase profits if done efficiency. Fangraphs has done tons of excellent work on the ‘actual value of a marginal win’ (note: not market value, actual value). Dave Cameron’s most recent work on the topic suggests that a marginal win is worth $2-3 to bad teams, rising to $6.5m for teams positioned to compete. If a team can acquire an added marginal win for less than the ‘actual value’ of that win: then profit maximization requires that team to add that marginal win.
For example, if the WhiteSox can are at a point on the win curve where an added win is worth (actual) $2.8m, and if they can acquire a 1 WAR player for $2.7m: profit maximization requires the WhiteSox to add that player. If, however, the 1 WAR player costs $9m, then profit maximization would require the WhiteSox to avoid that acquisition.
Profit maximization, by definition, requires companies to avoid inefficient spending. But winning and success generally also requires companies to avoid inefficient spending. Therefore, merely observing company cutting overhead and avoiding inefficient spending does not prove a profit maximization strategy.
I do not doubt for a second that MLB teams engage in a large amount of anti-competitive, anti-labor, anti-fan behavior that is driven solely by profit maximization. It is harder to argue, IMO, that recent tank jobs are a prime example, save maybe with Loria (and even that is a bit tricky due to lack of access to the relevant data).
MLB owners largely profit from TV money, stadium deals and accounting tricks (all leading to valuation inflation)- none of which are really driven by low payrolls, and all of which are sometimes inconsistent with low payrolls.
A payroll floor will only cause 2-3 teams each year to buy players out of no trade clauses, opt outs, or other player-friendly ‘non monetary’ benefits.
If that doesn’t work, 2-3 clubs near or below the floor will simply take on some bad contracts so as to acquire a prospect or two.
You cannot force team to shift future wins into the present via a salary floor.
I really think we need to see expansion. There seems to be more than enough talent for 2 more teams. Maybe not top end talent, but average talent
Whether or not that would be economically viable, I dunno. (Probably the best thing would be to put another team in NYC and LA but that won’t happen)
Here is the above table by AAV:
Rank—Player–Crowd–Actual–Difference
12_CC Sabathia__$13.1__ $10.0__($3.1)
13_Todd Frazier__$14.4__$8.5__($5.9)
14_Jay Bruce__$13.0__$13.6__+$0.6
16_Brandon Morrow__$8.2__$10.5__+$2.3
19_Addison Reed__$9.2__$8.4__($0.8)
20_Jarrod Dyson__$8.8__$4.0__($4.8)
21_Eduardo Nunez__$11.2__$6.0__($5.2)
24_Bryan Shaw__$7.7__$9.0__+$1.3
25_Logan Morrison__$10.8__$6.5__($4.3)
26_Joe Smith__$6.5__$7.5__+$1.0
27_Anthony Swarzak__$6.9__$7.0__$0.1
28_Jaime Garcia__$12.4__$10.0__($2.4)
29_Yonder Alonso__$9.9__$8.0__($1.9)
30_Jason Vargas__$10.3__$8.0__($2.3)
31_Juan Nicasio__$7.5__$8.5__+$1.0
32_Pat Neshek__$8.1__$8.1__$0.0
34_Carlos Gomez__$11.9__$4.0__($7.9)
35_Andrew Cashner__$10.4 __$8.0__($2.4)
36_Tony Watson__$5.9__$3.5__($2.4)
37_Michael Pineda__$8.9__$5.0__($3.9)
38_Jake McGee__$8.7__$9.0__+$0.3
39_Tommy Hunter__$6.4__$9.0__+$2.6
40_Steve Cishek__$6.4__$6.5__+$0.1
41_Jhoulys Chacin__$10.0__$7.8__($2.3)
42_Lucas Duda__$9.0__$3.5__($6.5)
43_Alex Avila__$8.2__$4.1__($4.1)
44_Cameron Maybin_$8.2__$3.5__($4.7)
46_Howie Kendrick__$8.7__$3.5__($5.2)
47_Brandon Kintzler_$6.6__$5.0__($1.6)
48_Welington Castillo__$9.9__$7.5__($2.4)
49_Doug Fister__$7.5__$4.0 __($3.5)
50_Jon Jay__$8.1__$3.0__($5.1) (75.4/32)
Totals_____$292.8__$220.5 ____$72.3
220.5/292.8= 0.76
So that’s a 24% shortfall from average crowdsourced estimates- not far removed from the 19% that is typical. This is especially true because of an increased usage of incentives and signing bonuses, as well as the increased number of conditional MLB/minor league deals that pay $1.5m upon promotion to the MLB roster.
It would be pretty surprising if anyone calculating this data failed to notice that by AAV, the shortfall was fairly typical (though a bit more than usual). But it fits the talking points to use total spend instead, masking the fact that players gave up less years of commitment.
I don’t care for FanGraph’s recent pro-Left/pro-union/anti-business slant at all. It’s dogmatic, it often reads like Scott Boras’ talking points, and it’s not fair to the teams or MLB.
But most of all, it’s not entertaining. Give us analysis and commentary about baseball, not social justice.
Thank you.
Sounds to me like the market inefficiency to exploit in 2019 or 2020 is going to be the declining value of middle class free agents. Just like we are now seeing relief pitchers getting paid, in a year or two middle class free agents should be all the rage. As we have discussed here, the Astros and Cubs tear down and rebuild cannot be successful if a substantial number of teams attempt it simultaneously, not all teams will be able to be successful with a Stars & Pre-Arbs approach if ‘everyone’ is doing it. Not enough stars will be available, not enough pre-arbs will be good enough.
Its looking like the median salary end of season is notbmuch greater than the minimum. You would think the lower-middle class by their sheer numbers would have more influence in MLBPA.
Former MLBPA counsel Orza was mentioned MLBPA giving up arbitration for players heading into their 3rd year rather than an extended strike and the collusion that followed in the aftermath in 1986
As to possible solutions for FA players it paradoxically includes making younger players more expensive, and getting them to FA earlier.
My recommendations are
Players become free agents no later than after their age 28 season regardless of service time (earlier still permitted underncurrent rules). In return , contracts to players after players age 34 season are no longer guaranteed with a 10% buy out.
Expand rosters to 28 players or get MLB to increase the number of teams to 34
Increase LT threshold and have increases pegged to MLB revenue growth
Increase pre arb minimum so that they top 20 – 2nd year players make 50% more than first year players and the top 30 – 3rd year players make 50% more than the top 20 2nd year players. Have the minimum salary pegged to MLb revenue growth
End the tax on teams who sign FA players who have refused the QO
Double 40 man roster Minor league salaries
In return, MLBPA agrees to allow teams to buy out guaranteed contracts at 50% should performance decline to replacement level for 2 consecutive without an injury being the principle reason. The algorithm to decide this will be determined and agreed. A 3 member medical arbitration panel will decide any disputes
MLBPA will also agree to contracts where incentives may be based on on field performance and not just awards and PA/IP
MLBPA will also take upon itself to insure on behalf of teams all FA contracts against injury. Since they insure the group as a whole their premiums will be lower. MLB will pay half the cost of insurance to MLBPA
Protecting teams from bad contracts leaves more money for new FA and younger players
Then on competition.
Teams who fail to achieve a 500 record for 5 consecutive years forfeit revenue sharing dollars for 3 years.
Simple. Of course, they have to be willing to strike and best start building that fund to tide them over.
“Its looking like the median salary end of season is notbmuch greater than the minimum.”
That might be the initial appearance from the data, but I went to Travis’ source data at USA Today and the median salary of the listed players for 2015 was $1.6 million, so a bit over three times the minimum that year ($507,500). The average salary was $4.1 million. That’s for what’s listed as 821 players on Opening Day rosters. (I assume the difference versus a theoretical 750 players on Opening Day rosters is players on the disabled list, and perhaps picking up released players with guaranteed contracts or minor league players over some threshold).
For 1995, the median salary was $290,000 and the average salary was $1.1 million for 805 listed players. The minimum that year was $109,000. Since the Diamondbacks and Rays weren’t yet playing back in 1995, that’s actually a somewhat deeper list of players relative to the theoretical total of 700 players for 28 Opening Day rosters.
I think that Travis’ buckets, particularly the final “minimum salary plus 10%” one, have quirks to the methodology that heavily overstate how much MLB’s relative salary structure has actually changed. I think it goes back to the tendency of teams to give some modest dollar amount raises over the minimum to pre-arb players, as I lay out in more detail in a comment below.
There’s probably a point here about difficulties for a certain type of veteran position player, due to both current roster construction (big bullpens) and aging curves.
A fair amount of this apparent change shown in the chart, however, appears to be due to a quirk in Travis’ methodology of defining “within 10% of the league minimum” as a near minimum salary. In short, it appears that a lot of MLB salaries have ended up as fixed DOLLAR amounts above the league minimum and not fixed PERCENTAGES, even as the minimum has increased. I think, though I’m not certain, that it’s tied to a tendency of how teams give raises to pre-arb players with more than 1 year of service time.
Here’s the underlying distribution of it.
In 1995, the MLB minimum salary was $109k. The USA Today opening day payroll database cited by Travis shows a total of 805 players. Of these players, 107 (13.3%) made exactly the MLB minimum salary. Only 41 (5.1%) made more than the minimum but no more than 110% of the minimum ($119,900). Going up to $150k picks up another 102 players (12.7%) getting us to a total of 31.1% of players. I would be surprised if those are all pre-arb players – we’re probably getting into some lower tier free agents and arb year players – but the players at $150k for 1995 include pre-arb names at the time such as Manny Ramirez, Javy Lopez, Tim Worrell, and Jerry DiPoto.
In 2015, the MLB minimum salary was $507,500. Adding 10% to that – which goes up to $558,250 – now appears to pick up a lot of these pre-arb players who teams were bumping up to amounts somewhere between $20k and $50k above the minimum salary.
We therefore really ought to look at these buckets in terms of service time. I would like to do so, but the USA Today database doesn’t include service time, and I unfortunately don’t know how to add that information other than an overly time-consuming player-by-player estimate.
There may well be some real shift that Travis is picking up in his numbers, but a lot of it simply appears to be that a team giving a $20k to $50k raise above the minimum salary prior to arb years was more than 10% of the minimum salary in 1995 but is well less than 10% of the minimum salary in 2015.