Carlos Correa Gets His Mega-Deal in San Francisco
The Giants made a giant splash on Tuesday night, signing the top free agent remaining, Carlos Correa, to a 13-year contract worth $350 million. One of the biggest free agents last year as well, he took a three-year deal with the Twins worth $105.3 million, but with an opt-out clause that allowed him to hit the open market if a second crack at it seemed like a good idea. After a .291/.366/.467, 140 wRC+, 4.4 WAR season in Minnesota, and an offseason with more owners more willing to make it rain than any year in recent memory, Correa took his shot. It was a well-aimed one.
BREAKING: Shortstop Carlos Correa and the San Francisco Giants are in agreement on a 13-year, $350 million contract, a source familiar with the deal tells ESPN.
— Jeff Passan (@JeffPassan) December 14, 2022
After Trea Turner got an 11-year, $300 million deal with the Phillies, and Xander Bogaerts landed $280 million from the Padres, it shouldn’t come as a surprise to see Correa comfortably clear the $300 million mark. While he didn’t have the best season of these three shortstops, he’s two years younger than Bogaerts and has a longer track record of success than the remaining elite shortstop, Dansby Swanson (and is a tiny bit younger). As I feel with the Turner or Bogaerts signing, this isn’t really a 13-year deal in a meaningful sense, and while the Giants will undoubtedly be overjoyed if Correa is still a star in 2035, that’s a long time from now. Spreading it out over 13 seasons allows his pre-benefit luxury tax number to be just under $27 million a year, something which seems like an unbelievable bargain right now. It’s technically a 25% pay cut from 2022!
| Year | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SO | SB | OPS+ | DR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | .277 | .356 | .462 | 520 | 77 | 144 | 28 | 1 | 22 | 74 | 63 | 114 | 0 | 124 | 7 | 5.4 |
| 2024 | .273 | .354 | .454 | 531 | 77 | 145 | 28 | 1 | 22 | 75 | 65 | 115 | 0 | 122 | 7 | 5.3 |
| 2025 | .271 | .353 | .453 | 528 | 77 | 143 | 28 | 1 | 22 | 73 | 66 | 114 | 0 | 121 | 7 | 5.2 |
| 2026 | .265 | .347 | .442 | 520 | 74 | 138 | 27 | 1 | 21 | 70 | 64 | 111 | 0 | 117 | 6 | 4.7 |
| 2027 | .259 | .342 | .426 | 502 | 69 | 130 | 25 | 1 | 19 | 65 | 62 | 108 | 0 | 111 | 5 | 4.1 |
| 2028 | .256 | .338 | .416 | 481 | 64 | 123 | 24 | 1 | 17 | 60 | 59 | 104 | 0 | 107 | 4 | 3.6 |
| 2029 | .251 | .333 | .402 | 455 | 58 | 114 | 22 | 1 | 15 | 56 | 55 | 99 | 0 | 102 | 3 | 3.0 |
| 2030 | .252 | .333 | .404 | 421 | 54 | 106 | 20 | 1 | 14 | 51 | 50 | 92 | 0 | 103 | 2 | 2.7 |
| 2031 | .249 | .331 | .394 | 421 | 52 | 105 | 20 | 1 | 13 | 49 | 50 | 93 | 0 | 100 | 1 | 2.5 |
| 2032 | .247 | .328 | .385 | 384 | 46 | 95 | 18 | 1 | 11 | 44 | 45 | 86 | 0 | 97 | 0 | 2.0 |
| 2033 | .241 | .320 | .372 | 352 | 41 | 85 | 16 | 0 | 10 | 39 | 40 | 80 | 0 | 91 | -1 | 1.4 |
| 2034 | .238 | .315 | .359 | 315 | 35 | 75 | 14 | 0 | 8 | 33 | 35 | 72 | 0 | 86 | -2 | 1.0 |
| 2035 | .239 | .316 | .360 | 272 | 30 | 65 | 12 | 0 | 7 | 28 | 30 | 63 | 0 | 87 | -2 | 0.8 |
| Percentile | 2B | HR | BA | OBP | SLG | OPS+ | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 95% | 40 | 34 | .324 | .409 | .569 | 160 | 8.0 |
| 90% | 38 | 30 | .313 | .392 | .541 | 152 | 7.4 |
| 80% | 34 | 27 | .303 | .381 | .516 | 142 | 6.7 |
| 70% | 32 | 25 | .292 | .372 | .496 | 137 | 6.3 |
| 60% | 30 | 24 | .285 | .363 | .476 | 130 | 5.8 |
| 50% | 28 | 22 | .277 | .356 | .462 | 124 | 5.4 |
| 40% | 27 | 20 | .269 | .348 | .447 | 118 | 5.0 |
| 30% | 25 | 19 | .259 | .341 | .434 | 111 | 4.4 |
| 20% | 24 | 17 | .251 | .329 | .416 | 106 | 4.1 |
| 10% | 21 | 15 | .237 | .317 | .396 | 96 | 3.3 |
| 5% | 20 | 13 | .221 | .304 | .374 | 90 | 2.7 |
Over 13 years, ZiPS actually guessed slightly less on this one, a departure from the big contracts signed this fall. ZiPS has seen enough in recent years to move to a piecewise function, valuing the first win at $5.26 million and subsequent wins at $9.33 million and a 3% yearly boost in both of those numbers. The percentage boost may seem miserly, but MLB’s salary growth has been short of inflation for a while and certainly way behind revenue growth, and helped by COVID, the average salary increased by only $70,000 between 2017 and 2021. MLB’s competitive tax threshold will remain a significant pain point, as will each number that puts a team into the next “tax bracket.” That first threshold barely budges over the life of the new CBA, only increasing 1.5% a year, from $230 million to $244 million.
In all, ZiPS projected a $382 million deal for Correa with the Giants, with $350 million getting you almost through the end of the 10th season of the contract (2032). The Twins apparently offered him a 10-year, $285 million agreement prior to his signing with the Giants; if Correa had an impeccable sense of timing, they displayed a rather poor one. Essentially, Minnesota was fighting the last war rather than the current one, offering a 2022 contract in 2023. Entering the 2022 season, the ZiPS projection for Correa with the Twins for 2023–32 amounted to $278.7 million.
How big a deal is Correa entering free agency at 28 rather than 30? A pretty big one. Below are the ZiPS projections for if I change his 2023 age.
| Age | Expected Deal ($M) |
|---|---|
| 25 | 470.6 |
| 26 | 441.5 |
| 27 | 419.9 |
| 28 | 381.6 |
| 29 | 328.9 |
| 30 | 282.9 |
| 31 | 244.0 |
| 32 | 216.8 |
Yes, Correa hit the market a year older, but he also entered it with an additional essentially healthy season added to his résumé. During his age 22–24 seasons, a series of injuries resulted in him only being able to play in 294 out of a possible 486 games. For a player that young, it was an extremely concerning development. But he played in almost every game in the pandemic-shortened 2020 season and 148 games in 2021. He missed a handful more games in 2022, but these maladies were more of the freak variety: an injured finger from a ball hitting his hand twice in a May game against the Orioles, and a stay on the COVID-19 list.
The cumulative missed time had an obvious effect on his long-term projections, and after ranking second in projected rest-of-career WAR in ZiPS before 2017, he slipped out of the top 20 before the 2020 season. Correa now has a mean projection of 42.4 career WAR remaining. With it looking increasingly likely that Fernando Tatis Jr.’s days a shortstop are mostly over, that’s enough to give him a projection of the best eventual career WAR of any active shortstop, slightly edging out the Mets’ Francisco Lindor.
The Giants have been active in free agency this winter, signing Mitch Haniger, Sean Manaea, Joc Pederson, and Ross Stripling already. However, while all of these players can contribute a lot in an NL West race, none can reasonably claim the mantle of a star, let alone that of a franchise-leading talent. San Francisco previously tried to burn down the NL West with an Aaron Judge signing, but the Yankees swept in to keep their franchise slugger. Truth be told, I think Correa’s a better fit for the Giants. They arguably need a shortstop more than a star corner outfielder, and Oracle Park is noted for its cruelty to power hitters of all stripes. While Correa hits for power, too, he’s more of the gap-to-gap type than pure loft. I’m slightly bearish on the projected home run totals for Correa, but I think he’ll hit more doubles and triples into Triples Alley in deep right-center than ZiPS envisions.
There’s unlikely to be any position controversy, even with Brandon Crawford signed for another season. While I wouldn’t anoint Crawford the best shortstop in Giants history — that plaudit better fits Travis Jackson or George Davis — he’s almost certainly the most valuable one for the franchise since Horace Stoneham hired the moving trucks in 1958. But Crawdaddy turns 36 next month and came back down to Earth after a fantastic 2021 season. Even more importantly, he’s in a contract year, and when Correa finishes his time in San Francisco, Crawford will probably have been retired for a decade. He’s still a fine defensive shortstop and ought to be a compelling replacement at third base over Evan Longoria and Wilmer Flores.
Losing Correa no doubt has to be disappointing for the Twins, but if they were willing to spend $285 million on him, there are other players out there. $285 million might land you Swanson and Carlos Rodón, and if not, at least the vast majority of their salaries. The AL Central is up for grabs, and that kind of investment may make a bigger difference there than any other division in baseball. It would be a shame if the Twins simply put that cash back in their pockets.
After seeing 36 wins evaporate from 2021 to 2022 and with the Dodgers and Padres looking like first-tier contenders, the Giants had a choice either to go big or to accept their lot as NL West underdogs. They went big, giving out the largest payday, by far, in team history. While the Giants have given out big extensions before, they only signed a single free agent to a $100 million dollar contract between Barry Zito and now (Johnny Cueto). The NL West just got a lot more exciting.
Dan Szymborski is a senior writer for FanGraphs and the developer of the ZiPS projection system. He was a writer for ESPN.com from 2010-2018, a regular guest on a number of radio shows and podcasts, and a voting BBWAA member. He also maintains a terrible Twitter account at @DSzymborski.
Thank you Dan, very cool!
Thank you Cave, very cool!
This adds nothing to the conversation
Thank you FunFella, very cool!
You’re supposed to be the fun one here. We all have our roles to play.
I think FunFella might be one of those opposite nicknames, like when you call the 400 pound guy “Tiny.”
Does this mean the Giants have dropped out of the bidding for Rodon? Aren’t they unlikely to shell out for Rodon on top of this deal for Correa?
That is my assumption, but I don’t think we can really say for certain until he signs somewhere else.
I think the Manaea and Stripling moves close the door on that more than Correa, the rotation is full with Kyle Harrison likely to get a shot at some point
The real reason they would want Rodon is for 2024; he’d thrive in a 6-man rotation if they land Ohtani, who I think is who they’re keeping an eye on. But of course, spending on all of Rodon, Correa, and Ohtani is going to be tough.
Have seen some rumors that Ohtani is open to pitching in a 5 man rotation.
The AAV may turn out to be a great value over the first 4 years, but I continue to be astonished at the duration of these megadeals. For elite players, will committing to them into the age 40 season (and beyond) become the the new norm?
I have said before that players must play to have value. I would like to reiterate that here. Correa is certainly a great player, when he plays. However, he has played in 150+ games just once in his career. It is hard to envision him not being injured for a substantial portion of the scheduled games over the next 13 years, which takes us through his entire 30s, all the way to age 41.
This is an astonishing contract.
Teams giving out long term contracts is like you buying a car through financing. Imagine you buy a $50K car financed for 5 years (lets assume no interest rate for simplicity sake). First year you have a new car for $10K and by year 5 you get a 5-yr used car for… still $10K. But you do it because it’s hard to pay $50K up front.
More like a mortgage, IMO. By the time we get anywhere near the end of this deal I expect that payrolls league wide will have ballooned such that $27M/yr isn’t as much of an overpay for an aging slugger as we feel it to be today.
Or converting salary into a signing bonus in the NFL.
I used car example because property value can rise over time even if the house itself obviously becomes crappier. Whereas a car (similar to a player career) has clear expiration date. It’s obviously not a perfect comparison but then not much in our everyday lives that compares to someone getting a $350million guaranteed contract
A 5-year financing deal on a new car makes sense, since you expect it to still be in decent shape in 5 years with the only additional costs over that time being the occasional standard maintenance.
It makes much less sense to finance an 8-year-old used car for 13 years.
never finance your new car for 5 years…on top of that, never buy a “new” car
I think your used car analogy fails for the reason you say it succeeds. The player will obviously become less valuable (relative to replacement level) as he ages…but his value in dollar terms is likely to increase, especially in an inflationary environment and with league revenue continuing to skyrocket even more.
Actually maybe the used car market analogy does work, if you look at the last 2 years. So many people who took out leases coming out way ahead when they exercise the purchase option because the residual values per contract were wildly lower than what the market actually was doing. So, if you think that kind of macro environment is coming, you extend your financing duration out as far as you can and/or lease.
TL;DR: In addition to the CBA and other baseball-specific considerations, I think larger macro considerations as well as surging revenue growth are a major factor.
They’re essentially deferring the money to a later time when it is worth less (not worthless), but by going this route they get the CBT advantages of a lower AAV. Teams had started doing this over the last two years, but now we’re seeing the crescendo for the approach. I don’t know if it’s better to give a guy 10/$300M or 13/$350M, but they’re closer than a quick glance would lead you to believe.
The economic rules of baseball are much different right now than when Pujols got his deal. The use of flat AAV for contract valuation for CBT purposes basically requires these long, long term deals for in-their-prime stars.
Higher inflation in the last year makes it somewhat more likely that teams will try this approach; many people are subject to money illusion, especially when there hasn’t been inflation for a while. (I don’t think that any of these contracts have an inflation adjustment.)
I think you could also argue that it implies that the owners believe that even if the RSNs implode with falling cable subscriptions, MLB revenues will still be fine. At the very least, it makes sense to do if franchise values keep going up; it’s sort of like using the equity value in a home.
It’s not the same situation as NFL contracts, because all MLB (but not MiLB) contracts are guaranteed. So it’s not a pure salary cap / bonus manipulation where the back end years are totally fake, but rather pushing some money out to the future.
In lieu of these deals I find this anonymous quote from someone with absolutely zero credibility so funny:
https://nypost.com/2022/12/09/padres-were-considering-400m-deal-for-aaron-judge/
This creates two scenarios: 1) this person is correct, which means the league plays favorites on trades, choosing when and where to threaten nullification then defending with weak points that lack precedent, or 2) he’s full of it. If scenario 1, that would seem like league over-reach promoting the interests of a marquee club over another with lower revenue-generation capability. Luckily, I don’t think we have to worry about it at this point.
Or, 3- The league offices are not stupid and can see a 44 yesr old Judge is unlikely to be still playing while a 41 year old Correa may be. (Look at the zips chart.)
Both deals are effectively deferring money but SF can pretend to be optimistic while SD has no such fig leaf. The league might be willing to tolerate some fun-and-games but there are limits.
Somewhere, Bobby Bonilla looks up from his newspaper and smiles, satisfied
Actually, Bonilla has company.
From the Orioles alone:
– Chris Davis will $9.16 million per year from 2023 to 2025, followed by payments of $3.5 million in the next seven years. From 2033 to 2037, Davis will make $1.4 million a season.
– Alex Cobb will be getting $1.8 million per year from 2023 to 2032.
And not too far away, Washington has a whole list of deferred checks lined up. And other teams have their own “pensioners” queued up.
“Look at the ZiPS chart…”
You, Sir, are drinking the kool-aid if you believe looking into a crystal ball 13 years out on a MLB players value has value.
ZiPS and Steamer are valuable tools for predicting the upcoming season, but they have close to a 0% chance of being correct much sooner than 13-years out.
Even the architects of these wonderful tools would say as much.
Note that I said “may be”, not “will be”.
Also, Zips is a statistical/probabilistic tool, not a crystal ball; it is a good divider from what has a chance (however faint) and what has the proverbial snowball’s chance.
And what ZIPS says is Correa has a non-zero chance to be a useful *part-time* player at 41.
On the flip side, few position players have been useful at 44. Dave Winfield was the closest at 43, for half a season. The biggest exception was Julio Franco and his record has…concerns.
Again: both SF and SD contracts are attempts to game the system but SD went too far.
Wait, what’s with Julio Franco? I don’t remember hearing his name in the steroids stuff.
Andy Van Slyke floated the idea in 2004.
https://www.chattanoogan.com/2004/3/4/47575/Braves–Julio-Franco-Responds-To.aspx
Julio Franco never played more than 125 games in a season after he turned 35. While everyone in the steroid era deserves some suspicion, Julio is also a health nut.
If you google “Julio Franco nutrition”, the first hit is “Breakfast at Julio’s”:
Julio Franco was doing the same sorta workout and nutritional stuff back then that Tom Brady is doing today.
None of the deals that haven’t been nullified took players even close to age 44. There has to be a line. Maybe 44 is too aggressive? But there have been fewer than 10 position players that played a meaningful amount age 44 and above since 1900.
I think MLB, or even individual teams, would be wise to explore streaming platforms.
You don’t want to have an MLB ot subscription for local teams because then you’re only capturing your most loyal audience and its hard to expand.
“Pirates on Peacock now for just $5/month if you sign up with the promo code PIT”
“Dodgers on Disney+”
Etc etc. WWE is probably a good study for how to do this. They had their own network and did okay, but interest, especially globally improved when they sold their library and events rights to Peacock.
Well, the MLB blacking out local markets sure doesn’t help.
It’s not MLB that insists on the blackout rules; it’s the RSNs and the distributors.
MLB’s own streaming platform – MLB.TV – won’t let me watch Brewer games from their home market.
What I find interesting about these rest-of-career deals is that they’re inverting the paradigm once again.
Pre-free agency, and even into the 1980’s, stars would spend nearly their entire career with one team.
The 1990’s onward brought about the mercenary free agents who’d sign for three- or four-year deals and switch teams three times a decade.
And now we’re in a weird almost-full circle, where guys are looking to land in one place for the rest of their careers; it just doesn’t often happen where they got their start now.
Thanks Dan! Love to hear what ZiPS thinks of each and every contract. Only area where I disagree here: If Correa steps up to the plate more than 2500 times over the next 5 years I will eat a shoe.
I’ll hold you to it.
In a directly-related point, I’d add that Correa has exactly *one* season with >5 fwar in his eight-year career.
Zips is expecting him to rack up three in a row from here.
It’s also expecting 4 consecutive seasons with 550 PA, when he’s only managed consecutive seasons of 500 once in his career.
You’ll need a strong blender for that smoothie.
If I’m not mistaken, all three super-elite shortstops (sorry, Dansby Swanson) signed deals that average approximately $27M per year and run up until exactly age 40. Bogaerts is a little bit less per year and Turner is a little bit more, but it’s crazy to see almost this exact result repeat itself.
Normally I don’t think that there is an obvious “market value” for elite players, simply because there aren’t enough of them and enough demand to show it. But these all wound up in the same place. It’s remarkable; no shortstop got a single deal that I would say is markedly better than the others. It’s all explained.
Which is kind of nuts, given that Turner’s a lot better than Correa.
I mean, he’s better right now. I don’t think “a lot better” is correct, though.
He’s been at least 0.4 WAR better in each of the last 5 seasons, and he’s been 6 WAR better overall.
Part of that has been the fact Correa can’t stay on the field…but having spent your early 20s as an oversized guy who can’t stay on the field isn’t a great indicator for durability in your 30s.
See: Stanton, Giancarlo.
FA contracts are forward looking.
Odds are that by the time these contracts are played out, Correa will have accrued a big mor WAR.
Age matters.
A bit more WAR.
(Stupid auto-corruption system.)
…assuming, as ZIPS does, that he’s dramatically more healthy in his late-20s and 30s than he was in his early and mid-20s.
I just don’t see it with his body type, at a position like shortstop…especially when his health to this point has been more Stanton than Judge.
Depends on your system, DRS is a big fan of Correa and has him ahead about 5 wins over the last 6 years.
DRS is prone to huge swings, and I prefer the way that FG just uses Tango’s range metric rather than trying to invent its own with the same data and much, much, much fewer resources.
I think we can all safely assume who the respective DHs will be for the Phillies, Yankees, and Giants 10 years from now…
Judge signs a one year extension?
Jason Giambi comes out of retirement.
I think it’s more likely that most of them will be hurt enough that they won’t get in the game much. So I think Trea Turner is more likely to wind up as the backup at 2B and SS than at DH, for example.
That’s what ZIPS numbers imply: adequate while playing but limited availability.
All that said, I have to be honest–these deals are all pretty scary, and so evaluating how good a deal they are for teams is tricky. There are good reasons to think that absolutely none of these guys are going to be any good starting around age 34. Bogaerts will be, at best, an offense-first second baseman in the Neil Walker mold, and at worst he’ll be a guy with an above average bat but who is pretty low on the defensive spectrum. Turner’s speed will go at some point, and the number of guys who rely this heavily on their speed aging well into their mid-30s is pretty small. Correa has not been especially durable, something that will only get worse as he gets older. His defense was also iffy last year, so it’s possible he’s going to be a third baseman pretty soon.
So then it comes down to: How many star-level quality years can they expect, versus how much they’re paying on the back-end to subsidize the front of the deal? Per ZiPS:
1) Correa projects for 15.9 WAR in the first 3 years of the deal; 8.8 in years 4 and 5; 7.6 in years 6 and 7; 5.2 in years 8 and 9; and then he’ll be too injured or ineffective to break 2 wins in years 10-13.
2) Bogaerts projects for 13.5 WAR in the first 3 years of the deal, so at the same rate or so as years 4 and 5 for Correa; 7.1 wins in years 4 and 5 (a little lower than what Correa is projected for in years 3 and 4, but not much); 4.9 wins in years 6 and 7; and then being too injured or ineffective to matter much in years 8-11
3) Trea Turner projects for 11.5 wins in years 1-2 of the deal, so a higher rate than Correa at the beginning too; but then 4.6 wins in year 3 (roughly equivalent to the beginning of Bogaert’s deal and the second phase of Correa’s); 3.8 wins in year 4, (roughly the same as the third phase of Correa’s deal and the second of Bogaerts); 5.3 in years 5 and 6 (similar to the fourth phase of Correa and third for Bogaerts); and then him being too injured or ineffective to matter much for years (7-11).
From this perspective, Correa and Turner match up as complementary–Correa has fewer “dead years” at the end than Turner despite it being a much longer deal, and will stay a star for longer. Turner is a bigger star right now but will give that up almost immediately, with an extra “dead year” at the end. Bogaerts is the one who looks a bit out of place, which accords with my prior that he’s just not as good as Correa or Turner. Bogaerts is only a star for 3 years, compared to 5 for Correa, with a higher level for Correa that is in Bogaerts’ rear view mirror, but they have the same number of “dead years” at the end.
I’m a little leery about all the deals because it’s a lot of money for guys who derive a lot of their value from playing shortstop, a skill that I’m not sure ages well. And ultimately I think that health and long-term competence at shortstop will probably be the biggest determining factor for these guys. But if I had to pick right now, I’d say I’d want Correa as my first choice, Turner as my second, and Bogaerts as my third.
These deals are ALL insane from a business perspective. I’d put Turner first because I think he’ll put up the most predictable, lowest-variation output over the next 3 years during which Philly has to maximize their chances of winning a title based on the Harper and Wheeler contracts.
The Correa deal only makes sense if you are a Carlos Correa away from being a top-3 team in the NL. The Dodgers are not, unless they are planning on signing Rodon and other parts.
And the Bogaerts deal still doesn’t make sense in terms of where these different players are going to actually play.
I’d also submit that it’s really, really bad for baseball overall that the coastal teams are loading up on these star players and the Central teams cannot even come close to competing on payroll. There are such differences between the typical “coastal” owner and the typical “Central” owner. Attendance and gate receipts simply don’t move the needle when you’re talking about moving your payroll from the $100M-$150M range to $250M+/year.
(At an average price of $30/ticket, adding 20,000 fans to every single home date – which is not a given even if you sign a team of all-stars – adds less than $50M of gross revenue before you factor in additional ballpark expenses to handle that kind of crowd… and that seems to be the average Central ticket price…)
There’s a HUGE correlation right now between teams that are spending money and teams that own a significant piece of their RSN. And that shouldn’t surprise anyone. But it’s bad for the sport.
Completely agree on this one. Somehow the union and MLB need to figure out a guaranteed revenue split between teams and players, more revenue sharing between teams, and a salary cap and floor that are reasonably close to each other.
I agree with you on the latter point, at least to some extent. The unequal TV revenues is a major problem. The Dodgers make basically their whole payroll from TV alone (something like $230M a year) and own 50% of their network. Other teams like the Cubs, Blue Jays, Mariners, and Red Sox own so much of their channel that they’re practically vertically integrated–the Blue Jays and the Cubs literally are (and they all make boatloads of money).
There are at least a couple of of teams that aren’t spending for reasons which we should justifiably criticize them for. The Reds and D-Backs both own their networks, I think, and their TV deals aren’t bad either even if you want to make some assumptions about who owns what in the company. Their owners are just cheap. But for teams like the Royals, Twins, and Brewers, they are teams that are consistently trying (some more successfully than others) but just don’t have sorts of TV revenues that other franchises do. (The Marlins, A’s, Pirates, Rays, and Guardians haven’t done themselves any favors by being obviously cheap to their fans, but also have serious structural limitations).
I just don’t know how some of these teams can keep up. I don’t think the revenue sharing system is working quite right. It’s better than nothing, but it’s not enough for the teams that are trying. I get that lots of people think that revenue sharing incentivizes bad actors, and that might be true too, but that would be even more reason to reform it if it were true.
They can “keep up” by spending some of the capital appreciation and voting to add teams to the biggest media markets.
What “capital appreciation” are you talking about for, say, the Brewers?
Exactly. The Cubs and Cardinals have a national fanbase to draw upon, and TV rights to go along with it. But Cleveland, Kansas City, Milwaukee, et. al., and Colorado, Arizona do not. And the Diamondbacks ownership is embroiled in some bitter, bitter nastiness, in part over what happens when your team and the Regional Sports Network have different groups of owners and different economic interests that can easily enrich one group at the expense of the other.
Baseball is and always has been a regional sport, and the talent is now concentrating in certain markets in a very, very rapid way. This is bad for the sport. It leaves me rooting for the Guardians to win their way and shatter the current paradigm that superstar payrolls win championships. Which is also bad for the sport. Talent deserves to get paid – but there are fewer teams viably competing for top talent based on the cost AND THE RISK. Smaller market teams can’t take on 10+ year guarantees.
I think it is a bit unreasonable to say that none of these guys will be any good at age 34. Definitely possible, and likely the most likely outcome, but far from a sure thing .
Is it? Why not start with the baseline that each and everyone of them can eat these deals for breakfast without feeling bloated?
I’d say its most hard to evaluate these deals for baseball operations because us plebs can’t get over the money + can’t wait for a cap
Yeah, these are all well within the budget that the teams should be willing to self-insure for. It’s a straight expected payout vs. expected reward calculation, you discount production some for injury risk (which ZIPS tries to do), you discount future expenses and revenue’s, you see if the deal looks good.
We don’t know what effect winning actually has on MLB owner revenue, but the owners sure act like it’s about $9 million a win and this contract is below the ZiPS projection.
That’s because $/win is not linear, and teams use more probabilistic models based on confidence intervals and %-outcomes.
For example, I don’t think ZiPS accounts for the loss of the shift in offensive or defensive projections. (Dan, I’m sorry if I’m wrong.) Teams with strong analytics departments have models that assuredly do because they have multiple people paid on staff to fine-tune their models as opposed to just one person.
What exactly would a cap do?
There are a few ways to look at this.
1) Obviously teams know what they are doing; they have more information than us poor middle-class people that live within our means. MLB is making money, digital means of reaching more people are improving, inflation eats into contract values down the road, blah blah blah.
2) Much like real estate in 2008 or any other “boom and bust”, markets can be irrational, and even otherwise intelligent people do crazy things when they see other people making/spending money. Imagine sitting in a boardroom of a major bank in 2007 and all your competitors (who were taking major risks) were making 20%, and your fiscally conservative institution is only making 10% – a difference of billions of dollars. Soon your shareholders start asking questions. Then your boss starts asking questions. At some point it becomes easier to just go with the flow, especially when the upside of sticking to your guns is less than the downside of everyone losing together and the regulators (MLB in this case) are asleep at the wheel and/or also profit.
So if my math is correct, he’s projected to finish his career (assuming he retires at the end of this contract) at 70+ WAR.
He *was* the first pick in 2012…
So…it’s basically the Stanton deal, except Correa’s three years older and has played a lower percentage of games over the previous 5 years?
And it comes 8 years later in an age of high inflation.
Each 2022 dollar is worth 86 cents in 2014 dollars.
So by your comparo he is getting 14% less at a more valuable position.
And in FA, rather than as an extension.
I guess that’s reasonable, given Correa’s age and injury risk.
They still need more to compete with the Dodgers, Padres, Braves and Mets. They might still be worse than the Phillies and Cardinals too. I don’t know that Farhan is really comfortable with spending big. Really big. I’ll retract this if they give Ohtani $450m or something
I’ve been saying this for a while: I think this is what they’re saving their pennies for. They’re trying to get a team that gets them in the wild card game this year so they can sell Ohtani as being the missing piece.
Then they’re putting all their eggs in one basket. I would be surprised if they project as a WC in spring training. Even if they were to sell a FA — Ohtani or Soto — on themselves they’d have to outbid everyone else. They’re not taking advantage of their massive revenues this way
Steamer certainly doesn’t think they’re a good bet for the wild card–they’re projected for 39.3 WAR, which is short of the Padres, Mets, Braves, Dodgers, Cards, Phillies, and Brewers (in order). I think Steamer might underestimate them, but it’s still not comforting.
Bringing back Rodon would probably put them just ahead of the Brewers, since it would come at the expense of Ross Stripling, and would also proof them against starting pitcher injuries.
They could also go for a 1B/DH like Justin Turner, or get Michael Conforto and play Haniger mostly at DH. They could trade for Danny Jansen; that would help a lot, given the questions about Joey Bart. Doing all those things might pull them ahead of the Phillies in Steamer projections.
They’d have to do all that and then go all out for Ohtani and Soto and hope to get one of them
With the way this offseason has gone, I’m not at all sure $450m is going to be the high bid on Ohtani.
He’ll need two contracts; one based on innings pitched and another based on hitting production. 😎
They are not in the business of winni g, they are in the business of entertainment, which means merely credibly competing.
One more thought: I have been very skeptical that Marco Luciano is an infielder, and I think the Giants are too. So while I think it’s possible that Luciano moves to 2B, he probably is more likely to wind up in the corner outfield.
If there is a long-term shortstop who will eventually bump Correa over to third base, it’s probably someone who isn’t in the organization, or Aeverson Arteaga, who finishd the year in A-ball, probably isn’t in the bigs until 2026 at the earliest, and hasn’t exactly hit like a star yet. So I don’t think this blocks anybody. And Correa will still be good whenever Luciano makes it to the major leagues–2024 or 2025, most likely, along with whatever pitchers make it through their system.
Thanks Dan. Quick correction, the Giants lost 26 wins from 2021 to 2022 not 36. Still a lot!
Most Cubs fans (on the cesspool that is the internet) now want to sit out the next few years until The Future arrives because this guy is off the board. They were also willing to do with Correa, seeing the scheduled Competitive Window (bc thats how it works, totally) as 2025 anyway. Insane, no?
Personally, I had next to no interest? Guy’s a very good player, congrats Giants or whatever, but too many GBs on offense (even @ lg avg ish), not enough FBs, and not enough certainty about his defense (Aging – should be a federal crime, back injuries, big dude, slow). I felt and still feel the fit was superficial, no QO and 28 in this instance being painted as young, rather than a true skills match for a team that needs defense, SP velo, and fewer GBs/more flyballs on offense. Props to the FO for not copping out and doing the easy, popular thing. Time to go get Swanson, Cubs!
Not bad for the Giants tho…Dude can ball, they’re a much more modern roster than Cubs, a year removed from 107 wins, etc
Is there anything written for why Dan has moved to a ‘piecewise function’ when valuing WAR? And if there is an argument for a higher valuation for a marginal win, why would the function be flat after the first win (scratches head)?
My guess is that at some point having decent quad A players available for your AAA affiliate has some value for training your real prospects and having a reserve against unexpected injuries.
It doesn’t really require a non-linear WAR value outside of very low WAR to explain non-linear at very low WAR, obviously a 0.0 WAR player isn’t available for free no matter how accurate linear values are for higher WAR players, nor does someone expected to get -0.3 WAR per Fangraphs have to pay the team money to play, someone is almost sure to offer him at least a MiLB deal and he may well be on the 40 man roster and get a cup of coffee in the majors some time during the season.
Flores got $5.5m AAV a couple years ago, Cron got $7m.
Meanwhile, Josh Bell just got $16.5m and Rizzo got $20m.
Tracks well enough for me, along with making intuitive sense.
Didn’t know I’d be going down the George Davis rabbit hole. 84 career WAR 1890-1909
All of the ZIPS contract projections seen really optimistic about how well these players will age. All of Bogaerts, Turner, and Correa are viable SS and have positive WAR at age 40. I can’t believe that’s the average outcome in each of these cases.
I feel scared and confused.
Same.
Does ZiPS have coding to age people out of positions? Or do these projections assume they’re going to be playing SS in their 40’s?
I’m confused by that as well.
If you look at hitters that are 36 years old (or older) you see some very depressing numbers. There were exactly 2 players that posted above 2 WAR this year that were 36 or older. The projections call for Correa to beat them all. And then repeat at age 37. And still be a quality starter at 38. If aging curves in 2032 look anything like what we saw in 2022 that feels like a very tall order.
To me, I’m taking the under, by a lot on everything past age 35. Sure feels like the projections are being very generous in predicting value once a player is beyond their mid-30s.
For fun – here are the best players who have retired since 2019 and what their WAR total was from 35 on (reminder – Correa is projected for 10.4):
— Zobrist – 6.4
— Granderson 4.6
— Ichiro 14.7 (note that 10.3 of that WAR was collected in ages 35/36 – from 37 to 45 he totaled 4.3 WAR + Ichiro is a freak that nobody should be compared to)
— Kinsler – 3.9
— Victor Martinez – 0.8
— Beltre – 19.3
— Utley – 5.9
I’m not suggesting that these were all players that were better or even the same as Correa BUT they were all really, really good players (Zobrist – as an example – had 7 seasons of 3 WAR or higher including a season at 8.7 and 6.4 – easily topping Correa’s best season to date). And these are the survivors! Doesn’t even include guys that completely fell off the cliff and didn’t have any production in their mid-30s and beyond.
Great info. One question: Isn’t Beltre also a freak that nobody should be compared to? 🙂
Yes, and it’s not just mid to late 30s. It could be early 30s as well if you look at the history of middle infielders who are not fueled by steroids. A good number fall off a cliff around age 32-33. There’s a real possibility a couple of these deals turn into immediate albatrosses like Pujols’ or Rendon’s. I dont trust ZiPS numbers, although I’m not sure of a recommendation that isn’t just “Don’t give out long term megadeals” – well, maybe unless you’re the Angels. Then don’t do it.
Here are the top shortstops by WAR since 2000:
Peralta – 9.4 after 30, Renteria – 6.9, JJ Hardy – 7.6
Throw in currently active Brandon Crawford with the mega deal guys (Lindor, Trea, Correa, Xander) and that’s everyone down to Corey Seager.
Crawford is an interesting success story – put up a 6.3 WAR season in 2021, otherwise has been a decent defense-first starter but that’s accumulated him to 14.6 after age 30, including the COVID year where he was good and he might still have some years left although the Giants are obviously moving him off short now.
Lindor, Seager and Correa you’re at least getting some prime seasons in their late 20s. I could also see Correa move to 3B and have enough offense to survive in his mid 30s provided the injuries don’t Tulo him. Seager it probably gets ugly after 32 but you at least have half the deal before then and maybe they sprinkle some Michael Young dust on him at 2B/3B.
I do think Trea might buy a few more years than some expect because speed ages well, counter to their suggestions that his offense is in trouble once he loses his legs – Starling Marte has still been able to leg out enough infield singles to hit .300 the last two seasons and Rickey was stealing bases and hitting .300 in his 40s. I’ll admit to not being optimistic about Bogaerts.
But Xander aside, I am being optimistic. All these deals are ugly age 35+ from the jump. Can you pull a Seattle, bank the good Cano years and then dump the bad Cano years on another team? That’s provided you get the good years and at a certain point, there are too many of these contracts on too many teams to do that.
Tulo, Reyes and Hanley would all get these 10+ year 300m+ contracts in this market and they would all give you basically nothing for it.
What we are reading is 1) that the expected cost of $27m in 10 yrs is low. 2) players might not need to show a lot of vallue after age 37 given inflation and the imputed value of salary tax space. Complicated but plausible = scam.
That can be calculated.
As it turns out, current estimates are we are in for ten years of 5%+ inflation. The online inflation calculator says a 2032 dollar will be worth 61% of a 2022 dollar, or nearly 40% less.
$27M translates to $16M.
Still an overpay for a part time 1 WAR player but no disaster.
Anyone that says they can predict inflation ten years from now is selling you something. In fact, prior to Covid, the overwhelming economic consensus was that the US was actually headed toward a Japan and Europe-style low inflation/deflation due to population aging, etc.
Further: the contract is certain. Inflation is not.
On what planet can you get both Swanson and Rodon for 285? The Twins’ FO either does not understand the market for elite players (CC and Darvish being examples), or are lying about trying to play in the elite market.
Not sure about Swanson, but Rodon is reportedly asking for 7 years at $30M+.
The offer to Correa was $28.5M a year so if Rodon agreed to that salary, it would only be $200M, but unless both players accept significant deferred money the quoted offer can’t bring both in. Swanson + a second tier pitcher, yes. Rodon + Iglesias, yes. But not both the big names.
And to be honest, both FAs are most likely looking for bigger venues where success or failure will hinge on them because both know they aren’t headliners. They have to strike out with all the big marketd before going to the Twin Cities.
Surprising to read all the comments about whether these players are worth it. That’s missing the point. From a business perspective, it does not matter. Owning a baseball team is close to a license to print money.
So a couple of points:
1) there will be, as there has been, salary inflation that will not make these contracts too much more than an annoyance by their end.
2) The Yankees are worth what, 8 or 10 billion? They can run a $500 million payroll and still make money. The Giants own much of the real estate around their ballpark. These two teams are investing in their overall asset with these contracts.
3) I believe I read an article a few years ago that pegged the value of a single home playoff game to be $50 million. So the investment stands a good chance to pay for itself every year, leaving aside the overall picture I mentioned above.
4) and of course, flags fly forever, and in the Bronx and to a lesser degree China Basin, that’s the goal.
5) as for other franchises, who cares? If a team that makes money, which they all do, is owned by a cheapskate, or an incompetent business group, than that is the problem. If anything revenue sharing has exacerbated the issue, not mitigated it. Remember that these are wealthy people who own franchises, they don’t need to be subsidized by other wealthy people. But that baseball does this is crazy.
6) Franchises need to be moved to maximize revenues. Having teams in Cincinnati or Pittsburgh in 2023 because that’s where they were in the 19th century is nuts. Move them to Nashville or Charlotte and end revenue sharing nonsense.
The total value of a team is only vaguely related to how much payroll they can run. You’re confusing asset value with operating expenses. Healthy operating profits (and expected future profits) drive high asset values, not the other way around.
Even with Correa, the Giants aren’t making the playoffs, so your $50 million playoff number is moot.
SF is also not winning the WS anytime soon, making your “flags fly forever” point also moot (even if they also get Ohtani).
Baseball franchises aren’t subsidized by other wealthy people, they are subsidized by taxpayers (which I suppose you could make the argument are generally wealthy-er) people. Baseball is effectively a monopoly because politicians say so, and politicians say so because that’s what voters want.
There is no way to know the Giants won’t make the playoffs in 2023, they did in 2021. They won 3 WS in the last 13 years with fairly mediocre clubs, so their own history would seem to refute your arguments.
And baseball franchises are absolutely subsidized by other franchises, that’s what revenue sharing and the luxury tax are all about.
And I’m sorry, but if you think voters want baseball to be a monopoly you’ll have to cite your source for that.
A better argument would be that politicians respond to the desires of big dollar donors.
They won three world series in the last 13 years in a completely different division. You can reasonably make the argument that SF is now the fourth best team in the division, even with Correa.
The poster said “subsidized by other rich people”. Unless you are making an argument against revenue sharing/luxury tax.
As for the politicians: I didn’t say all voters want baseball to be a monopoly. No politician with an IQ over 80 is going to push for taking away MLB’s monopoly. Imagine if the monopoly was lost, and competition starting eating away at MLB. Eventually, we would see MLB teams re-locate, some would collapse, others would form…baseball would start to look like any other market. The Dodgers and Yankees would survive; Tampa Bay would probably move, etc. The small amount of baseball fans/voters (relative to the total US population) would “lose” a lot more than the rest of the non-baseball fans/voters would “win”, and the “losers” would shout a lot louder than the winners. Politicians would have to answer tough questions and try to explain economics to voters.
Think back to when the government was trying to decide to save General Motors. The losers if the government didn’t support them would be extremely “loud” – newspaper articles about people losing jobs, etc – even if the overall US population would likely “win” by not picking winners in certain economic markets. Politicians don’t necessarily respond to money. They also respond to public opinion. What senator or congressman is going to support losing his/her local team? It’s just a bad look for a politician.
Last: I’m willing to put my money where my mouth is on SF not making the playoffs in 2023. Are you? If so, I’ll give you my personal contact info and we can make this happen.
Interesting to see a guy who has had all of one season better than 4.4 fWAR since 2017 projected to hit 4.7 fWAR and higher in each of his next four seasons.
If Correa is a positive WAR player in 2035, I’ll eat my left shoe.
Like all of these other long-term deals, probably great for fans in the short-term, and horrific towards the end.
Lots of shoe-eating offers today
Turner, Bogarts, and now Correa are all off the Market. There are still some big market teams in play that need a shortstop. Swanson has to like his odds at this point.
Bidding should start at Seager money.
If he’s waiting for Seager money he may be waiting a while
Every time I see an established player get one of these bizarre long term contracts that takes them into their late 30’s, or even 40’s, I continue to be astonished at how Alex Anthopoulos stole a march on the entire industry by trusting their player evaluation and signing the Braves core players soon after reaching the majors for pennies on the dollar and getting these stars during their prime and not when they should be in comfortable retirement. My fear is the Red Sox are, as Dan said so accurately about the Twins, still thinking that this is 2022 and that a 6 or 7 year deal is going to get the job done and unless they are willing to accept that at least a 10 year deal is what is needed to sign today’s top players then Devers is leaving and the future looks bleak.
Without looking up bonuses, my guess is the Braves’ big secret is none of these guys were expensive amateurs. I pay attention to the Cubs’ system and the highest bonus signed since Kris Bryant in 2013 (6.7) is Horton’s 4.2 last year, before that Howard’s $3.75…Wouldn’t be surprised if it’s played out similarly throughout baseball over the last decade with a couple noisy signings acting as cover
The draft slot and international bonus quotas at work.
He didn’t steal a march on the rest of the industry. I’ve been signing young players to long contracts for years in OOTP…
Yeah, I mean credit to AA for getting it done recently, but I remember back when we called these kind of deals for young players a St. Louis special.
How about John Hart and the Indians in the ’90s?
I associate this with John Hart in Cleveland too.
“ZiPS has seen enough in recent years to move to a piecewise function, valuing the first win at $5.26 million and subsequent wins at $9.33 million and a 3% yearly boost in both of those numbers.”
This seems like a buried lede. I would like to see the details behind this.
Ditto.
Yeah, I’ve seen people arguing for years that WAR shouldn’t be valued in a linear fashion…so it would be great to have a data-driven analysis on it!
“$285 million might land you Swanson and Carlos Rodón, and if not, at least the vast majority of their salaries.”
I see this kind of false equivalence used all the time, it’s misleading. Not calling Dan out specifically but I just don’t like how often this comparison is used.
It’s pretty clear the equation for teams isn’t based on total dollars, you can’t just ignore contract term and AAV (in fact, this is why we are seeing these longer deals this offseason).
A contract for $285M over 10 years is far different than 2 $150M contracts over say 7 years each, even with comparable total dollars (and is probably selling both Swanson and Rodon short).
That’s $28.5M AAV vs. ~$42M AAV combined.
And if they both received 10 year deals you’d expect the total dollars to greatly exceed that $285M figure and there will still likely be a sizable gap in AAV.
Good in the main, but it doesn’t tune finely enough. Ignoring for a moment the value to a team of deferring money by even a few seasons, the 13/$350m offer to Correa was essentially Judge Money, far more like 9/$350 than the nominal 13 year deal SF put on the table given how unlikely a player who already has trouble staying on the field is to be productive ten seasons from now. Given how routinely the last years of the longest deals yield 0 WAR and worse, it makes sense to adjust accordingly for the purpose of your analysis.
Pro rating each of the Swanson, Rodon, and Correa deals to bring them more in line with what generally happens gives a more accurate picture of value. As it played out, fwiw, it’s also far likelier that Swanson or Rodon are playing productively in the last year of the deal each got, than Correa in 2035 (now 2034 given his deal with the Mets).
Moot