Archive for Daily Graphings

Handicapping the NL West Race

There are two weeks left in the regular season, and over in the NL West, things are getting fun. Here are the current standings as we head down the stretch:

San Francisco, 84-66
San Diego, 83-66
Colorado, 82-67

The Giants have the edge by virtue of winning the one extra game they’ve played, while Colorado stands one back in the loss column behind both teams. All three teams have a real chance of winning this thing, and the division will be decided by who finishes the strongest.

To figure out if any of the teams have an advantage, let’s take a look at their respective schedules.

SF: @CHC (3), @COL (3), Off, vs ARI (3), vs SD (3)
SD: @LAD (3), vs CIN (3), @CHC (4), @SF (3)
COL: @ARI (3), vs SF (3), vs LAD (3), @STL (4)

The big difference between the three teams is that San Francisco is the only one with an off-day left in their regular season schedule. After this weekend’s games, they take Monday off before starting their final homestand of the year. Offsetting that, the Giants are the only team that has to play two teams fighting for a playoff berth down the stretch, as they face the two teams they’re fighting for the NL West over the next two weekends.

San Diego has to contend with a good Cincinnati club, but they have little to play for at this point, so Dusty Baker may be more inclined to hold out players who would otherwise be on the field on some days, and there’s certainly a motivational aspect that can’t be completely ignored. Meanwhile, the Rockies have just their three game set against the Giants, but other than that, they play a bunch of teams that are already planning their October vacations.

I’d give a slight edge to the Rockies in terms of ease of remaining schedule, but that previously mentioned off-day for San Francisco looms as an equalizer. Their next six games will see games started by Matt Cain, Jonathan Sanchez, Madison Bumgarner, Tim Lincecum, Barry Zito, and then Cain again before the day-off. The break gives them the opportunity to shift their rotation around, setting them up better for a potential tie-breaker or the NLDS.

They could finish the season with Sanchez-Lincecum-Bumgarner-Cain-Zito-Sanchez, which would allow them to limit Barry Zito to just two starts over the rest of the season, and setup Lincecum to pitch on regular rest in either Game 1 of the NLDS or an if necessary tie-breaker following the conclusion of the regular season. If they had to play their way into the NLDS, they’d then have Bumgarner available to start on full rest, which isn’t the worst situation they could face.

Meanwhile, Colorado and San Diego just have to roll with how their rotation shakes out, since they play 13 games in the final 13 days. Unless one of them runs away with this thing, which seems unlikely, they won’t be able to set their rotations up for a a potential tie-breaker or the NLDS. Given that they also have a slight lead over the other two clubs, the Giants have to be considered the favorites right now.


Guerrero, Andrus, and Swing%

One of my favorite stats pages on FanGraphs is the Plate Discipline Leaderboard. In it, you can find out which hitters swing at pitches out of the strikezone (O-Swing%), make most contact when swinging (Contact%), or see the most pitches in the zone (Zone%). In particular, Swing% tells us which batters swing at the most pitches or the fewest pitches. It should not be surprising that Vladimir Guerrero is the leader in this stat this season, swinging at 60.7% of all pitches. On the other end of the leaderboard, his Rangers’ teammate Elvis Andrus is 6th this season in the least percentage of pitches swung at with 36.9%.

I was curious to see how Guerrero and Andrus differed in Swing% based on different pitch types: fastballs, sliders, curveballs, and changeups. I modeled each batter’s Swing% vs. each pitch type by handedness and plotted heat maps for each one. Turns out I came up with 16 graphs, so let’s take a look at four of them at a time. The first four are Guerrero and Andrus against RHP and LHP fastballs:

Guerrero saw 2335 RHP fastballs and 904 LHP fastballs since 2007 while Andrus saw 1522 RHP fastballs and 541 LHP fastballs since his debut. The levels on the right can be read as percentages, so 0.8 indicates swinging at 80% of pitches. Guerrero loves to swing at fastballs from both hands, swinging at 80-90% of fastballs up and in while inside the zone. The centers of these fastball hotzones are similarly located for Andrus, but he swings at far fewer fastballs, maybe topping out at 65-70% in his hottest spots. Let’s look at the next four, which are against RHP and LHP sliders:

Guerrero saw 1040 RHP sliders and 174 LHP sliders since 2007 while Andrus saw 429 RHP sliders and 88 LHP sliders since his debut. Again, Guerrero hacks at a lot of sliders, particularly low and inside sliders from LHP. It seems that Andrus is also pretty vulnerable in swinging at low LHP sliders, but many of these are low and outside instead for the young right-handed hitter. Let’s look at how the teammates swing at RHP and LHP curveballs:

Guerrero saw 441 RHP curveballs and 208 LHP curveballs since 2007 while Andrus saw 262 RHP curveballs and 105 LHP curveballs since his debut. Similarly, both Guerrero and Andrus swing more at LHP curveballs than they do against RHP curveballs. Remember, these plots are looking at Swing% and are not indicative of whether the result of the swing was a swinging strike or an extra base hit. However, you can safely assume that a low breaking ball out of the zone is not a wise pitch to swing at (well, except that Guerrero is notorious for making solid contact off pitches out of the zone, but that’s for another post). Finally, let’s look at Guerrero and Andrus swinging against RHP and LHP changeups:

Guerrero saw 313 RHP changeups and 278 LHP changeups since 2007 while Andrus saw 237 RHP changeups and 212 LHP changeups since his debut. The colors in these plots look similar to that of fastballs, except that the epicenters of the hot swing spots are lower for changeups than for the high fastballs. Again, Guerrero isn’t afraid to swing at inside RHP changeups, swinging at 90% in some areas, while Andrus lays more of these pitches off, swinging at about 50% of changeups throughout the strikezone.

A lot of interesting questions could be asked from here in terms of comparing Guerrero and Andrus. For instance, how often does Guerrero make contact off of low sliders compared to Andrus when he swings? How much damage does Guerrero make off of changeups down the middle compared to Andrus? Is Guerrero swinging at too many pitches or is Andrus swinging at too few? This season, Guerrero has made contact 80.6% of the time he swings, while Andrus, although swinging at many fewer pitches, makes contact 88.4% of the time when he does.

A quick look at pitch type values can also tell us which hitter is more successful against which pitch types. Obviously, Guerrero has much more power than Andrus does and is particularly effective at hitting curveballs and changeups, with a wCB/C of +6.85 runs and a wCH/C of +4.68 runs — good for 1st and 2nd in the majors this season. However, the one pitch that Guerrero is worse at hitting this season is the slider, with a wSL/C of -0.52 runs (he has been more successful in the past).

Much more information can be gleaned if we look at contact, batted ball, or SLG% plots. For now, it’s fun to marvel at visualizations of vastly different approaches in plate discipline.


Danny Valencia’s Rookie of the Year Case

Sometimes early impressions stick with us and play disproportionate roles in our judgments. Case in point: this week’s FanGraphs Audio, in which we discuss postseason awards. After spending a good chunk of the show’s 40 minutes discussing the Cy Young and MVP cases, we kind of gloss over the Rookies of the Year. They seem so obvious. Jason Heyward stands out from the pack in the NL. In the AL, Austin Jackson established himself early and is the rookie WAR leader. Does that mean his case is as clear-cut as Heyward’s?

Beyond Jackson, the only player any of the panelists named as an alternative was Rays’ catcher John Jaso. Playing catcher certainly helps his case, as does his .377 OBP and .345 wOBA. Since his recall in mid-April he has accumulated 370 PA, mostly batting leadoff against right-handed pitchers. The platoon role obviously cuts into his playing time, which affects his WAR. A negative DRS hurts a bit, too, but it still leaves Jaso with 2.3 WAR, sixth among AL catchers. That certainly makes a strong case, but I’m not sure it’s stronger than Jackson’s.

Yesterday, a commenter asked a good question: Why hadn’t anyone mentioned Danny Valencia? I’m sure we could give a number of reasons, but I think it really comes down to one thing: Valencia has accumulated just 273 PA this season, which means he won’t appear on any default leader boards. That’s nothing but laziness on our parts. Considering what a remarkable season he has put together, he certainly warrants at least a mention for the AL Rookie of the Year award. Consider this post a mea culpa.

For years, third base has been a weak spot for the Twins. They’ve had a mix of good and bad defenders play there, but on the whole none of them could hit. Here is their 3B wOBA since they lost Corey Koskie:

2005: .306
2006: .309
2007: .293
2008: .320
2009: .309

Of course, the only year they fielded remotely respectable offensive third basemen, they finished with a -11.3 UZR, fourth worst in the majors.

Heading into the 2010 season Valencia represented the possibility of an upgrade at the position. He put up excellent offensive numbers through AA, though he did struggle a bit at AAA. Even so, Baseball America ranked him the Twins’ No. 6 prospect and had nothing but good things to say about his offensive skills. “He has the bat speed to get to good fastballs and trusts his hands, staying back on breaking balls and using the whole field,” they wrote on their prospect list. They also praised his ability to play third, but noted that he would need more work to fulfill his potential defensively. Still, it sounded like he could be a solid answer to the team’s void at the hot corner.

Apparently the Twins didn’t think Valencia was ready at the start. They optioned him to AAA, leaving the third base job to Brendan Harris and Nick Punto. That predictably turned out poorly. Harris hit just .170/.260/.239 through May, and Punto hit .221/.287/.284 in limited duty thanks to a groin injury. The Twins needed help, and even though Valencia struggled with his power stroke in AAA they called him up in the beginning of June.

For his first month the power remained dormant, as he had just one double in 50 PA, a .022 ISO. But in July he surged, producing a .492 wOBA on the strength of six doubles and a homer. While he came back down to earth a bit in August, Valencia has again torn the cover off the ball in September, a .417 wOBA through 53 PA. It all adds up to a .373 wOBA in 273 PA, which amounts to 2.8 WAR. Despite the two-month handicap, Valencia still ranks fifth among AL third basemen in WAR.

Considering Valencia’s torrid production during his three and a half months, I think his case is a bit more solid than Jaso’s. He has a higher WAR in fewer plate appearances. For those who don’t like to make cross-position comparisons, especially with catchers, based on WAR, Valencia also has a better batting component than Jaso. For that matter, he has a higher batting component than Jackson. That, I think, should earn him consideration for the award.

When the votes are tallied in November, I still believe that Jackson will win the AL ROY award. He has gone wire-to-wire as the Tigers’ center fielder and leadoff hitter, and has put up attractive numbers. He might have an unsustainably high BABIP, but that shouldn’t factor into the award voting. Valencia makes a strong case, and if he had come up maybe three weeks earlier I think he’d be in more serious consideration. But because Jackson has put up his numbers in more than twice the number of plate appearances, I think it goes to him. The Twins might have found their third baseman of the future, and I wouldn’t complain at all if he snuck in and won the ROY. But right now Jackson still looks like the man.


Community Blog Update

Yesterday, we debuted our newest writer here on FanGraphs, as Albert Lyu joined the staff. Albert had been writing at his blog for several months, and after we launched the Community Blog, he began submitting pieces for publication. We liked his work so much that we offered him a job.

The Community Blog has been a great addition to the site. When it went live in mid-May, we weren’t really sure what to expect, honestly. We knew a lot of you guys had some interesting things to say, and we wanted to give you a platform to have your voice heard on a scale that it probably wouldn’t be otherwise. There was so much initial interest that we were overwhelmed with entries, and had a large backlog of quality pieces to publish. Sometimes, they’d be a bit out of date by the time we were able to publish them, simply because there were so many good articles to go through. Then, late July hit, we all got swamped with our own writing, and the Community Blog didn’t receive the attention it needed.

If you submitted something to the Community Blog in late July, consider this an official apology – we dropped the ball on keeping it updated. However, we’ve got a system in place now to ensure that doesn’t happen again, and we’re going to stay on top of things over there going forward. We’re going to make sure that the great submissions you guys are turning in get published in a timely fashion, and we’re going to increase their visibility on the main site. As 2:00 Eastern today, we’ll feature an article from the Community Blog on the FanGraphs home page, and this will become a regular feature of the blog. We want to give these high quality pieces the exposure they deserve, and so we’ll regularly run articles from the Community Blog on the FanGraphs home page, where the amount of eyes that see your work will grow exponentially.

We really want the blog to be a podium for good ideas and interesting research. I think most of us would agree that Albert’s pieces are pretty fascinating stuff, and they bring something new to the table. You don’t have to know how to publish heat maps from R, but I will say that our tendency is going to be to publish topics that have not already been covered. It doesn’t have to original content, as Albert’s posts were copies of things he’d already published on his blog, but the best work comes from original ideas, and that’s really what we’re hoping to shine a spotlight on.

A few of my favorite posts from the Community Blog to date, to kind of give you an idea of what we’d like to see in future submissions:

A New Old Idea For The KC Royals

Dusty Baker And Pitch Counts

Interview: Jed Hoyer

Revisiting A Blown Call From The 2009 Playoffs

The Nationals Unique FanBase

Liberating Liberated Fandom

There’s a wide spectrum of topics in there, and all were handled differently. The key was that they were all original ideas. With the Community Blog, we want to feature the creative ideas that you guys have, and we’re going to work to make sure that they get the exposure they deserve. So, keep those submissions coming, and we’ll keep featuring the best articles right here on FanGraphs.


Could MLB’s Postseason TV Ratings Be Down?

Television ratings are a fickle thing. Not the easiest for the average fan to glean info from (Is share better than total household numbers, or…?), the numbers are a source of saying that a sporting event was popular or not (for the record last year was a hit, due to the return of the Yankees to the postseason. Plus, ratings internationally were very high)

With the 2010 postseason nearly upon us, the question will once again be, “Is baseball drifting from the collective conscious of America?” Media – often of the radio ilk – has had a field day talking of how the Super Bowl, a ratings juggernaut, is “x amount” better than the World Series.

There’s little discounting that the Super Bowl is far more popular than anything that a sport that offers a best of seven series can offer. The drama of a single game for all the marbles creates a massive event-driven atmosphere.

So, for MLB, the best form of competition is with itself. How ratings fare from one year to another dictates how much interest diehard, as well as fringe fans, have interest.

At its simplest level, MLB’s postseason ratings game boils down to two things: market size, and brand power. More often than not, the two are intertwined, with some exceptions (this would be you, St. Louis).

With the regular season about to end, the “bad thing”, if you want to call it that, is one of likely lower ratings than in recent years. Only the future knows how the level of play is, but we could witness some of the greatest baseball played and not have it resonate with a national viewing audience from sea-to-shining-sea. In that sense, Bud Selig, and fans of parity, gets what we’ve been asking for: variety. Television execs may not be so happy.

Here’s why… Based upon the standings today, these are the teams that will, or could make the postseason:

  • Yankees
  • Twins
  • Rangers
  • Rays
  • Phillies
  • Braves
  • Reds
  • Giants
  • Padres
  • Rockies

For the likes of FOX and TBS the ratings game hinges almost exclusively on the Yankees. With no Cubs, Dodgers, or Red Sox in play, the biggest brands from large markets are absent from this year’s crop of teams. To make lemonade out of “ratings lemons”, the networks are looking at the Braves and the Phillies to be the National League storyline to pin their best hopes for the most viewers in the World Series. The choice between them is somewhat of a coin flip. Both come from large markets, with postseason history. If the Phillies were to make the World Series, it would mark the third time in as many years that they had done as much, something that hasn’t happened since Yankees did so from 1999-2001 (technically, they had 4 straight years in the WS starting in 1998). If they were to win the Series, the “dynasty discussion” would start making the rounds. On the flip side, some fans might be turned off by a repeat of last year’s Series match-up.

Read the rest of this entry »


The Braves Go to Beachy

Shortly after it was announced yesterday that breakout prospect Brandon Beachy would be making a spot start for Jair Jurrjens, Craig Calcaterra tweeted this about the week’s series between Philadelphia and Atlanta: “Philly starters: 765 career starts. Braves starters: 59. 52 of those are Tommy Hanson’s.” The other seven belong to Mike Minor, whose August debut I profiled in this space. I figured it was only fair to extend the same courtesy to Beachy. Where Minor pitched against a hapless Astros team in his debut, Beachy’s first test was a much taller order: on the road, against the rival and hottest team in baseball, in the midst of divisional and Wild Card races.

You could excuse a 23-year-old kid, particularly one who was an undrafted free agent and former NAIA pitcher, for being a little nervous. And there’s no question he was often during his 82-pitch debut, for which he was ultimately credited with the loss. Beachy allowed three runs, but just one earned – as Jason Heyward dropped a line drive for a three-base error to start the fifth inning and the bullpen allowed its lone inherited runner (Chase Utley) to score – in 4.1 innings. He walked three, two of them intentional — albeit one IBB was after two normal pitches missed the strike zone — and struck out just one (Chase Utley) of 21 batters faced. In fact, Beachy induced just five swinging strikes all night, two on fastballs and three on change-ups.

It was mostly just those two pitches for Beachy, as just eight of his 82 pitches were curveballs. The 6-foot-3 right-hander used the pitch in a weird fashion, throwing 5 of the 8 to left-handed batters. In a game against four right-handed hitters, just three times did he throw the deuce. One of them, and perhaps this was why the usage diminished, was a hanging curveball that Carlos Ruiz smacked to left field for an RBI double. Only once did Beachy drop the pitch in the dirt — it’s more of a control pitch that he uses to freeze hitters expecting an early-count fastball.

The book on Beachy, which was unwritten entering the season, is centered around his excellent control. He walked just 2.1 batters per nine innings this year, matching his career minor league rate, which is 208 innings long. Given his overall success, the implication of control AND command certainly exists, and the Braves television team reported to hearing just as much within the organization. But while color man Joe Simpson said in the fourth inning that Beachy was “locating his fastball real well,” I certainly beg to differ. I can’t fault the kid for being off given the environment, but let’s not pretend something was there that wasn’t. Beachy did not have good command for the majority of last night, neither with his fastball nor his change-up.

For the most part, however, the Phillies good offense didn’t make him pay. The team hit three or four balls hard but foul, including an almost-homer on a fastball to Raul Ibanez that caught too much plate. In the next at-bat, a 10-pitch battle with Carlos Ruiz, another missed fastball was almost a double. Beachy learned quickly that you can’t miss the catcher’s mitt with a 89-92 mph fastball at the Major League level.

Generally speaking, though it received more derision from Simpson, the change-up was the better commanded pitch for Beachy. Though that should be clarified: the change-up hit the vicinity of the catcher’s mitt more often than the fastball, but he had a couple misses with the change-up that promise his HR/9 ratios (just 0.3 in the minors) will see an up-tick in the Major Leagues. To lead off the third inning, Beachy threw change-ups to Shane Victorino and Placido Polanco that he was truly lucky weren’t put over the fence. Unsurprisingly, the next nine pitches were all fastballs.

But where I can’t see the swing-and-miss in Beachy’s fastball, not at that extreme over-the-top arm angle with that velocity, his change-up will have to be the out pitch for Beachy to post requisite strikeout numbers in the big leagues. At times we saw it, including in the aforementioned 10-pitch at-bat versus Ruiz, which included a swinging strike one, a good miss low-and-away, another just-miss that Ruiz offered at, and another pitch he dribbled foul. Four change-ups in one at-bat, and all of them were good. The pitch has potential, and I started to really find that to be true later in the game.

In that way, it was sort of a funny outing for Beachy. I thought he was getting better at the end, though that’s when the “damage” came. He threw two really good change-ups in the fifth inning, including the one that Placido Polanco dribbled to shortstop for the second-run of the game. His final batter faced was Utley, who he initially froze with a curveball, then jammed him inside with a fastball, and then Utley executed some great hitting skills by taking a good low-and-away fastball and smacking it to center field. Where I thought he deserved a beating early, there were some redeeming traits shown later in the outing that, because of the runs, probably were unnoticed.

Given the sheer depth of the Braves pitching staff, it’s hard to project a starting role for Beachy in this organization. He throws 3 pitches, but not one of them is a plus offering right now, and I think maybe only the change-up profiles at plus. He’ll need better command to have any success, because I think he’s going to have problems sustaining his strikeout and home run ratios given the fairly pedestrian stuff. If the young right-hander can paint the black with his fastball, and refine his change-up into an out pitch, he could be a back-end starter in the big leagues. I’m willing to believe that better stuff will be seen in subsequent outings, in less hostile environments, but for now he gets a second-divison starter or middle relief grade from me.


The Hotter Rock

Yesterday, Dave laid out the case for Troy Tulowitzki and the National League Most Valuable Player award. While Dave’s case went deeper than Tulowitzki’s September, there is a case to be made that he’s only the second best Rockies’ offensive player over the last 30 days, and that makes him the second best offensive player in the league over that span.

If one is willing to extend their arbitrary timeline beyond the design of a calendar and into the length of most months instead, then Carlos Gonzalez’s name perches atop their wOBA leaderboard. Gonzalez’s line lists at .436/.513/.792, whereas Tulowitzki sits at only .343/.412/.843. Their wOBA are .535 and .522, respectively, and their BABIP at .481 and .292. The last point is crucial since it tells us a bit about how the pair differ. Just about every other ball Gonzalez puts in play is going for a hit.

Tulowitzki’s ISO is an incredible .500 and Gonzalez’s is only .356. For perspective, Barry Bonds’ career ISO is .309 and his 2001 season (when he hit 73 home runs, not that anyone needs reminding) ISO sat at .536. Both are bringing the pop, with Tulowitzki bringing it in a 24-pack as opposed to Gonzalez’s one liter. Not too shabby considering Tulowitzki has double the amount of home runs that Gonzalez has.

One factor that should be noted is that Gonzalez has four intentional walks over the last 30 days. That would be two more than Tulowitzki, who bats after Gonzalez, which sort of goes against intuitive thinking. After all, Tulowitzki is the guy hitting everything into other galaxies while Gonzalez is only hitting balls out of this orbit. Those free passes do help Gonzalez’s wOBA, which skews his lead just a bit.

Nevertheless, the Rockies have the National League’s best hitter over the last 30 days. And they have the second best hitter, too. The order is mostly moot.


Adam Jones Is Never Room Temperature

There are numerous methods for one to illustrate the streaky tendencies in a batter’s season. If I were to gamble on such a topic, I would feel safe guessing that Dave Allen would whip up a nifty graph, whereas Carson Cistulli would write each month in iambic pentameter. I’m neither as creative or talented as those men, so instead, allow me to take the old-fashioned approach to the science of month-by-month analysis with Adam Jones as the subject.

April (.223/.245/.388)
May (.279/.303/.375)

Creating outs is the greatest crime in this game of baseball. In April, Jones created many outs. Not only did he create outs by not having his batted balls turn into hits or striking out, but also by refusing to walk. He finished the month with more double plays hit into than walks. A .303 on-base percentage is horrendous and yet represented an upgrade in this circumstance. Through the first two month of the season, Jones’ line displayed an empty (and mediocre) batting average and no power. What, do tell, is going on with our Adam Jones, wondered Orioles’ fans.

June (.320/.353/.600)

Merely a coincidence that Jones and June are spelled alike? Sure, but is it merely a coincidence that Jones did his best to quench those curiosities during June? Some things we simply aren’t meant to know. For his part, Jones hit eight home runs in 100 at-bats and walked four times despite walking only five times through the first two months.

July (.257/.315/.376)

The sequel to his hot June was a letdown. His inhibitions against walking are never at their worst than when he is, too. A quick glance at Jones’ O-Swing% gives us some good and bad news. The bad is that he’s swinging out of the zone as often as ever. However, so is the rest of the league, meaning that, relative to his peers, Jones is actually swinging out of the zone less often than in previous years.

August (.304/.382/.468)
September (.386/.449/.591)

A double-scooping of good news to go with that tidbit and these two extremely good months is that Jones’ O-Swing% is down (relative to the league) for the second straight season. September is Jones’ little black dress while August is the business casual that Orioles fans request he wear more often when on the job for the next few seasons.

Months like August are why folks held superstar aspirations for the 25-year-old. Months like April, May, and July are why he’s yet to reward those aspirations with performance. To his credit, Jones is about the best bet in the Orioles’ lineup for between 1.8 and 2 wins during any given season and his age suggests that maybe, just maybe, he can still become the superstar that left Mariner fans in the gutter when Bill Bavasi moved him in a stupor.


Tulo’s WPA And The MVP Award

One of the objections I heard today to my suggestion that Troy Tulowitzki deserves MVP consideration is that there’s a massive gap between him and Joey Votto in WPA. And it’s true, there is. Votto has the highest WPA in baseball, coming in at +6.47, while Tulowitzki’s +1.38 ranks him just 46th among position players, never mind all the pitchers who also rank ahead of him.

One of the main reasons why Tulowitzki’s WPA is so low is that a lot of his offense has come in games that had already been decided. In low leverage at-bats, he is hitting .361/.427/.649, but just .261/.357/.472 in high leverage situations. This gap is pretty large, and the opposite of Votto’s, who has hit better in high leverage situations this year. That makes a difference to a lot of people, and I understand why.

However, let me use an example from Saturday to show why you should be careful using context-dependent stats like WPA to determine how valuable a specific player was.

9/18, Colorado vs LA

Top 1st, 2 outs, runner on 1st, no score.

Tulowitzki hits a home run, giving the Rockies a 2-0 lead. Since their chances of winning jumped from 48 percent to 68 percent, Tulowitzki gets 0.20 added to his WPA total for the season.

Top 3rd, 2 outs, no one on, 2-0 Rockies.

Tulowitzki doubles to center. Because the Rockies were already likely to win the game, this double was worth a little less than a normal double, and he is credited with just 0.02 WPA. He would eventually score on Melvin Mora’s single, and the Rockies would take a 3-0 lead.

Top 5th, 1 out, runner on 1st, 3-0 Rockies.

Tulowitzki hits a home run, giving the Rockies a 5-0 lead. Because the Rockies already had an advantage, these runs were worth less than the earlier runs, so Tulowitzki only got 0.08 WPA for pushing their win expectancy from 86 percent to 94 percent.

I’d imagine you can see what happened here. Tulowitzki received minimal credit for his 5th inning home run because the Rockies already stood a really good chance of winning the game, and yet they had those good odds of winning because of what Tulowitzki did in his prior two at-bats. He essentially created his own low-leverage situation by single-handedly beating the Dodgers on Saturday.

Do you really want to say that Tulowitzki’s two-run homer in the 5th was less than half as valuable as his two run homer in the first? In terms of the story of the game, those runs didn’t have the same impact, but were they really less valuable? The fact is that the WPA of that HR is decided by how Tulowitzki performed in his first two at-bats of the game – should we hold a player’s good performances in less standing if they come after his previous good performances in the same game? Or, alternately, should we punish him for performing well on the same day that Jhoulis Chacin was throwing a shutout? If his first inning home run had tied the game, rather than breaking a tie, and his second home run had broken open a closer affair, the WPA story would be a lot different, even though the only variable we’re changing is the performance of the Rockies starting pitcher.

For these reasons, I lean towards context neutral performance. For me, WPA is like overall team performance – use it as a tie-breaker in a situation where it is otherwise hard to distinguish between two candidates, but don’t lean too heavily upon it. I’ll give Votto a bit of a boost for just how awesome he’s been in high pressure situations this year, but I’m not going to ignore how great Tulowitzki has been in situations where the game wasn’t close just because he helped make it not close in the first place.

WPA is great at telling the story of how a game unfolded. It is less great at evaluating how much a player helped his team win through his own actions. This doesn’t make it a bad stat, but it was designed for a specific purpose, and it is best used in that purpose. Trying to take it and turn it into a value stat for player performance is asking it to do something it was never intended for in the first place.


It Must Be Gardy

I don’t care about the Manager of the Year award. If fired Royals manager Trey Hillman won it this year it would be fine with me. In fact, I’ll start the campaign now: Hillman for 2010 American League Manager of the Year!

But seriously, folks… if Ron Gardenhire wins Manager of the Year, I’m fine with it. If he doesn’t, that’s fine with me, too. I don’t care. If he does win, I know that it will drive many saber-oriented Twins fans crazy, as I’ve read many of their criticisms of his decisions. You can find enough of those around if you look around the ‘net. I’m not here to say that Gardenhire is a bad manager. I don’t really know.

That last sentence is key to my post, as a couple of my favorite saber-friendly writers seem to think that a lack of knowledge about whether “Gardy” helps the Twins win or not redounds in his favor. Joe Posnanski writes:

I think Ron Gardenhire is the best manager in baseball. I think that not based on what we see but what we can’t see.

Commenting on Posnanski, Rob Neyer blogs:

Managers make moves that don’t make sense, based on the numbers we’re looking at … but we often don’t have all the numbers…. If we did have absolute knowledge, Gardenhire might look better than we think.

Posnanski’s appeal to our lack of knowledge either way is more obvious, but it is also present in Neyer’s strange thought about the “absolute knowledge” we don’t have — we “don’t know everything” going on with the Twins, so Gardenhire must be making more of a difference than other managers. I’m not going to criticize Gardenhire, but rather to point out the obvious problem with this claim.

To be fair, Neyer does make some other points (although doing so cuts against his “we don’t know” claim). He notes that the Twins have historically had a low payroll (although he also notes they don’t this year [thanks to the taxpayers’ largesse towards the impoverished Twins owners], which sort of makes the point irrelevant when considering 2010), but what does that have to do with Gardenhire? It was their front office that signed Jim Thome and Orlando Hudson and traded for J.J. Hardy. When the A’s were winning despite a low payroll in the first half of the decade, did everyone credit Art Howe? Yeah, I think they did — wasn’t that what Moneyball was all about, how Billy Beane was a mere figurehead and Howe was the real mastermind behind Oakland’s success?

Some will say that Gardenhire should get credit for the Twins’ winning despite injuries to Joe Nathan and Justin Morneau. The Twins were heavily favored to go to the playoffs long before the season started, and when Nathan went down I (incoherently) predicted that certain writers would use it as an excuse to give Gardenhire credit even though the best closers don’t matter all that much. Over the last three seasons, Nathan has averaged about 2 WAR. This season Jon Rauch has been worth 1 WAR. Obviously, a brutual loss. As for Morneau, he’s actually been worth 5.3 WAR this season — a career best. The “R” (“replacement”) in WAR accounts for the playing time element. Maybe Gardenhire saw this coming, and came up with the great idea of asking Morneau to hit for a Bondsian .446 wOBA in the short time he did have. “Strawberry, hit a home run!” “Okay, Skip.” “Ha-ha! I told him to do that!”

Going through these arguments (and there are others) distracts from my main point regarding the Poz/Neyer quotes, however. In both of them, it is asserted that we can’t say that Gardenhire isn’t a key to the Twins because we don’t know/don’t have all the information. Taken on its own, it is a fallacious argument from ignorance. “I’m asserting something without argument, and it’s your job to disprove it.” I’m not even claiming that they necessarily need numbers to back it up (it would be nice, of course). The problem is that just asserting that “we don’t know why the Twins are having success, so it must be due to Gardenhire” isn’t a valid argument. What would Neyer and Posnanski say to someone who claimed that the reason the Yankees are winning this season despite Derek Jeter’s season is because of Jeter’s “intangible” leadership? Hey, Jeter’s around, the Yankees are winning, there must be some connnection, right? We don’t know, but it would be “prudent” to be open to the possibility, right? How is that any more baseless than asserting that Gardenhire must be doing something we can’t see in the numbers or in his tactics? Maybe there are other managers around baseball who have helped their teams even more than Gardenhire has; how should we select which manager has done the best at things we don’t know about?

Maybe Gardenhire is making a difference. Maybe he isn’t. But the proper inference from “we don’t know” isn’t “he probably is,” but rather “we don’t know.”