Archive for Daily Graphings

Nelson Figueroa Is Still Good

We know Ed Wade loves his former Phillies. The Astros rotation currently contains three former Phillies pitchers (J.A. Happ, Brett Myers, and Nelson Figueroa), with Figueroa being the latest to get a shot at starting down in Houston. While there have been a good amount of criticisms thrown Wade’s way over the past season, picking up journeyman right-hander Figueroa was a low cost move that will help the Astros win ballgames.

This past off season, I wrote an article entitled, simply enough, Why Nelson Figueroa is Good, hoping to draw some attention his way. The conclusion was also pretty straight forward:

What can we expect from Figueroa in 2010? Well, considering that four out of the Mets five current starting pitchers took a trip to the DL last year, we may get to see him start once again. Or, more likely, he’ll spot start here and there and split time between Triple-A and the bullpen. Hopefully, however, he gets a chance to pitch, because Nelson Figueroa is good.

The forecasters all predicted a FIP in the low to mid 4.00’s before the season, and Figueroa has beaten that this year, no doubt thanks to pitching mostly from the bullpen. The Mets put him on waivers during Spring Training (and have gone on to watch Fernando Nieve and Pat Misch start games in 2010, let alone Oliver Perez do it seven times) where he was quickly snagged up by the Phillies.

He pitched well in Philadelphia with a 3.46 ERA and 3.49 FIP (4.51 xFIP) in twenty-six innings. Considering the lack of serious depth in the Phillies bullpen, why he was put on waivers again is troubling (I guess Danys Baez’s near identical walk and strikeout numbers were just too appealing). The Astros claimed him on July 21st, where he continued to pitch out of the pen, again succeeding. He was moved into the Houston rotation last week, and thus far has pitched well. The coolest part is that he volunteered himself to become a starter when the Astros lost some pitchers to injuries. For the 2010 season, here are Figueroa’s total numbers:

IP: 48.1
ERA: 2.98
FIP: 3.37
xFIP: 3.79
tERA: 3.38
K/9: 7.26
BB/9: 2.42

For the rest of the season, ZiPS thinks he’s good for a 4.23 FIP, a solid improvement on his preseason projection from ZiPS (4.54). That’s not bad for a pitcher that seems to go on waivers more than he starts games. Fortunately for the Figueroa family, I think he’s found a home in Houston this time.


FanGraphs Chat – 8/25/10


Will Leaked MLB Financials Alter Revenue-Sharing?

There was something oddly fitting about both a statue of Bud Selig being unveiled and the final set of leaked MLB financial documents becoming public on Tuesday. Selig has said on more than one occasion that we’re witnessing the “Golden Era” of baseball, citing the economic windfall that has come to the league over the last decade. Revenue-sharing, a pride and joy of Selig’s, is at the center of the largest public release of club financial documents – leaked to Deadspin – that include the Pirates, Rays, Mariners, Marlins, Angels, and Rangers (see them all here).

In July of 2000, with the league claiming projected losses of $232 million for the 2001 season, Selig came before Congress with his Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics report, which at its heart states, “Proper competitive balance will not exist until every well-run club has a regularly recurring reasonable hope of reaching postseason play.” The report then went on to say that, “The limited revenue sharing and payroll tax that were approved as part of MLB’s 1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Major League Baseball Players Association have produced neither the intended moderating of payroll disparities nor improved competitive balance. Some low-revenue clubs, believing the amount of their proceeds from revenue sharing insufficient to enable them to become competitive, used those proceeds to become modestly profitable.”

So, with each Collective Bargaining Agreement since, revenue-sharing has been increased, funneling money from the haves to the have-nots of the league in order to gain competitive balance. In 2009, $433 million in revenue-sharing moved from high-revenue clubs to those in need of assistance.

Along the way, sizable increases in the amount of “central revenue” has found its way into club coffers. The growth of national television money from ESPN, FOX Sports, and TBS which total approx. $660 million a year in rights fees funnel back to each of the 30 clubs. Add in annual dividend checks from MLB Advanced Media of $2 million, revenues from MLB Properties, international broadcast agreements, etc.,  and all clubs, large revenue-making, or not, have found extra money that can be used to help produce a winning product on the diamond.

Still, the field would remain unlevel without revenue-sharing tied to net local revenues, so with the leaked Deadspin docs having three clubs (the Pirates, Marlins, and Rays) that have received considerable amounts via the revenue-sharing system, the documents provide ammunition for clubs such as the Yankees and Red Sox when collective bargaining begins in earnest shortly after the World Series ends.

Parsing the documents, here’s how much revenue-sharing was either received or paid out for a given year:

Read the rest of this entry »


Cust Succeeding Without Power

Before the season, it appeared that Jack Cust’s career with the Oakland Athletics was over. After a relatively unimpressive 2009 campaign (.342 wOBA, 0.9 WAR, 612 PAs), the A’s designated Cust for assignment at the end of Spring Training. Cust went unclaimed and seemed destined to rot in AAA Sacramento. But the Eric Chavez project ended as a complete failure (.268 wOBA in 123 PAs), resulting in Cust’s return to Oakland.

Cust’s return has been a rousing success. He’s still not making contact often (38.2% K/AB), but when he does, he’s making things happen. Entering play yesterday, Cust had a .267/.391/.436 slash line, and he added a 2/4 game with a HR against the Indians last night. With that home run, Cust has only 10 home runs in 278 plate appearances – not bad for the typical player, but Cust hit 84 HR in his first three MLB seasons. The low home run total marks a bit of a decline for Cust, and we can see that in his ISOs: .248, .245, .177, .169 from 2007 to 2010.

Despite this power drop, Cust’s 2010 wRC+ of 134 compares well with 144 wRC+ in 2007 and his 132 wRC+ in 2008 largely because Cust is having a remarkable amount of success on balls in play. His .386 BABIP is the highest mark of his career, besting the .355 mark which helped power his career year of ’07 and his solid career mark of .334. Naturally, this is a huge reason why Cust’s line looks as good as it does. My four factors method would project Cust’s line at a slightly above average .335 wOBA with his career .334 BABIP. If Cust’s average were 52 points below his career average instead of 52 points above, the method predicts a .303 BABIP, right around replacement level for a DH.

It shouldn’t be that surprising, however, that Cust is seeing relative large fluctuations in his BABIP, as he quite rarely hits the ball in play. In fact, the only player to put the ball in play less often this year is Mark Reynolds, whose 46.2% BIP rate is the only one besides Cust to be under 50% this year among players with at least 200 platte appearances. Reynolds is actually seeing the opposite kind of variance to Cust, as Reynolds’s .279 BABIP is 51 points below his career BABIP. Here is a spreadsheet with these BIP rate numbers for the whole league to date in 2010.

BABIP is a fickle beast, and the fact that players such as Cust see even fewer balls in play than the average player makes it even more prone to wild fluctuations. This season, Cust is the benefactor. Next year, though, the A’s might get more of a 2010 Mark Reynolds BABIP than what they’ve seen from Cust this year, and then Cust may come crashing down to Earth if his former power doesn’t return.


When Interim Managers Restack

Alfonso Soriano hit a three-run home run last night out of the seventh spot in the lineup. If that last part did not make you say, “Huh?” then either you follow the Cubs or Soriano is on your fantasy team. As it turns out, Soriano had hit sixth most of the year for Lou Piniella, but since Mike Quade has taken over, the star left fielder has taken a demotion in the order. That isn’t the only difference between Quade’s lineups and those of Piniellia either. Here is the batting order from Quade’s first game at the helm:

2B Blake DeWitt
SS Starlin Castro
CF Marlon Byrd
3B Aramis Ramirez
1B Xavier Nady
RF Tyler Colvin
LF Alfonso Soriano
C Geovany Soto

Piniella had access to Dewitt for three weeks and never batted him higher than seventh, save for two exceptions. Quade has batted him leadoff in both of the games he has managed. The switch is a heck of a change in fortune for Dewitt and a peculiar – not necessarily right or wrong, but peculiar – change for a new manager to make, which led me to wonder: have other interim or new managers this season added a personal flare to the lineup cards immediately after becoming boss?

The answer is going to be subjective in each case because I did not do anything mathematical– i.e. weigh at-bats by lineup slot before and after – to arrive at the answer. My process might weaken the case but this is more trivial than serious. Here are the findings:

Arizona
In: Kirk Gibson
Out: A.J. Hinch

Mr. Gibson took over for the 80th game of the season. Up until then, Chris Young had not led off all season. Since, he’s led off every game but 10, with Stephen Drew leading off the last five. The only other significant and steady change has occurred lately with Kelly Johnson and Justin Upton switching spots, although that too has occurred only recently.

Baltimore
In: Juan Samuel, Buck Showalter
Out: Dan Trembley, Juan Samuel

Double points awarded to the Orioles for killing two birds with one show this season. Trembley met the axe after 54 games and Samuel after 51 more, leaving Showalter to manage the last 21. Samuel quickly moved Miguel Tejada from fourth in the lineup to second; a move that totally makes sense given Tejada’s proficiency in reaching base. With the exception of some new names, the only notable move is Showalter batting Nick Markakis second, something that started a few days before his arrival.

Florida
In: Edwin Rodriguez
Out: Fredi Gonzalez

Gonzalez hit the unemployed waters following game 70, and if he is following along, he would’ve noticed the same lineup most days until Chris Coghlan’s injury. Since then, Hanley Ramirez has moved to leadoff while Logan Morrison bats second and Gaby Sanchez third. Jorge Cantu’s departure meant Dan Uggla could beat cleanup. Cody Ross’s departure left Mike Stanton batting fifth.

Kansas City
In: Ned Yost
Out: Trey Hillman

Yost was toasted – get it? – and promoted after 35 games. Hillman’s final lineup included Scott Podsednik at the top and Jason Kendall at the bottom. At first, things looked like standard protocol for the Royals’ lineups, then, oh so suddenly, Yost batted Jason Kendall second once. And again a little over a week later. Then, Yost began batting Kendall second daily. From June 1 until Monday night, Kendall has batted second in all but nine games. Not the best of ideas considering one has to Photoshop Kendall on base in order for the image to exist.

In: Daren Brown
Out: Don Wakamatsu

The most recent of managerial firings (as opposed to retiring), Wakamatsu was given a pink slip after 112 games. Brown has not messed with the top of the order, leaving Ichiro Suzuki and Chone Figgins along, but moved Jose Lopez to third for a two-game span and then flipped to Russell Branyan, with Lopez batting cleanup instead. Brown’s biggest change is playing Matt Tuiasosopo as much as possible; he of a career .218 on-base percentage in 166 plate appearances and so-so Triple-A numbers.

I would classify Quade, Gibson, Samuel, and Hillman as making significant changes in the order with Brown on the verge. The more I think about it, the more it makes sense that new managers, particularly of the interim variety, shake things up. Managers being fired generally are not running the optimal lineup out there (that or the team is void of talent) which means the new manager’s job is to ghost-ride the whip until the offseason when an even newer manager is hired. So, what’s a tinker here or there hurt? Maybe it motivates the players, maybe it doesn’t. In the end, Brown and Quade aren’t risking their managerial futures by playing with the controls a little.


More NPB Prospects You Should Know

Picking up where I left off last time…

Norichika Aoki (OF, Yakult Swallows, 28) – In a post-Ichiro, post-Matsui NPB, Aoki reigns as the consensus top hitter. I’d actually go so far as to say that he”s the best pure hitter Japan has produced since Ichiro. Aoki is a line drive hitter with occasional power who uses the whole field. He’s also a disciplined batter, walking about as often as he strikes out, which is rare in Japan. Aoki is short and somewhat stocky at 5’7.5, 182 lbs, but is a good runner with tremendous range in the outfield. The only knock on his game is his rather weak throwing arm, which may limit him to left field at the MLB level. For video, I dug up some batting and fielding highlights and a breakdown of his swing on YouTube.

Hiroyuki Nakajima (SS, Seibu Lions, 28) – Nakajima gets my vote as Japan’s second best hitter, behind Aoki. Nakajima doesn’t quite match up with Aoki’s pure contact skill or plate discipline, but is still very good in both categories and adds a bit more gap power to the equation. Nakajima is a back-leg hitter, with a big stride that he will occasionally shorten up. On the turf, Nakajima plays a solid shortstop, among many good shortstops in his league. The best video I could find of Nakajima was this one, of him hitting an opposite field home run off Dicky Gonzales (I know, not the best competition). Also of note in the video, you can see that he’s made friends with teammate Dee Brown. The high-five routine they do after home runs shows up on Japanese highlight shows.

Wei-Yin Chen (LHP, Chunichi Dragons, 25) – Last offseason, Chen was probably the more outspoken about wanting to be posted than any other NPB player. Chen is Taiwanese, but signed with Chunichi as an amateur out of high school, apparently without any provisions to make him a free agent if he and the team can’t agree to a contract during the annual negotiations (as veteran foreign players who sign from 3A or Korea usually do). This is an unusual situation, but not unprecedented, as the first couple postings for Dominican players the Hiroshima Carp had signed as amateurs, including current Giant Ramon Ramirez. Chen does appear to be serious about MLB, as he hired agent Alan Nero last offseason, and I expect him to push to be posted again this year.

Chen features NPB’s top lefty power arsenal, primarily throwing fastballs and sliders, while mixing in occasional forkballs and the random big, loopy curve. His fastball reaches 95 mph or so, but usually sits around 90-92, while his slider breaks in on righthanded batters and sits in the 85-87 range. Chen has been letting his pitches get up in the zone much more this season, and is showing more of a flyball tendency than he did last year.

The Chen video I have is two hours of game footage from his August 17 start, against Seth Greisinger and the Giants. The video occasionally switches to a Yokohama game, but still gives you a better sense of what Chen throws than a 10-minute highlight reel will.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gAyoigqsLt8

Bautista’s Surge Continues

Since September 1st, 2009, Jose Bautista has played 152 games and received 647 plate appearances. That’s one season’s worth of playing time. In those 152 games, he has launched 50 home runs. It’s time to stop wondering when he’s going to go back to the hitter he used to be. He’s not going to. He has taken a step forward.

I’m not saying he’s going to keep hitting home runs at this pace, which is an unrealistic assumption even for the game’s premier power hitters. But we should recognize that Bautista has made changes to his offensive approach, and not assume that he’s simply getting lucky with balls flying over the wall.

Here are his flyball rates over the last three years.

2008 – 38.8%
2009 – 42.1%
2010 – 53.6%

You don’t have to look too hard to spot the pattern. Bautista has made a conscious decision to adjust his swing to gain more loft. In fact, if you saw the swing he took on his second home run last night – which was aided by some anger about being thrown out earlier – you can see exactly why Bautista is no longer hitting the ball on the ground.

He has a pronounced uppercut and he swings about as hard as humanly possible. These are not cheap home runs he’s hitting. Take a look at his home run charts from Hit Tracker.

There are a couple of squeakers on there, but for the most part, he’s been hitting bombs like the two he drilled last night. If we look at his HR/FB rate, you can see that his frequency of getting balls to clear the wall isn’t that unusual: 21.5 percent of his flyballs have left the park this year, which still ranks him behind Joey Votto (25.7%), Carlos Pena (23.7%), and Adam Dunn (21.7%). Over the past three years, five players have averaged a HR/FB rate of 21.5% or better, which isn’t exactly uncharted territory.

Bautista will likely never have a year like this again, but there’s no reason to think he’s going to revert back to the version we saw before last September. He has made changes that can stick, even if not quite to this degree, and I wouldn’t be at all surprised to see Bautista hit 30 to 40 home runs each of the next several years.


Defense and Slumps

A statistically minded baseball fan typically does not have to go far to find criticisms of the defensive metrics available. Certainly, some of that criticism is valid – defensive metrics are by no means perfect, and they particularly have flaws when looking at single seasons of data. This piece at Baseball Prospectus (subscription required) by Colin Wyers does a fantastic job of framing the problems and biases involved with defensive metrics, as well as a possible answer.

One issue presented with defensive metrics I believe is invalid, however, is the idea that inconsistencies in defensive ratings from year to year somehow render defensive systems useless, whether it be UZR, TotalZone, +/-, or any other stat. The idea seems to be based on a traditional baseball idea that while pitching and hitting can slump, speed and defense both tend to hold constant. According to this idea, seeing a player post UZRs of -3, +6, -9, and then +2 in four consecutive seasons would represent a problem with the metric as opposed to simply the ups and downs of single season. Such fluctuations in wRAA aren’t uncommon, but such things can be explained away by hot streaks and slumps over the course of multiple seasons.

Sky Andrecheck analyzed the idea of “defense doesn’t slump” last year. Based on the idea that the distribution of probabilities of outs on balls in play is bimodal – that is, most are either sure hits or sure outs – the standard error for fielders is smaller than that for hitters.

From an individual player’s standpoint, the average fielder has about 500 balls in play in his area over the course of the season (of course, this varies by position, and we can adjust accordingly) . Using the numbers above, we see that the average fielder has a standard error of about .23*SQRT(500) = 5.14 outs over the course of a season. This means that he is prone to make about 5 or so more or 5 or so less plays in a season than his true talent would usually call for. This corresponds to a difference of about 4 runs in a season. While this is fairly small, it does show that random variability can play a part in a fielder’s performance just as it can for hitters

Sky’s work, to me, effectively proves that we should expect some variability in defensive abilities. There’s also another element to the variation we see in defensive metrics that he doesn’t look at, and that’s the physical and mental aspects of the game. If a player tweaked his hamstring but doesn’t tell his manager, we could see a decrease in his range that would be unexplained by the information available. If a player is uncomfortable in a certain park, for whatever reason, he could slump if he receives an abnormal amount of chances at that park in that season. There are probably a multitude of other reasons as well.

The issue of chances is likely one of the reasons that we don’t typically recognize fielding slumps. I posed the question of why slumps can’t occur on defense on twitter, and the omnipresent Colin Wyers pointed out that it is “because a player’s ability to get to a batted ball informs our thinking about whether or not he should have made a play.” A player who is slumping on defense won’t get to balls that he may have gotten to normally, and that’s terribly difficult for fans to point out. Announcing crews aren’t going to have convenient stats like “Prince Fielder has one hit in his last 24 at bats” for defense.

Basically, I think that there’s plenty of reason to believe that defense slumps, and although we don’t really know the magnitude, I also don’t see why it wouldn’t be near that of the slumps we see for batters, or even greater due to the fact that all defensive chances aren’t created equal nor distributed at a regular schedule. Similarly, I would imagine that defense sees hot streaks as well – perhaps my focus on poor fielding is because I’m a pessimist. Regardless, as our ability to evaluate defense evolves, I predict that we won’t look at fluctuations in defensive metrics as a sign of incorrectness, and instead we will learn to accept that, for whatever reason, it’s not fair nor reasonable to accept that a player is the same quality defender against every ball in play in every game in every season.


Lackey’s Lefty Blindspot

John Lackey certainly hasn’t been the pitcher that the Red Sox hoped they would be getting when they signed him for over $80 million this past winter. As an Angel, Lackey had consistently run xFIPs right near the 4.00 mark with stable rates in strikeouts, walks and ground balls. 2010 John Lackey however has fewer strikeouts and a lot more walks raising his xFIP to 4.63 coming into play today. That is the highest mark of Lackey’s career and does not portend well for the next four seasons to Boston.

Lackey’s pitch types and frequencies have not changed much if at all and signing with Boston did not mean a change in leagues. While the AL East might appear to pose stiffer competition than the AL West did, when discussing an individual pitcher, the sample sizes vary too much to be generalized. Lackey’s average hitter faced his season had a .737 OPS while it was .755 and .766 the previous two seasons with Anaheim. Even adjusting for the overall decline in offense this season, Lackey has faced weaker hitters in 2010 than in either 2009 or 2008 and yet his performance has declined noticeably.

Lackey’s struggles can be parsed further by examining his splits. His performance against right-handed hitters remains close to his established levels while he has struggled mightily against southpaws this season. Lackey’s strikeout to walk rate versus righties was 3.0 in 2008, was 2.9 last year and is at 2.9 this season. Versus a lefty it has slipped from 3.6 in 2008 and 3.1 in 2009 all the way to 1.3 in 2010. John Lackey isn’t facing significantly more lefties this season than he did in the past, but perhaps he should be given his collapse against them this year.

As always with splits, it’s a small sample and more time will be needed before being able to see if this is a mere blip or if this is something that will severely hamper his ability going forward. Not being able to retire other handed hitters will lead to teams more dramatically stacking their lineups and also makes the chances for a return of the 4.00 xFIP version of Lackey much less likely.


Don’t Intentionally Walk Teixeira

In the fifth inning of yesterday’s game between the Seattle Mariners and the New York Yankees, the Mariners decided to intentionally walk Mark Teixeira with runners on second and third and one out in a 1-0 game. With Alex Rodriguez out of the lineup, that brought up Robinson Cano with the bases loaded. Cano hit a grand slam, putting the Yankees up 5-0. At that point, the Yankees win expectancy was over 95%, and a formerly close game was effectively over.

The Yankees scoring after an intentional walk of Teixeira isn’t exactly something new. Yesterday marked Teixeira’s fourth intentional walk. Three times, including yesterday, the result was a grand slam. The other resulted in a run-scoring wild pitch, a strikeout, and then a two-RBI single. Overall, Teixeira and both runners in front of him have scored every single time that he’s been intentionally walked.

Obviously, we wouldn’t expect this to continue to happen every single time, but that doesn’t make the intentional walk a good strategy in this case. Here’s what The Book has to say:

If all batters have equal ability, intentionally walking a batter to set up a double play, force, or other situation is at best a break-even move (or insignficantly better than a break-even move). Doing so early in the game is counterproductive, since it increases the odds of a big inning more than it increases the odds of a scoreless inning.

Now, all batters in the Yankees lineup aren’t of equal ability, but when we look at those after Teixeira, they are all very good. Alex Rodriguez and Robinson Cano are typically the two hitting after Teixeira, making them the important two to examine when it comes to analyzing the value of the intentional walk. The third batter also matters, but far less; this season it has been a mix of players such as Jorge Posada, Marcus Thames, Nick Swisher, and Randy Winn. Overall, though, what matters is that the hitters that come to bat after Mark Teixeira are well above average, particularly Rodriguez and Cano.

Using the Markov chain calculator at Tom Tango’s website, we can take a look at the run expectancy for the composite line of Alex Rodriguez and Robinson Cano, which is essentially what managers are looking at after walking Mark Teixeira. The results, unsurprisingly, suggest that the Yankees are probably going to score a lot of runs after walking Teixeira, even in the situation with one out and runners and second and third, the situation most conducive to a productive intentional walk. Here’s what the calculator spits out.

Runners on 2nd, 3rd, 1 out: 1.578 runs
Bases loaded, 1 out: 1.986 runs

So opposing managers are essentially forfeiting .4 runs for the opportunity to say “Well, I didn’t let Mark Teixeira beat me!” at the post game press conference. The odds of scoring at least 1 run in an inning don’t justify the managers’ decisions either.

Runners on 2nd, 3rd, 1 out: .707
Bases loaded, 1 out: .752

Intentionally walking Mark Teixeira is simply not a smart move. The Yankees lineup behind Teixeira, particularly Cano and Rodriguez, is simply too good, which just magnifies the fact that the intentional walk adds to the possibility of a big inning. Four times, opposing managers have attempted to get out from a jam by walking Teixeira. Four times, at least three runs have scored. If a manager wants to win, his best option is to pitch to Teixeira and hope for the best.