Archive for Daily Graphings

Patience Pays

Right now, the top of the MLB position player WAR leaderboard looks like this:

Justin Morneau, +4.4
Robinson Cano, +4.3
Carl Crawford, +3.8
Alex Rios, +3.4
Adrian Gonzalez, +3.3

Besides all having excellent first halves of the 2010 season, and generally being high quality players all around, these five have something else in common – they were all pretty awful in their first trip around the big leagues.

To illustrate the point, here’s their WAR per 600 PA for something equivalent to their “rookie year” – several of these guys had half seasons in several different years, so I’ve combined those into one “year” and then extrapolated the number to an equivalent of one full season’s worth of plate appearances.

Morneau, 2003-2004, +1.1 WAR
Cano, 2005, +0.2 WAR
Crawford, 2002, +1.3 WAR
Rios, 2004, +2.1 WAR
Gonzalez, 2004-2005, -2.3 WAR

Morneau flashed some power, but didn’t hit for much of an average or draw enough walks to be useful at the start of his career. Cano didn’t walk and couldn’t field his position. Crawford was excellent defensively but couldn’t hit. Rios was like Crawford, but with even less power. And Gonzalez was just all kinds of terrible.

Of the five, only Crawford came up at a really young age. The rest were 22 or 23 and were coming off successful stints in the minors, offering hope that they could contribute right away. Pretty much across the board, they came up and stunk up the joint at the plate. Crawford and Rios were able to rescue themselves a little bit with their athleticism on defense, but none of them were able to quickly translate their minor league success at the plate to the big leagues.

I said all of this to say don’t give up on talented young players who struggle in their first taste of the majors. Whether its Justin Smoak, Matt LaPorta, Michael Saunders, or even Mike Stanton, patience is a virtue. Writing off a young player who doesn’t hit immediately upon arrival is a great way to get burned – just ask the Rangers whether they’d like to have Gonzalez back right now.


The Lion Roars: Leo Nunez’s 2010 Awesomeness

After the 2008 season, the Kansas City Royals traded Leo Nunez to the Florida Marlins for Mike Jacobs, who was to become a key part of the Royals 2009 push for the AL Central title. There is no need to re-visit the fate of Kansas City’s aspirations. The Marlins apparently aren’t happy with how their own 2010 playoff push is going, firing manager Fred Gonzalez and some coaches today. I suppose owner Jeffrey Loria feels like being forced by the union and MLB to actually spend money entitles him to expect greatness from those under him. I leave that discussion for someone else.

But looking back at the 2008-2009 off-season, from the standpoint of the spendthrift Marlins, Nunez’s best attribute at that time was probably that he had one more pre-arbitration season left, and that they could get him for Jacobs, a replacement level player they were likely going to non-tender. Sure, Nunez had been a half-win reliever in 2008 with a 3.77 FIP, but while his 3.62 tERA looked good, his 5.13 xFIP was less than impressive. In 2009, while Jacobs (unsurprisingly to to nearly everyone everyone except the Royals’ “braintrust” and, it must be said, a number of FanGraphs commentators) was awful in Kansas City to the tune of -0.5 WAR, Leo Nunez didn’t exactly light it up in 2009, either, putting up -0.8 WAR. One could still say that the Marlins “won” the trade given the salary differential from the two, but this clearly wasn’t what they were expecting. Nunez wasn’t completely horrible, as his xFIP was 4.41, but a 4.91 tERA showed he was getting hit hard, his strikeout rate wasn’t making up for the big flies, and, frankly, given Florida’s usual budgetary methods, the predictable outcome would have been a non-tender rather than let Nunez head to arbitration. Florida obviously saw something they liked, however, and settled with Nunez for $2 million dollars.

Thus far in 2010, the Marlins’ faith in Nunez has been amply rewarded, we he’s put up almost one win already. What caught my eye, however, wasn’t simply Nunez’s good performance so far — after all, pitcher performance varies more year-to-year than hitters, and given the small samples we get of reliever performance in single seasons, great changes are to be expected from season-to-season since we only get a glimpse of their true talent. What grabbed my attention was how firmly Nunez seeming “transformation” is supported by his peripherals.

Beginning with the “dumb” stat, ERA: Nunez currently sits at 2.43. Over not even 30 innings, a lot of pitchers could do that. That is actually higher than his FIP, at 2.33. Nunez has had good FIPs before, partly on the basis of his luck on flyballs. He has been lucky with HR/FB rate this season, at only 4.0%, but even when normalizing that, his xFIP is still an impressive 3.04, and that’s mainly because of one of the most impressive and radical changes to Nunez’s peformance: after having about a 40% GB rate and about a 43% FB rate in 2008-2009, in 2010 Nunez has ramped up his ground ball rate to 52.6%w and his fly ball rate is down to 32.1%. All this explain why his tERA is an amazing 2.11 in 2010.

That isn’t all. In 2008, Nunez simply didn’t strike that many batters out (4.84/9). He increased that to 7.86 in 2009, but also upped his walk rate to 3.54. In 2010, he has lowered his walk rate down to 2.12, while increasing his K rate to 8.80, a career high if he keeps it up. Combining that with his newly-found groundball tendency, it’s as if Nunez looked at his 2009 in the offseason, wasn’t happy, and simply decided, “well, that didn’t work, maybe I’ll try striking out more guys, walking less, and, while I’m at it, I’ll keep half the balls in play on the ground. Maybe that will work.” I’m sure Brian Bannister has talked about it in one of the 27 interviews he’s given over the last few seasons, but Nunez is actually making it happen.

All of this is in an extremely small sample of course (not quite 30 innings), but keep in mind that it isn’t as if Nunez had a huge sample of last year’s performance, either, at about 70 innings. Using simple 5/3/2 weights for seasons, at about 42 innings we’d weight Nunez’s 2010 equal to his 2009 in terms of projecting his true talent, so he’s getting close. And there is evidence (other than the results he’s getting) that he’s changed his approach. His BIS pitch-types indicate that he’s throwing fewer fastballs and sliders in favor of many more change-ups, which has made his fastball and (especially) his change-up more effective. Whether he can continue with this success throwing almost 46% change-ups is something to watch.

We don’t know exactly what the Marlins saw in Nunez, but whatever it was, the made the right decision, and it is a credit to their talent evaluators. FanGraphs currently values Nunez’s 2010 performance alongside or greater than that of more well-known relievers such as Rafael Soriano, Billy Wagner, Francisco Rodriguez, Grant Balfour, Jose Valverde, Mariano Rivera, and Joakim Soria. Even if he can’t keep it up, he’s more than earned what the Marlins are paying him this season.


Ordonez’s Contact Skills

Magglio Ordonez is having a great year for the Tigers; his .402 wOBA sits just outside the top ten in baseball. Ordonez has always been able to maintain a relatively low strikeout rate for a hitter with his power and walks, and this year it is even better with a career low strikeout rate (9.5%), a career high walk rate (11.7%) and solid power (ISO of .185). The great BB:K numbers are caused by his best O-Contact%, Z-Contact%, and Contact% in the FanGrapgs Era (since 2002). His 91% contact rate is ninth best in the bigs and of those players better than him only Dustin Pedroia and Victor Martinez have anywhere near his power.

Here I will quickly look at where that extra contact is coming from. I use the contact contours that I introduced in this post. These contours are estimates of Ordonez’s contact rate.  A swung-at pitch inside the solid line is contacted over 92.5% of the time. A pitch around the solid line that Ordonez swings at (92.5% contour) is contacted 92.5% of the time.  A swung-at pitch between the solid and dotted is contacted between 92.5% and 87.5% of the time.  And so on. I compare his contact rate for 2010 to his contact rate on pitches between 2007 and 2009 (those in the pitchf/x data set) and the image is from the catcher’s persepctive.

Because Ordonez hasn’t swung at many pitches outside of the zone, inside the curves are unresovled there, but throughout the strike zone he has a much higher conatct rate. His 92.5% contour covers much of the zone in 2010 compared to perviously where it was just a small part middle-in. He is also making contact at a higher rate on pitches up-and-away. Previously, he made contact on those pitches less than 87.5% of the time, but he is making contact at a high rate (higher than 92.5%) on these pitches.

That extra contact has led to fewer strikeouts and is partially responsible for Ordonez’s success so far. On the face of it, this success may partially vindicate the Tigers’ decision to allow Ordonez’s option to vest (he has already been worth nearly 11 million dollars, and more if you think wins are more valuable than average to the Tigers who have a shot at the AL Central). Still, decisions need to be evaluated based on the information that was available when they were made. And even the Tigers could not have predicted a .400 wOBA first half from Ordonez.


What Should the Orioles Do?

Overview

With their 10-4 loss to the Marlins last night the Orioles are now 19-51, last place in the majors by six full games. That puts them on pace for a 44-118 season, which would put them in company with the 2003 Tigers and 1962 Mets. It would also be a 20-game downturn from last season, when they went 64-98. There are a few bright spots and plenty of potential, but these Orioles are a bad team that has underperformed. There’s not much anyone can do to fix that.

Buy Or Sell

The O’s face a conundrum as the deadline approaches. They do have a number of players who other teams will find attractive. The Orioles stand to improve future teams by cashing in on those players, so in an ideal world they’d be aggressive sellers. But the Orioles have to deal with reality, and in reality those trade chips rank among their top performers. To sell them off could be what pushes the Orioles past that 120-loss mark. No team wants to face that possibility.

Orioles president and CEO Andy MacPhail might not have a choice. He knows what lies ahead for his team. There is no mercy for the weak in the AL East, and the division will only get tougher as Toronto reloads. For Baltimore to keep its best trading chips would be to miss an opportunity to help build a stronger future. That is not something they can afford right now. If it means a new low in the loss column, well, that’s the price that teams sometimes have to pay for future wins.

After a strong start Kevin Millwood has pitched poorly lately, which certainly hurts his trade stock. As Dave wrote yesterday, however, he could present a bargain for a contending team looking for an additional arm. This is good for the contender, but bad for the Orioles. According to Eddie Bajek’s reverse engineering of the Elias rankings Millwood still rates as a Type B free agent, and unless he completely collapses probably won’t lose that designation. The Orioles can likely do better — they did, after all, nab Josh Bell for George Sherrill last year — but they shouldn’t expect a huge return for Millwood.

Ty Wigginton has made the most of his playing time. He started the season as a reserve, but became a starter when Brian Roberts hit the DL with back problems. He would have gotten at-bats anyway, considering Garrett Atkins’s horrible bat, but he has taken advantage regardless. His .367 wOBA still ranks high on the AL charts, though it is dropping. Since May 19th he’s hitting .223/.339/.282. He’s clearly better than that, but he’s not as good as his early season hot streak either. Because he is versatile he should find a few suitors, but because he is a free agent at the end of the year teams likely won’t give up much for the rental.

The player that could probably fetch the greatest return is outfielder Luke Scott. This is his sixth season in the majors, but he has accumulated only three full years of service time, meaning he has two more dates with the arbitration panel before becoming a free agent. His production this year, a .365 wOBA, is in line with his career .360 mark. His best defensive innings have come at the outfield corners, where he has a positive career UZR. The production and service time combination means the Orioles could get more for Scott than they could for Millwood and Wigginton. In a year when offense is down, there are certainly a few contenders who could use an outfielder with an .838 OPS.

The rest of the roster features nothing attractive. The Orioles want to hang onto their younger players, and the rest are veterans who probably wouldn’t help a contender. Even Miguel Tejada looks pretty terrible right now. The only other name that approaches attractiveness is Jeremy Guthrie, and it’s unlikely the O’s trade him. Like Scott, he has two more years of arbitration which, combined with his mere $3 million salary in 2010, could yield some decent offers from other clubs. But to lose Guthrie would be to lose veteran presence in the rotation next year. It’s not something that we can really quantify, but I’m sure the Orioles would like to avoid relying on a rotation of pitchers 25 and younger.

On The Farm

This is where things get interesting for the Orioles. They have already tapped a couple of pitchers from their top 10, Brian Matusz and Jake Arrieta, and could again dip into that pool later this season. LHP Zach Britton, their No. 3 prospect entering the season, has pitched very well at AA and might take a trip to Baltimore before season’s end. Switch-hitting Josh Bellhasn’t hit that well at AAA, but considering the poor production the O’s are getting from third base he could also crack the roster this season. First base prospect Brandon Snyder has heated up of late and could find himself with the big league squad in September. Again, it’s not like they’re getting anything from their current first basemen.

Beyond those guys the O’s have a number of high-ceiling guys at the lower levels. Some of them might be able to help next year, but as the team has learned this year it’s not something they can count on. It looks like the O’s could use more in the way of middle infield prospects. They have plenty of pitching on the farm.

Budget

The O’s opened the season with a $73.8 million payroll, their highest since 2007. That shouldn’t matter much, though. Budget is probably the last item on the team’s collective mind. It’s all about rebuilding now. Even if that means losing 120 games.


Jason Bay’s Swing

Jason Bay is having a really bad year. Considering his large contract he’s been given by the Mets, his 125 wRC+, combined with mediocre defense at a non-premium position, is simply unacceptable. The question, however, is what has gotten into Bay to have him drop so dramatically? No prognosticators saw this coming, and the Mets brass has to be shocked at the power outage, which Jack Moore chronicled wonderfully last week.

I think we may learn a little bit from Bay’s swing. Let’s take a peak at his stance from July of 2009 on the Red Sox and June of 2010 on the Mets:


So you can definitely see a difference here despite the slightly different camera angles. On the Sox, Bay had his hands farther up and out, his knees bent more, and his stance slightly more open. Given his swing, this is the better approach, as Bay is giving himself the proper momentum to come through on the ball, flicking his wrists to generate power. Bay doesn’t have a typical swing where he whips the bat around all the way; he’s more of the Richie Sexson/Chase Utley school of hitting which requires a flick of the wrists.

Here is Bay getting ready to swing as the pitch is coming in, already released from the pitcher’s hand:


The differences here are more subtle. On the Sox, Bay is less crouched (see how his knees are more bent on the Mets and his rear end is sticking out more). On the Mets, his front foot isn’t as parallel to his back while his hands are farther down, meaning he’ll generate less power with his swing. The main takeaway is that he is more geared back for a strong swing earlier, but now is more flat-footed, giving him no chance to drive the ball on the outside part of the plate with any serious power.

Finally, look how far away from the plate he is on the Mets. It doesn’t look like much, but that ~1 inch or so can mean the world. Because Bay stands so far away from the plate, there’s no way for him to generate any power to right field. He’ll either swing through a pitch on the outside corner, pop it up to right, or roll it over for an easy grounder. Here are his stats when hitting the ball to the right side:

2010: .188/.176/.375, 35 wRC+
2009: .267/.267/.533, 103 wRC+
2008: .256/.247/.522, 92 wRC+

However, if we look at the numbers to right field a little closer, we can learn some more:

2010: 8.8% LD, 5.9% GB, 85.3% FB, 24.1% IFFB, 3.4% HR/FB, .152 BABIP
2009: 9.8% LD, 11.5% GB, 78.7% FB, 20.8% IFFB, 8.3% HR/FB, .214 BABIP
2008: 8.6% LD, 9.7% GB, 81.7% FB, 13.2% IFFB, 6.6% HR/FB, .205 BABIP

I think that Bay has gotten slightly unlucky on his balls in play to the right side this year, but ther’s good reason for such a .156 BABIP. One out of every four balls he hits to the right side is a popup, which is basically an automatic out. That percentage is almost double of his 2008 numbers. Bay’s groundball rate is also extremely low, and grounders have a higher BABIP on average than fly balls. Right field at Citi Field is cavernous, and for Bay to hit flies 85% of the time he hits to right field is a death wish.

The power droppage to right field, and overall for that matter, is stunning, but not necessarily shocking. The change in Bay’s stance isn’t overwhelming, but it may be a marginal cause for his weak numbers for the season. Only time will tell if Bay can get back into form.


FanGraphs Chat – 6/23/10

Noon, baseball, chatting. Let’s do it.


On Reading Trade Rumors

Even though he can’t count Lou Piniella among his fans, Ken Rosenthal remains among the best in the business at breaking news across baseball. Naturally, that means I occasionally find myself reading The Buzz on Fox Sports’s website, where Rosenthal and Jon Paul Morosi report some of the latest news, rumors, and other such things from around baseball.

Their most recent post as of this writing deals with the Oakland Athletics and their willingness to trade two of their more prominent chips this summer, namely Ben Sheets and Coco Crisp. Apparently, the A’s are happy with how Sheets is serving as a mentor to their young players, and may want to keep him for the rest of the season, even though they possibly wouldn’t gain any free agent compensation if he walks at the end of the contract. Crisp has a $5.75 million club option which “could fit easily into their budget.” In conclusion, the Athletics would need to “receive a compelling offer” to move Sheets and would have to be “motivated to move” Crisp. The conclusion regarding Sheets is from “major-league sources;” the conclusion regarding Crisp could simply be speculation by Rosenthal- it’s not clear.

What does all this actually mean? Mark Polishuk summed up the post over at MLBTradeRumors with the title A’s May Hold On To Ben Sheets, Deal Coco Crisp?. The question mark and use of the word “may” display uncertainty, but the language in the Fox Sports post doesn’t suggest either of those conclusions to me. First of all, the A’s would obviously have to receive a compelling offer in order to move Sheets. In trades, the trading partners are always looking to receive equal (or higher) value for their respective pieces; no player is ever moved without a “compelling offer.” Also, Polishuk’s title suggests that Crisp is more likely to be dealt than Sheets. To me, the difference between “motivated to move” and ‘a compelling offer” is simply one that could be found in a thesaurus.

Perhaps I’m expecting too much or reading the article incorrectly, but I don’t feel that I’ve learned anything at all by reading Rosenthal’s blurb – it tells me that Oakland would have to receive something meaningful back in return in order to trade Ben Sheets or Coco Crisp, but that is the case with any player. Still, some fans may interpret this article as saying there’s no chance that Sheets is moved, or perhaps that Crisp’s option will certainly be picked up.

The rumors are relatively benign – nobody’s going to be terribly excited by this news, nor should they be. Now is the time of year where trade talk heightens and Fox’s report is merely one example of misleading or meaningless language. For those who obsess over Major League Baseball like I do and like I know many of you reading do and like many of those fans who won’t ever set eyes upon this blog do, trade rumors are a regular part of our baseball watching and reading. For some reason, we care about what Ken Rosenthal and Buster Olney and other major league sources are saying. Based on the volume of rumors around the game – MLB Trade Rumors averages 104 posts per week – these sources sure have much to say. But in this case, and in many others, all this talk adds up to nothing.

As the meat of the trading season approaches, more and more trade rumors will flood the internet. When it comes to these rumors, we have to remember that, in many cases, they are just that – rumors. This isn’t meant as a blast at MLBTR or Polishuk or Rosenthal – they do a an important job in the baseball world. I find MLBTR to be an invaluable resource when it comes to news and formulating ideas, and as I mentioned above, Rosenthal is an excellent story breaker. But, at the same time, just because it comes out of the mouth of a source doesn’t make it meaningful nor even true. I think that knowledge and some critical reading just could keep all of us a little bit calmer this July.


Dobbs DFA

Greg Dobbs was designated for assignment today. Let’s take a look at him.

Dobbs broke into the majors in 2005 as a 25-year-old with the Seattle Mariners, he’d eventually find his way to Philadelphia and in 2007 he received enough playing him time to hit 10 homers with a .335 wOBA in more than 350 plate appearances. The next year he’d be restricted to mostly pinch hitting, a role he’s since been confined to, and he’d post a .354 wOBA with nine homers. Generally speaking, you don’t expect a player to hit more home runs the less time he sees, but Dobbs did that. In 2009 everything seemed to fall apart and in 2010 he’s got a higher on-base percentage (.222) than wOBA (.218) in 73 plate appearances.

Of his 1,078 career plate appearances, 261 are of the pinch hit variety. That’s about a quarter of the time that Dobbs went to the plate he was in a role where offensive performance is expected to decrease by something like 10%. Suffice to say, Dobbs’ raw numbers (.312 wOBA) would be understandable if they sold him a little below his true talent level based on poor inch hitting numbers. Oddly, though, Dobbs had a slash line as a pinch hitter of .251/.314/.413 for his career; almost equal to his starter slash line of .269/.311/.418.

ZiPS has him hitting less than league average (.319 wOBA) which is really all that matters with Dobbs because defensively he’s a sub-par third baseman without much playing time elsewhere. Weak beat, weak glove, will travel isn’t the most attractive classified ad, but it’s the one Dobbs will submit while on the waiver wire. Odds are, he’s heading to Triple-A, but some team might fall in love with his 2008 and give him a shot.


Yet Another Setback For McGowan

Unfortunate news out of Toronto today as Blue Jays pitcher Dustin McGowan has injured his shoulder once again. McGowan heard a pop in his shoulder while throwing at the team’s spring facility in Dunedin, FL. McGowan will certainly miss the remainder of the 2010 season due to what will be the second surgery on the labrum in his right shoulder. It seems possible, if not likely, that McGowan will also miss the entire 2011 season as well.

In 2007, the Toronto Blue Jays starting pitchers put together a combined 20.7 wins above replacement. Dustin McGowan and his 3.9 WAR was a large piece of that group; between him, Roy Halladay, and A.J. Burnett, the Blue Jays appeared to have the core of what could be a top-flight starting rotation for years to come. However, it wouldn’t last past 2008. McGowan’s first shoulder surgery came during the ’08 season, and Burnett left for the Yankees that offseason. Of the five starters for the Jays in 2009, only Roy Halladay also pitched in 2007, and he would be traded to the Phillies after the season.

Still, the Jays have some solid starting pitchers on their roster now, including Shaun Marcum, Ricky Romero, Brandon Morrow, and Brett Cecil, all of whom have at least 1.4 WAR on the season already. GM Alex Anthopolous and the Blue Jays hoped that McGowan would be able to return by May or June and give that rotation a boost – given the Jays’ hot start, McGowan’s addition would’ve been a sizable help in remaining in the playoff race.

Now, it seems that McGowan may go as many as three seasons between MLB appearances. The nearest analog for this situation appears to be Brewers pitcher Chris Capuano, who went from 2007 until 2010 without appearing in a game after two Tommy John surgeries, but he’s only thrown 4.2 innings for the Brewers this season.

The road back will be long and difficult for McGowan, and there’s no guarantee that he will be anywhere near the same pitcher upon his return. This is a large setback for the Jays organization, as McGowan appeared to be turning himself into one of the more reliable starters in the league back in 2008, and now his season and possibly his career is over.


More Nonsense on Time of Game

Today, Ken Rosenthal wrote about a conversation he had with Frank Robinson, who has been tasked by Bud Selig with trying to get a few teams to shorten the length of their games. As Rosenthal notes, MLB has been trying to do this for years, and with no success. They send memos, they ask nicely, umpires complain to the media, and none of it matters.

And yet, somehow, they continue to miss the obvious – they cannot make the games shorter unless they reduce offensive levels. It is a simple fact that run scoring is the main driver of the length of a baseball game. You will never go to a 13-10 slugfest that moves at a brisk pace. The only way for games to end is for 51 or or more outs to be recorded, and every time a batter reaches base safely, he’s extended the time of game without contributing towards its finish.

Yes, the Yankees and Red Sox games always take longer than everyone else. Guess what? The Red Sox score more runs than any other team in baseball, and the Yankees are right behind them. This shouldn’t be any kind of surprise to Robinson, or anyone else in Major League Baseball.

The Yankees and Red Sox have something else in common, of course – an offensive philosophy that values selective hitters. Boston’s hitters see 4.07 pitchers per plate appearance, most in baseball. With hitters like J.D. Drew, Kevin Youkilis, and David Ortiz, the Red Sox have built an offense that was designed to make pitchers work. The Yankees do the same, always loading their line-up with high walk, high power guys who don’t swing very often.

This style of baseball is naturally going to take longer than the Royals or Giants swing-at-anything approach. Guess what, Mr. Robinson? You can’t issue a memo that orders Nick Swisher to swing at pitches out of the strike zone.

If you want Boston and New York (as well as the rest of the league) to play quicker games, you have one option, and one option only – make the strike zone bigger. Over the years, it has steadily shrunk, especially on the high side, where nothing over the belt is a strike anymore. The shrinking strike zone has allowed selective hitters to keep the bat on their shoulders until they get a pitch they can drive, and no amount of complaining about it is going to make them adopt a less effective approach to scoring runs.

Nothing else they do will matter. The only way to shorten a Major League game is to make the strike zone bigger. Until they decide to do that, the rest of this is just posturing.