Archive for Daily Graphings

The Wrong Way: Barton’s Bunts

Oakland first baseman Daric Barton is having a nice season under the radar, hitting for a .360 wOBA (.283/.390/.418) and playing good defense. It’s not a superstar performance, and a good OBP with little power and fielding, especially at first base, aren’t going to get him a lot of national publicity, but it is valuable nonetheless.

Something about Barton’s 2010 has caught the eye of someone outside of Oakland, however: his nine sacrifice bunts. It begins with this article by Susan Slusser, in which not only were Barton’s bunts discussed, but praised, as it turns out he’s doing it “on his own.” It is part of a typical “prospect finally living up his potential’ piece for a local paper, but it was Joe Posnanski who declared this excitement over Barton’s (praised, if uncommanded) bunts The Day Moneyball Died. Rob Neyer offered a half-hearted defense of Oakland General Manager Billy Beane’s seeming acquiescence to this tactic as perhaps Beane wanting to “zag” when everyone else was “zigging.”

I have no idea what is going on, or even if it is significant. Maybe Barton is engaging in a little game theory, given that he hasn’t shown a great deal of power yet, and is trying to get the infielders to further play in against him. That is a bald speculation, however, and Barton is not much of a groundball hitter (which bodes well for his future power potential, of course). And while sacrifice attempts sometimes increase run expectancy during a plate appearance, it looks like Barton is “succeeding” far too often for that to be the plan.

Perhaps Barton has taken on some other wisdom from sabermetrics and is actually in situations where a bunt increases win probability (WPA) and/or run expectancy based on the base/out state (RE24). Well, FanGraphs has the tools to find out, so we’ll go to the play-by-play logs.

April 11 vs. the Angels, Barton bunted twice. The first time was in the first inning with one and one out. The WPA for the plate appearance was -0.017 and the RE24 was -0.22. The second time was in the eighth inning, in a near-identical situation: Rajai Davis got on first, stole second, and Barton bunted. Barton’s WPA was -0.010, the RE24 was again -0.22.

April 17 vs. the Orioles, Barton again bunted Rajai Davis over from second to third. WPA: -.010, RE24: -0.19.

April 30 vs. Blue Jays, Barton advances Cliff Pennington to third with a bunt with no one out. WPA: -0.15, RE24: -0.19.

May 15 vs. Angels, Barton again bunts Pennington from second to third with none out in the first innging. WPA: -0.17, RE24: -0.22.

May 23 vs. Giants, eighth inning, none out, Barton sacrifices Rajai Davis from first to second in a 1-0 game. WPA: -0.007, RE24 -0.21.

May 26 vs. Orioles, Barton moves Davis over to second with a first inning, no out bunt. WPA: -0.019, RE24: -0.23.

May 28 vs. Tigers, Barton bunts Davis from second to third with none out. WPA: -0.015, RE24: -0.19.

June 11 vs. Giants, Barton bunts Mark Ellis from second to third with none out in the first inning. WPA: -.013, RE24: -0.16.

From the standpoint of straight up run expectancy based on base/out states (RE24), all of these bunts are obviously bad ideas. Of course, it is well known that in certain game states sacrifice bunts can increase win expectancy, and the point of the game is to win, after all. Yet in not a single case did Barton make the right decision. The first inning bunts with none out are especially atrocious, of course. I realize there is a chance for a sacrifice fly when moving a runner from second to third, but it’s pretty funny when it’s Rajai Davis — there’s a guy who need the extra help getting home on a single!

But even late in the close game of May 23, with the As up 1-0 on the Giants, when one might think adding “just one” in the eighth could be a good idea, the WPA for Barton’s sacrifice was negative (if ever so slightly) at -0.007. So even the “best” of Barton’s bunts was a bad idea.

Daric Barton is helping the As this season at the plate and in the field. Maybe he’s playing games with the infielders. But while some might hail his play as the Right Way and a lack of selfishness for a good young hitter, the primary thing he’s been sacrificing (against his intentions) is Oakland’s chances to win games.


Pedro and the Phils

With the Phillies struggling in third place this yer after back-to-back National League Championships, GM Ruben Amaro has been toying around with an old idea:

Pedro Martinez appears to have his sights set on a repeat of 2009, when he joined the Phillies midseason and wound up starting two games for them in the World Series.

…”Pitching is always the issue. Everybody is always looking for the same thing,” Amaro said. “Again, a lot of it depends on how Happ progresses. And we’ve got to get (setup reliever Ryan) Madson back. I like our chances when both of those guys are back.”

…”I don’t know how much he’s been throwing, but what he did here last year, he was great for this team and helped (the Phillies) out a lot,” said Phils catcher Brian Schneider, who caught the righty with the Mets. “I loved working with Petey. But we have enough stuff going on right now that we’re just concentrating on the pitchers that are already here.”

While the Phillies may say they are happy with the pitchers they’ve got on board, I don’t see why they would be. Here are the members of the Phils rotation with their current and rest of season FIPs courtesy of ZiPS:

Roy Halladay: 2.67/2.93
Cole Hamels: 4.55/3.78
Joe Blanton: 5.83/4.30
Jamie Moyer: 4.98/4.83
Kyle Kendrick: 4.81/4.74
J.A. Happ: 4.48 (10 innings)/4.71

There is currently not one starter on the Phillies not named Roy Halladay who has a better FIP than any Mets starting pitcher. Joe Blanton’s projection for the rest of the year seems generous given his awful pitching, and Cole Hamels has suffered from a nasty combination of homeritis and a career low K/BB.

But what can Pedro Martinez offer the Phillies? Not much, really. He put up a 4.28 FIP last year, but is another year older and hasn’t pitched yet this entire season. Keeping that in mind, here’s what the prognosticators said before the start of the 2010 campaign:

Bill James: 3.67 FIP
CHONE: 4.75 FIP
Marcel: 4.65 FIP
ZiPS: 4.17 FIP

The algorithm at Bill James’ site must be messed up, because it has Pedro with a 8.90 K/9, even though his last two years were 7.46 and 7.18 (and, again, he’s 38 years old and bound to be rusty). Pedro would most likely sit around the ~4.50 FIP area, which would basically give the Phillies someone a tick better than Kyle Kendrick. Martinez’s ceiling isn’t that high, but his rock bottom can be pretty bad.

Pedro Martinez may give the Phillies an extra 0.5 WAR at best, but he’s unlikely to be the tipping point in the Phillies’ race to make the playoffs. Right now Philadelphia needs Ryan Howard and Chase Utley to right themselves, as the offense has been putrid of late. If the Phillies are going to trade for any starting pitcher, Cliff Lee may be the one guy who can put them above and beyond every team in the National League. They’d be so good I couldn’t imagine anyone ever passing up the opportunity to go Halladay-Lee-Hamels in the starting rotation. Oh, wait…


Cano’s Improvement

As of last night, we have officially had a changing of the guard. After setting up camp at the top of the WAR leaderboards for most of the season, Justin Morneau has finally been displaced. Now it’s Robinson Cano leading all of Major League Baseball with +4.0 wins of value added, as the Yankees second baseman is carrying his teammates.

Offensively, not much has changed with Cano, as the surge in his numbers is basically tied to a higher than usual BABIP (.382) and his extra base hits flying over the wall instead of bouncing off of it. Last year, 36.7 percent of his hits were of the extra base variety, and he’s at 36 percent this year – the distribution of those XBH, however, have tilted toward home runs. It’s hard to say that either of those spikes represent a significant improvement, and not surprisingly, the ZIPS rest-of-season projection suspects that Cano will hit at basically his 2009 level for the rest of the year.

There exist other numbers, however, that suggest Cano has indeed turned himself into a better over all player. The big strides he has made have not been at the plate, but rather in the field. I saw Cano play quite a bit in 2002 when he was assigned to low-A Greensboro, and it’s not an exaggeration to say that he was a defensive disaster. His footwork was laughably bad, and while he showed athleticism, there were just no fundamentals that suggested he was even on the path to becoming a big league middle infielder.

He wasn’t much better by the time he got to the majors, in 2005, as he posted a -21.2 UZR in his rookie year. Despite hitting well for a second baseman, he gave back nearly all of his value by failing to convert outs behind his pitchers. Again, I figured it was only a matter of time until Cano was shifted to the outfield, where his athleticism could play well and his inability to react quickly would be of less importance.

To his credit though, Cano has put in a tremendous amount of work, turning himself into a competent defender. No, he’ll never win a gold glove, but his +2.3 UZR to date this season is no longer the kind of shocking number that makes people question the system itself. While a couple of months of UZR data isn’t large enough to make any conclusions, his UZR since the 2006 season is just -12.4, or about -3 runs per year.

Cano probably won’t continue to have 40 percent of his extra base hits fly over the wall, nor will he be able to keep his BABIP at .382. He can, however, continue to play a decent enough second base, and he should take pride in that fact, because he got there through sheer hard work. Even when the offensive numbers inevitably regress a bit, Cano will still be one of the game’s best second baseman, and that’s a testament to just how far he’s come as a player.


College World Series Preview: Bracket 1

The College World Series begins on Saturday with the nation’s final eight teams playing a double elimination tournament for a spot in the best-of-three finals. The teams are split into two brackets, and over two posts, I’ll preview each bracket.

Bracket 1: TCU, Florida State, Florida, UCLA.

Texas Christian: Dominated their hosted regional by beating each team (Lamar, Arizona and Baylor), outscoring their opponents 36-8 on the weekend. In the Super Regional, TCU stunned Texas in Austin, holding the Longhorns to one run in games one and three.

How They Got Here

Highest Drafted Player: Bryan Holaday, C, Detroit Tigers, 193rd overall.

Best Prospect: Matt Purke, LHP, So.

Florida State: Undeterred despite traveling to Connecticut for their regional, Florida State went 3-0 to sweep the regional, twice beating Oregon by two runs to reach the next round. They hosted Vanderbilt last weekend and won in three games, despite being outscored 20-18 by the Commodores.

Highest Drafted Player
: John Gast, LHP, St. Louis Cardinals, 199th overall.

How They Got Here

Best Prospect: James Ramsey, of, So. or Sean Gilmartin, lhp, So.

Florida: The Gators are a perfect 5-0 in the postseason, and have yet to allow an opponent to score more than three runs. Over those five games, the Gators have scored a total of 43 runs.

Highest Drafted Player
: Kevin Chapman, LHP, Kansas City Royals, 119th overall.

How They Got Here

Best Prospect: Preston Tucker, 1B, So.

UCLA: The Bruins faced no easy road getting here, but swept a regional in the mix for Regional of Death: LSU, UC Irvine, and Kent State. In the Super Regional, they came back numerous times against Cal State Fullerton, most notably scoring seven times in innings 8-10 to win Game Two 11-7.

How they got here

Highest Drafted Player: Rob Rasmussen, LHP, Florida Marlins, 73rd overall.

Best Prospect: Gerrit Cole, RHP, So.

After the jump, I wax free-form about how this bracket might go.
Read the rest of this entry »


Where Have A.J. Burnett’s Strikeouts Gone?

Following Wednesday night’s disastrous start (3.1 innings pitched, two homers, and more walks than strikeouts) A.J. Burnett has now faced 382 batters on the season. Two hundred batters faced is the amount Pizza Cutter established as the threshold for strikeouts/plate appearances to become a reliable metric during a single season. That’s worth noting because Burnett’s strikeout percentage sits at 16.5%. Over the last three seasons, he struck out 23.7% of batters faced; over the last five that number is 23%; for his career it’s 21.7%. As it stands, the only season in which Burnett struck out batters at a lower rate than he is currently was way back in 2000. That year, he struck out 15.7% as a 23-year-old

When Burnett signed with the Yankees, the expectation was that his numbers could actually improve. He was battle tested in the rough American League East. More important than battled tested, though, he was successful. His xFIP had ranged from 3.55 to 3.64 over his three-year stint with the Jays, and a move to the Yankees meant he would no longer have to face a lineup consisting of multiple Hall of Famers on numerous occasions each season. That hasn’t been the case, though.

It was probably unrealistic to expect Burnett to improve on his whiff rate, which was over 10% in 2008, but that figure declined to 8.2% in 2009, and sits at 7.1% in 2010. A once raging fastball, sitting in the upper 90s on some occasions, has retreated in velocity. Pitchfx has its average velocity sitting just about 93 miles per hour, with empty swings occurring under 6% of the time. The only pitch Burnett is actually having batters miss often is his knuckle curve (12.5%). Compare that to last season and the only noticeable changes have nothing at all to do with his velocity being down. He’s actually getting more whiffs on the fastball and fewer on the curve.

That would suggest the decline is not entirely due to his velocity, which leaves predictability and location as the other potential culprits. The curve becomes Burnett’s go-to pitch when he reaches two strikes. With the exception of 3-2 counts, Burnett tosses his bender more than 50% of the time on each count. This doesn’t differ too much from 2009, when he threw it 60+% of the time on 0-2 and 1-2 and 48% on 2-2. This usage pattern actually resembles his 2008 pattern more than anything.

This would lead to a question of whether it’s Burnett’s location of the curveball that’s problematic. In 2009, the pitch was swung at under 40% of the time and resulted in a strike nearly 60% of the time. In 2010, however, the swing rate has remained static, while the strike rate has dipped to a little over 51%. That’s not a radical shift, mind you, but a big enough one that it alters Burnett’s ability to succeed. If batters are able to hold off on the inevitable avalanche of curveballs that dive below the zone on two strike counts, that means Burnett will have to beat them with his fastball or sinker, a combination of which hasn’t resulted in a positive run value since 2007.

The most troubling statistic associated with Burnett is that 40% of his strikeouts have come against the Orioles and Indians. Those starts account for a little more than 20% of his starts this season.


Ubaldo’s Unimpressive Start

Behind Ubaldo Jimenez’s eight IP, one run outing, the Colorado Rockies defeated the Minnesota Twins 5-1. As much as an eight inning, one run start can be unimpressive in the major leagues, this was it. Jimenez only struck out four batters while walking two. He allowed eight hits while allowing seven line drives and only inducing two swings and misses.

Not only that, but the Twins lineup today was especially weak by their standards, as Matt Tolbert was in the lineup for Orlando Hudson at second base and Drew Butera was at catcher for Joe Mauer. J.J. Hardy’s continued absence forced Nick Punto to move over to SS and rookie Danny Valencia to start at third base. The loss of Mauer, in particular, lowers the lineups average projected wOBA from .344 – well above average – to .329, nearly average.

Given the results from Ubaldo’s start – 4 K, 2 BB, 12 GB, 4 OFB (outfield flies), 7 LD, we would have expected the Twins to score 3.75 runs, based on the average run values used from tRA. That would be 4.22 runs per 9 innings, or 3.88 earned runs per 9 innings. That’s not bad – it’s still well above average, but not what we’d expect from the pitcher who has essentially been crowned King of the World.

It’s starts like these that are the reason that we shouldn’t place Jimenez above such pitchers as Cliff Lee and Roy Halladay, both pitchers who have performed at a higher level this season than Jimenez. Lee has a well-documented 15 K/BB, which would easily be the best mark in Major League history. Roy Halladay’s 2.38 ERA is supported by a superior 2.67 FIP, making him the most valuable pitcher in baseball so far.

It’s not like this start is just one isolated incident – see 5/26 vs. ARI – only 3 Ks and 1 BB, or 5/20 vs. HOU – there are times that, despite his ace stuff, he doesn’t quite dominate hitters like his ERA suggests he has.

This isn’t to say that Ubaldo Jimenez isn’t a great pitcher – I believe he’s squarely in the top 10 SPs in the league, if not the top 5. However, today’s start simply wasn’t a top-level start, even though he managed to hold the Twins to one run. We cannot crown him as the greatest pitcher in the league quite yet.


More Egregious Umpiring: Yorvit Torrealba Suspended Three Games

We’ve had some Awful Umpiring this season, from the Buehrle Balks to the Galarraga One-Hitter, and players are calling out individual umpires by name more than ever before. The recent ESPN poll of major league players about the best and worst umps in baseball was especially revealing: it was the first time in my memory that players were asked their opinion of umpires by name, and while the results were eye-opening they weren’t at all surprising. The worst umpires were CB Bucknor, Joe West, and Angel Hernandez, which we all knew anyway, but it was remarkable to hear the players admit it.

Yorvit Torrealba got suspended for three games after protesting balls and strikes on Monday, when the brim of his batting helmet incidentally touched umpire Larry Vanover. But Vanover escalated the argument considerably. Watch the video, and you’ll see he actually took a step toward Torrealba. Torrealba will have to take the suspension sooner or later — umps are sacrosanct, and no part of you gets to touch any part of them — but Vanover’s actions feed into the overall problem that more and more players are calling out this year: the umpires think the game is about them, they like drawing attention to themselves, and, as a result, it’s hard to trust them to be neutral arbiters.

The parallel problem, of course, is obvious. The more mistakes that umpires make, the easier, and more inevitable, become the arguments for instant replay. Sure, it makes the game seem less “pure,” and it will probably make an almost intolerably long game excruciatingly longer — especially if you imagine Joe Girardi and Terry Francona staring at each other across the top step of their dugouts, challenge flag in hand, ready to call back the slightest miscue, a possibility so nightmarish that it could cause Joe West to wake up screaming. Instant replay is, by its very nature, slow: it’s replay. It’s an imperfect compromise between a world where umpires are the law and a world where umpires aren’t necessary, where a GameDay Pitch Tracker calls strikes and balls and a traffic camera mans first base to call runners safe and out. We have the technology right now to do without umpires. We don’t have the gumption — but we have the tech.

So it makes sense that umpires feel like they’re under attack. They are. Their livelihood is being threatened by the times they live in. However, it’s also being threatened by the individual actions of individual umpires, from the explosively short fuses of Joe West and Bill Hohn to the completely inconsistent strike zones of Angel Hernandez and CB Bucknor. In ordinary times, a good umpire is like a good spy: the best ones are the ones you never hear about or think about at all. These are not ordinary times, and the spotlight is shining brightly. The more they step towards it — like Larry Vanover’s step towards Yorvit Torrealba — the brighter it will shine. The only way for umpires to decrease the drama is to take a step back.


Why Do Managers Bat Replacements in the Starter’s Spot?

There are plenty of managerial decisions that I routinely do not understand. Most of them relate to the bullpen and how the manager selects a reliever for certain situations. The rest relate to lineup construction. We know that in the macro lineup order doesn’t matter that much, but that doesn’t exactly justify the decision to use a well below-average hitter in that position. Why place a poor hitter among your best? Why not move him to the bottom, so the good hitters have a better chance to get on base and knock each other in?

This leads to another managerial tactic that I never understood: placing a replacement in the starter’s batting order spot. When this happens with a bottom of the order hitter it’s usually no big deal. It’s when the manager replaces one of his top hitters with a replacement that baffles me. There has to be some reason behind it, since so many managers routinely do it. But that doesn’t make it any less perplexing.

Ron Gardenhire not only does this, but he’s doing it while one of his starters is on the DL. Orlando Hudson should be back from his wrist injury by week’s end, but until then Matt Tolbert acts as his stand-in. If this were just a defensive move it wouldn’t be a problem. After all, few teams can absorb an injury to their starting second baseman and replace him with someone who can produce similarly. The problem is that Gardenhire has not just penciled Tolbert’s name into Hudson’s spot in the field, but also in the batting order. In 45 PA this year Tolbert has gotten on base 10 times. Last year, in 231 PA, he had a .303 OBP. He belongs nowhere near the No. 2 spot, and yet Gardenhire has used him there for most games during Hudson’s absence.

Tigers center fielder Austin Jackson is currently day-to-day with back spasms. He left Sunday’s game and hasn’t played since. That shouldn’t be a big problem for the Tigers, since they have Johnny Damon, who for most of his career was a leadoff hitter, in the No. 2 spot. But instead of moving Damon up one spot and putting a hitter like, say, Brennan Boesch or Carlos Guillen in the second spot, Leyland has chosen to use Jackson’s replacements, Ryan Raburn and Don Kelly, in the leadoff spot. Raburn, maybe, makes a degree of sense. He had a .359 OBP and .378 wOBA last season, though he’s playing horribly this season. Kelly, however, is a plain bad hitter. He’s actually brought down his .290 career OBP this year, reaching safely just 13 times in 77 chances. There is no reason to hit him first and give him more PA than hitters like Guillen and Boesch.

These are just two examples I noticed last night. Many other managers do this, too. Jerry Manuel, for instance, used to bat Alex Cora second when giving Luis Castillo a day off. Hitting Castillo second is questionable in the first place, but at least he had a .347 OBP to help justify the move. But to replace him in the field and in the batting order with Cora just seems reckless. In only three seasons of his career has Cora’s wOBA broken .300, the last time in 2008 with the Red Sox. He has a .306 OBP this season. There are plenty of hitters on the Mets, including David Wright, who would fit better in that spot when Castillo sat. With Castillo on the DL Manuel has shown a shred of sanity, hitting Angel Pagan second.

The question still remains of why these managers employ this tactic. It can’t be because the other players are comfortable in their batting order spots. Manuel has messed with his lineup numerous times this season, moving Wright from third to fifth, to fourth for a game, and now back to third. Jason Bay has hit in the Nos. 3, 4, and 5 spots. Neither has hit second even one time. Alex Cora has 16 times. Similarly, Damon has hit leadoff three times and has hit third four times. Why in the world, then, play Kelly there for even one game? Gardenhire routinely hits Justin Morneau third when Joe Mauer takes a day off. Why, then, can’t he put a hitter better than Matt Tolbert in the second spot?

Again, on a macro level, lineup order doesn’t matter a great deal. But on a game-to-game basis, when anything can happen at any moment, why wouldn’t you want to put your best hitters near the top of the order, where they can get on base and knock each other in? Why put a player who makes out more frequently than other players in the lineup near the top? Why let them take one more turn at bat than clearly superior hitters? It just doesn’t make sense. That hasn’t stopped managers from doing anything, though, so I fully expect this trend to continue. But that doesn’t make it any less of a shame.


Should the Mets Trade for a Starting Pitcher?

There have recently been some murmurs going around the Orange and Blue watercoolers that the Mets are looking for a starting pitcher, with names like Cliff Lee and Kevin Millwood being thrown around. Although the Mets are within a reasonable striking distance of first place in the NL East, there are a few things to analyze here. First, what is a weakness the Mets can try to improve? Here are some relevant rankings for the Mets in terms of place in the National League:

Team ERA: 6th
Team xFIP: 14th
Team FIP: 10th

So the Mets may be getting a little lucky with their pitching performance thus far, but we also need to remember that those numbers include some terrible pitching from former starter Oliver Perez (now on the DL and in the bullpen upon his return) and John Maine (now on the DL). Here is what looks to be the Mets rotation for the rest of the season with current FIP and rest of season FIP via ZiPS:

Johan Santana: 3.81/3.47
Mike Pelfrey: 3.28/4.00
Jonathon Niese: 3.76/3.98
R.A. Dickey: 3.37/4.66
Hisanori Takahashi: 3.27/No Projection
John Maine: 5.82/4.44

There are some problems with looking at the projections as well. R.A. Dickey is pitching with a completely new regimen and type of knuckleball, so the the outlook may be unfairly pessimistic, and there are no numbers for Takahashi. Either way, this rotation is solid. But what about the offense?

Team wOBA: 13th
Team OBP: 13th
Team SLG: 12th

Not pretty. However, the Mets do hope to get Carlos Beltran back in the near future, and Jose Reyes and Jason Bay will most likely perform better than they have thus far. With a lineup of Reyes / Beltran / Wright / Davis / Bay / Pagan / Barajas / Castillo, the Mets could reasonably have each position player with a wRC+ at ~100 or over. Unfortunately for the Mets, they have to hope for Beltran, Reyes, and Castillo to return to health and form, as well as continued above-average production from Barajas (although Blanco has played extremely well thus far).

Omar Minaya has another month and a half to see where the Mets stand. They probably have a true talent level of about 85 wins or so, but even teams with a true talent level of .500 can get to 88 wins or more. However, if the Mets are within a few games of first place at the end of July, a solid trade can easily push them right into the thick of things. This isn’t to say the Mets should trade Reese Havens, Jenrry Mejia, and Ike Davis for Cliff Lee. In fact, it may be more prudent of the Mets to move John Maine and Takahashi to the bullpen and pick up another solid arm without as big of a pricetag. Jake Westbrook would be a good fit; he’s a groundball pitcher who has been hurt value-wise by his homers per fly balls. A dose of Citi Field may be exactly what he needs. He’ll get a chance to audition for the Mets when he faces them in Cleveland tonight.

Unsurprisingly, the answer to the title of this article is, “It depends.” Omar Minaya may have the green light to pull the trigger, but picking up too big of a gun may prove pyrrhic in the longrun.


Piniella Loses His Marbles

In the last month, the Cubs have played 27 games. 15 of those have been started by Geovany Soto, while 12 have been started by Koyie Hill.

Soto is hitting .268/.409/.458, good for a .387 wOBA.
Hill is hitting .236/.267/.292, good for a .245 wOBA.

It gets worse. We’re over halfway through the month of June, and Soto has 22 plate appearances. Hill has 27. As the Cubs season slips away, Lou Piniella has decided that one of the ways he can get his team to win games is to change catchers, despite the fact that Soto is one of the best hitting catchers in the game while Hill is one of the worst.

The reason, of course, is the old manager crutch: handling pitchers. Since Hill can’t hit, he’s earned the reputation as a good defender. Piniella believes he’s simply exchanging offense for defense by putting Hill in the lineup. The problem is that there is absolutely nothing in the record that he could possibly lean on to support playing Hill with such frequency.

Soto is poor at throwing out basestealers. He is just 8 for 41 this year, a 20 percent success rate. Hill? 3 for 16, a 19 percent success rate.

Lou doesn’t like the way Soto handles a pitching staff, and believes the guys on the mound perform better with Hill behind the plate. Opponents are hitting .253/.324/.392 when Soto catchers, and .236/.308/.383 when Hill catches. The difference is tiny, and is entirely wrapped up in BABIP – the team’s BB/K rate is actually slightly better when Soto catches.

In fact, if you look back over the last three years, the Cubs have allowed 4.18 runs per game when Hill starts and 4.27 runs per game when Soto starts. Even if you believe in something like catchers ERA (you shouldn’t, but that’s another story), the observed difference between Hill and Soto is less than a tenth of a run per game.

The observed difference between Soto and Hill at the plate is much, much larger. Even using a regressed projection like the rest-of-season ZiPS, we would see a .362 wOBA for Soto and a .289 wOBA for Hill, which translates to about .25 runs per four plate appearances.

Plain and simple: Piniella is screwing up. He’s playing a bad player over a good player in an effort to win more games. It’s not like the team is responding to the move, either. On May 17th, the Cubs were 17-22, 5 1/2 games out of first place. Today, they are 29-36, 6 1/2 games out of first place. They’ve gone 12-14 since Piniella decided to make Soto a part-time player.

The Cubs are almost certainly going to have a house cleaning at some point in the near future. In the best interest of the organization, their manager should probably be part of that, and the franchise should make “Is Geovany Soto a better catcher than Koyie Hill?” the first question they ask in the interview process.