Archive for Daily Graphings

Tommy Hunter’s High Curves

Over the weekend R.J. Anderson, Zach Sanders and others tweeted about Tommy Hunter’s curveball. R.J. noted that Hunter’s curve was way up in the zone during Hunter’s start on Saturday. I was not watching the game, but I thought it was an interesting observation. I pulled up the pitchf/x data for the start and they were right:

His curveballs were very high: most in the upper half of or above the zone. Those curves got him a good number of called strikes, a handful of whiffs, and a couple balls in play (all outs).

Next I wanted to see whether his curves were always that high and how they compared curves as a whole. So I plotted a histogram of the height of all of his curves (his one start in 2010, a couple from 2008 and 19 from last year) and those for all curves in the pitchf/x data.

Hunter’s curves are, on average, a good six inches higher than the average pitcher’s. While curves as a whole peak in the bottom third of the zone and there are a good fraction below the zone, Hunter’s curves peak above the middle of the zone and a good number spill out above the zone.

Do all these high curves hurt Hunter? It doesn’t seem so. He throws the curve a lot, over 25% of the time, and by linear weights the pitch it is a very good pitch. Digging into why that is we can compare some of its components to Harry Pavlidis’ benchmarks for the curve:
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MLB Draft: A Recent History of Criticism

We often say on draft day and the days following, as a precursor, that you can’t judge a draft class until two or three years down the road. However, today you’ll find outlets across the interwebs – including this one at 7 p.m. EST– willing to judge immediately. I don’t know if tonight’s top 10 picks will have a surprise that throws off the mock drafters, but like every year, it will have a pick that we, the “experts”, question. As a review of how that usually turns out, here’s a look at six players over the last three years that have baffled the collective minds.

2007 Draft

Pittsburgh Pirates select Dan Moskos, lhp, Clemson. (Fourth Overall)
We wondered why he went before
: Ross Detwiler, lhp, Missouri State. (Matt Wieters, too).

The Pirates wrote off Wieters early in the spring, so while we wonder in hindsight how they could have passed on him, the narrative on draft day was why you’d lean Moskos over Detwiler. Pittsburgh did so intending to keep Moskos in the rotation – he’d had an up-and-down junior season as a starter after starring as a sophomore (and on Team USA) in a relief role. In two years as a starter, Moskos had a walk rate of 3.5, uninspiring strikeout rates, and was generally ineffective. But this year, in a return to the bullpen, he’s been really good: allowing just one earned run in four of his 21 Double-A outings. Time will tell on Moskos vs. Detwiler, but for the first time since he was drafted, I’m really starting to believe in the idea of Moskos the Major Leaguer.

Milwaukee Brewers select Matt LaPorta, LF (?), Florida. (Seventh Overall)
We wondered why he went before
: Quoting myself, minutes after the pick, “They must have some belief that LaPorta can play left, but here’s my question: if you want an outfielder with plus power, does LaPorta really project better than Jason Heyward?”

This was an even stranger pick at the time than Moskos, as the draft day buzz around LaPorta was more focused on the late first round. It would be unfair to limit LaPorta’s analysis to comparing him to Jason Heyward, though obviously that decision still baffles today. However, LaPorta is a big league player that was twice ranked among Baseball America’s top 30 prospects, so, he was probably undervalued by media outlets on draft day 2007. Still, it seemed clear even then that the Brewers may have taken LaPorta just to inevitably trade him, which they did in acquiring C.C. Sabathia in 2008. We should also mention that he’s been a mess this season, negating the value he provided last year (0.5 WAR) in a decent rookie cup of coffee.

2008 Draft

Houston Astros select Jason Castro, c, Stanford. (Tenth Overall)
We wondered why he went before
: Justin Smoak, Brett Wallace, 1Bs.

This was Bobby Heck’s first draft in Houston, so unlike when a revered scouting director like Tim Wilken drafts Tyler Colvin, we didn’t give him the benefit of the doubt. Castro was a guy that a lot of people liked, but he was also one without a track record: he’d hit .167 as a sophomore. I’m sure the Astros didn’t go into the draft thinking Smoak would even be available, but there he was — and no one had Castro ranked ahead of Smoak. That analysis still seems correct, but Castro has quieted a lot of critics, especially after a good 2009. He struggled early this season, his OPS at .603 on May 6, but he’s since hit .330/.422/.404. The power doesn’t look to be there, but Castro should make good on the expectations of a tenth overall pick.

2009 Draft

Pittsburgh Pirates select Tony Sanchez, c, Boston College (fourth overall)
We Wondered Why He Went Before
: A lot of pitchers and Grant Green, ss, USC.

This was problematic for a couple reasons. First, Pirates fans are particularly sensitive nowadays about going the inexpensive route. Second, Sanchez wasn’t being talked about as a top-5 overall player. Third, he didn’t really have a discernible plus tool. It was just puzzling across the board. But now, the catcher is batting a robust .318/.423/.460 in the Florida State League, showing patience and gap power. However, his defense – at times praised more than his bat entering last year’s draft – has really lagged behind. Sanchez has thrown out just 7 runners in 50 basestealing attempts, and leads the league with seven errors. I think the pick looks good right now, but I still have questions about his ultimate success. And why the Pirates made that pick.

Baltimore Orioles select Matt Hobgood, rhp, California HS (Fifth Overall)
We Wondered Why He Went Before
: Jake Turner, Matt Purke, Tyler Matzek.

With the next pick after Sanchez, the Baltimore Orioles made Matt Hobgood the first high school pitcher taken in the draft, a spot where no media outlet had him ranked. The Orioles, even more than the Pirates, were adamant that Hobgood was ranked higher on their boards than the other high school talents. Given this position by the Orioles, I wrote last year that Scouting Director Joe Jordan was “ballsy to not blame ownership and stand behind your scouting.” So far, the big right-hander has had a decidedly up and down first professional season. Hobgood has a 4.40 ERA in the Sally League, with a not-so-solid 39/26 K/BB ratio through 59.1 innings. However, he is showing a heavy fastball, given the 1.91 GO/AO ratio, and has showed brilliance at times. And given how seldom Turner and Matzek have pitched this spring, it’s not as if his peers are particularly outpacing him.

Atlanta Braves select Mike Minor, lhp, Vanderbilt (Seventh Overall)
We wondered why he went before
: Mike Leake, Aaron Crow, Alex White.

Considered the most egregious of the three 2009 surprises, I think this quote from Kevin Goldstein managed to put a finger on the complaints behind the pick: “It’s a horrible pick FOR ME, but I think early picks should be all about upside. Minor has a better shot of reaching [the] big leagues than anyone other than Strasburg in this thing, but his ceiling is a fourth starter.” But I suppose it’s only fitting that last year’s weirdest selection is this year’s biggest enigma. Minor seems a different pitcher in the Braves organization than he was in college, then lauded for his command and pitchability. Now, he’s among the minor league leaders with 91 strikeouts in 63.2 innings, but he’s been walking people, with 28 free passes handed out. Apparently, the Braves were keen on Minor’s development of his third pitch (curveball), and believed his change-up would play better in pro ball. Now, it just seems foolish we ever questioned the Braves fantastic scouting department.


Adam Dunn Has Gone Fishing

Few baseball players do everything. Some can consistently field balls at spots their peers have trouble reaching. Some can beat out a slow chopper to short. Some display a keen batting eye that keeps pitchers honest. Some possess a preternatural ability to hit the ball where they ain’t. A few accomplish this by hitting the the ball so far that outfielders run out of room long before it lands. Only a small smattering of players do all these things. The ones who can do one or two of those things usually find themselves in a starting lineup, or at least play on a regular basis.

When it comes to Adam Dunn, the focus seems to be on what he can’t do rather than what he does well. Since his full-season debut at age 22 in 2002, Dunn has done two things at an elite level. He has kept pitchers honest by taking the pitches he can’t hit. If the pitcher does deliver a hittable pitch, Dunn tends to hit it far beyond the reach of fielders. From 2004 through 2008 Dunn hit at least 40 home runs, and fell only two short of that mark in 2009. Yet when it comes to mainstream evaluation, the focus is not on these strong points, but rather on his weaknesses. That is, his ability to make consistent contact and his poor performance in the outfield.

Dunn understands the criticism he receives, but given a comment he made in spring 2007, he also knows the value he provides with his approach. “I’m going to be Ichiro,” he said. “I’m going to have 216 hits, 177 of them singles, six homers and steal 77 bags.” He did later make some more serious comments about improving his contact skills, though not much came of it. His 70.4 percent contact rate from 2006 does remain the lowest of his career, but he hasn’t improved on it significantly in the past three and a third seasons. His rate consistently sits well below league average.

Even so, he had his two strengths to fall back on. From 2007 through 2009 Dunn hit 118 homers and 79 doubles, which have accounted for nearly 49 percent of his total hits. He has also drawn 339 walks which, while not quite as valuable as hits, are far, far more valuable than outs. Plenty of major leaguers have hit for a higher average than Dunn, but few have matched his other skills. This shows up in his wOBA, which hasn’t fallen below .383 since 2006, that .234 BA year. That mark sits at .386 this season, but the composition has changed. Something is quite different about Adam Dunn in 2010.

The aspect that stands out the most is Dunn’s OBP, just .371 this year. That mark usually comes across a bit higher, in the mid-.380s. Last year, on the power of a 17.4 percent walk rate, Dunn got it all the way up to .398. He also raised his batting average to .267, by the slimmest of margins the highest mark of his career. That batting average sits around the same mark this year, .271, but his walk rate has slipped to 12.7 percent. Dunn has never experienced a rate so low, not even during his short stint as a 21-year-old in 2001. It made me wonder whether this is a blip on the radar or a complete change for Dunn.

Seeking an explanation of some sort, I turned to his plate discipline data, which, as expected, yielded an oddity. While Dunn has established a reputation of not doing the pitcher any favors, this year it appears he has, swinging at 26.2 percent of pitches outside the zone. For the first time in his career he approaches the league average mark. From 2002 through 2009 he swung at just 17.5 percent of pitches outside the zone, always falling a good deal below the average. But this year he’s close. Closer than he’s ever been. These extra hacks at bad pitches also show up in his swinging strike rate, 12.7 percent, another career high.

Where have all these walks gone? It appears that two of Dunn’s teammates have compensated a bit. Ryan Zimmerman, scorcher of baseballs, has added over four percentage points to his walk rate from last year, which had added almost four percentage points from the previous year. Josh Willingham, also in the midst of a career year, has added more than five percentage points to his walk rate from last year, which, as with Zimmerman, was then a career high. I’m not sure if those two have to do with Dunn, but it is curious that those two are drawing far more walks while Dunn draws far fewer.

There might be a solution in this. For most of the season Jim Riggleman has penciled in a 3-4-5 of Zimmerman, Dunn, and Willingham. Those are his three best hitters, and since they go righty-lefty-righty it fits perfectly with baseball conventions. The problem does not lie in those three, but instead at the top of the Nats’ order. Nyjer Morgan, Christian Guzman, and Adam Kennedy have seen most of the time in the top two spots, and none of those three sports an OBP that screams leadoff hitter. That means fewer men on base for the heart of the order.

Might it be better for the Nats’ offense if Riggleman spared the convention and started condensing his better hitters closer to the top of the order? Lead off with either Guzman or Morgan, and then go right to Zimmerman, followed by Willingham and then Dunn, or Dunn and then Willingham if the right-lefty-righty combo is so important. That means not only more at-bats for the best hitters in the lineup, but also that they can hit with more men on base. Might Dunn get more hittable pitches if he has two .400+ on-base guys hitting in front of him? It seems at least worth a try.

Chances are that we’ll see this run its course without any tweaks. Two relatively weak hitters will continue to hit atop the order, creating more outs ahead of Zimmerman, Dunn, and Willingham. That gives them fewer opportunities to knock in runs. That’s convention, though, and it will take more than an article centering on a few data points to change that. Still, it seems like that might at least slightly boost the Nats’ production. As for Dunn, I’m not sure that a lineup change will help his newfound propensity to swing at pitches outside the zone. At this point, though, isn’t it worth a shot?

Beyond that parting question, I’d like to ask something of Nats fans. Dunn is seeing more pitches than ever outside the zone, 56.9 percent against league average of 52.6 percent and Dunn’s career average of 52.4 percent. At the same time he’s seeing more first-pitch strikes than ever, 57.8 percent. We’re dealing with just 237 PA, so it’s difficult to draw any conclusions. Have you noticed pitchers attacking him in a deliberate manner? Is there a pattern for how pitchers work him that might throw off his game plan? This won’t show up in composite numbers, so I’m looking to Nats fans for a take on the question.


But Yeah, Catcher > Outfielder

There is a player in this draft, you may have heard of him, that has already shown scouts an ability to catch, but may become an outfielder in professional baseball to expedite his timetable to the Major Leagues. The guy swings a big stick, after all, and despite good arm strength, is pretty raw behind the plate. The catcher vs. outfield question will surround him for the definite future. That guy is University of Minnesota right fielder Mike Kvasnicka. What? Not who you thought I was talking about?

What’s important to understand is Dave’s analysis that Bryce Harper should be moved to the outfield does not apply to most players. You don’t need me to tell you that Harper is a special breed, and that he should be treated like the odd-duck he is. I agree with Dave’s analysis, but want to point out that it does not apply to all bat-first, maybe-catchers, and Kvasnicka offers us a concrete example. The Golden Gopher slugger has been rumored as a back-up plan for teams drafting as high as the top 10, and shouldn’t go to bed tonight without knowing where his future lies. But his destination will only be with an organization that believes he can catch — and it only should be. Kvasnicka is a first rounder behind the plate, and a fifth rounder (at best) in the outfield.

Because Minnesota has a defense-first catcher named Kyle Knudson, Kvasnicka hasn’t caught much in three seasons, as scouts have just 38 attempted steals in three seasons to work off. Kvasnicka threw out just 10 of those runners, but you certainly can’t blame him for being raw. He didn’t even catch in the Northwoods League last summer, so scouts are left to really project how he’ll catch based on athleticism, arm strength, body type and more. But they will see it through rose-colored glasses, because they understand what we do: that over a full season, the positional adjustment difference between a catcher and a right fielder is 20 runs, or two wins.

The PNR Scouting Report for Kvasnicka reads thusly about his defense in right field: “[C]ould be an average defender at a corner with enough arm for right.” Let’s say, for illustration purposes, he is a league average right fielder, playing in 600 plate appearances per season. Or, given that he’s raw defensively, let’s say as a catcher that he’s minus-5 over 500 plate appearances. To be worth 3 WAR in RF, he would need to be +17.5 with the bat, or one of the best 60 hitters in any given season. At catcher, that bat would need to be worth just +5.8 to hit the three-win threshold, a far more achievable feat.

When you draft a player like Harper at first overall, and pay him what will be an eight-figure bonus, your worry is how to best set him up for prolonged Major League success. Dave is talking about 10,000 Major League plate appearances. For a draftee like Kvasnicka, your worry is getting him to the big leagues at all. We’re talking about a guy with gap power, who, in his first two seasons at Minnesota, posted a walk-to-strikeout ratio of 25-to-103. It was a much healthier 46/28 this season, but at a sink or swim position like right field, where you need a plus bat just to get an opportunity, his resume looks a little more dicey.

In prospect analysis, there is not one philosophy that can guide you through decision-making, instead, decisions have to be made on a case-by-case basis. For Harper, the right move is the outfield. For Kvasnicka, his only chance is probably behind the plate.


Bryce Harper, Outfielder

In approximately seven hours, the Washington Nationals will select Bryce Harper with the first overall pick in the 2010 draft. In a couple of months, they’ll sign Harper to a lucrative contract, and he’ll begin his professional career – most likely, as an outfielder.

A catcher by trade, the Nationals are said to be leaning towards moving Harper to the outfield on a full-time basis. As is usually the case when a premium prospect is moved down the defensive spectrum, the reaction from the sabermetric community that I have read has been mostly negative. It is quite common to read comments to the effect that Harper’s value is diminished as an outfielder, because his bat is so much more valuable behind the plate, where premium bats are a rare breed.

However, there’s a presumption in these statements that I don’t believe holds true – that Harper’s projected offensive value is a constant regardless of his defensive position. Put simply, that isn’t supported by years of history of Major League Baseball.

Catching is hard work. It takes a toll on the human body, wearing players down and requiring frequent days of rest. Knees and backs routinely decide to give out from the stress that crouching behind the plate puts on them. Even the players who avoid the disabled list have to deal with the fatigue that just comes with the job.

There’s a reason why no catcher in Major League history has eclipsed 10,000 career plate appearances. By comparison, 33 outfielders have racked up at least 10,000 plate appearances, with the leader (Carl Yastrzemski) almost reaching 14,000. It is simply a statement of fact that Harper would be expected to have a longer career in MLB as an outfielder than he would as a catcher. The quantity of time that he would be able to add value on the field is larger, even if the potential quality of that production is lower.

So, simply applying a position adjustment and claiming its a bad move to make Harper an outfielder doesn’t cut it. If we want to really know whether this move makes sense, we’d have to explore whether the increase expectation in playing time outweighs the decreased value from not having Harper’s bat at a position of low offensive output. Beyond that, we’d also have to determine the effect that playing catcher could have on stagnating Harper’s offensive growth.

94 catchers in Major League history have accumulated at least 3,000 plate appearances. You know how many have posted a career OPS over .900? One – Mike Piazza. Okay, fine, a career .900 OPS is a pretty high bar (63 players at other positions have done it, but it’s still a pretty impressive feat), so lets lower it to .800 – 11 catchers in Major League history have a career OPS over .800 (and at least 3,000 PA), but four of those are active and haven’t had their numbers suppressed by end of career decline yet. Another one of those, Mickey Tettleton, spent 20 percent of his major league career playing positions other than catcher.

Perhaps we’ve all been spoiled by the presence of Piazza, Joe Mauer, and Jorge Posada over the last 20 years, but in reality, there are just a handful of big league catchers in the history of the game who have been able to both endure a career behind the plate and wield an impact bat at the same time.

By all accounts, Harper’s bat has a chance to be extremely special. If he makes it to stardom, it will be his offense that carries him there, not his work behind the plate. Moving him to the outfield will not be a waste of his value any more than it was when the Blue Jays moved Carlos Delgado to first base, the Astros moved Craig Biggio to second base, or the Braves moved Dale Murphy to center field. Harper can be plenty valuable as a power hitting athletic outfielder, and he can play until he’s 40 out there.

While the Nationals will be criticized by some for forfeiting some potential value, in the long run, it will probably be in his best interests, and I don’t blame the team for making that decision now, rather than wasting years of development trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.


Can Ryan Howard Hit Lefties?

When it comes to righty/lefty matchups, my nerdy senses start tingling. I think it is one of the most fascinating subjects in baseball, mostly because it’s a cool combination of game theory, statistics, and psychology. Although Ryan Howard’s name is in the title, this isn’t really about him (I promise my time at Fangraphs won’t be spent solely on Ryan Howard and philosophy).

As a baseball fan, I watch a lot of games. As a follower of advanced analysis, I know this can be both helpful and hurtful. When it comes to righties and lefties, I sometimes let my gut take over, and to be honest, I feel a little guilty. From watching games, my gut tells me that Ryan Howard stinks against lefties. The numbers back it up. For his career, Howard is hitting .226/.304/.441 against southpaws in 1144 plate appearnces. But a few months ago, the incredibly wise Mitchel Lichtman (MGL) wrote the following:

IOW, how a batter does against RH pitchers informs us on how he will likely do against LH pitchers and vice versa. Why? Because there is not much of a spread in true platoon splits among ML baseball players yet there is a large spread in overall true hitting talent among ML baseball players. So if we see a large platoon split, like for a player like Howard, it is likely a fluke. If a player does really well versus RH pitchers but terrible against LH pitchers, both the “really well” and the “terrible” numbers are likely fluky and the “truth” is somewhere in between…

…First we’ll estimate his overall true OPS. In his career, it is .966. We’ll regress that and call it .930, which is a typical projection for him. Now we have to take his observed platoon ratio (I like to use ratio – some people use a differential) and regress that. His observed platoon ratio for those 4 years is 1.052/.719, or 1.46. For the average lefty, it is 1.20 and we just don’t see that much variation among players in their true platoon splits. IOW, that 1.46 is likely very (but not completely) flukey. We might regress that 1.46 80% toward the league average of 1.20, to get 1.25. That is Howard’s “true” estimated platoon split.

Now we simply apply that to his overall estimated true OPS of .930 and the fact that he faced 62% RHP. That gives us an OPS of .805 versus LHP and 1.006 versus RHP.

Matt Swartz of Baseball Prospectus also looked at the numbers before the start of the 2009 season and concluded, “…a mixture of an inability to avoid comparing Howard’s skills versus lefties from his skills versus righties, and unwillingness to actually look up the numbers has led the sabermetric community to be just as inaccurate and groupthinking as the mainstream media.”

Maybe I should just stop right there when two really smart guys like Litchman and Swartz are agreeing on an issue. However, my main area of contention is the argument that because Howard is good at hitting righties, it shows he is a good hitter and that his performance versus lefties is a “fluke.” I understand the argument, but what about the possibility that Howard is just bad against lefties and very, very good against righties? From watching games, this seems to be the case. This is what my “baseball mind” is telling me. The issues with resting on that gut feeling are obvious and many, but that doesn’t mean the conclusion is necessarily wrong.

I guess I should also clarify what I mean by “bad.” He’s not 2010 Aramis Ramirez bad against lefties, just more like 2007 Jason Bay bad. His immense success against righties also makes things relative.

Below are Howard’s wRC+ from 2005-2010, going from overall to versus lefties and then versus righties:

2005: 135, 4, 169
2006: 166, 133, 182
2007: 140, 110, 159
2008: 123, 91, 143
2009: 141, 71, 178
2010: 109, 75, 129

Using the splits section, we can also see that the quality of balls hit by Howard against lefties is much worse than against righties (fewer line drives, more infield flies, etc). Am I saying that Howard should be sat versus lefties? No. I also think that MGL is right, that Howard is more likely to be better than his career OPS versus lefties than worse. The question is how much. Howard’s career walk rate against lefties is 9.4%. This year it’s 3.6%. As we discussed the other day, Howard is having a rough year. The question I want to pose to everyone is, how long do we need to wait until we can “tell” that someone is just not very good against lefties? Is this an instance where we need our gut to take over a bit because the sample size needed for this platoon is big enough to take many years to get to? You tell me, because I still haven’t figured this one out.


Drafting the Third Plus Pitch

Regrettably, I began my series both reviewing draft history and previewing the 2010 draft position-by-position too late in the draft season. So, since we haven’t covered outfielders and pitchers — and because there’s no way I could cover all of them in one post — I’m not going to try. Instead, I’ll just post a bit about one unique story at each position.

Mike Leake
was drafted in the top 10 last year not because of overwhelming stuff, but because the Reds believed he offered present value — and they have been proven right. There is something to be said for the guy that makes, and sticks, in the Major Leagues first. A win today is cheaper than it’s going to be next year (in theory), and Leake already has 1.6 WAR in 11 starts. This year, many have compared Ohio State RHP Alex Wimmers to Leake, because Wimmers is going to move fast.

I saw and wrote about Wimmers earlier in the spring — and came away from the start most intrigued by his change up. “The best development for the right-hander was the strength of his change up,” I wrote. “He struck out three LHHs with the pitch, and he showed plus feel throughout the game.” It seemed that I had mostly heard about the curveball prior to this season, though, so I became intrigued at how far this pitch has come.

“His first year, he came mostly out of the bullpen learning to command that curveball,” Ohio State pitching coach Eric Parker told me. As a freshman, Wimmers appeared in 25 games in relief, posting a 4.50 ERA, with a 51/31 K/BB ratio in 40 innings. “I had talked to him about adding a third pitch, but his curve was so good, he didn’t need it in relief. I blame myself — we didn’t talk about the change up much.”

Parker credited the work Wimmers put in that next summer, in the Valley League, as where he began the development of the pitch. Baseball America ranked him the #2 prospect in the league after that summer, highlighting his “excellent curveball with hard, late break.” But for the change-up, they were less complimentary: “His circle changeup is still a work in progress and is clearly his third-best pitch.”

The next spring was where Wimmers broke out, winning 9 games, finding a spot on the Division I leaderboard in strikeouts with 136 in 104.2 innings. The pitch had evolved, been turned from a weapon in the Valley League to a plus pitch, probably during fall practices with the Buckeyes. According to CollegeSplits, in 2009, he struck out 56 left-handed batters in 147 at-bats. Overall, lefties hit .231/.372/.299 against him. He had a new weapon in his arsenal.

Next was a stop in the Cape Cod League, where regular Cape attendee and blogger Greg Schimmel ranked him as the league’s seventh-best pitching prospect, behind likely first-rounders Chris Sale and Brandon Workman, among others. Schimmel wrote, “[H]is best pitch was definitely his 74-75 mph curveball…Wimmers also has a good 76-78 mph changeup with good downward movement.” The pitch seemed undervalued even then.

However, his Cape Cod League manager remembered it more fondly in a recent conversation. Bourne manager Harvey Shapiro hasn’t seen Wimmers this spring, so his scouting report dates back to last summer. But the praise for the changeup is bold. “I think his changeup is a plus-plus pitch,” Shapiro said. “Whether you’re a lefty or a righty, his is so good he can throw it to either.” That, in fact, is one thing that his OSU pitching coach Eric Parker referenced was a focal point this spring.

And, of course, the pitch has taken a life of its own this spring. The Baseball America scouting report for him now references that one scout has called the pitch the most advanced change he’s seen from an amateur. Lefties, against whom Parker called the changeup “unbelievably effective,” hit a rather unbelievable .110/.168/.120 off him this spring, with 43 strikeouts in 100 at-bats.

The key to the pitch came from both coaches, as Parker credited Wimmers for having “such great arm speed” on the pitch, and said he “maintains the same arm slot.” Shapiro, in a separate conversation, said: “He throws all three pitches from the same arm slot, and with the same arm speed.” Scouts often believe that college pitchers with changeups might be even better in pro ball, as they will have more confidence to throw the pitch against same side hitters when they are facing wood bats rather than aluminum. The team that thinks this applies to Wimmers will draft him very highly today. They will think that his three plus pitchers are good enough that he’ll move quickly, potentially contributing at the Major League level by 2012. I do, too.


Trading Number One

Barring unforeseen tragedy or circumstance, Bryce Harper will be the number one overall pick in next week’s amateur draft. This will occur roughly a week after Steve Phillips suggested he would trade last year’s number one pick, sir Stephen Strasburg, for a proven veteran starting pitcher. Undoubtedly someone who resides somewhere will suggest a similar faith for Harper. The concept of trading the number one pick before said player reaches the major isn’t just a concept or crackpot suggestion, though, it’s happened and it’s happened as recently as last decade. Here’s a brief history.

The Tim Belcher trade

Drafted by the Minnesota Twins as the first overall pick in the 1983 amateur draft, Belcher actually did not sign with the Twins, and instead would be drafted the New York Yankees in the secondary draft. The Oakland Athletics would acquire Belcher as a free agent compensation pick less than a month later. For Belcher it was a tumultuous path not to the majors, but just to find an apartment for longer than a few weeks at a time. In 1987, the Athletics would send Belcher to complete a previous trade for Rick Honeycutt and three days later Belcher would debut in the majors. Per Baseball-Reference, he would compile 13.2 WAR for the Dodgers while starting 119 games. As for Honeycutt and the Athletics, he would spend eight years there, pitching 406 innings and recording 3.9 WAR.

The Shawn Abner trade

After 16 drafts without a first overall pick being dealt for reaching the majors, we had it happen with back-to-back picks. Drafted by the Mets in June of 1984, Abner would be traded to the San Diego Padres in December of 1986 along with Kevin Armstrong, Kevin Brown, Stan Jefferson, and Kevin Mitchell for Adam Ging, Kevin McReynolds, and Gene Walter. For his part, Abner would actually be well below replacement level despite only racking up 562 plate appearances over five years for the Friars.

The Josh Hamilton trade

This is probably the best known entry while being the one under the least normal of circumstances. Hamilton, of course, fought through addiction and league banishment just to re-enter the Rays’ minor league system in 2006. After a few weeks in short season ball he suffered a season-ending knee injury that required surgery. The Rays left him exposed for the Rule 5 draft and figured he wouldn’t stick on a 40-man roster. The Cubs took him in the draft and traded him to the Reds for cash.

The Adrian Gonzalez trade

The top pick from the 2000 draft, the Marlins would send him along with Ryan Snare and Will Smith the Texas Rangers for Ugueth Urbina. This is one of those trades where it’s easy to look at it now and say, “Wow, they gave that up for Uggie Urbina?” and yes, they did. They gave up a guy with a myriad of potential Fresh Prince and Jazzy Jeff jokes for Urbina. They also gave up Gonzalez.

At that point, Gonzalez was in the midst of a season and a half of disappointing statistics in Double-A as a 20- and 21-year-old; disappointing in the sense that he wasn’t quite the devourer of ozone layers quite yet. Presumably the Marlins didn’t feel comfortable with his development and decided that flags fly forever, so why not add the ultra good Urbina? Not that I’m defending the trade or that point of view, but Gonzalez would contribute -0.7 WAR to the Rangers over two seasons while Urbina would rack up 0.9 wins in 38 innings for the eventual world champs.


Is Fausto Back?

Fausto Carmona’s descent is well known. He had a 4.2 WAR season in 2007, thanks to a 2.55 BB/9 and a miniscule 0.67 HR/9. Even though that sounds like he may have had some luck with regards to home runs, xFIP would disagree, as he had a 3.88 xFIP against a 3.94 FIP. Carmona had the perfect formula for a low strikeout pitcher: keep runners off the bases and throw a ton of ground balls, as he posted a ridiculous 64.3% ground ball rate that season.

Carmona couldn’t keep the walks down in 2008, as he walked nearly twice as many batters on a per inning basis. The ground ball rate was still high, at 63.5%, which was the only thing keeping him above replacement level, as he posted a K/BB well below 1.00. The 2009 season was equally as bad, as an increase in strikeouts wasn’t enough to counteract a drop in ground ball rates. Both seasons saw xFIPs around 5.00 and FIPs in the same range.

This season, Carmona is having what appears to be a rebirth, as he’s running a 3.53 ERA through his first 11 starts. Looking slightly deeper, we see a similar K/BB rate to Carmona’s great 2007, but the ground ball rate just isn’t there any more. Still, with a ground ball rate as high as Carmona still runs, like his 56.2% rate this season, even a little luck can turn a mediocre season (4.18 FIP, 4.59 xFIP).

Those advanced metrics suggest that Carmona is back in the sense that he’s a Major League quality starting pitcher again, but he’s by no means an ace or even a number two. That shouldn’t be terribly surprising, as he simply doesn’t have strikeout stuff, and it’s very hard to be consistently successful in the major leagues when contact is made as consistently as it is against Carmona. Still, he also proves that a pitcher with a high ground ball rate can be very useful.

Carmona is under contract for the 2011 season at $6.1 million and then the Indians hold $7M, $9M, and $12M club options for the next three years. Even though Carmona isn’t an elite pitcher, the market for starting pitching can be thin, and $6.1 million for an average or even slightly below average starting pitcher isn’t a bad deal. Either Carmona wears out his usefulness by 2012, or the Indians can play the market for the next few years and see if he still fits into their plans.


Doubled Up 2010: The Best (So Far)

On Wednesday, I wrote about measuring the runs a player costs his team by grounding into (or avoiding) the double play. If you haven’t, I recommend taking a look at that post if you’re interested in the methodological details. Today I’ll discuss the players who have been the best at avoiding the double play ranked by the runs they’ve cost saved their team relative to average (0.35 runs above/below average per GiDP opportunity — average is around 11%) in 2010, then go over a few interesting points in conclusion to both discussions.*

* For today’s post I’m using the most recent data from Baseball-Reference’s situational leaderboards, so things “on top” (or bottom, depending on your perspective) have changed since then, although not much.

There are a number of hitters at around +1.4 runs, and between no double plays (in fewer oppportunities than the leaders below) and four percent grounded into per opportunity. In no particular order: Adam Dunn, Curtis Granderson, Hideki Matsui, Justin Morneau, Carlos Pena, Cody Ross, Josh Willingham, and Chris Young.

The second best player in GiDP runs saved is Carl Crawford, who is 0-45 in DP situations so far, +1.75 runs. He’s been excellent at it throughout his career, but this is also a a bit ironic given that Crawford is perceived as a great leadoff man (although he hasn’t always been used that way). It is well-established that, on average the lead off spot sees the fewest DP opportunities (runner on first with less than two outs). Of course, Crawford has been seen as a lead off man because of his speed, particularly his basestealing ability. But as The Book also notes, having a great basestealer leading off is a bit of a flawed strategy, since most teams have good hitters (usually with good power) hitting behind him; does Evan Longoria really need Crawford’s help in moving along the basepaths? As with most things batting-order related, it’s a tiny difference over a season (and in 2010, Crawford hasn’t led of at all, maybe Joe Maddon read something co-authored by his biggest fan?), but it is interesting to note. As an aside, The Book also mentions that the third spot sees the most GiDP chances on average, which is why good hitters like Joe Mauer and Billy Butler might not fit well in that spot in the order.

Josh Hamilton leads the league in GiDP runs saved so far this season, at +2.1, and over his career, he’s been about as good as Crawford. It’s a nice addition to the mini-comeback season he’s had. I’m guessing it’s the tattoos.

Three (promissory?) notes in conclusion two these two posts:

a) I don’t think it needs to be said (but I’ll say it anyway) that these are just “leaderboards” for the current season, not estimations of true talent (“projections”), although the leaders/trailers so far have been players one would expect give past performance (Billy Butler and Joe Mauer having problems, Hamilton and Crawford doing well). I might mess around with projections after the season, right after I finish all that other stuff I want to do but don’t have time to do.

b) It is interesting, but not entirely surprising, that low-strikeout players not known for their wheels (Butler, Mauer, Pablo Sandoval, Ivan Rodriguez) have been the worst so far these season, and while there are some speedsters up top (Crawford, Granderson) there are also some slow guys who strike out a lot like Dunn and Pena (Granderson and Young, among others, also strike out a good deal). This small sample with regard to both time and number of players doesn’t prove anything, but it suggest to me that while speed is an important factor in double play avoidance, taking pitches might also be a factor. Of course, to get the full measurement of cost/benefit here, we’d have to also measure the linear weights of productive outs and groundouts in general above and below average to see what the strikeout guys might be missing out on, too.

c) It is also curious that the handedness of the leaders and trailers is in line with some initial findings by MGL (who shouldn’t be blamed for anything I write here, obviously). Of the players having the most problems so far from Wednesday’s post, all are right-handed hitters except for Pablo Sandoval and Joe Mauer, who are themselves atypical hitters (Sandoval for his success while swinging at everything, Mauer for his preference for the opposite field). Almost all of today’s leaders are left-handed. This requires much more study, but it suggests that handedness matters, and that when projecting GiDP skill, that regression by hitter-handedness might be a good idea.