In absolute terms, we know that strikeouts are at an all-time high. We see it in box scores, talking heads consistently discuss and lament the phenomenon on broadcasts, and in truth, it’s been going on for years. We’re left to wonder and analyze where the ceiling is for this trend, and exactly where the line between passable and unacceptable strikeout totals for batters begins and ends. For pitchers — whose velocity is a main factor in the increased strikeout numbers — going to work must be that much more enjoyable. And, in 2015, it was most enjoyable in terms of strikeouts for the rotations of the Chicago Cubs and Cleveland Indians.

If we look at strikeout rates for individual team seasons over the course of baseball history, no one struck out batters at a higher clip than the rotations of the 2015 Indians (24.2%) and 2015 Cubs (23.9%). That isn’t really surprising given the strikeout trend of recent years, but in mid-June of last season, the Indians’ rotation was actually on pace for the third-highest league-adjusted strikeout rate since 1950. At that point in time, they were striking out a historic rate of batters in a historic strikeout period, which is the sort of thing that tends to lend itself to positive team results. It didn’t, but most of that wasn’t the rotation’s fault (hello, team defense!), and the ridiculous strikeout pace didn’t quite continue into the second half of the season.

In the end, they finished as the 41st-best league-adjusted strikeout rotation, which really isn’t too bad: they ended up striking out almost 27% more batters than the league average starting rotation in 2015. Here’s the 2015 Indians compared to the best 15 league-adjusted strikeout rotations since 1950 by K%+ (percentage points above average compared to a given year’s league average strikeout rate):

In case you’re wondering, the 2015 Cubs finished 105th-best, with a K%+ rate of 120. Also not bad, but it’s illustrative of just how many strikeouts a team has to amass to make a run at breaking the record. And so I wondered: what strikeout rate would it take in 2016 to break the league-adjusted rate? And do the Cubs or Indians (or another rotation) have any realistic shot at breaking it?

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Early this morning, the full 2016 ZiPS projections went live on the site. This is probably news to many of you. Surprise! Happy ZiPS day. You can now export the full ZiPS spreadsheet from that link, find individual projections on the player pages, and view our live-updating playoff odds, which are powered by a 50/50 blend of ZiPS and Steamer. This is good news for everyone, including us, the authors, because now we have more information with which to work.

And so here’s a post that I did last year, and one which I was waiting for the full ZiPS rollout to do again: previewing the year’s team defenses. It’s been a few years running now that we’ve marveled over speedy outfielders in blue jerseys zooming about the spacious Kauffman Stadium outfield, and now those speedy outfielders in blue jerseys are all World Series champions. People are thinking and talking about defense more than ever, and you don’t think and talk about defense without thinking and talking about the Kansas City Royals. Defense: it’s so hot right now. Defense.

The methodology here is simple. ZiPS considers past defensive performance and mixes in some scouting report information to give an overall “defensive runs above or below average” projection. Steamer does the same, except rather than searching for keywords from real scouting reports, it regresses towards the data from the Fans Scouting Report project compiled by Tangotiger every year. The final number is an average of these two figures, and can be found in the “Fld” section of the depth charts and player pages. It isn’t exactly Ultimate Zone Rating or Defensive Runs Saved, but it’s the same idea, and the same scale.

Let’s look ahead toward the year in defense.

* * *

The Best

1. Kansas City Royals

This is one of my new favorite fun facts: the Royals outfield defense, just the outfield, is projected for 31 runs saved, which is higher than any other entire team in baseball. And with Alex Rios out of the mix in right field and Jarrod Dyson and Paulo Orlando stepping in full-time, Kansas City’s outfield defense should somehow be even better than it’s been in the past.

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The 2010 Mariners were a dreadful baseball team, and an unexpectedly dreadful baseball team at that. They were designed to be competitive — they should’ve been competitive — and from a fan’s perspective, I’m not sure I’ve witnessed a bigger letdown. It was a difficult season for countless different reasons, but what’s been most upsetting, both now and back at the time, is that the Mariners being terrible cost me the opportunity to watch more Cliff Lee on my favorite team. I knew he was awesome when he was first brought in, but I didn’t appreciate the extent until I got to watch him every five days.

I bring this up because Lee is in the news:

Sounds like Cliff Lee’s career is over. His agent, Darek Braunecker, told me, “We don’t anticipate him playing at this point.”

— Ken Rosenthal (@Ken_Rosenthal) February 23, 2016

Lee hasn’t officially retired, and you never know when someone might have a change of heart. Yet it’s never been less likely that Lee will return, so I want to take this chance to offer a quick retrospective. Not everyone is deserving of the treatment, because not everyone is equally interesting, but Lee developed into the perfect pitcher. It took him some time, and he’s not going to end up in Cooperstown, but for a good six-year stretch, there was nothing else you could’ve wanted Cliff Lee to be.

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You smell that? It’s baseball’s prospect-list season. The fresh top-100 lists — populated by new names as well as old ones — seem to be popping up each day. With the individual rankings coming out, some organization rankings are becoming available, as well. I have always regarded the organizational rankings as subjective — and, as a result, not 100% useful. Utilizing the methodology I introduced in my article on prospect evaluation from this year’s Hardball Times Annual, however, it’s possible to calculate a total value for every team’s farm system and remove the biases of subjectivity. In what follows, I’ve used that same process to rank all 30 of baseball’s farm systems by the surplus WAR they should generate.

I provide a detailed explanation of my methodology in the Annual article. To summarize it briefly, however, what I’ve done is to identify WAR equivalencies for the scouting grades produced by Baseball America in their annual Prospect Handbook. The grade-to-WAR conversion appears as follows.

Prospect Grade to WAR Conversion

Prospect Grade	Total WAR	Surplus WAR
80	25.0	18.5
75	18.0	13.0
70	11.0	9.0
65	8.5	6.0
60	4.7	3.0
55	2.5	1.5
50	1.1	0.5
45	0.4	0.0

To create the overall totals for this post, I used each team’s top-30 rankings per the most recent edition of Baseball America’ Prospect Handbook. Also accounting for those trades which have occurred since the BA rankings were locked down, I counted the number of 50 or higher-graded prospects (i.e. the sort which provide surplus value) in each system. The results follows.
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If you’ve recently spent time with other humans, it’s likely that you noticed that they tend to be overconfident about how well they understand the world around them. Think of all of the people you know who have tried to weasel their way out of admitting they were wrong even when presented with strong evidence that they had misinterpreted a situation. Humans are bold and unapologetic in their declarations and do not like it when you point out that they’ve made a serious error.

It’s hard to criticize people for that when it seems to be a pretty fundamental aspect of the species. It’s not good or bad, it simply is. But that doesn’t mean we can’t enjoy little moments when someone makes a compelling argument and then the world totally destroys their hard work by changing around them.

For example, two political scientists once wrote a book called Congress’ Permanent Minority? Republicans in the U.S. House which was the first major scholarly account of how a minority party operates when it expects to be in the minority for the foreseeable future. It’s a well-researched book and was well reviewed when it came out. Unfortunately for the authors, it came out in January of 1994, just 11 months before the Republicans would win control of the House for the first time in 40 years. It was a perfectly fine analysis, it was just totally detached from the reality of American politics almost immediately.

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Other clubs: Braves, Cubs, Diamondbacks, Orioles, Reds, Red Sox, White Sox.

The Indians have an enviable number of likely big league players in their system, though only a handful of them project to be impact talents. The top three in the list have the highest ceilings, I believe, with Bradley Zimmer the pretty undisputed number-one guy. I’m pretty high on Triston McKenzie, and at one point had him in the number two spot over Frazier. Other guys about whom I’m a little more optimistic include Mark Mathias, Erik Gonzalez and Greg Allen.

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On February 27th, 1997, the cover of the then newly-released March issue of Sports Illustrated featured two baby-faced baseball players — with the headline “Derek Jeter and Alex Rodriguez head up the finest group of shortstops since World War II.” The next season, Nomar Garciaparra had his breakout, and he joined the two in what was an embarrassment of riches at the position. Three years later, the trio was elected to the 2000 All-Star Game — a recognition of what was one of the finest multi-year periods by a group of three shortstops in the history of the game.

A historical convergence of that type of talent happens rarely in baseball, and it happens far more rarely at one position – and in just one league. During any particular season, there are usually only a certain number of players that are above a particular production level. Take, for example, the number of players that produced at least 6.0 Wins Above Replacement in 2015. We’ll focus on 6.0 WAR because above that level we consider production to be in the realm of a possible “MVP” performance.

In 2015, there were only ten players in all of baseball who had greater than 6.0 WAR. In 2014, there were only nine, and in 2013 there were also ten. Some years have more players and some years have fewer, but the point is that there are usually few players who are in this upper echelon of production. It’s also important to understand that shortstop is usually a less talented position than others on the field: the skill set to be successful both offensively and defensively at shortstop simply narrows the range of potential players down. Case in point: there hasn’t been a full-time shortstop with at least 6.0 WAR since Hanley Ramirez and Derek Jeter both topped that mark in 2009.

In 1998, Jeter, A-Rod, and Garciaparra all had over 6.0 WAR. They were all shortstops. They were all in the American League. The confluence of circumstances that came together for that to happen should be celebrated by its own holiday. In fairness, 1998 was a ridiculous year for great position players – there were 24 players with at least 6.0 WAR – the result of both great timing and, well, steroids. Still, there has rarely been a time when talent among American League shortstops – and shortstops in general – was more top-heavy than in the late ‘90s and early ‘00s.

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After having typically appeared in the very hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have been released at FanGraphs the past couple years. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the Cleveland Indians. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.

Other Projections: Atlanta / Baltimore / Boston / Chicago NL / Cincinnati / Kansas City / New York AL / Philadelphia / Pittsburgh / Seattle / Texas / Toronto.

Batters
One challenge to understanding how ZiPS’ position-player forecasts reveal Cleveland’s actual strength as a club — one challenge to understanding that hinges upon the health of Michael Brantley. The left fielder underwent surgery on his right shoulder following the season. The original prognosis called for Brantley to return in mid-April. More recent reports, however, suggest that the 28-year-old might not be ready until June. ZiPS has no knowledge of Brantley’s injury either way, projecting the him to record more than three wins over the the course of a full season. He might be capable only of producing half that total.

Very probably because his club reached the postseason — and because he recorded a number of home runs in support of that particular cause — Houston shortstop Carlos Correa won the American League’s rookie of the year award in 2015. By WAR, it wasn’t particularly close. Which is to say: by WAR, Cleveland’s Francisco Lindor (and not Correa) was pretty clearly the AL’s top rookie. ZiPS is less optimistic about Lindor’s 2016 campaign, calling for regression in the 22-year-old’s plate-discipline and batted-ball numbers. Still, the computer expects Lindor to lead Cleveland’s field players in wins.

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The Cleveland Indians finished in third place in the AL Central last season, but just 4.5 games out of the Wild Card, and 13.5 behind the eventual World Series champion Royals. With a pitching staff fronted by Corey Kluber and a young talented infield headed by superprospect Francisco Lindor, the Indians are looking at 2016 as a chance to take the next step and make the playoffs for the first time since 2013. But, being the Indians, they have a problem.

Taking that next step towards the playoffs means adding to the team’s offense. Last season Cleveland scored 669 runs. Only Seattle, the Angels, the White Sox, and Tampa scored fewer, and nobody scored much fewer. The Indians were 47 runs ahead of the last place White Sox, but 222 runs behind first place Toronto. The team wasn’t wholly without merit, though, as they also allowed just 640 runs, the second fewest in the AL and one fewer than those darn Royals. So, if we can speak in broad generalizations for the moment, we can say that the Indians have pitching and fielding, but to become a championship-caliber team, they need to score some runs. They need offense. So get some offense. That’s it. The end! Thanks for reading!

But, wait! This is the Indians we’re talking about. They can’t just go out and get offense. They can’t sign Jason Heyward or Chris Davis. Like your roommate, they’re perennially short on funds, dude (but if you front them for some pizza they’ll totally get you back next Thursday). So the problem is twofold: the Indians don’t have the ability to simply sign someone at market rates because to do so would blow up their salary structure. This means a trade. And, as shell-shocked Red Sox fans trying to talk themselves into the Craig Kimbrel trade will tell you, you have to give up something to get something.

Further, if Cleveland is going to acquire a major league player who can hit and play the outfield passably well, the likelihood is they’ll have to give up major league players to do it. Sure, the Brewers might be inclined to deal Ryan Braun and the Padres will gladly give you a steaming helping of Matt Kemp, but that will detonate the ol’ salary structure as well, and then there’s that whole “we’re trying to win” thing. So that’s a polite no thanks. This is all by way of explaining why the Indians, a team that is trying to win now, have been mentioned so prominently in trade rumors recently and even going back to the end of last season.

And, in fact, even while I’ve been writing this, here it comes again. Via MLB Trade Rumors:

The Blue Jays, Dodgers and Yankees are among the teams that have reached out to the Indians and had “preliminary” trade talks about Cleveland’s starting pitching, reports Jon Morosi of FOX Sports (links to Twitter). The still-very-early frameworks being discussed would each send a controllable starter away from Cleveland in exchange for an everyday outfielder, he continues.

The problem with this is obvious. It robs Peter to pay Paul, as they old saying goes, and I’m not sure it doesn’t rob Peter’s wife, and their neighbor Frank as well. The cost of giving up a Carlos Carrasco or Kluber is significant. Sure, you’re saying, the Indians would get something significant back, and I’m certain you’re right. They would. But this is simply a reallocation of resources. This is taking four WAR and moving it from your rotation to your outfield, and that’s if you do it right. If you don’t, like the beaming ray in Spaceballs: The Movie, you lose something in the translation.

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Early in this year’s postseason, the excellent Jessica Mendoza made several references in the broadcast booth to the idea of the “non-competitive pitch.” We know that pitchers, most often, are trying to throw strikes. We know that, other times, a pitcher will intentionally locate a ball outside of the strike zone, attempting to coax a batter into a misguided swing. For these pitches to be effective, they need to be reasonably close to the edges of the zone. Otherwise, the batter won’t swing. When located well, even if the batters don’t swing, you’ll hear these referred to as “good misses.”

What a pitcher is rarely, if ever, trying to do is locate dramatically outside of the strike zone. I’m talking several feet. These pitches happen, but for all intents and purposes, they’re unintentional and serve no use. They’re an extra tally on your pitch count and they almost exclusively go for a ball without any real chance of a swing. This was something upon which I briefly touched in my review of Gerrit Cole’s rough Wild Card start, in which he threw three of these non-competitive pitches consecutively to Kris Bryant to issue a walk after getting ahead in the count, 1-2.

When I wrote that post, I knew I’d revisit the topic in the offseason. The thing about a data set is, there’s always a most extreme something. Someone threw more non-competitive pitches than anyone else. One ball may not seem like a huge deal, but the difference between a ball and a strike changes the nature of an at-bat. After a first-pitch strike this season, batters had a .609 OPS. That’s Alexi Amarista. After a first-pitch ball, batters had an .815 OPS. That’s J.D. Martinez. The average run value of the difference between a ball and a strike is typically worth between one- and two-tenths of an entire run! Throw a lot of non-competitive pitches — automatic balls — and it will add up. We just need to define non-competitive, and then find them.

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