Win Curves and Player Pricing
As expected, there were two basic responses to yesterday’s news that the Tigers had agreed to pay Prince Fielder $214 million over the next nine seasons:
1. “That’s just way too much money.”
2. “As long as he helps them win, the cost is irrelevant.”
I’m part of the group that says the former, as I simply don’t think that the Tigers are going to get a very good return on their investment in Fielder, and if they had this kind of money to spend to upgrade their roster, I think there are far better ways they could have used that money to produce a better team overall. However, while I think the second point ignores the fact that signing Fielder wasn’t the only option available to to the Tigers, I understand the desire to focus on total wins rather than cost efficiency. After all, the point of baseball is to win a championship, not to finish first in the $/WAR standings. Efficiency is a method to help create a championship caliber roster, but it isn’t the goal in and of itself.
And, those that argue in favor of the deal are arguing from a premise that holds some truth – the Tigers were absolutely in a position where each marginal win is significantly more valuable than the average. I referenced the win curve theory in the post yesterday, but it’s worth expanding on briefly. If you’re not familiar with the concept of the win curve, this article by Vince Gennaro from 2007 is a good place to start. I’ll highlight one of the important passages: