Charlie Morton Was Baseball in 2017
Last night, with the franchise’s first championship hanging in the balance, Astros manager A.J. Hinch handed the ball to Charlie Morton. He never asked for it back, and four innings later, the Astros mobbed Morton on the mound. They are champions today in part because of Charlie Morton, and there was perhaps no more fitting player to get the last out of the 2017 season, because Charlie Morton embodies so much of what baseball is today.
I won’t belabor the backstory too much, because you’re probably familiar with what Morton used to be: a generic pitch-to-contact starter who couldn’t get lefties out. In fact, his struggles against southpaws were so significant that, when the Astros signed him last year, I called him “Bud Norris with health problems.” While acknowledging that there were parts of his arsenal that made him interesting — Jeff saw this far more clearly than I did — I included the following table in that post, suggesting that Morton was not likely to solve the Astros’ pitching problems unless he could figure out how to get left-handed batters out.
| # | Name | AVG | OBP | SLG | wOBA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Charlie Morton | .301 | .392 | .466 | .375 |
| 2 | Nick Blackburn | .300 | .356 | .478 | .362 |
| 3 | Jeremy Guthrie | .286 | .345 | .491 | .362 |
| 4 | Bronson Arroyo | .287 | .338 | .500 | .361 |
| 5 | Roberto Hernandez | .287 | .365 | .456 | .359 |
| 6 | Livan Hernandez | .297 | .358 | .473 | .359 |
| 7 | Kyle Kendrick | .279 | .351 | .476 | .358 |
| 8 | Bud Norris | .271 | .359 | .460 | .357 |
| 9 | Jason Marquis | .277 | .367 | .449 | .356 |
| 10 | Justin Masterson | .283 | .369 | .431 | .353 |
During his career up to this year, Morton was the worst regular starting pitcher in baseball against left-handers. This is a pretty glaring flaw, and despite his velocity bump and high-spin curveball, I maintained some skepticism about his potential. Let me now present a second table.
| # | Name | IP | AVG | OBP | SLG | wOBA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Stephen Strasburg | 84.2 | .191 | .265 | .309 | .248 |
| 2 | Charlie Morton | 71.2 | .172 | .263 | .298 | .249 |
| 3 | Corey Kluber | 94.2 | .199 | .255 | .321 | .251 |
| 4 | Ervin Santana | 100.1 | .212 | .260 | .386 | .275 |
| 5 | Sonny Gray | 73.2 | .219 | .293 | .352 | .281 |
| 6 | Zack Greinke | 101.1 | .240 | .284 | .373 | .283 |
| 7 | Zack Godley | 72.1 | .216 | .301 | .347 | .285 |
| 8 | Luis Severino | 86.2 | .217 | .281 | .387 | .287 |
| 9 | Marcus Stroman | 93.0 | .248 | .321 | .329 | .289 |
| 10 | Marco Estrada | 89.1 | .214 | .268 | .418 | .291 |
Morton didn’t just get better versus left-handers, he held them to the second-lowest wOBA of any right-handed starter in baseball this year. After spending nearly a decade as a contact pitcher who couldn’t get left-handers out, he posted the highest strikeout rate against lefties of any righty starter. After running one of the largest platoon splits in baseball for the first 900 innings of his career, Morton just turned into an entirely different pitcher.
Let’s look back at what Morton used to be. Here’s a couple of GIFs from a random start in 2014, when Morton was facing the Marlins. First, here’s his fastball.
And here’s his curve.
That basically was Morton’s repertoire: 91 mph two-seamers and a looping 78 mph curve. He threw some changeups occasionally, too, but they were terrible, so he was mostly a two-pitch guy with below-average velocity who compensated by throwing strikes.
Now, for comparison, here’s Morton’s fastball and curve from last night. This was his fastball to Corey Seager, one of the best left-handed hitters in baseball.
And because this at-bat might be the lingering memory of this game for me, here’s the three pitches he threw to Cody Bellinger in the seventh.
That’s 99 on the hands to Seager, shattering his bat with an unhittable fastball, follows by three just knockout curveballs to Bellinger that said good morning, good afternoon, and good night. There were some great pitchers in this series; on just raw stuff, though, no one could really match Morton’s overpowering fastball/curveball combination.
By DNA, he’s the same guy, but as a pitcher, the 2017 version of Charlie Morton bares little resemblance to the guy who came up with the Pirates. And, in that way, Morton is the personification of what we saw on a league-wide level this year. The idea of a static skill set, that you are what you are, just doesn’t really exist anymore.
Morton added velocity because, in his own words, he just “tried to throw harder.” But while the 98s and 99s draw your attention, it’s really that curveball that made Morton what he has become. By linear-weight values, Morton’s curve was the third-best in baseball this year, and his ability to attack left-handers with a power swing-and-miss curve gave him something he’d never really had before.
Whether it’s Morton on the mound or Jose Altuve, Chris Taylor, and Justin Turner at the plate, we’ve entered an age where players are developing elite skills seemingly out of nowhere. Weaknesses are becoming strengths, and players are dramatically altering everything we know about their abilities. There are still differences in ability, of course, and no one can simply choose to make himself Mike Trout, but skills these days feel far more malleable than they have in the past.
And for all the talk of market inefficiencies and roster construction, this feels like the area where data and analysis are really changing the game. For most of the last 20 years, the statistical revolution was about helping the front office figure out which players weren’t being properly valued. These days, however, the data is being used not to just identify potential bargains, but to help the players themselves become something they weren’t previously.
Baseball will always have bigger-than-life stars, guys who were born with gifts of which others can only dream. But Morton is a reminder that talking about any player’s “ceiling” is basically a fool’s errand. If one can go from throwing 90 to 99 and turn his looping breaking ball into a devastating power curve, then every player’s upside is turning into the best player in the game. So many of this year’s elite players weren’t supposed to be superstars.
And yet, when the games mattered most, it was Morton facing guys like Taylor, a former slap-hitting shortstop who got to the majors with his glovework, but now is an offense-first outfielder who hits the crap out the baseball. This series had the Correas and the Seagers and the Kershaws, sure, but don’t let anyone tell you the Astros are champions simply because they lost 100 games three years in a row. They’re also champions because they gave Charlie Morton $14 million as a free agent, got mocked for it, and then watched him throw the best stuff in the World Series.
So much of baseball in 2017 feels like it came out of nowhere, so it is fitting that Morton ended this season by throwing the kind of heat usually reserved for No. 1 picks. Being great isn’t just for those born with it anymore. With hard work, Charlie Morton became something else this year, and because of that effort, he and his teammates can call themselves champions.
Dave is the Managing Editor of FanGraphs.
Hooray for Ground Chuck, the guy took a ton of abuse from the media and fans here and dealt with a fragile psyche for years. It was just awesome to see him win game 7 and get the final out.
BTW, this was the 2nd re-invention for Charlie. The first was when he gave up some velocity to mimic Halladay’s delivery and two seamer approach, which took him from terrible to OK.
So interesting with your fragile psyche comment.
I think most anyone who saw a number Astros games this year understood why Hinch had him closing out both Game 7s. He is about as stoic as a player can be (at least this year) and always seemed to be at a resting heartbeat whether sawing off bats or giving up cheap homers in Yankee stadium. Based on some of the quotes from him throughout the playoffs, it sounds like he didn’t just change his stuff, but his outlook on success/failure.
In his early days with Pittsburgh he struggled with confidence to the point that the media was really pulling for him to figure things out. The beat writer at the time was Dejan Kovacevic and he wrote about Charlie not being able to get out of his own head.
McCullers, not Morton, closed game 7 against the Yankees.
He’s also a 3 WAR pitcher making $7mm a year. Showing just how good the Astros front office is at baseball too.
-Edited for my own stupidity-
The Astros have a great front office that has endured a lot of scrutiny at times. It’s good to see their work rewarded.
I’d be curious to find if we’ve seen ever really before 3 pitchers in essentially save situations(I know last night Morton got the win not the save, but still)- in 8 games- go as long as McCullers, Peacock, and Morton went to end the game.
McCullers g7 LCS- 4 ip 0 r 1 h 1 bb 6 k
Peacock g3 WS- 3.2 ip 0 r 0 h 1 bb 4 k
Morton g7 WS- 4 ip 1 r 2 h 1 bb 4 k
so the 3 of these outings 11.2 ip 1 r 3 h 3 bb 14 k
Strangely, the announcers on the MLB Network said that since McCullers left the game too early to qualify for a win, the win could be awarded to a pitcher at the discretion of the scorer. I hadn’t realized the rule worked that way.
yeah very strange provision…
Morton works 4 innings and gets the win, Madbum back in 2014 worked 5 innings and got a save. And Morton actually gave up a run(Madbum of course didn’t). Guessing the margin at entry made it easier for Madbum with the save(3-2).
Beat me to it by about 5 minutes, stever. Anyway Morton would have surely been awarded a save if didn’t get the W. As I understand it if the reliever pitches the last 3+ he gets a save regardless of the score when he entered (although there is some discretion not to award a save if the score way really out of hand, there’s no way they would have done that in this case).
Am I mistaken? Why the downvote?
It’s odd to me that it’s at the scorer’s discretion, but he can’t choose the starting pitcher anyway, even if the guy pitches 4.2 perfect innings and the rest is bullpen for an inning a piece. Seems off.
yeah, and given the way the game is evolving, you wonder if this may change in the rather near future.
Of course, McCullers was far from 4.2 perfect innings last night- that’s for sure.
It’s an intriguing notion “the data is being used not to just identify potential bargains, but to help the players themselves become something they weren’t previously” but I’d still like to know exactly *how* data was employed to help a mediocre 33 year old pitcher suddenly discover elite velocity and break on his curveball? How do we even know it was something the Astros saw in the analytics to think he had the potential for this vs. just overpaying for what Morton was pretty and then getting lucky?
15 years ago when balls were also flying out of the park at historic rates, if you wrote that “players are dramatically altering everything we know about their abilities” about a guy like Morton, or Taylor, most baseball fans would have assumed something entirely different was at the heart of that transformation. I don’t want to be that guy. But I’m also skeptical of giving too many kudos to the Astros for seeing this potential in Morton without any idea really of how.
To be fair, Morton’s velocity didn’t just come out of nowhere this year. Last year, he was averaging 94.3 on his fastball. That’s not 99, but it was a substantial increase over what he’d been throwing before. I know he only pitched a handful of innings last year, but there was also spring training 2016 and the off-season of 2017 that the Astros had to look at him. So I think we can at least give them credit for seeing a possible improvement in a formerly mediocre pitcher and jumping on it.
First he decided to throw harder, then he decided to throw way harder
I see some pretty good FIP/xFIPs on Morton’s profile. In 2012, his FIP/xFIP was roughly league average versus other SPs. Better than average in 2013-14. Just worse than average in 2015. Much better than league average in 17.1 IP in 2016.
FIP/xFIP isn’t gospel, but I see a pitcher that’s been better than average more often than not across five seasons leading up to 2017, but who hadn’t been able to stay healthy. So, I guess I think it’s pretty obvious how the Astros saw potential in Morton. They looked at his stats.
I’m inferring that you think there’s something nefarious afoot, but I don’t really think so. I think the Astros identified a bargain using pretty common analytics, and then either the pitcher got better independently or with help from his team. I’m not seeing a lot of mystery.
I don’t see intelligent baseball fans making accusations anymore. That said, It’s reasonable for people to be, err, surprised, by a sudden and substantial jump in velocity so late in a pitcher’s career.
After being burned so many times, it’s interesting that so many fans still seem to assume the best. A 33 year-old adding 5 mph to his fastball in one off-season certainly isn’t normal. Doesn’t mean anything nefarious is going on, but I’d have expected to find more skepticism.
He was 94.3 last year and 95.0 this year, that isnt 5mph and is likely close to measurement gain with statcast. The bigger jump was the 2mph between 2015 and 2016, but its not like he didnt throw hard in other versions during his Pirate days.
I completely agree – there’s no reason not to be suspicious of players using steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs. With so much money at stake – 2 years, $14 million is a ‘bargain’ for Houston but is more than I’ll make in a lifetime – there’s ample reason for players to use them. We’ve seen the cat-and-mouse game in other sports, with newly discovered drugs and new methods to detect them; why not baseball? As Fangraphs’ writers like to say, #ResistNarrative
EDIT: Resist the narrative to accuse people of cheating whenever they throw harder*
Morton made a start on September 23, 2015 at Coors Field. He averaged 96.4 on his four seam, 94.6 on his two seam and topped out at
96.8.
He changed his mechanics after 2015:
“But toward the end of 2015, Morton recalled playing a game of catch between and “just kind of angrily throwing the ball.” In one of his last few starts of 2015, he just started throwing “as hard as I could.” And his velocity did pick up at the end of 2015, and then it spiked remarkably at the beginning of 2016, before a hamstring injury derailed his season.
It was at the end of 2015 and the following winter when Morton decided to conduct his own private experiment.
“I changed my workouts after that season. I tried eating a little bit better, nothing crazy. But I also started messing with my mechanics,” Morton said. “I didn’t work with anybody. I just listened to my body. And I don’t think I made any substantial changes, in terms of my mechanics, but I think I started trusting myself, what my body was telling me, what my arm was telling me, everything, my timing.
“And I went to spring training with the Phillies last year, I’m pitching against the Yankees in my first start, and I look up and I’m 94 to 96. After coming to spring training the previous year, a good five miles an hour slower than that, five, six miles an hour slower.”
https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/charlie-morton-now-dictating-his-own-fate/
Thanks for this J.D. I had missed that article and this gets to more of the backstory I was looking for. A change in mechanics would go a long way to explaining the increased velocity and break on the curve. Now my question is, what was it in the data the Astros were looking at that made them buy into his transformation (or potential for it at least) where other teams didn’t?
How do you know what teams were interested?
You can pull up pitch FX data on Brooks dating back to 2008 where Morton hit 96-97, and sat 93-95. It wasn’t every game, but he’s always been a hard thrower. Obviously injuries have taken their toll on his delivery, causing decreased velocities sporadically over the years.
His curveball has been one of the most effective curveballs in the game for years. Top five in baseball.
Since 2011 he’s been a sub four ERA, FIP, xFIP, SIERA pitcher.
It’s not hard to see why a team would give him a shot, especially when in 2016 he showed the stuff was still there if not better than before.
Also just an aside, but I find it interesting that Morton was given W last night over Peacock (2 scoreless) when in 2014 G7 it was Affeldt (2 1/3 scoreless) who got the W and Bumgarner the save. In fact I remember during the 9th inning of the broadcast then, Buck said they had heard from the scorer that Bum was going to be awarded the win if they held on, just like yesterday. Then for some reason that was changed after the game. Lobbying by Bum and the Giants perhaps because Affeldt came up with KC? I don’t know but it seems like where the scorer does have discretion on something like that it should really follow precedent as much as possible, while here they had that direct recent precedent and ignored it. Not that it really matters of course. I’m just curious now what conversations (if any) were had with the scorer in both cases.
like i said earlier, I wonder if it had something to do with the score at the time of entry. Madbum entered with the game at 3-2. Morton enters with the game at 5-0. Only thing I could think of.
And like I said above (cross posting at the same time), if a reliever pitches the last 3+ he gets the save regardless of the score. So it’s not like they awarded Morton the W because they couldn’t give him a save. He was already going to get that.
right. I’m saying that because the 2014 game was so much closer it felt like he was saving the game. Different than last night- though doesn’t feel like Morton deserves either the win or the save for last night(but he has to get 1 or the other).
I don’t think the score matters so long as it’s 3+ innings. Alan Mills once got a save with like a 20 run lead.
IMO, Morton’s pitch of the night was a down-and-in changeup to a RH batter (Chris Taylor?) after McCann visited the mound. Totally unexpected and perfectly executed. 2nd pitch shown “Morton 12 outs” mlb video: https://www.mlb.com/gameday/astros-vs-dodgers/2017/11/01/526517?#game_state=final,game_tab=videos,game=526517
Morton came up with the Braves, not the Pirates. He was traded to the Pirates for the great Nate McLouth.
Never forget!
… I wonder when Gorkys Hernandez will be in the WS…
Hey we got the immortal Jeff Locke in that trade too. It just isnt a Pirates season without 2 good months of Locke surrounded by 3 disaster months and eventually losing his rotation spot.
Can’t help but notice how much more forcefully he is pulling with his glove-side. Instead of ending up down by the knee, the glove is tucked above his hip now. Morton the Pirate looks a bit aim-y while Morton the Astros is really finishing pitches, and maintaining that effort between the fastball and off-speed is likely a big part of what both made the runs/breaks/fades better and tougher for the hitter to pick up.
Great article. I didn’t see who the author was initially, and near the end wondered, “what would Dave Cameron think about this?” For whatever reason, I associate Dave with skepticism that a player can become more than what he has been in the past, so seeing the author was a surprise.
Same thing with me and this comment. About halfway through, I thought “What would Mo Vaughn think about this?” I usually associate Mo Vaughn with playing baseball instead of commenting on FanGraphs, so seeing the author was a surprise.
Can’t help but think back to a couple of MLB radio talkers crapping all over the Morton signing when it was announced…..it was so out of left field that they didn’t feel confident enough to flat out condemn it, but they made it clear it wasn’t something they would have endorsed. Need to read this article…..and stay in the studio.
He’s supposedly a tremendous guy as well.
Dave I love you but.. When Morton was with the Pirates his nickname was “Electric Stuff” because he had electric stuff. Problem was he wasn’t healthy or didn’t have control…had anxiety issues…had terrible catchers… etc. etc. etc. We saw 2017 Morton plenty of times, just not for a whole season like this year.
Hell no Morton never threw nearly this hard with Pittsburgh. I’m sorry but you did not see anything like this before 2016.
Well that’s not true, Rols.
The new GIFs are amazing, thank you FG!! Yeah, I’m the guy who whined about them the other day on that other great post.
Great piece. The more one reads about Morton, the more one likes him. I hope he decides to stick around for 2018 rather than retire, even if that’s me being selfish.
I know one thing for sure. If he did decide to retire, not too much of a better way to go out…
Yonder Alonso — career SLG below .400, over 2000 AB in majors, career high 7 HR, hits 28 HR and slugs .501. At age 30.
Taylor, Smoak, Nunez (last year); the list goes on and on. It seems like players can actually remake themselves.
Is he maybe more effective throwing 4 seamers up in the zone than sinkers down because of the high spin? In theory more fb spin helps with rise while low spin helps with sink. I don’t know if his curve spin translates to fb spin but maybe his sinker had too much spin and thus stayed up too much? Or am I off base here?
“Whether it’s Morton on the mound or Jose Altuve, Chris Taylor, and Justin Turner at the plate, we’ve entered an age where players are developing elite skills seemingly out of nowhere.”
Altuve doesn’t belong in this comparison. He isn’t a player who experienced mediocrity in his first couple of years in the bigs and then all of a sudden took everyone by surprise. The man has shown an outstanding hit tool at every level of pro ball, even at 17. His height was the only reason (excuse) for why the “experts” didn’t give him the credit he deserved as he moved up the system. But last I checked, hitting .300+ at the highest levels plays, whether you’re 5’6 or 7’6.
Excellent article,Morton is this years Kyle Hendricks.
The world series champs,secret weapon.
Congrats to the Astros.
Great world series.
cannot for get about how well he commanded everything. Even with the riding move meant of the the fast ball he was still painting.
Morton flat out has top 5 stuff in baseball. Just an absolute hell of a sign.
I agree altuve did not develope an elite skill out of nowehere. he had an elite hit tool before and he also never had no power. he only hit 5-7 HR a year but with high GB rates. he then learned to elevate the ball more which made him better but even the 7 hr Version of him had a 135 OPS+ season in 2014 (albeit somewhat BABIP fueled).
he also still hasnt’t elite power. his iso has improved but his 202 was 61st out of 144 qualified hitters. he still is 16th in SLG but that is more driven by his BA. still of course without the power surge he wouldnt be an mvp candidate but he already had an elite skill and developed another solid skill to make him really elite.
It will be interesting to see how long Morton stays healthy, and if it turns out that sitting 97-99 as a starter limits your career to 1-3 years, will teams accept the tradeoff and just blow through more pitchers.
I know this thread is getting old and not the first thing that people read when other articles are posted, but the one thing I want to note with the change in Charlie Morton is his pitching coach in Brent Strom. His approach in having his pitchers doing several things well and one of them is curveballs. Look at McCullers and the use of his curve, see the changes in Morton’s curve and even Keuchel’s use of his curve. I would even note that Verlander who had already turned around his season from July on, but when Strom got a hold of him, his command and use of the curve only got better.
Steve,
Can we get a clip of Morton not hobbling through his delivery a month before hip surgery?
https://www.baseball-reference.com/boxes/PIT/PIT201408050.shtml
“… for all the talk of market inefficiencies and roster construction, this feels like the area where data and analysis are really changing the game.”
This comment, right here, for the win. This is going to be a greater factor in separating the great franchises from the rest of the pack: the ability to use data and video analysis to unlock the All-Star that’s lurking underneath every player and pitcher who was ever a decent prospect, and more.
Once the majority of teams come online with unlocking hidden talent in players with similar analytical tools and interpretational acumen–my god, can you even imagine how great the level of play is going to be? The organizations lagging behind are going to be rendered the equivalent of minor league teams.