Choose Your Own Lineup Adventure: On-Base vs. Slugging
Let’s get right down to the question that all baseball analysis is asking at its core: Which of these two players would you rather have on your team, all else being equal?
| Player | AVG | OBP | SLG | wOBA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Player A | .319 | .387 | .469 | .371 |
| Player B | .267 | .328 | .556 | .372 |
It’s a close one, right? That’s largely because I decreed it to be so; these aren’t real players, just stat lines I made up that have the same wOBA. Who would you rather have? They’re extremely different, of course; one gets a ton of value from walks and singles, with some doubles sprinkled in for good measure. You can surmise that the other gets a ton of value from home runs — look at that slugging percentage — but does worse elsewhere.
Oh yeah, a few other caveats. These are underlying talent levels; you might look at Player A and say that the BABIP can’t continue, or Player B and say the HR/FB rate can’t be real, but for our purposes, these are the lines they’ll put up over 1,000 PA, or 10,000, or 1,000,000. This is their real skill level. Given that, in most cases, it doesn’t matter much which one you choose, because they’re about the same. That’s the point of wOBA, after all.
That’s not a very interesting answer, so I decided to go deeper. I constructed a generic American League lineup. I removed intentional walks so that we’re comparing apples to apples. The result looks like this:
| Order | BA | OBP | SLG | wOBA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | .261 | .328 | .423 | .325 |
| 2 | .256 | .324 | .423 | .323 |
| 3 | .255 | .332 | .458 | .339 |
| 4 | .255 | .325 | .453 | .333 |
| 5 | .248 | .319 | .431 | .323 |
| 6 | .240 | .308 | .408 | .309 |
| 7 | .233 | .294 | .399 | .299 |
| 8 | .227 | .289 | .371 | .287 |
| 9 | .228 | .293 | .360 | .285 |
I threw that lineup into a lightly modified version of my lineup simulator, a short snippet of code that lets you put in a lineup (based on the probability of each outcome every time they bat) and get an estimate of how many runs they’d score per game. This one comes out to 4.53 runs per contest, which is close enough to the actual AL average for my purposes.
We don’t care about the average AL lineup, though; we want to know how the lineup will do with our two chosen hitters inserted. I plugged each hitter into the fourth spot in the lineup, replacing the team’s second-best hitter. Don’t think our hitters should bat fourth? Tough! That’s where I put them in the lineup, optimal construction notwithstanding (and it wouldn’t be a huge deal either way).
With Player A, the on-base champion, in there, the team scores 4.677 runs per game. Why so many places in the number? Because with Player B, captain home run, the team scores 4.672 runs per game. Those numbers are almost indistinguishable — five runs per 1,000 games, or less than a run per season. Sounds like we’re equally happy having either player, and wOBA works.
But that’s a boring answer, and I’m in search of a better one. What if we have a great offense instead of one that’s league-average? I took the average production of the top three offenses in the AL by wOBA: the Blue Jays, Astros, and Red Sox. These lineups crush. Seriously, take a look:
| Order | BA | OBP | SLG | wOBA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | .259 | .329 | .463 | .339 |
| 2 | .272 | .337 | .438 | .335 |
| 3 | .296 | .364 | .519 | .375 |
| 4 | .292 | .356 | .513 | .369 |
| 5 | .281 | .348 | .502 | .362 |
| 6 | .265 | .328 | .447 | .332 |
| 7 | .249 | .306 | .410 | .308 |
| 8 | .245 | .304 | .384 | 0.298 |
| 9 | .228 | .302 | .381 | .297 |
Thrown into my simulation, this blended team scores 5.26 runs per game. In reality, they’ve scored 5.22 runs per game. Seems like we’re on to something here. Next, let’s put in our two prospective players. They won’t be as helpful as before, naturally, because the four hitter in these lineups is already great.
Player A upgrades the lineup slightly — to 5.28 runs per game. Player B actually downgrades the lineup — to 5.25 runs per game. We solved it! Player A is better. That difference comes out to roughly five runs per season — a win if things break well. But that’s for two players with the same wOBA, so it’s an interesting finding. It’s an obvious thing, but lineup construction can change which kind of hitter you’d prefer.
That’s also boring. Let’s really change the lineup construction and see if we can move the needle at all. I went back into that hybrid good-offense lineup and changed each of the spots other than cleanup to emphasize getting on base. The wOBAs are still the same, but now every hitter gets there with meaningfully fewer homers. Here’s our new squad:
| Order | BA | OBP | SLG | wOBA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | .264 | .337 | .450 | .339 |
| 2 | .273 | .345 | .424 | .335 |
| 3 | .299 | .371 | .508 | .375 |
| 4 | .292 | .356 | .513 | .369 |
| 5 | .291 | .366 | .478 | .362 |
| 6 | .270 | .338 | .429 | .332 |
| 7 | .254 | .314 | .397 | .308 |
| 8 | .249 | .312 | .371 | .298 |
| 9 | .235 | .311 | .366 | .297 |
This lineup scores 5.3 runs per game, which should tell you that stacking OBP is at least a marginally good idea — without even adding our two hypothetical players, emphasizing on-base ability in every player adds roughly 13 runs a season to offensive production. That’s not a huge difference, of course — not enough to make you try to go trade your existing lineup for similar-wOBA, different-shape hitters — but it’s a neat effect nonetheless. It makes sense, too: stacking the bases with more runners makes singles, doubles, and walks more valuable because there’s a higher chance that there will be someone on base, as well as a higher chance that the next hitter up will advance the previous one on the bases.
Even here, the impact of our two equal-wOBA mystery hitters is small. Player A juices things slightly — to 5.32 runs per game. Player B lowers scoring — to 5.28 runs per game. There’s a slight gap between the two again, and it is again not explained by wOBA. Why? The same reason as above: stacking OBP creates synergies with itself.
Next, let’s try a powerful lineup with the same wOBAs instead. That wimpy OBP-heavy lineup we constructed above? It would have hit roughly 170 homers on the year, good for 20th in baseball despite scoring at a ludicrous clip. This one would lead the majors in homers, and trail only the Jays in slugging percentage:
| Order | BA | OBP | SLG | wOBA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | .253 | .324 | .472 | .339 |
| 2 | .262 | .326 | .453 | .335 |
| 3 | .289 | .356 | .530 | .375 |
| 4 | .292 | .356 | .513 | .369 |
| 5 | .272 | .340 | .515 | .362 |
| 6 | .259 | .320 | .458 | .332 |
| 7 | .247 | .302 | .417 | .308 |
| 8 | .243 | .293 | .402 | .298 |
| 9 | .221 | .296 | .390 | .297 |
On its own, this lineup projects to score 5.23 runs per game. That’s slightly worse than the baseline we started with — and don’t worry, I’ll throw in a table at the end. But for now, let’s add in our two mystery players to see what gives. Player A leads the lineup to 5.25 runs per game. Player B doesn’t move the needle much — he checks in at 5.23 runs per game. That’s essentially no difference, even over a 162-game season.
Here it is in grid form:
| Team | RS/G | w/Player A | w/Player B |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average | 4.53 | 4.67 | 4.68 |
| High Offense | 5.26 | 5.28 | 5.25 |
| High OBP | 5.30 | 5.32 | 5.28 |
| High Power | 5.23 | 5.25 | 5.23 |
What’s the point of these endless simulations and tables? Partially, I just like asking and answering questions like these. It’s cool to me that two players who look so different — seriously, our two hypothetical guys are 60 points of OBP apart and nearly 100 points of slugging percentage — deliver roughly the same performance. It’s also cool that stacking OBP has an effect — the high-OBP lineup outperforms the high-power lineup comfortably (12 runs a season) despite identical “one-number” statistics.
Why does this effect happen? Isn’t wOBA supposed to handle that? Not so much, actually. Stats like wOBA (and wRC+, which uses the same inputs but adjusts for park) look at the average offensive context of the league. They consider the frequency of each base/out state league-wide when they assign value to each outcome. Our hypothetical offenses definitely don’t have the same frequency for each base/out state. The ones that have no one on base? Those happen a lot less often when your team is running an aggregate .340 OBP.
Who should you prefer between Player A and Player B? It doesn’t really matter. But a full team of Player A or Player B? You should lean into players who rack up hits and walks if you can, because they stack together delightfully. This is a neat effect. It’s also one that few teams can leverage, because in reality, you’re going to put the best players you can on your team, and care more about how many runs they produce on offense than how they go about doing it.
This cool synergistic effect could produce an extra win a year that won’t be obvious in the stats — but you could just find a way to upgrade one spot on your roster by one win, or make a trade that nets you two wins, or any number of more impactful improvements. In fact, even though the conclusion of this article is “the shape of your production matters,” the truth is, the shape of your production mostly doesn’t matter. In a theoretical world where you can bring in an entire team of weirdo, low-ISO BABIP gods (perhaps a cloning facility with Luis Arraez’s DNA?), sure, go pick up your free win. But in reality, wOBA and wRC+ do a pretty good job! Just go find the best players, and the rest will work itself out.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
What happens if you stack slugging rather than OBP? How would that compare to the baseline, and what happens if you add the two hypothetical players to that lineup?
Is there any mix of OBP and power in a lineup that outperforms pure OBP stacking? Does giving your team a good chance for three-run homers outweigh the OBP synergy at some point?
Dave Cameron, I think it was, did a similar analysis as this article here on this site a few years ago. Unsurprisingly, he came to similar conclusions. He found, essentially, that in a lineup already trending towards an extreme (high OBP/low SLG, or the reverse) that like feeds like. A high OBP team benefits more from adding more OBP than SLG, and a high SLG team benefits more from adding more SLG. Seeking balance was unhelpful.
Yes, I thought of that article from Cameron too. Think it was about Trumbo (low OBP/high SLG player) with the Orioles (low OBP/high SLG team). So it was a good match in that regard.
Dave Cameron? Sounds like a fake name.
Fake name? Not cool!
Actually, I think his conclusion was slightly different. I believe his conclusion was that a ‘good’ offensive team was better served adding OBP, while a ‘poor’ offensive team preferred to add SLG. This conclusion makes sense when considered. If a team is good offensively, OBP leads to other good hitters being up more (which is more consistent), and thereby having a chance to do what they do, while a bad offensive team needs to score when it can, so having rarer outcomes more often is more valuable.
The difference between the effect on a good and bad team can be observed by looking at the limiting case ad absurdum.
Take Player A’ who literally never makes an out, but only walks. If his teammates do nothing but strike out, the team will score zero runs no matter what despite his performance. On the other hand, if his teammates also never make an out, then the team will score an infinite number of runs with him on it.
Conversely, Player B’ has the same wOBA by hitting a home run 1/3rd of the time and striking out the other two-thirds. On the lousy team, they’ll still score over a run a game (they should bat him leadoff.) But on the great team, his outs will prevent the team from batting around more than 4 or 5 times most innings.
Yeah I was a little surprised to not see the exercise repeated with a “bad” offensive team in the same way it was with the “good” amalgam.
So I got a little curious about the best team-wide OBPs in the league after reading this. When I think of OBP lineup stacking, I think about some of those Red Sox and Yankees teams in the 00s. The teams today are not like that. This year, the Astros are number one. That’s not a surprise, they were mentioned in the article. They also have a DH. It looks kind of like what you’d expect, with a whopping 6 regulars with OBPs between .350 and .385, and Yordan Alvarez just hanging outside that group at .349.
If you were to identify a case of OBP stacking in the real world in the 2020s, the Astros lineup is probably pretty close to what you’d find. I don’t think we have a ton of lineups like the 00s Red Sox or Yankees anymore. For example, the 2007 Red Sox had seven (!!!!!) regulars with OBPs between .365 and .445, and would have been eight if Jacoby Ellsbury hadn’t been unavailable for much of the year. The idea of a team doing this today seems impossible. Pitchers stuff is just too good and their strategies have changed, and now that teams are aware of the importance of OBP I don’t think it’s as easy to load up on guys like Kevin Youkilis anymore.
Okay, all that is fun, but guess who is #2 in team-wide OBP? I thought it would be Red Sox or Blue Jays since they’re the best offenses but it’s the Nationals. The Nationals! They don’t get a DH for most of their games and their offense is about league average. Some of this is guys who are no longer there like Trea Turner, but in small samples they have a ton of guys putting up astronomical OBPs . Riley Adams is rocking a .436 BABIP en route to a .418 OBP. Lane Thomas has a .397 OBP. Having Juan Soto and his incredible on base skills certainly helps but aside from that nothing they’re doing makes any sense. It’s super awesome and cool.
I haven’t checked at all, but how do the early moneyball A’s teams rank? That’s the first thing that comes to mind for me, but the Sox/Yanks certainly refined their proto-approach.
The top 4 highest team OBPs from 1998 to 2002 were two from Cleveland and two from NYY. Oakland placed 12th and 18th. So they might have known its importance earlier than others, but it didn’t translate into bottom-line results.
Perhaps it was the fetishism for walks that got them there while having few actually good players held them there.
It gets weirder. If you filter the leaderboards starting on August 1st (post trade deadline) the Nationals are #1 in all of MLB in OBP a 0.346.
The SLG is mediocre but the total package is the 3rd best offense in the NL over the past six weeks. Pretty crazy for a team that traded away every starting batter outside of Soto and Bell.
About that pitching…
What does it look like without Soto’s OBP pulling up the average?
This is definitely a case of “enjoy Lane Thomas and Riley Adams while they’re hot.” Just gotta go with the flow and enjoy it while it lasts.
Riley Adams is Babip driven, but Thomas looks like he could be legit at getting on base
Which is stickier year-to-year, on-base skills or slug?
Pelican grip.
I take that as a vote for George Brett-style slug.
This is actually really interesting!
I wonder if, in real life, the high-OBP lineup would also see more balls, more walks, and get deeper into the bullpen? And would that even be a good thing in a single unique game where the relievers are often so much more dominant?
Maybe this shows that the new inefficiency is to go after high OBP, low power guys both in free agency and in drafting.
Most likely, yes. I can’t remember if I read an interview with Wade Boggs about this or someone commenting on his career, but my understanding was that the Yankees brought him in during the early 1990s specifically for that grinding-down-the-bullpen dynamic you mentioned. So this was very much on the radar for teams as of about 20 years ago.
It’s scary to think, the early 1990’s is actually about 30 years ago.
So small ball can work and you don’t need an entire league full of TTO? Whodathunkit
There are some caveats to this. While you do sort of get to pick your players, you don’t have total control. If it were as easy as everyone going out and getting Ty France to play first base, then more teams would do it. And if Jared Walsh falls into your lap, are you going to try and dump them in the hopes that you get someone with an OBP 30 points higher? Probably not. You’ll count your blessings you have a guy who contributes offensively with a and move on.
Furthermore, sometimes you do pick the players and the type of player they turn out to be is just way different than what you expected. This year Jorge Polanco has whacked 30 homers in less than 500 PAs and is only running a .330 OBP. Who saw that coming? Polanco’s probably a fluke, but there are a number of players who came up as bat-to-ball, low-K guys like Ozzie Albies who have (at this point) established that they are not especially great at getting on base but they do hit the ball over the fence.
Somewhat related issue: Let’s say you do decide to prioritize small ball. This works if one team does it and less if everyone does it. The Astros have clearly made it a priority, getting and retaining Michael Brantley and Yuli Gurriel. Part of the reason this works is valued players like that the same way the Astros do, they’d be more expensive to hire.
The bottom line is that wOBA and wRC+ and things like that are really good summaries of offensive ability. It is better to stack OBP but it’s not as easy to do it, and it’s probably better to just get good players when it’s not possible.
You do realize that high OBP players often lean pretty hard into those true outcomes right?
It is really hard to find the prototypical low-power, low-strikeout, high-OBP guys anymore too. This year’s version of Starling Marte is kind of like that, but historically he hasn’t been. Nicky Lopez would fit but as was detailed on these pages before, that’s probably not sustainable. Michael Brantley is probably the closest you can get to that type of player, and good luck finding Michael Brantleys at every position.
Adam Frazier
Robbie Grossman anyone
If Player A were slightly better than Player B in *all* possible lineups, then the answer would just be to change the weights in wOBA to very slightly increase the value of getting on base versus slugging.
Considering the way the weights are already calculated, and the fact that they’re nearly equivalent with an average lineup, we should assume that Player B is slightly better with *below* average teammates.
All that makes sense. To the extent that you can count on your teammates, you want to avoid making outs. To the extent that you can’t count on your teammates, you want to hit home runs. Taking the limit ad absurdum, if all your teammates always strike out, the only thing that matters is hitting more home runs. Vice versa, if your teammates never make an out, then the best thing you can do is also not make any outs (well, ignoring that you can’t just declare like in Test cricket.) But the good news is that even with fairly outlier “best/worst in MLB” cases, the teammates don’t matter that much, it’s only when it’s the Gas-House Gorillas vs Bugs Bunny that you see real meaningful differences.
To me, it kind of boils down to whether you want to pressure the opposing pitchers or hitters. If you go with a slugging team, you’re putting pressure on the opposing batters to keep up; conversely, the OBP team is constantly pressuring the pitchers and defense.
There’s another factor to consider as well: your own pitching staff and defense. If the defense is porous, it’s probably better to build a slugging team that can put runs up in a hurry.
Me…I think, ideally, I’d want the OBP lineup. The slugging lineup can cause you to lose, sure, but the constant pressure of men on base can cause you to want to quit playing.
Not an expert of course but is there a defensive offset. I play in a small group strat-o-matic league of 16 teams so we tend to be high power of course. I have always gone the OBP route and done quite well but the Achilles heal – at least in strat – is quality defenses. Strat the card game is in no way an actually representation of hte real world of course, especially on defense. but I am curious if a similar affect occurs. When I run into a top defensive team in strat my OBP lineup tanks because I get fewer base runners overall and the double plays spike. Curious if this affect takes place in the real world with shifts and good defensive teams. In strat against those teams you want to hit the homers because your are not going to reach critical mass often enough on the base paths.
Yeah, good defense is the weakness of an OBP lineup. That’s unfortunate, but I would say that good teamwide defense is less common than a buzzsaw pitcher. More moving parts means more chance for breakage, right?
Especially given that strikeout rates are ungodly, the all or nothing approach seems to be a lot more nothing than is desirable.
This is great. It would also be interesting to see how these results change (or stay the same) for poor offenses (low offense, low OBP, low power). I would hazard a guess that the higher SLG player would create a larger impact on runs scored than the OBP player because a standalone OBP threat amidst replacement level players doesn’t seem likely to create synergy opportunities, but maybe not!
It’d likely be a curve with diminishing returns until you reach that critical point to change the trajectory into a parabolic swing towards exponential gains.
It certainly feels like there are more Players B out there than there are Players A.
Not the exact same criteria, but earlier in the year I was trying to figure out how many “old school” hitters there were. My filters were wRC+ & AVG+ over 100 with ISO+ & K%+ below 100.
Out of 197 players with at least 150 PA at the time of the query only 24 checked all four boxes.
Love this article. I imagine you writing it with this huge s**t eating green slapped between your chin and nose. We need more elegant, thought provoking, fundamental articles as you produce, eg
-Does bunting really make sense?
-is 2-0 really the best count for stealing?
-when should you use your best reliever?
-does momentum mean any more than tomorrow’s starting pitcher?
-How are batters adjusting to exaggerated shifts
-how do changes in spin rate predict domestic violence (just kidding there, couldn’t help it)
I mean, who really cares how an obscure call-up helped a.500 team. You are awesome about investigating and understanding the forrest rather than the trees.
Dang, doesn’t baseball freeking rock?
Great, awesome, fun article once again, Ben
Let me ask the “Bill James” question. How do the two hitters distribution of outcomes turn into actual real world wins? I postulate that the home run hitters outcomes are even worse from this perspective; hitting home runs should lead to a wider distribution of runs, so sometimes you win by “too many runs” whereas the high obp guy should have less variance in his outcomes, consistently providing runs