Chris Sale and Giving Up a Stud
Yesterday, Ken Rosenthal published a piece over on FoxSports arguing that, if a team wants to put themselves in the Chris Sale sweepstakes, they should consider parting with one of their “can’t touch” players.
“Can’t do that.”
That’s the phrase baseball people often use when confronted with the possibility of trading a top young player. Can’t do that. Won’t do that. Don’t even go there.
The availability of White Sox left-hander Chris Sale, however, creates a different landscape — or at least, it should.
Rarely, if ever, have we seen a pitcher obtainable under circumstances like this.
Sale, 27, is not simply one of the game’s top aces. He also is under club control for three more years — and priced well below market value at less than $13 million per season.
The White Sox, then, are justified in setting an exceedingly high bar for Sale, and should not settle for less when they start hearing the proverbial “can’t do that” from one team after another.
Rosenthal goes on to list six players who fit the criteria of a cornerstone player, the kind that Rosenthal believes Sale should bring back in return as the foundation of a deal. Those players? Alex Bregman, Andrew Benintendi, Rougned Odor, Julio Urias, Trea Turner, and Dansby Swanson.
Rosenthal is right that Sale, based on his elite performance and remarkably underpriced contract, is worth this kind of player. It’s why he ranked as the 15th most valuable asset in the game in this summer’s Trade Value series, ahead of all six of those players. But if I’m one of the teams trying to make a deal for Sale, I’d still be inclined to try and say “no thanks” to a deal built around those kinds of players.
To be clear, this piece isn’t intended as any kind of knock on Chris Sale. I don’t think he’s overrated, or about ready to break down, or anything else that would cause me to shy away from paying a premium price for a player of his caliber. Sale is great, and Rosenthal is right that his combination of elite performance at a young age and team-friendly contract have not hit the market for quite some time. He’s worth a ton.
But I think that, in most of the win-now trades that have gone wrong for the acquiring team of late, there’s been a common denominator; they gave up a piece off their Major League roster that made the short-term upgrade too minimal to justify the long-term value surrendered. And I think that might well be the case with any of the players listed in Rosenthal’s piece, especially if they are just part of a larger multi-player package.
Before we get too far into the argument, let’s just look at some data. These are the 2017 Steamer forecasts for everyone listed in Rosenthal’s column, along with Sale’s projection, for reference.
| Name | PA | wRC+ | Off | Def | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alex Bregman | 643 | 110 | 8 | 1.2 | 3.2 |
| Trea Turner | 594 | 113 | 11.3 | 0.1 | 3.1 |
| Rougned Odor | 616 | 108 | 6.9 | -2.4 | 2.6 |
| Dansby Swanson | 587 | 89 | -8.1 | 6.7 | 1.8 |
| Andrew Benintendi | 509 | 103 | 2.2 | -6.4 | 1.3 |
| Name | IP | ERA | FIP | WAR | RA9-WAR |
| Chris Sale | 213 | 3.43 | 3.45 | 4.9 | 4.8 |
| Julio Urias | 131 | 3.34 | 3.59 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
As you can see, Steamer likes all of these guys, with perhaps the exception of Benintendi, who rates as a below-average player for 2017. But that’s a pretty easy projection to quibble with, because Steamer is assuming that Benintendi is a average defensive left fielder, when he profiled as a legitimate center fielder coming up through the minors, and could easily be a plus defender in left once he gets used to playing in front of the Monster. Realistically, if you buy into the scouting reports that suggested Benintendi was going to have some real defensive value in addition to a solid bat, then all of these guys look like average or better players for 2017.
Sale, of course, is better than all of them. He projects as a five-win pitcher in 2017, one of the legitimate true aces in the sport. A team with Sale is better than a team with Bregman, Turner, or any of the rest.
But when including one of these guys, the magnitude of the upgrade becomes a lot smaller. For the Astros or the Nationals, they’d be swapping out a +3 WAR player for a +5 WAR player, which has roughly the same effect on the team’s expected record as, say, signing Josh Reddick. Reddick is a nice player who made the Astros better, but I didn’t hear too many people talking about how that move dramatically changed the course of Houston’s 2017 season.
This was the problem the Diamondbacks ran into last year with the Shelby Miller trade. Well, besides the fact that Miller himself was terrible in 2016. But even if he had pitched like they expected, the Diamondbacks still wouldn’t have been significantly improved, because they had to give up Ender Inciarte’s 2016 value in the deal. By subtracting a piece from the big league roster that was nearly as good as the piece they were getting, the Diamondbacks set themselves up to give up a bunch of future value for no real gain.
No one is going to make that kind of mistake again any time soon, most likely, but giving up a package of talent built around one of these guys would risk following in the same process that the Diamondbacks took in making the Miller trade. When you make one of these big splash trades to win now, you have to make sure you make your team gets a lot better in the short term. And that is tough to accomplish when you’re giving up an average or better player making the league minimum, since even the deepest teams don’t have those kinds of players just sitting around ready to fill the gaps.
Sure, if you trade a guy like Bregman or Benintendi for Sale, you can more easily go sign a replacement for what you thought you were going to get from the young guy this year in the free agent market, except that the trade will have also removed $13 million from your free agent budget. $13 million isn’t the end of the world, but it’s enough to get you Josh Reddick these days, so you’re not only giving up the young guy who can help you this year, but enough money to sign another complementary piece too.
And when you look at that alternative, it’s not clear that the team with Sale is dramatically better than the team with the young guy and some mid-level free agent. A little better, probably. Maybe a win or two better. But how much long term value do you want to give up to make your team better by a win or two this year?
If the White Sox were only asking for one player in return for Sale, okay, then give up Benintendi, Urias, or Odor. Sale is worth that, if it’s one for one. Or maybe even Bregman or Turner, though that would be a harder pill to swallow, given how good those guys could be in 2017. But Rick Hahn doesn’t want one player for his ace. He’s going to want a handful of players to give him a chance to build a new young core to build around. That’s the whole point of this trade for the White Sox; to reload with depth, rather than just having a few good players surrounded by guys who aren’t good enough.
And when you’re talking about giving up a package of talent, you have to make sure to get a lot better in 2017. Giving up a +3 WAR player for a +5 WAR player, while also taking on some extra salary, isn’t a big enough upgrade to justify the acquisition cost.
That’s why a Red Sox deal makes more sense centered around Yoan Moncada, who probably isn’t quite ready to help the Red Sox win in 2017. You swap out Moncada for Sale, and all of the sudden, the Red Sox are probably three or four wins better than they are right now. That’s a huge change in expected outcomes, and starts to be worth the long-term value being surrendered.
Most teams don’t have a Moncada, of course, which is why most of these deals often end up as five or six player packages, with teams keeping their best young players for themselves. Because contenders are almost never in a position where they can afford to just give up average or better players off their big league roster, especially ones making the league minimum, who allow the team to pay free agent prices to fill other holes. Once you have a guy like that, who can help you both now and in the future, it usually doesn’t make sense to use that guy as part of a package to try and obtain a better core piece.
That doesn’t mean Sale isn’t worth that kind of player. He is, if that’s all Chicago wanted in return. But the White Sox are going to want a handful of players to help rebuild their talent stock, and when you’re giving up multiple pieces of long-term value, you don’t want to build the package around a guy who is not that far from being as good as the guy you’re getting.
Dave is the Managing Editor of FanGraphs.
Washington should definitely sell high on Treat Turner. No way he carries that babip over next year and if Chicago is dumb enough to give up Sale for that, Washington may as well pencil themselves into the NLCS barring injuries.
Washington should definitely not sell low on Trea Turner. He can definitely carry that babip over next year and if Washington is dumb enough to want Sale for that, Chicago may as well pencil themselves into the ALCS barring injuries.
Just wanted to see how the reverse of that speculative statement would look.
There isn’t much of an impact to the regular season outcome but there is a significant impact to the playoffs. If you are the Astros, you make the playoffs with Bregman or with Sale, but your chances are a lot better winning in the playoffs with Sale than Bregman.
If we agree that the expected outcome during the regular season would only be slightly altered by trading Bregman for Sale, then I think they would be better off waiting until the deadline to trade for an impact bullpen arm. It’s not just that the 2017 regular season wouldn’t have a different landscape. The same would be said about 2018 and 2019.
Yeah, this is a really good point. Another thing to consider is exactly who the replacement player they acquire in free agency is. If it’s bringing back Valbuena, that might only be a one and a half win decrease at third base, and a four win upgrade at pitcher, netting you two and a half wins in the regular season and, like you say, significantly better chances in the playoffs.
But let’s say the Astros aren’t just talking the talk, and instead of getting Valbuena they get Sale and Justin Turner? All of a sudden you are looking at adding five wins to the roster, and suddenly you are within a win of the Cubs. The key is, how willing whatever teams giving up one of these assets are to really pushing the limits of team building.
The replacement player would be Gurriel, who is already on the roster. Or maybe you could consider whatever 1B/DH they sign as the replacement.
Out of curiosity I’m interested in quantifying what you mean by ‘a lot’. Say the Astros win their division with Bregman and you don’t know anything else. You’d probably guess that their chances to win the WS are about 12.5%. Now if you remove Bregman from their roster, and insert Sale, how much would you think that 12.5% increases?
Guess I’m wondering how Sale gives much better odds in the playoffs vs Bregman. As we’ve seen with Kershaw & Price, a regular season “ace” doesn’t always translate to postseason “ace. Maybe it’s just small sample size BABIP, but, the point remains. Heck, we just saw a team with 1 starter, using their bullpen 5 innings a game for the other 3 guys almost win the WS.
Odor? Are people really that high on him?
Middle infielder with power? But yeah, I don’t see how he fits being named with the other guys. They all have huge upside, and I could easily see any of them actually putting up a better WAR number than Sale next year. Odor I just don’t see that from – maybe if he puts it together he gets to 3.5 or 4, but even that’s a stretch.
I disagree about Bregman being a more upside prospect than Benintendi. I think they both posses the upside to be perennial all stars. Urias may posses slightly higher upside than those two, but is also a pitcher.
I would actually rank them in this order:
-Turner
-Bregman, Benintendi, Urias
-Swanson, Odor
I think Turner gets the edge over the others and Benintendi gets the edge over Swanson/Odor for a higher upside.
That’s what I was thinking. Bregman, Urias and Turner are in a different class than Odor, Swanson and Benintendi. Bregman, Urias and Turner are potential MVP-level players while Odor, Swanson and Benintendi have lower ceilings.
Whoops, meant to reply to your comment. I think really they are all in a similar class in terms of value (outside of Odor), with Turner ahead of the pack.
I would love to hear how you think Benintendi is outclassed by Bregman, considering that the two have had virtual clone careers to this point. I think it’s much more likely that the two duel over “who is better?” annually than one clearly outclass the other.
My guess is that due to hearing about Odor with some regularity over the last few seasons and not hearing much about Turner/Bregman/Benintendi other then they are “top prospects” you probably think Odor is old. He’s not. Odor is younger then Turner and only a few months older than Bregman/Benintendi. Yet those guys have ~180ish games between them all in the majors; while Odor has 384.
So yeah, Odor’s not old and is super valuable. Also, Odor punched Jose Bats in the face, so yeah don’t forget that.
The 300 more games played compared to the others is exactly what devalues Odor relative to the other three, because he will be under team control two years less than the others.
So when you take that into consideration along with the fact that he isn’t quite as good as the other three, his value isn’t really on the same teir.
Odor has value, but his below average defense does hurt him somewhat.
His “breakout” season in 2016 still only produced 2.4 WAR because of poor defense.
The Astros at least already have a 3rd baseman they are paying a lot of money to on the roster if they give up Bregman. Considering they’ve already signed Reddick, traded for McCann, and are allegedly about to sign Encarnacion, they’re kind of running out of places to play Gurriel as well, which might indicate they are prepping for a trade for a #1 starter?
This is exactly the point and I do not know if the White Sox get it. They are a few years away from having enough pieces (especially bats) to be any good. Those pieces are probably not in their minor league system right now. Getting a great young hitter off a team’s major league roster doesn’t get them any closer to being relevant, just like Sale’s new team doesn’t get much better over all. In a couple years the White Sox will be looking to trade that hitter after another 90 loss season. They are just swapping one problem for another. The White Sox should not be looking for the best young hitter on a 25 man roster, they should be looking for the best three or four hitters with no MLB service time. And then they should try to get the best two or three hitters without service time from another team for Quintana.
Agree 100% on this. It’s hard to trust them to not only do this deal, but do it right.
Bregman + is the kind of thing they should be looking for though (the + being another 3 good prospects most likely). Still 6 full years of control. I think they want to trade Sale for major pieces, unload Frazier, Robertson, the guys with only a year or two left, and then hold on to Quintana (control through 2020), Eaton, Rodon, etc expecting to be trying again in 2019.
Bregman + can mean 3 high quality prospects or it can mean a depth package
Bregman/Martes/Tucker/Reed is a possible top end option
Bregman/Tucker/Whitley/Paulino/Cameron/Perez or Ferrell is the depth option
Not sure which the Astros would prefer. Cream off the top, or gutting system depth
A package centered around Martes is not one the Sox will end up accepting though
I think it’s complicated. I honestly believe if the Sox were JUST looking for a good young hitter off a major league roster, as you seem to be implying, a deal would be done already. As this article points out, they aren’t shooting for either/or, they’re shooting for both a young major league hitter AND minor leaguers with no service time. If it were one or the other, I’d agree with you that the Sox should go with the minor leaguers with no service time.
I 100% agree the Sox are a few years away, but assuming a reasonable period for the rebuild, guys who are controlled through 2023 (like Bregman) or even 2021 (like Odor) should be around when they are ready to contend. The advantage of trading for a player like that (again, in addition to/not instead of minor leaguers with no service time) is that you absolutely cannot trade away Sale and come up empty handed. Guys who have some degree of success in the majors and highest levels of the minors are much more projectable. People tend to overestimate the likelihood of prospects with no minor league time being good major league players. Even for the most highly regarded prospects major league success is something of crapshoot (http://camdendepot.blogspot.com/2013/12/death-to-tinstaapp-updating-mckinneys.html). Combine that with the Sox being run by a front office that has proven, not merely bad, but historically awful at identifying and developing position player prospects, it is almost an absolute imperative that they get a player who has had some degree of success in the majors and is much closer to being a “sure thing”.
I look back at RA Dickey for Travis D’Arnaud (Syndergaard was the unproven prospect in A-ball in 2012 and barely made the top 100 prospect lists). Dickey was a CY winner that had shown ability to pitch really well for a mediocre Mets team over several years (3.4 avg fWAR). D’Arnaud was a ready-for-the-majors player.
The Mets were perennially finishing a few games under .500 in 4th place in the NL East. They wanted to sell high on Dickey for prospects and Toronto offered a hitting catcher (which the Mets LOVE) and the Mets asked for a high-upside prospect. They were really just selling high and didn’t expect to be competitive for a couple years anyway.
Toronto was a perennially finishing a few games under .500 in 4th place in the Al East. They had a Bautista, Encarnacion, Lawrie, Rasmus, and NO STARTING PITCHING. They had visions of dancing knuckle-balls and the wild card. They got Buehrle and Reyes from the Marlins to put together a team built on scoring lots of runs and having at least 2 starters to pitch to soak up innings and be good enough to keep them in games in the playoffs.
Hmm, I think this applied more towards Hamels when he was being shopped. Obviously back then, it made zero sense for teams to part ways with guys like Betts, Seager, Urias, Mazara, ect. Given contract (was still being paid tons) and the good, but not amazing production obviously it didn’t make sense for those teams to part ways with elite talents.
However, for Sale, I think he should command that type of talent plus a little more. Projections are fun, but the fact is guys like Swanson and Bregman and Benintendi are still unproven. Theres a decent chance none of them are any more than average players. While you could argue a average player at league min with 6yrs of control could provide more WAR than an ace with 3yrs of control, the argument is fishy at best. A 6 WAR ace pitcher being paid 10mil a year for 3yrs is going to be valued a whole lot more than a 2-3 win player making the league min controllable for 6yrs. If WAR divided by money owed was the end all be for trades, then guys like Kimbrel, Chapman, Hamels, ect would never fetch anything close to what they got. Teams pay premiums to have the better talent and make their teams better. Averages players (although very valuable with 6yrs control) are dime a dozen. Ace pitchers in their primes? Not so much.
I get the argument though. Some people acting like Sale is worth Benintendi+Moncada+Devers is wild. However, I think Sale should probably land one of those names + another top 100 + 2-3 other decent but not super valuable pieces. So maybe Moncada/Kopech + two lower guys. Or Urias/Bellinger. Or maybe Swanson/Allard + two lower ends.
Urias/bellinger is so much better than kopech/moncada. Proximity to majors especially for pitchers plays such a huge role in value. We are pretty confident urias can start and hold up over a whole year. Kopech we have no idea if he even profiles as a starter yet. Secondly do we even know where moncada can play? He has been panned at 2nd and 3rd leaving cf as the most likely fit?
I suppose I don’t value Bellinger as highly as some. The outline for a Sale trade I was making was one elite 65FV asset (Moncada/Urias/Swanson/Bregman/Benintendi) + one 55FV type top 100 (Kopech, Allard, ect) + maybe 2 other lower end pieces (maybe a 50 and 45 FV) If you value Bellinger more as a top 25 60 FV prospect than it would probablybe too much. Maybe substitute him for Alvarez.
Going back to my previous comment, you are undervaluing Sale and his cheap contract.
The White Sox won’t accept a middling offer for Sale as they can hold onto him and deal him at the deadline if necessary. Many teams will be trying to trade for Sale given the utter lack of solid free agent pitching opions and the EXTREME cost of signing a top starter in free agency. Many suitors drives up the cost of trading for Sale
Sale is worth much more than you are suggesting.
Chapman netted the Yankees Torres, a top 25 prospect + more
Andrew Miller for two years netted the Yankees Frazier and Sheffield, a top 25 and top 100 prospect + two more lower level prospects
Shelby Miller netted Atlanta Swanson (top #10), Blair (#40 at the time) and Inciarte (quality mlb regular)
All of these proposals suggesting Sale is worth one top prospect plus a little more is ridiculously undervaluing a proven MLB left handed #1 starter over totally unproven prospects. A team will be willing to give what it takes…and expect the return to be massive
Dansby Swanson was probably a 15-20 ranked prospect at the time of that trade (only MLB.com had him top 10). The packages for all these other guys were headlined by similar level players. They also were consensus overpays (and someone might indeed overpay for Sale too, but you can’t declare that to be the fair market value).
When you start talking an Urias or Moncada, true consensus top 5 prospects, you are in another level. That may or may not make the difference, but it IS a MAJOR difference.
That is true, but, none of those guys that were traded were on the MLB team & expected to contribute in 2017. That was the point of the article. Top prospects are one thing, trading cheap good players off the MLB roster is another.
Fwiw, those are two deadline deals and a crazy az gm. Its just not comparable. I would go back to the david price trade as the closest comp. Which was a cost controlled mlb ready pitcher, a back end top 100 toolsy middle infielder and a cost controlled utility guy with some upside in Nick Franklin. That’s for 1 1/2 years. So deadline premium mitigates a year of control, Austin Jackson was also dealt, that’s another 1/4 year value mitigated.
A similar red Sox package would be rodriguez, moncada and shaw. That’s factoring in the additional control sale offers. Pitching value has only gone up so maybe it’s a swihart short.
Now I believe the white Sox should offer to take pandas contract in the deal and add frazier. Then you are looking at something along panda, erod, moncada, devers, swihart and kopech.
This article is a breath of fresh air from the Twitter bog of eternal stench and its clamoring to trade “Bregman and more!” for Sale. THANK YOU. Spamming the link everywhere I can.
This is logical, but what is the precedent? Looking at what Boston gave up for Pomeranz, I can see why the ChiSox are asking for so much.
I’d argue that the Pomeranz trade is good precedence for a Sale trade actually. Espinoza is a blue chip prospect, but is probably at least 2 years away from the majors. Sale is better than Pomeranz, so the White Sox should target a plurality of Espinoza type prospects, namely highly regarded but not major league ready.
If you’re looking for precedent, how about Sales for Delino DeShields Jr.? Seriously, would love to see the Dodgers offer a big package that doesn’t include Urias. (DeLeon, Verdugo, Calhoun, Diaz, Stewart?)
THIS ANALYSIS IS VERY FAULTY/PROBLEMATIC!!! It assumes all STEAMER projections are equal in terms of their likely degree of accuracy. Therefore, the article argues, that since STEAMER projects Sale to be worth “X” number of Wins in 2017 and projects each of Rosenthal’s “untouchables” to be worth only slightly less than “X” number of Wins in 2017, the value of having Sale over having the “untouchable” traded for him isn’t substantial enough to justify foregoing what is likely a greater long term value of the “untouchable” + the rest of the package shipped to Chicago for Sale along with him.
The problem is that all STEAMER projections (and other projection systems, for that matter) are not created equal. The STEAMER projection of a 5 WAR for Sale is far more likely to have a significantly higher degree of accuracy than the STEAMER projections for any of the “untouchables” (Odor is the exception, though he comes with unique issues of his own as the centerpiece of a Sale trade). Projections of future baseball player outcomes or any future outcome are the result of coherent analysis of relevant historical data. So, assuming the analysis involved in all projections remains equally coherent (which I assume it does for STEAMER projections), how likely any particular projection is to be how accurate is entirely dependent on the sheer quantity (i.e. sample size) of relevant historical data available regarding that projection, and qualitative degree of the correlation between that historical information and the future projection being made on its basis (relevance).
With Sale there is a large sample size of more highly relevant information. That is we have a lot of recent past performance of Sale against major league competition which is likely to correlate strongly to the major league competition against which STEAMER is projecting his 2017 performance. Of course, that personal big league past performance must be analyzed in the context of historical data for players with similar characteristics (performance, position, age etc..), but such historical data will also correlate strongly to future performance.
By contrast, for the “untouchables” (with the exception of Odor), we have only very small (and therefore less meaningful re projecting future outcomes) sample sizes of that highly correlative data. That is, 5 out of the 6 “untouchables” have basically a 1/2 season or less worth of performance vs major league competition. We have larger sample sizes of recent minor league performance history for the “untouchables”, but the correlation between past minor league performance and future major league performance is obviously MUCH MUCH weaker than the correlation between past major league performance and future major league performance, and further weakens as the level of the minors from which the historical data is culled gets lower (i.e from AAA-AA etc…) (this is a problem both because the correlation gets weaker and because once you differentiate between the levels of the minors, the sample size of data at each particular degree of correlation to future major league performance gets smaller, causing the projection of future major league performance to be based on a synthesis of data having differing degrees of correlation to what is being projected, and therefore making a higher degree of accuracy for the projection less likely).
The value of having Sale in the near term, therefore, as opposed to one of the “untouchables” is the far greater degree of certainty of that Sale yields his projected value. Even if we assume that STEAMER accounts for this uncertainty by lowering the projected WAR of players like the “untouchables” to a more conservative number, the relative certainty of Sale is still carries huge value over the wide range of outcomes for the “untouchables”. For a contending team, knowing that there is say an 80% chance Sale will give you the contribution you feel you need to contend for a World Series, is more valuable than the possibility that an “untouchable” may give you the same, more, less, or far less than such contribution.
As to Odor, the player among the untouchables for whom there is a larger sample size of more relevant historical data from which to build a projection of future big league performance, the problem is that he is arbitration eligible after this season. If his profile remains similar to what his past performance suggests, he will get paid a lot more money than he is truly worth, as a 2b who can hit 270 with 30 HR and drive in 90 runs. The arbitration process values the more traditional stats, so even though given his on base skills and defense Odor is 2.5 win player, he’ll get paid like a 5 win one. Whereas so much of Sale’s value lies in the fact that he is so underpaid given his level of production, Odor, while a good player will likely be overpaid given his level of production. Especially for a White Sox organization that operates like a mid-small market club, that would be a huge concern.
It is a very bad ANALYSIS/DISCUTABLE. It is assumed that all plans have equal probability level Steamboat. Therefore, it is necessary to the article, as well as the number of projects sold STEAMER value “H” won by 2017. year and Rosenthal each project “Hit” just a bit less than “X” number of victories in 2017, the price it was sold-through is “moved” to trade for him is not strong enough to make long-ignored St can have a value of “touch” + the rest of the package was sent to Chicago to trade him.
The problem is that all the projected money (and other projection systems, for that matter) are not equal. Steam cooker with 5 wars on sale more likely to have higher precision than expected MONEY to anyone, “untouchable” (the smell is no exception, although it is only a matter of yourself as you are shopping centers). Predict the outcome of future members of the Homophones or future results are the result of a coherent analysis of the historical data. So, assuming that the analysis includes all forecasts are no less strict (for which I think works for the steamer), how can that be a special projection is accurate depends entirely on absolute terms (e.g., sample size) historical data relevant about the level and quality of the relationships between the information about the history and predict future performed (related).
Selling a great pattern and relevant details. It’s like we have a lot of sales activity of advantage over rivals may be strongly associated with the main competitors of the Federation about the operation against established in 2017. Of course, the big Leagues through effective analysis in the context of historical data on players with the same characteristics (performance, location, age, etc), but also historical information about focus future productivity.
But for “the untouchables” (except aroma), we only have a very small (and therefore less significant reconstruction results predicted in the future) the size of the data model is very high. In other words, 5, 6 “utility” is basically a Season 1/2 or less value performance in relation to the competition the main tournaments. We have a large sample of recent performance history Little League for “Untouchable”, but the correlation between influence in the past in Little League and on future activities in the majors is obviously much, much less than the correlations between effects in recent major tournaments and made the future, continue to undermine the level of junior, where he shot bass history data (AAA and AA etc. …) (This is a problem because the correlation between lower level and different time in the minors, the sample size of data at a particular level of correlation with future activities at the tournament, causing forecasts about future performance majors based on aggregate data has other correlation of what is expected in a wide measurement accuracy may show less).
The sale price in the near future, that is not one of “those” have the highest degree of safety in the sale with the predicted values. Even if we assume it is shipment to occupy this uncertainty by reducing the expected WAR “touch” in a very conservative, relatively safe business always wear in high prices on a wide range of results “Incorruptible”. Specifically for this, chance said 80% of the sales will help you when you feel you have to fight for the World Cup, has the ability to “tap” can be the same, more, less or much less from contributors.
And fragrance, play in the population is greater than the corresponding figures in history, a model of building a big tournament to predict future performance, the issue is in arbitration eligible after this season. If your profile as his biography and indicates that he will pay him more money’s worth and 2 b hit 270 with 30hr and drive in 90 runs. The arbitration process is more traditional Statistical value, even to the basic skills and the protector of the new fragrance is 2.5 win player, he will pay high wages to win by 5. While most are sold on the value lies in the fact that it is so poorly paid for it, the scent, while a good player will likely preplažen because their production levels. Especially for White Sox organization plays a role in the market in small clubs, it will be like an hour
I’m not completely sure why this has been so heavily downvoted (though my best guess is that it’s a combination of the use of capitals, the excessive length, and the inflammatory opening sentence) but honestly i think you raise a good point that gets overlooked. The number we see for a player’s projected WAR shows the median projection, but nowhere is there any mention of the variance. Most of us fans probably don’t spend a ton of time thinking about that variance, but I’m sure teams do, so it should matter to us more. It would be great if Fangraphs could show the 25th percentile and 75th percentile projections for players alongside the median so that we could get a better sense of the error bars surrounding the projections.
I agree. Does Steamer do percentiles? PECOTA does.
Seems to me this just means that the ideal trade partner is one that: 1. Has surplus talent at the position (ie., the traded 3 WAR player has a ~3 WAR player who would play instead) and/or 2. Enough money not to care about the financial prudence of a marginal upgrade.
The negative of dealing in the offseason is that no team is going to be all that desperate. For instance, if you had the Cubs trading Gleyber Torres for Chapman in the offseason, it would have been seen as completely bonkers. But in the stretch run, a reasonable person could say that the small gain of having Chapman in the pen might just be enough to put them over the top. And if a bad deal gets you a ring, who cares? But teams don’t think like that in the offseason, there are too many question marks. But midseason, nobody parts with young players so close to the majors.
Given the lack of free agent pitching available, a team will pony up the king’s ransom for Sale
Houston seems primed to take the plunge with a mega offer
This post noted the marginal extra value teams would get if they surrendered such pieces for Sale (marginal value that diminishes potentially further given other pieces likely to be involved). Already, such trades look unwise.
Then you factor in that each of these players (except Odor) is cheaper AND comes with literally double the length of control. Double. And this kind of deal becomes mind-bogglingly bad.
People need to stop treating these kinds of semi-graduated “prospects” as if they are the same as regular prospects. Many casual fans did the same thing with Mookie Betts regarding a Hamels deal. I called such talk idiotic at the time, and I have been proven even more right than I ever imagined. Each of Bregman, Benintendi, and Turner now have MUCH higher floors than prospects ever can have, thanks to their early demonstration of being able to handle the Majors, and all have high ceilings. There is little chance that Sale will offer even equal surplus value to them, much less be more valuable over the life of his control.
Swanson and Urias at least make a bit more sense given that their downsides are still higher in probability, but even then it isn’t inspiring. Sure, a team might be fooled into dealing a player like these for Sale, but it would be a mistake.
You are right to a degree, but also wrong to a degree. The fact that one time (Mookie Betts) a player performed in a manner that alligned with your theory that “semi-graduated” prospects have much higher floors than regular prospects (who have not played in the majors yet), doesn’t really prove that point, any more than it would if someone tried to prove that all prospects ultimately live up to the hype accorded them even prior to their big league debuts, by saying that they knew Kris Bryant would be great from the moment he was drafted. For example, I could point to Gordon Beckham as an example of the exact opposite of the projectability of future success of “semi-graduated” prospects
However, you are right that past success at each progressively higher level (MLB being the highest obviously) is increasingly more correlative to future major league performance. Again though, the problem is sample size of that success for guys like Bregman, Swanson, Urias, Benintendi and Turner (not to mention that save maybe for Turner none of them has demonstrated the value that Sale has in that small sample size).
What about Verlander over Sale?
Verlander is complicated because although he’s coming off a great season (better than Sale), he is older with a bigger risk of decline and owed a ton of money over the next 3 years
Sale actually posted a 3.46 FIP compared to Verlander’s 3.48 FIP this season. Splitting hairs, I know, but they had extremely similar seasons.
Verlander is owed 28 million per year for the next three seasons and will be 34 years old at the start of the 2017 season.
A team trading for him is taking on vastly more salary and also higher risk as Verlander is exiting his prime years and is more likely to regress.
Exactly. The Astros have money to spend and don’t want to trade Bregman. This is a way they could accomplish that.
Roughed Odor??