Last December, the Seattle Mariners signed Robinson Cano to a contract worth slightly more than the GDP of all Palau. Insofar as Cano had been good previously and seemed likely to continue that trend for the time being, the move wasn’t an illogical one.

But acquisitions don’t occur in a vacuum, either. While it’s generally the case that a club will draft the best talent available, it’s also true that free agency is utilized primarily as a means by which to address a club’s weaknesses or positional holes. And among the Mariners’ weaknesses entering the 2014 season, the second-base position wasn’t the most urgent. In fact, one could reasonably argue that second base was a strength. For example, the ZiPS projections for Seattle, published here at the end of last December, rated Nick Franklin as the third-best position player on the club, with a 3.2 WAR, behind only Kyle Seager (3.7 WAR) and Brad Miller (3.2 WAR). Corey Hart and Logan Morrison and Justin Smoak, meanwhile — all expected to play major roles in a corner-outfield/first-base role with the club entering the season — were projected to produce just one win a piece.

This, of course, didn’t deter Jack Zduriencik et al. from signing Cano, nor did it prevent Cano from playing excellently. In the first year of that enormous contract, Cano produced a 136 wRC+ and 5.2 WAR — numbers which mostly approximated his established levels to date. And, for the most part, the Mariners were competitive, finishing just short of a postseason berth. As compared to the club’s most recent four seasons, over which they’d averaged just 69 wins, the 2014 campaign was a rousing success.

And yet, the weaknesses anticipated by the projections manifested themselves as real-live weaknesses, as well. Logan Morrison recorded a 1.0 WAR in 365 plate appearances — slightly better, that, than his projection. Corey Hart (-1.2 WAR, 255 PA) and Justin Smoak (-0.3 WAR, 276 PA), however, underperformed their already modest projections. Multiple experiments with other outfielders (Endy Chavez, James Jones, Stefen Romero) all ended up in negative WAR figures, as well. For whatever marginal gain Cano provided over Franklin — two or three wins, according to the projections — those same wins were lost by an outfield corps that lacked depth.

All of this is relevant now, as it appears as though the Mariners are once again exhibiting interest in an expensive free agent to replace a much cheaper, yet still reasonably productive in-house option.

From Bob Nightengale of USA Today:

The Seattle #Mariners are aggressively pursuing free agent shortstop Haley Ramirez, letting him know how badly they want him.

— Bob Nightengale (@BNightengale) November 10, 2014

As was the case with Cano, it’s demonstrably true that Hanley Ramirez is good. Steamer, for example, projects him to record a 3.3 WAR over about 600 plate appearances in 2015. Not the level of Cano, that, but certainly above average. The problem, however, is this: both the Mariners’ third- and fourth-best position players, according to Steamer, are shortstops, as well. Brad Miller and Chris Taylor are projected to record WARs of 3.2 and 2.9, respectively, per 600 plate appearances in 2015 — numbers which the reader will recognize as very similar to Ramirez’s, at a fraction of the cost. So, unlike in the case of Cano and Franklin, where the former would merely be replacing the latter, the Mariners actually appear to have a surplus of shortstops, and — according to reports, at least — are actively pursuing another one. And the marginal gain in wins for that shortstop whom they’re pursuing is, at best, probably a win — a win that would cost $18 or more million per year in the form of Hanley Ramirez and unnecessarily render one or two talented position players as trade bait.