Intentionally Walking the Bases Loaded: A Primer
Mike Shildt had a decision to make. It was only the first inning, but the Brewers were all over Daniel Ponce de Leon. They’d already scored three times, and had runners on second and third for number eight hitter Luis Urías. A hit here could break the game open, so Shildt took a risk and intentionally walked Urías. With a pitcher batting next, maybe he could salvage the inning.
There was just one problem: Daniel Ponce de Leon was pitching. His 11.6% walk rate this year has actually lowered his career mark. Not only that, but he’d already walked a batter unintentionally this inning, though it’s unclear whether that’s predictive. Either way, though, whoops:
Maybe that was a strike, and maybe it wasn’t. In any case, it turned into a run, and the game eventually turned into a Brewers rout. The Cardinals scored only three runs; as it turns out, the first inning was all Milwaukee needed. Urías didn’t have a hit on the day, not that that’s a particularly telling statistic.
Normally, I’d break down the pros and cons of Shildt’s decision in minute detail. Avoiding Urías and his career .318 OBP to face a pitcher seems good. Turning a walk into a run with Ponce de Leon on the mound seems bad. It’s certainly not a slam dunk in either direction.
In this particular case, there’s no time to review the particulars, because Shildt had some batters to walk. On April 14, a mere three days later, he found himself in a similar bind. In the top of the second inning against the Nationals, Adam Wainwright was in an even more precarious situation. He faced second and third with no one out, with the game tied.
This time, the number seven hitter was up, but the Nats often bat their pitcher eighth, and Joe Ross lurked in the on-deck circle. Shildt again put four fingers up, juicing the bases. Wainwright managed to escape the jam — he overpowered Ross, who was attempting to bunt, then got Victor Robles to swing through a cutter.
Two free passes, two opposite results. This one was better-advised, despite the fact that the free run was more likely to matter, because Ross was far less likely than Yan Gomes, the recipient of the free pass, to take advantage of the one-out situation to score a run. Still, Shildt was living dangerously.
Again, there’s no time to break that one down, because he wasn’t done. On April 16, well, you get the idea. Second and third, one out, eight-hole hitter Mickey Moniak due up in a one-run game in the bottom of the second; Shildt knew what to do. Moniak trotted down to first, and Zach Eflin stepped to the plate. After a first pitch strike, disaster struck:
This time, the Cardinals didn’t limit it to a single run. The next four batters reached before Carlos Martínez recorded a second out, and the inning ended with a six-run Philadelphia lead. Martínez has hit a shocking eight batters this year; it’s safe to say that his command hasn’t been razor sharp. He might well have walked Moniak anyway, but choosing not to pitch to the bottom of the lineup didn’t exactly pay off here.
I could go on… and on… and on. The Cardinals have issued a whopping seven intentional walks that have loaded the bases. Facing the pitcher is an enticing incentive, but it doesn’t automatically make the decision right, and two out of those seven times were actually walks to position players.
In fact, the Cardinals are far and away the leaders when it comes to filling up the bases by choice. Here’s the leaderboard so far this year:
| Team | IBBs |
|---|---|
| STL | 7 |
| WSN | 5 |
| NYM | 4 |
| OAK | 3 |
| TEX | 3 |
| TOR | 3 |
| ARI | 3 |
| ATL | 3 |
| CIN | 3 |
| LAD | 3 |
| PHI | 3 |
| SDP | 3 |
| LAA | 2 |
| SEA | 2 |
| CHC | 2 |
| SFG | 2 |
| BOS | 1 |
| CHW | 1 |
| DET | 1 |
| KCR | 1 |
| NYY | 1 |
| TBR | 1 |
| COL | 1 |
| MIA | 1 |
| HOU | 1 |
| MIL | 1 |
| BAL | 0 |
| CLE | 0 |
| MIN | 0 |
| PIT | 0 |
In all, there have been 61 walks that fit the criteria I used. They were reasonably straightforward. First, the walk had to fill the bases. Second, it had to be truly intentional; giving Bryce Harper a trip to first base after he reaches 2-0 doesn’t count. All of these walks are wholly up to the manager, a decision to skip a batter simply to face someone else.
With so many examples already this year — truly, 61 is a ton — diving deeply into each one was out of the question. Instead, I came up with a generic way of looking at each intentional walk that can give us a rough idea of who’s costing their team the most — or, hey, adding the most value, let’s not leap to any conclusions — by intervening and jamming the bases full.
First, I took the change in the win probability we report for each event in our game logs for each intentional walk. Going from second and third to the bases loaded, particularly in the early innings, adds baserunners and therefore potential runs to the opponent’s score, so most intentional walks are a bad idea. That’s not universally true, though; loading the bases with one out can increase the probability of double plays, and thus the probability of escaping the inning without any runs scoring. Late in tie games, that’s a boon.
Win probability is matchup-neutral. It doesn’t consider the identity of the pitcher, the bypassed batter, or the new batter. Many of these intentional walks bring up the pitcher, so we need to account for that. I took preseason wOBA projections for each batter, then used pitchers’ overall wOBA this year anytime the pitcher spot was due up next. That differential can be converted into context-neutral runs.
Context-neutral isn’t right here — the context is decidedly not neutral — but it’s close enough for a first pass. The next step was to convert those runs into win probability. Again, I’m approximating here, but I multiplied the runs by the average leverage index over the two plate appearances, then divided by 9.709, this year’s approximation of runs per win. This gave me a fraction of a win, which is the same unit as win probability, so I simply combined the change due to base/out state and the change due to batter identity to create the overall change in win probability.
As an example, take the intentional walk that the Blue Jays issued to Randy Arozarena on May 21. It came with two outs in the 11th inning, and moved a runner from first to second. That’s a huge negative base/out state change, because it moved a second runner into scoring position in extra innings, where a two-run lead is substantially better than a one-run lead — negative 3.1% of a win, in fact.
Brett Phillips was due up next, which changes the calculus somewhat. Arozarena’s preseason wOBA was projected 66 points above that of Phillips. That works out to 0.053 runs per plate appearance. Phillips’ at-bat came with a leverage index of 6.89. Combining those, we get an equivalent of 0.31 runs, or 3.2% of a win. This intentional walk was roughly neutral — a slight win for the Blue Jays, who issued it. Phillips struck out looking, incidentally.
In any case, it’s time to go to the numbers. Walking the bases loaded feels terrible as a fan, and it seems to always result in a walk to the next batter. Just this week, the Cardinals intentionally walked Ketel Marte for the privilege of walking Carson Kelly unintentionally, driving in a run. Here’s the thing, though. It doesn’t seem to matter all that much. Seriously, these are the smallest results imaginable:
| Team | Win Prob Added |
|---|---|
| NYM | 0.13 |
| SDP | 0.03 |
| CIN | 0.02 |
| MIA | 0.02 |
| SFG | 0.01 |
| STL | 0.01 |
| HOU | 0.01 |
| TBR | 0.01 |
| NYY | 0.00 |
| WSN | 0.00 |
| SEA | 0.00 |
| ARI | 0.00 |
| BAL | 0.00 |
| CLE | 0.00 |
| MIN | 0.00 |
| PIT | 0.00 |
| CHW | 0.00 |
| BOS | 0.00 |
| CHC | 0.00 |
| LAA | 0.00 |
| COL | 0.00 |
| KCR | 0.00 |
| ATL | -0.01 |
| DET | -0.01 |
| OAK | -0.01 |
| PHI | -0.01 |
| TEX | -0.02 |
| MIL | -0.02 |
| LAD | -0.03 |
| TOR | -0.05 |
I’ll grant that my technique could be better. Using specific probabilities of each event rather than generic wOBA could improve things, as could better accounting for the pitcher and the platoon matchup. Plenty of my frustration as a Cardinals fan (though not as an analyst) comes from the dissonance of the team with the most unintentional walks in baseball issuing more on purpose.
Overall, however, it’s apparently not so bad to intentionally walk the bases full, at least before considering the knock-on effects; more plate appearances against the good hitters in the lineup (since you’re forfeiting a chance to face one of the bad ones), more stress on pitchers, and more chance of a big inning if you can’t get the pitcher out — win probability definitely doesn’t consider which batters are due up after the one at the plate, given that it doesn’t even consider who’s at the plate.
Overall, I’m still against intentionally walking the bases loaded. Doing it 61 times to net a small gain before considering negative externalities seems like a bad plan, and intentional walks are just a bad plan overall; baserunners are more valuable than managers think they are. But I owe Mike Shildt an apology for all the times I grimaced when he did it… at least for now.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
Keep in mind that walking the bases loaded doesn’t just increase the chances of a double play. It also gives you a force out at any base, including home plate, which can be just as valuable in escaping an inning unscathed.
There’s also the case of doing it with 2 outs, where the point is basically that you only need to get 1 of the next 2 batters out, and you have a much better chance at beating the guy on deck.
Finally, in the case of walking a guy to face the pitcher with 2 outs in the middle innings, there’s the possible advantage of forcing the opposing manager to choose between either letting his starting pitcher hit with the bases loaded or taking his starter out of the game before he’d normally want to do so.
We’re talking about walking the bases loaded with 2 outs, so a double play isn’t a concern.
I agree with you about creating a force out all the bases, instead of just first and second, although I suspect that in most cases, the out is still made (or at least could be made) at first base.
Keep in mind, though, that in loading the bases, you’re also ensuring that the opposing team will score at least one additional run if the ensuing plate appearance results in an XBH or BB (assuming it’s originally runners on first and third). Across all of MLB, those outcomes happen about once every six plate appearance on average – even if you discount that ratio for the caliber of hitter at the plate, that’s still a hefty risk.
I didn’t see anything in the article suggesting that we’re talking about walking the bases loaded with 2 outs. In fact, most of this article seems to be specifically talking about potential double-play situations. How did you come to that conclusion?
“there’s the possible advantage of forcing the opposing manager to choose between either letting his starting pitcher hit with the bases loaded or taking his starter out of the game before he’d normally want to do so.”
That’s not really an advantage. Relievers are typically much more effective than starters, especially at a point in the game where you’re already on the brink of removing the starter. The reason managers don’t go to the bullpen earlier is so they aren’t taxed for future games. But in the regular season, those future games come against a different team.
You only briefly glanced over it, but one of the most important factors to consider for the intentional walk is the game situation. If 1st base is open late in a game (or sometimes even in the middle innings) that’s tied or where you have a 1-run lead (or conversely a 4-run lead where the run represented by the walked batter isn’t that important), then an intentional walk is a much better idea in order to maximize your chances of keeping the opponent from scoring at all. It’s the same reasoning behind bringing in the infield with a runner at 3rd base with less than 2 outs.
Now I don’t agree with Schildt using the tactic so early in the game, but normally it’s good strategy that doesn’t feel awful at all even when it backfires, as even your own calculations prove.
Whether it goes well or not it is not as simple as declaring it successful. Even if it works, you are turning the lineup over. Modern analysis is obsessed with short-term results but that is definitely flawed.
In a four run game, don’t put runners on period. This is only acceptable late close and even then I don’t love it. I would prefer to let the players play.
What I love about that first GIF (STL/MIL) is the supreme confidence of both batter and pitcher that the call will go their way. Batter has a fabulous flip back to the dugout, after maaaaybe enough time for the umpire to call a ball (on a check swing!), and Ponce de Leon is already in foul territory on his way to the dugout.
I dont blame De Leon if I’m the pitcher and make that pitch in that situation I would probably run to the dugout.
That is embarrassing. Bat flip on a K. Running off the field on a walk. I don’t love that at all. That hitter should be looking to swing the bat in a huge spot – he could have been walking back tot he dugout. That pitcher has\no business nibbling there. That is bad baseball no matter how you slice it.
It’s a shame he’s not a good pitcher, because Daniel Ponce de Leon is an absolute first ballot HOF name
When he first turned up in MLB The Show I assumed it was one of the computer generated names.
It would be interesting to see an article about the potential value of intentionally walking the first hitter in extra innings to put men on 1st and second with none out. It might make more sense as the visitor, since you don’t care if the home team scores more than 1 run.
Agreed. I think that actually makes sense. It would make more sense to stop deciding baseball games by slowpitch softball rules. It is a terrible rule that was ushered in with the pandemic. It simply isn’t baseball.
Interestingly this just happened last night. Blue Jays vs Marlins in Buffalo. Bottom of the 9th, Bichette has just tripled with two on and no out to tie the game 5-5. Vladdy is up next. They intentionally walk both Vladdy and Teoscar. Grichuk causes a force out at home making it bases loaded with 1 out. Of all people, Joe Panik hits a deep sacrifice fly to win the game. Ultimately, walking them made no difference.
It may have made no difference in outcome, but odds of that outcome were definitely changed. The odds of getting Vlad / Teo / Grichuk out without even having the ability to drive a guy from 3rd home are far less than Handsome Randal, Joe Panik and Gurriel.
Those two IBBs were basically the batters version of defensive indifference.
They could have pitched to Teoscar. he is far less dangerous than Vlad. These things are not black and white. If anyone was going to give away an AB he was a decent bet… especially when you consider the unintentional intentional walk – they could have pitched him super tough. That option expires when the sacks are jacked. Talking strategy is fun for me, but it is anything but definitive.
Yeah, I don’t think that fits this general analysis other than putting context to an actual situation. You will find that most of the situations are quite unique. The travesty is going to be where this gets accepted as a strategy to be deployed in general situations. I did catch that situation but it made sense. Don’t let the MVP candidate beat you. That wasn’t about forces. Walking Barry Bonds late is just about match-ups and that is what that was. The most interesting thing about that play was that the CF dropped that ball… not that it would have mattered. They could have pitched to Teoscar and that might have been the right call because Panik, while not too dangerous, is a good bet to put a good AB together. Walking Vladdy was easy, the Teoscar walk may have cost them the game. It is never clear, but that won’t stop people from making declarations that it was or wasn’t. In my book, if you don’t let the players play and it doesn’t turn out well then it is a crime. It depends on your perspective though.
“truly, 61 is a ton” I mean, it seems like it, but is it? How many have been issued in past seasons, or in the first two months of play in past seasons? B-Ref tells me there have been 61328 PAs so far this year, so that’s conveniently about 1 per 1000 plate appearances. What has the rate been in past years?
I think part of my frustration with Shildt in terms of the intentional walks is the pitcher he chooses to do it with. I can’t remember which game it was, but we walked the bases loaded and then brought in Tyler Webb, presumably so that he could try to get a GIDP. Tyler Webb, he of the 33% ground ball percentage, who has never had a GB% over 44% at any time. I know part of it is selecting guys who are available, but he’s often put in the situation to choose a sub-optimal bullpen piece because of his previous mis-management. He’s Matheny with much better people skills, when it comes to bullpen management
Please analyse last night’s MIA-TOR game. In the bottom of the ninth inning, Jays down by two runs, the first two runners singled. Bo Bichette then tied the game with a triple. So, no outs, winning run on third, AL batting leader Vladdy Jr (1.411 OPS, RISP) coming up. Mattingly gave him an IBB. Then he gave silver slugger Teoscar Hernandez an IBB to load the bases with no outs — for Randal Grichuk (1.068 OPS RISP), who already had 805 feet of homers that game! Grichuk hit a grounder, Bo forced at home, but no double play. Bases still loaded, and a double play would end it. Up to bat, light-hitting Joe Panik. However, Panik had a 1.188 OPS with RISP. He hit a walkoff sac fly to centre, which Marte dropped in the rain.
Just delightful.
We got this above. Literally the polar opposite of loading the bases early. Walking Vlad was extremely trivial, the rest is not. It is very likely that Bichette would have been out at home without a force, but that scenario is a few steps down the line from where it started. Panik was a pretty good bet to not give away an AB.
These are walks to face the pitcher, not a walk to load the bases. Walking the bases loaded is about creating forces and double plays, which is not the intent here. They are entirely different baseball situations. Context is the only thing that matters in these situations. Walking the bases loaded in the early innings is the kind of mistake that only someone who knew little of baseball could advocate for.