Let’s Fix MLB’s Salary Arbitration System: The Arbitrators
In the last installment of this series, we explored the issues posed by the form the arbitration system takes, as well as the constraints a requirement to make an either/or decision when assessing player and team salary figures puts on arbitrators. Today we’ll take a look at the arbitrators themselves, and how they go about their work. To begin, we know that salary arbitrators are typically labor lawyers.
Salary arbitration cases are presented before a panel of three arbitrators, all of whom are among the top labor arbitrators in the country. Why labor? Because the relationship between the Players Association and the Clubs is grounded in labor law and governed by a collective bargaining agreement. When not hearing salary arbitration cases over the first three weeks of February, the panel arbitrators are presiding over arbitrations in the service industry, the building trades and in various other private and public unionized sectors.
Against that backdrop, it makes some sense that the information that helps determine the outcome of an arbitration hearing is typically more in line with “baseball card” statistics than advanced metrics. Lawyers aren’t supposed to be baseball experts, right?
Hitters are typically evaluated using batting average, home runs, runs batted in, stolen bases and plate appearances. There are some positional adjustments, but typically the added defensive value of a shortstop relative to a first baseman is not as important in arbitration hearings as it is on the free agent market. Hitters also can receive larger arbitration awards if they have unique accomplishments, such as winning an MVP award. Pitchers typically are evaluated using innings pitched and earned run average. Starting pitchers are rewarded for wins, and relievers are rewarded for saves and holds. Unique accomplishments, such as Cy Young Awards, matter for pitchers as well.
At the same time, however, it’s unfair – and inaccurate – to say that home runs and runs batted in are all that’s presented in an arbitration. As Jeff Passan relates:
The arguments throughout a case run the gamut. Arbitrators have long rewarded home runs and saves, so they are featured prominently among the players with them, like Oakland’s Khris Davis, who could seek a raise from $10.5 million into the $18 million range. At the same time, the arbitration system is not the antediluvian, abacus-using Luddite-fest it has been portrayed as. The wins above replacement metric is used extensively. So are fielding independent pitching for starters and leverage index for relievers. Statcast data is not allowed in cases, mainly because the league has a far greater plethora of it than the union; and in 2016, when the CBA was signed, the accuracy of spin-rate and launch-angle metrics so vital to modern baseball was not tested out over a large enough sample to warrant their inclusion.
So advanced metrics are making their way into hearing rooms, but are they swaying case outcomes? It doesn’t seem so. MLB Trade Rumors’ arbitration model, which is based on those “baseball card” numbers, remains remarkably accurate – suggesting that advanced metrics, to the extent they’re used, aren’t yet carrying as much weight as they perhaps should.
How can we account for advanced stats taking a backseat to more traditional metrics? Different theories abound. To some legal observers, the consistency in arbitration outcomes, and the usage of the same basic statistics year over year, is a sign of the arbitrators engaging in a form of self-preservation. Jeff Fannell, himself a former agent and assistant general counsel to the Major League Baseball Players’ Association, summarized that view thusly:
Clubs hold the historical edge in salary arbitration hearings. According to the MLBPA website, through 2012, arbitrators have ruled for clubs in 286 cases and for players in 214. This is generally reflective of labor arbitration, where employers win more than they lose. More than one cynic has suggested that such is [sic] way arbitrators ensure they continue to get cases.
What’s interesting, however, is that Fannell seems to have successfully translated at least some advanced metrics into his cases, as a way of undermining the traditional baseball card analysis used by teams. Take this case he highlights, which he worked on while employed by the MLBPA:
JFA represented a Major League starting pitcher who was seeking to more than double his previous year’s salary, despite coming off of a season in which he lost more games than he won. The pitcher was seeking a salary of $8 million, while the club had countered with $6.9 million … JFA crafted a strategy that focused on the quality of the pitcher’s individual performance, while highlighting the poor offensive production of the club. The pitcher’s subpar won-loss record, JFA argued, was primarily a product of poor run support. Based on historical data, JFA demonstrated that the pitcher’s individual performance would have translated into a superior won-loss record had his team provided better run production. JFA also showed that pitchers with lesser performance in the current market who had superior offensive support, posted winning records – further demonstrating the importance of run production.
Arbitrators found the case persuasive; the pitcher ultimately won his case. A search of the 2012 arbitration results shows that the pitcher in question was likely Anibal Sanchez, who in 2011 posted a 95 ERA-, 88 FIP-, and 84 xFIP- with good strikeout (24.3%) and walk (7.7%) numbers despite an 8-9 win-loss record.
If data like this works, why don’t agents use it more often? There are a few possible reasons. First, the arbitrators might not be well versed in it. Remember, they’re labor lawyers, not front office analysts. As Fannell explains:
As to the latter, while sabermetrics are increasingly being used by teams in evaluating and predicting player performance, the use of such measures in arbitration has proceeded more slowly. So the use of advanced metrics must be carefully considered. If you have to spend valuable time explaining an advanced metric to the arbitration panel, and if the explanation is not an easy grasp, then it may not be worth introducing that metric.
This might explain why players who derive much of their on-field value from their defense have often fared poorly arbitration, at least so far. It’s a lot easier to explain home runs and runs batted in than it is UZR and FRAA. A bigger issue, however, is that a player’s agent might spend their time explaining this data and not know if it even made a difference. To see why, let’s take a look at how an arbitration panel makes its decision:
The next day [after the hearing], the panel chairperson will call the designated Union and MLB representative and report that the panel ruled either for the player or the club. That’s it. No explanation. No rationale. Nothing. Just a stated winner of the case. The Union and MLB then call the player and club, respectively, and report the result. If an outside advocate is used, he or she will also get a call.
On the one hand, this isn’t that unusual for arbitration generally. But then, arbitration generally, unlike salary arbitration, doesn’t have precedential effect. Every ruling an arbitration panel issues has the possibility of being used in the future: “Players are compared to recent players who went through the arbitration process, who played similar positions and who had similar MLB service time.” So when an arbitration panel issues a decision that merely announces the hearing’s outcome, they aren’t telling the parties which arguments they found persuasive. Players’ advocates just have to guess for next time. And the teams, who can coordinate their figures, have a lot more to work with than the players do.
So how can we fix this? There are three fairly straightforward changes to the salary arbitration system that would likely address these problems. First, the arbitration panel could be required to issue a written memorandum opinion for each decision it reaches, and to make those memoranda available to the MLBPA, player reps, and team front offices. We don’t need to make it public, for obvious reasons; a player’s value doesn’t need to be judicially determined in a public forum. And we don’t need thousand-page tomes. But a few pages explaining what the arbitrators found persuasive, how they reached the decision they did, and why they rejected the losing arguments, would go a long way towards creating a measure of predictability and accountability in the process that is, right now, lacking.
Second, teams and player representation should both be required to disclose to the arbitrators, and the other side, their own proprietary measures of that player’s value. If a team is claiming at arbitration that a player is worth $5 million in arbitration and not the $8 million he is requesting, the player should know if the team’s own internal valuations show him as being worth $16 million. How those numbers were calculated can be kept confidential except as is necessary, but there is a lack of transparency in the present process that allows the parties to take contradictory positions that don’t serve the interests of the process.
And third, the arbitrators themselves should be signed for long-term, multi-year contracts, be trained in advanced metrics from a third party not affiliated with MLB or the MLBPA (like FanGraphs or Baseball Prospectus), receive pay by the hour instead of by the case, and be granted contractual assurances that their decisions will not be cause for the termination of their contract by MLB or the MLBPA. This insulates the arbitrators from the parties they are presiding over and adds a measure of independence. Even whispers that an arbitrator rules in the team’s favor for self-interest can be damaging to the process, whether or not those rumors are well-founded. Separating the arbitrator from the parties in this way ensures that the process is viewed as impartial.
Arbitrators face a difficult task, one that is likely to get harder as advanced stats continue to proliferate and the number of hearings over which they preside increases as teams employ the “file-and-trial” method. As labor lawyers, they are well equipped to engage the law; the hope is that these changes would better position them to engage baseball as it is now. Doing so can only improve arbitration outcomes.
Sheryl Ring is a litigation attorney and General Counsel at Open Communities, a non-profit legal aid agency in the Chicago suburbs. You can reach her on twitter at @Ring_Sheryl. The opinions expressed here are solely the author's. This post is intended for informational purposes only and is not intended as legal advice.
“According to the MLBPA website, through 2012, arbitrators have ruled for clubs in 286 cases and for players in 214. ”
Is it also possible that the teams are generally more realistic with the numbers they put in? Maybe it’d be interesting to see the cases, with each sides numbers as well as the MLBTR estimate and see if there is a pattern there.
Is it also possible that the arbitrators see the $$ in question (~15-300x the US household average) and are more likely to side with the lower number just because the figures seem like a lot for “playing a game”?
“Is it also possible that the arbitrators see the $$ in question (~15-300x the US household average) and are more likely to side with the lower number just because the figures seem like a lot for “playing a game”?”
God, I hope not. If that is the case, they really shouldn’t be there.
Actually I’d argue teams probably are more realistic with their numbers for issues that Sheryl already laid out. With teams coordinating with each other more than agents, they’re able to be more consistent with their filing figures and arguments which then allows them to build stronger cases. Quite frankly I think this is probably the main reason for the gap in win percentage not arbitrator bias – though that is of course impossible to know for sure. Also, even if I am right about that, the fact that the arbitrators don’t have independence from the league leaves the system open to a perception of bias which certainly needs to be fixed.
It’s true that arbitrators “don’t have independence from the league” because MLB is involved in an annual selection process, but by that same standard arbitrators don’t have independence from the MLBPA. They are chosen jointly by both parties.
Here’s the exact process from the CBA:
“The Association [i.e., MLBPA] and the LRD [i.e., MLB’s Labor Relations Department] shall annually select the arbitrators. In the event they are unable to agree by January 1 in any year, they jointly shall request that the American Arbitration Association furnish them lists of prominent, professional arbitrators. Upon receipt of such lists, the arbitrators shall be selected by alternately striking names from the lists. All cases shall be assigned to three-arbitrator panels. The Association and the LRD shall designate one arbitrator to serve as the panel chair.”
That’s also why Ring’s idea that arbitrators “be granted contractual assurances that their decisions will not be cause for the termination of their contract by MLB or the MLBPA” strikes me as sounding nice before thinking much about it but almost certainly unworkable and unappealing to both MLB and MLBPA. Whether the process is annual or once every few years, MLB and MLBPA are going to have a process by which they agree on arbitrators. Each side will understandably want some ability not to renew the contract of an arbitrators if that side feels that the arbitrator has often been part of panels making outlier decisions in favor of the other party.
Great article!
But I’m confused by this sentence: “And third, the arbitrators themselves should be signed for long-term, multi-year contracts, be trained in advanced metrics from a third party not affiliated with MLB or the MLBPA (like FanGraphs or Baseball Prospectus), receive pay by the hour instead of by the case, and be granted contractual assurances that their decisions will not be cause for the termination of their contract by MLB or the MLBPA. ”
Are you saying that FanGraphs and BP are affiliated with the MLBPA or are you saying that the sites are not affiliated with the MLBPA and thus would be good sources of arbitrators? If the latter, I definitely would like you and Jeff and Meg to arbitrate cases for a year and then write a book about it. PLEASE.
“trained in advanced metrics from a third party not affiliated with MLB or the MLBPA ”
It seems pretty clear that they’re advocating that arbitrators be trained by someone neutral.
oh yeah that makes sense. Still want to Jeff, Meg, Sheryl and the crew to be arbitrators.
“Even whispers that an arbitrator rules in the team’s favor for self-interest can be damaging to the process, whether or not those rumors are well-founded.”
Well put. Longtime MLB arbitrator Shyam Das was fired in 2012 for being perceived as not friendly enough to management. This was in 2012, when he found for Ryan Braun (in disciplinary arbitration, not salary…but it’s the same concept & same people involved). MLB never forgave that insult to their authority by Das (whose good reputation remains intact as he now arbitrates for the NHL). The people who pay arbitrators are not always looking for fair & impartial.
I’d go even further, and contract the arbitration out to a 3rd party legal firm entirely unrelated to the owners or the players. Said firm is signed for a long term, and is responsible for appointing and training the arbitrators. If the owners or MLBPA is unhappy with a single decision, tough.
Fascinating breakdown of the rights of players and the zero-sum game they want to play.
I’d also be interested in your take on the Micah Bowie story. Could a team roster an injured player just to get him benefits, like as a “call up” on the 40 man during September?
As I understand it, part of the arbitrator’s job is to be consistent. It’s not enough for them to say that WAR better evaluates a player, they need to rule on cases in a way that follows the precedent of previous cases. That doesn’t preclude more transparency as suggested above, but does explain why they’d be slow to adopt advanced metrics, even if they’re better. And really, do we want one arbitrator using fWAR, one bWAR, one VORP, one Win Shares, etc, etc?
I have a suggestion that will never go anywhere, because it’s probably unprecedented in the labor negotiations to do something like this: Instead of arbitrators, just take a simple average of WARP, bWAR, and fWAR, and then multiply by a constant to get first year “arbitration” salaries. Then, in the second year, multiply the simple average of WARP, bWAR, and fWAR by a constant to get how much they should be raised.
This is probably anathema to the front offices because the current arbitration system favors teams (since they can keep guys who are undervalued and non-tender guys that are overvalued like Chris Carter), and I don’t think the union has any desire for it either. But it would solve a ton of headaches.
My thoughts are similar. We know that there are models out there to calculate expected arbitration costs. Seems like the league and the MLBPA could work together on a single model that simply spits out a number.
Start with a consistent baseline and then adjust the model outputs by some inflationary figure representing growth in the league. Have both parties come back to the table at each CBA to evaluate the model and make adjustments as necessary.
This adversarial labor negotiation model seems like a lot of extra cost/time/angst for all parties. A model would provide consistency, predictability, and eliminate the negative experience of arguing back and forth between player and team.
Right, if you really wanted to, you could just buy MLBTR’s formula since they seem to be able to hit on the arbitration number without all the hassle of hiring arbitrators and legal departments and such. Or you could buy something better. But it would give a lot of clarity to everyone involved.
I still don’t think it’s ever going to happen, though.
> If a team is claiming at arbitration that a player is worth $5 million in arbitration and not the $8 million he is requesting, the player should know if the team’s own internal valuations show him as being worth $16 million. How those numbers were calculated can be kept confidential except as is necessary <
On an honor system that teams won't keep two different sets of numbers? Maybe a confidential auditor goes in and checks?
Asking the teams to expose their player value model… that's a lot. Now the agent builds a picture of that for each team, or potentially pool data. Other teams might get it.
This seems like uphill sledding.
As a sidenote, Khris Davis projecting to $18M sounds weirdly high. (Sounds like he settled at $16.5M, which also surprises me.) Nobody’s paying a 2.0-WAR 1B/COF/DH slugger who’s bad at defending an AAV anywhere close to that on the free agent market, right?
I don’t understand the alleged benefit or purpose of the second suggestion. Why should the team have to disclose what the player’s value is, according to its internal calculations? Sheryl uses an example where the asks are $5 and $8 million and the value is $16 million. If the two sides have figures in the $5-$8 million range, presumably those numbers were based on comparables in terms of statistics and service time. What purpose does informing the arbitrator that the player’s true value is $16 million serve?
The team isn’t arguing the player is worth $5 million at arbitration. The team is arguing that the player should be paid $5 million based on historic precedent and comparables. I don’t think anyone, including arbitrators, disputes that many young players contribute more in value than they are paid in their first few years.
Finally, I think that this would create a disincentive for teams and players to reach long-term contracts pre-free agency. If a player and a team wanted to reach a long-term contract after his first arbitration year that bought out a couple of years of free agency, I could see an impasse arising quickly as the team would base it’s offer on likely salaries awarded through arbitration and then whatever the appropriate cost of the player’s free agent years was, with appropriate additions and subtractions to the total figure for guaranteeing the salary, for the player forsaking free agency at an earlier opportunity and so on. However, if I’m the player’s agent, I’m going to have a hard time selling him on taking a contract extension that values Arb Year 2 at $10 million if we heard in the arbitration hearing last year that the club valued him at $18 million in the year before Arb Year 1 and the player just posted a similar season statistically. Conversely, if I’m the team, I’m not going to increase my offer for the long term contract extension that values Arb Year 2 at $18 million, when I know going to arbitration would likely get a salary in the $10 million range. I don’t think disincentivizing those extensions is good, as they work out for some players (Jon Singleton, Ricky Romero to name two) and less well for others (Longoria) and players who want to bet on themselves often choose not to enter them (Lindor, Machado, etc…)
Right, there are lots of issues with these suggestions.
Let’s use just one example. – Lance McCullers is going to be paid $4.1MM through arbitration this coming year. But Lance McCulllers is not going to pitch this coming year, because he just had TJ surgery. His value to the Astros (other than seeming to be fun guy to have around) next year is essentially $0. Obviously the Astros are paying because they want future years of team control, but that does not give the team at value for next year. Should he get $0, or even league minimum?
But arbitration takes the injury out of it, and looks to comps. Ergo, the parties settled on $4.1MM (which is a lot of money!).
The general problem with these articles (other than some of the unworkable suggestions) is that they don’t grapple with the economic rationale for arbitration. It is designed to be a relatively predictable means of setting salaries (and of estimating total wealth transfer between teams and players) during this period of team control between the minimum salary years and FA. It allows the players to make significantly more money than minimums depending on performance (tens of millions of dollars in cases like Arenado, Betts, etc.) but still doesn’t grant FA. That’s it.
To understand whether arbitration needs “fixing” one would have to ask completely different questions. The questions would start with how the total amounts of money paid through arbitration (or negotiated contracts that cover arb years) in total have changed over time and then see whether arb is doing its job to help meet the overall goal of the parties that ML players get ~50% of total baseball revenues in salary/bonuses/benefits.
Well said. The “value to the team” idea strikes me as a really bad idea with a host of both theoretical and practical problems.
It seems first to misunderstand the theoretical basis of now standard surplus value calculations. They’re based on the idea of considering what a substitute would cost in free agency, which is the market where MLB-ready players are available for only money. It’s also the market with the highest marginal cost per WAR salary for players due to league structure, including the CBA. That does make sense for comparing decisions on other methods of acquiring players, but it’s dubious for the purpose that Ring is proposing here. Team construction isn’t based on obtaining every player at free agent dollars per WAR. One could just as easily argue for a “value” based on some other metric such as “average dollar per WAR for all players (free agents and team-controlled) across MLB” or “expected marginal revenue from a win for that particular team”. The latter idea starts to get into exactly what arbitration prohibits, likely at the MLBPA’s insistence: the financial position of the club can’t be used as evidence in arbitration.
On the practical side, value is necessarily forward-looking. As it stands now, arbitration only allows for past performance to be used as evidence. That obviously helps inform projections, and arbitration certainly could in theory consider projections without going the next step to a team’s internal “value” that puts a monetary value to that projection. It’s easy to foresee a host of practical problems, however. Comparability between players – the goal of arbitration – is difficult if each team (and very possibly each agent) is presenting its own proprietary projection. And part of Ring’s underlying assumption is that greater complexity in arbitration benefits teams due to greater resources. The idea of introducing projections and future “value” is at odds with that thesis, because it pushes in the direction of greater complexity.
Yup, exactly.
Look at the part of the article where it says the “team’s internal valuations show the player to be worth $16MM.” Huh?
What if, “internally,” the player was “worth” < $1MM to the team because the arb-eligible player was only slightly better than several internal options that were minimum salary players. Should the team include it's own position on the win curve in the analysis? There are so many permutations that it makes the idea completely unworkable on a team-by-team basis.
Quoting you – "Team construction isn’t based on obtaining every player at free agent dollars per WAR. One could just as easily argue for a “value” based on some other metric such as “average dollar per WAR for all players (free agents and team-controlled) across MLB” or “expected marginal revenue from a win for that particular team”."
Yes, agreed. To this day, I'm surprised fangraphs hasn't bothered to calculate the average $ per WAR for all players. And in reality, on a team-by-team basis, each team's marginal win value is based on their own players + market options. Putting aside the misuse of the "$8-10MM/WAR" stat for the cost of a win on the FA market (including that the number itself is thoroughly infected by the winner's curse), it is not the same number for each team. Teams want to create the most expected wins given their respective budgets. But writers don't want to and can't do that work. So we get question-begging assumptions about whether teams should sign some FA player, and we get throwaway lines about $5 million here and $10 million there, and it all doesn't matter anyway because the owners are all billionaires anyway….
Thank you Sheryl for the excellent series of articles. There is one major component I think you are missing as to why advanced metrics has yet to make its way into the arbitration process.
Because arbitration is based on a comparable case system, suppose there are players with strong WAR totals or other strong advanced metrics but received low salaries because the previous system did not value those metrics. Well if a player’s representative introduces his high WAR total as a reason for him to get paid, all the team needs to do is cite that underpaid player with a similarly high WAR total and the WAR argument goes out the window. Maybe the player rep can try and compare the player to another player with a higher salary but lower WAR total, but the team could just say “but this guy has more home runs and RBIs!” and that argument is still highly valued in arbitration.
The biggest problem in my opinion, more so than the either/or issue you brought up in your previous article, is the fact that arbitration is reliant on precedence to make decisions. As long as that is the case, you won’t see too much progress made with the inclusion of new stats. More educated arbitrators would certainly help (they can correctly determine that WAR really does matter more than HRs and RBIs).
I do have issues with your three proposals:
1) Arbitrators issuing memorandums would definitely benefit all parties in terms of certainty. It would make submitted numbers better and thus players would be hurt less by risk-neutral teams taking advantage of the uncertainty created by unknown arbitrator numbers. That being said, written rulings would only perpetuate the problem of precedence I discussed previously. In this case, you would have arbitrators citing case law (previous cases) which would dominate the majority of discussions. There would be even less room for arbitrator valuation to evolve.
2) I’m really not sure how you can enforce team’s disclosing their evaluation metrics, mostly because those probably look very different from team-to-team. First, you somehow have to be able to enforce teams to submit everything they have information-wise (not an easy task). Second, you somehow have to prevent teams from manipulating their own numbers to make players look worse then they are (maybe cite Marginal Revenue Product instead of Market Value or expected win production).
3) While there is definitely some sense to keeping arbitrators on long-term, you also open up the door to corruption and poor performance. To my understanding (please correct me if I’m wrong), both the union and MLB have to approve of the selection of each arbitrator to be in the pool of potential arbitrators. If anything, having the one-year deals helps maintain non-bias via the arbitrator exchangeability hypothesis (basically that states you don’t want to show bias one way or the other in fear that you will be replaced in the following season). Then there is the argument similar to what one would make for Hall-of-Fame voting: older arbitrators may be more likely to rely on older precedence and older statistics than younger arbitrators, especially if they aren’t required to appear unbiased in the process.
Again, great piece. I am interested in your thoughts here.
Wait so if teams are coordinating their figures is that possibly a collusion-type activity?
Also why can’t agents coordinate figures? Competition amongst themselves may prevent this. However aren’t teams supposedly competing with each other? Or is it more of a 1 corporation 30 franchisees situation that allows them to act in a cartel/monopolistic manner?
I think another challenge to wider adoption of advanced statistics in arbitration is a practical one. Since many advanced stats are predictive by nature, every hearing will essentially come down to a similar question: whether or not the player has underperformed or overperformed their underlying metrics. Every player will have some sort of discrepancy between their underlying advanced metrics and their “baseball card” stats, so every case will incentivize one party to argue for advanced metrics and the other against. It will just flip-flop who argues for what on a case by case basis (and front offices are better equipped to build statistically-driven cases than players and agents are). Of course, the whole point of arbitration is to settle disputes such as this based on the cases presented, but I think incorporating advanced stats into arbitration without some sort of consistent framework creates two competing methods of evaluating players that would be really hard to sort through. Players should be compensated fairly for their production, but it’s unclear how effective arbitration can be as player evaluation continues to shift so dramatically.