Let’s Watch Dallas Keuchel Face Mike Trout Three Times

Saturday night, Mike Trout kicked the living crap out of Scott Feldman and the Houston Astros. His first time up, Trout went deep. His second time up, Trout went deep. His third time up, Trout went less deep, but he went deep enough for a double. All of that’s to say Trout had 10 total bases through three at bats. After a performance like that, you could say Trout was locked in. After a performance like that, you could say either the Astros didn’t have a good enough game plan, or the plan was fine and they didn’t execute. We usually don’t know enough to identify which, but, anyway, let’s continue.

You’re super familiar by now with Trout’s alleged vulnerability. You might even be sick of reading about it. Let’s take a look at the pitches that Trout hit off Feldman to see what we can see. We’ll go in order: homer, other homer, double.

Feldman had been working Trout high. Feldman had been working Trout higher than this. The call was for a fastball around the belt, and Feldman missed just a little down, and Trout took him out to the opposite field. I want to highlight the Angels’ broadcast. Mark Gubicza, talking to Victor Rojas, moments before the home run:

Gubicza: He’s forcing it, the pitch upstairs, knowing that’s the report against Mike Trout — high fastballs. But he’s a sinkerball pitcher; it’s difficult to consistently stay upstairs with his fastball.

Trout circled the bases, and he returned to the dugout for felicitations. TV showed a slow-motion instant replay, and then Gubicza started talking again.

Gubicza: I always thought that was the most difficult thing to do. If you’re a pitcher that’s going to live and die with the sinker downstairs and the slider and the split-fingered fastball and the curveball, all downstairs, to change that course and go upstairs against a hitter just because he likes the fastball downstairs, it’s just not going to work for you.

Rojas: As opposed to just saying with your bread and butter.

Gubicza: You gotta go with your strength. It’s still a very difficult thing to hit a baseball as it is. You have to keep the ball downstairs, that’s where your bread and butter is.

Months ago, Dave put up a post titled, “Why is Mike Trout Still Getting Pitched Down and In?” Gubicza provided the answer. The simplest way to put it: Pitchers have forever been taught to try to keep their pitches down, presuming they don’t have exceptional heat. Trout is the league’s best low-ball hitter. But then you have strength versus strength, and pitchers would prefer that approach over weakness versus weakness. Pitchers have confidence in themselves, and they figure if they can execute how they want, they can get a guy like Trout out. If you’re used to pitching low, and you try to pitch high because of the hitter’s identity, well, according to Gubicza, that’s not an easy thing. Feldman made a bit of a mistake. He probably would’ve preferred to pitch like himself.

About that. The next time up:

Low breaking ball, and Trout made no mistake. The movement on the pitch was good. The location was even pretty good. But Trout’s pretty good. We advance to the third showdown:

The call was for a fastball higher and more inside. Feldman, again, didn’t quite execute. Trout clobbered the ball, maybe even harder than he did the first two times up. Maybe this was the Gubicza theory again. Maybe Feldman wasn’t comfortable trying to pitch up. Maybe that’s why he missed at thigh-height. Not that pitching down really worked for him — not that anything worked for him — but it was interesting to watch how Feldman tried to get Trout out. And that meant it would be interesting to watch how Dallas Keuchel would try to get Trout out the next day.

Trout, as established, is an extraordinary low-ball hitter. Keuchel, who is less established, is becoming an excellent low-ball pitcher. I’ve noted before that Felix Hernandez is an awesome low-ball pitcher, and maybe that’s why Trout’s been so successful against him to this point. Keuchel versus Trout could conceivably match strength against strength, with Keuchel offering low sinkers and lower sliders. Or maybe the Astros would have Keuchel pitch differently, particularly against Trout. Or maybe they wouldn’t, because of the Feldman case the night before. This year, Keuchel has thrown more than half his pitches below two feet off the ground. He has the fourth-highest low-pitch rate among starting pitchers. The only guys in front of him are Felix, Wade Miley and Shane Greene.

Keuchel, for a time on Sunday, tried to be perfect. Then he tried to just throw a no-hitter. Then he didn’t do that, but he did win. Keuchel faced Trout three times. So, what was the approach? Did Keuchel try to pitch to his strength, or did he try to pitch to Trout’s weakness?

His pitches to Trout:

His pitches to non-Trout right-handed hitters:

See those pitches up? See those pitches up and in? Keuchel threw seven pitches up and in to Trout. On the year, he’s thrown just 6% such pitches to right-handed bats. Here’s another way of putting this: Keuchel’s pitches to Trout had an average height of three feet. His pitches to non-Trout righties had an average height of two feet. Dallas Keuchel wasn’t pitching like Dallas Keuchel, with Trout at the plate. Along with catcher Carlos Corporan, he tried to get Trout out in the way that Trout has made the easiest outs.

It’s time now to break this down. We know how Trout was pitched, overall. What were the sequences; what were the targets?

Plate Appearance No. 1

How Corporan set up:

The first pitch was a low fastball. Now, that’s a dangerous fastball — it’s a Keuchel fastball, but it’s also a Trout fastball — but perhaps the Astros were trying to take advantage of Trout’s first-pitch tendency. That is, Trout usually takes the first pitch. He’s swung at just 10% of first pitches on the year, one of the lowest rates in baseball. He swings at fewer first pitches than Joe Mauer and Brett Gardner. Keuchel got ahead, with a good fastball, and then you can see how Corporan adjusted. The next call was for a high-inside fastball. The next call was for a high-inside fastball.

Then Corporan dropped down. They wanted Trout to see a breaking ball, so Corporan called for a slider just off the dirt. Keuchel actually made a mistake and left the pitch up, in very hittable territory, but Trout fouled it off. So the call came in for a high-outside fastball, and then there was a call for a high-inside fastball.

With the count full, Corporan called for a Keuchel fastball — down and away, just at the hollow of the knee. It had been a few pitches since Trout saw heat that was down, and Keuchel threw a perfect pitch and Trout got a piece of it. So then Corporan came back and called for heat, up. Keuchel found the high-inside corner, and Trout went down on strikes. Seven of the eight pitches were fastballs, and five of seven intended to be up.

Plate Appearance No. 2

How Corporan set up:

The first pitch was supposed to be down, like the first pitch in the first at bat, but this time Keuchel came with a changeup instead of a fastball. Again, Trout doesn’t usually offer at the first pitch he sees. The changeup missed to the other side of the plate, but Trout watched it go by and fell behind.

Back came the elevated fastballs. The first time it was 0-and-1, Corporan called for a fastball high and in. This time he called for a fastball high and away, and Trout took it for a ball. The next pitch was supposed to be similar, but Keuchel threw it too low and Trout fouled it off. Thankfully for Keuchel, he didn’t put it in play. At 1-and-2, the call was for a heater high and tight. Keuchel threw it, Trout watched it, and Trout returned to the dugout, having struck out on a borderline call. Three of four pitches were fastballs and three of three intended to be up.

Plate Appearance No. 3

How Corporan set up:

For the second time in a row, Corporan called for a low-away first-pitch changeup. For the second time in a row, Keuchel missed with his location. This time, he missed up and he missed outside, falling behind in the count for the first time. Still, Corporan figured he knew how to bring Keuchel back: high fastball. Keuchel just missed with the pitch away, so the count ran to 2-and-0.

The Angels still didn’t have a hit, but at this point, Trout was in the driver’s seat. Corporan didn’t want to give him an easy fastball, so he signaled for a changeup down, even below the knees. Keuchel missed again, up and beyond the outer edge of the zone. So there were three balls and no strikes, and Trout has swung in just five of 121 such situations in his career. The Astros probably figured the Angels were just trying to get Keuchel out of the game, and Corporan called for a fastball at thigh height, by the outer edge. Keuchel got the strike to stay alive, and then Corporan felt like calling for a high fastball again. With Trout more likely to swing, he wanted to maybe get a pop-up. The call was in for a high fastball. Keuchel threw a high-inside fastball. Trout swung and broke his bat, which meant it was a victory. The ball still dropped in the outfield, which meant it was a loss. But as Mike Trout goes, that’s not a bad outcome.

Three of five pitches were fastballs; two of three intended to be up.

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On the year, fewer than 20% of Dallas Keuchel’s fastballs to righties have been within or beyond the upper-third of the zone. That is, one would say Keuchel has thrown about one-in-five high fastballs. Against Trout on Sunday, Keuchel tried to throw 10-in-13 high fastballs. Given the number of fastballs, and given the location of the fastballs, it’s pretty clear Keuchel wasn’t approaching Trout like he was anyone else. He was approaching him like he was Mike Trout, with Mike Trout’s weakness. Keuchel tried to pitch to that, even though it’s not his own game. The night before, Scott Feldman got hurt with that approach. Keuchel succeeded, even if the numbers show that Trout hit .333 against him on the afternoon. Against the best player in baseball, Keuchel picked up a pair of strikeouts and a broken-bat gork. Score one for the crowd that says pitch to the weakness, if you can.

If Keuchel is willing to not live low against Trout, everyone should be willing to not live low against Trout. The report, obviously, is out there. It’s up to pitchers to take advantage of it, and it’ll be interesting to see to what extent they go. How many pitchers will pitch against their own strengths, if they prefer to stay down? Will they struggle, trying to pitch a game that isn’t their own? How right is Mark Gubicza about forcing high fastballs? Keuchel made it work. Feldman didn’t make it work. Is it actually sensible to keep pitching Trout low, if it turns out it’s actually quite hard to pitch well upstairs if it’s unfamiliar?

We’ll see where Trout goes from here. That’ll tell us something. Baseball, in general, is a pretty stubborn game, with a population of pretty stubborn players. But, it’ll be interesting if Trout keeps seeing his pitches get higher and higher. And, it’ll be interesting if he doesn’t. To be honest, I don’t know what to expect. It’s not like the Astros are an accurate representation of Major League Baseball.