Masahiro Tanaka Is Beyond McCullersing
I wrote last week about how, based on the early evidence, Patrick Corbin is McCullersing. That is, of course, a reference to Lance McCullers Jr., who has taught us that, if you have a really good pitch, you should just throw it a whole bunch more. McCullers has a great curveball, so he throws a lot of his curveball. Corbin has a great slider, so he’s started to throw a lot more of his slider. It’s a strategy that’s almost stupidly obvious, but it’s taken a while to catch on. Such is the power of baseball tradition.
There’s another way to think about this. You can throw more of a good pitch, but then, all the pitch rates have to add up to 100%. So if you’re throwing more of one thing, that has to come at the expense of something else. Typically, what we see is more secondary stuff, at the expense of fastballs. And this is how we get to talking about Masahiro Tanaka. Tanaka already pitches for a team that’s opted to de-emphasize the heater. But even within that context, Tanaka is extraordinary. Tanaka is working away from his hard stuff. He’s been doing this for a while already, but he’s gotten to the point where he’s throwing hard pitches as if he were a knuckleballer without a knuckleball.
Since arriving in the majors, Tanaka has thrown six different pitches: a four-seamer, a sinker, a cutter, a curveball, a slider, and a splitter. The four-seamer, he’s thrown about 15% of the time. The sinker, about 20%. The cutter, about 8%. These are Tanaka’s three hardest pitches. They’re basically different types of fastballs.
Tanaka has started twice so far in 2018. Of his pitches, 16% have been four-seamers, which is fairly normal. And yet he’s thrown only six sinkers. Even more, he’s thrown only one single cutter. Tanaka, to this point, has been particularly slider- and splitter-heavy, continuing a trend from later last season. Over Tanaka’s last five games, only 27% of his pitches have been the three hard types. It’s even more stark when you split 2018 away. Here’s a familiar-looking plot from Brooks Baseball.
Barely 20% of Tanaka’s offerings have been hard pitches. In terms of single-game hard-pitch rate, Tanaka has achieved two of his three lowest career rates in his most recent two starts. The other of the three came last October. Looking at this year’s starting pitchers, the average stands at about 60% hard pitches. The name nearest to Tanaka is teammate Jordan Montgomery, at 32%. Tanaka has the lowest hard-pitch rate by a full 12 percentage points. Even McCullers himself is at 36%.
We have some half-decent pitch-type information stretching all the way back to 2002. I split by season and looked at every single starting pitcher with at least ten innings thrown. That gave me a sample of more than 4,200 pitcher-seasons. Tanaka has some particular company. The only names with lower rates of hard pitches thrown: Jared Fernandez, Charlie Haeger, Tim Wakefield, Steven Wright, R.A. Dickey, and Steve Sparks. Those are the only pitchers who have come even close to Tanaka’s low hard-pitch rate in a season, and they all threw a knuckleball. Tanaka doesn’t have one of those, but, so what?
This season, Tanaka has thrown nine pitches in a 1-and-0 count. None of them have been fastballs or cutters. He’s thrown another nine pitches in a 2-and-1 count. None of them have been fastballs or cutters. He’s thrown five out of 21 hard pitches in 1-and-1 counts. He’s thrown 14 out of 43 hard pitches in 0-and-0 counts. Tanaka simply refuses to give in, insisting on pitching backward, because backward is his forward. Against the Orioles the other day, Tanaka threw a total of 13 pitches with at least one more ball than strike. These are, conventionally, fastball counts. Tanaka didn’t throw a hard pitch until pitch number nine. Here’s how Tim Beckham handled it.
The next time Beckham came up, the count ran to 2-and-2. Beckham swung.
Credit to Beckham — he stayed on the pitch and wound up with an opposite-field single. But you can see how Beckham clearly cut down on his swing, even compared to earlier swings in the same game. Beckham appears to have been ready for something offspeed, and then he just threw the bat out when he saw a heater. The fastball caught him off guard, because, at this point, when you’re facing Masahiro Tanaka, a fastball is a secondary pitch. Maybe even a tertiary pitch, if you want to be pedantic.
The thinking here is the same as ever. Over his big-league career, Tanaka has not thrown successful hard pitches. He’s thrown very successful “soft” pitches. Tanaka arrived in 2014, so I went back to then and looked at every starter with at least 300 innings. For every pitch type, I calculated the run value per 200 innings. Here are Tanaka’s various percentile ranks.
Very ineffective four-seam fastball. Very ineffective sinker. Pretty ineffective cutter. Incredibly effective splitter, and greatly effective slider. Grouping all hard pitches, Tanaka has ranked in the 11th percentile among starters. Grouping everything else, Tanaka has ranked in the 98th percentile among starters. The only starters with more effective soft stuff have been Clayton Kershaw and Carlos Carrasco. More importantly, the only starter with a bigger difference between hard and soft stuff has been Jhoulys Chacin. Chacin’s soft stuff has been better than his hard stuff by 41 runs per 200 innings. Then there’s Tanaka, with a difference of 40 runs. In third place, none other than McCullers, with a difference of 36 runs. These are all pitchers who could stand to throw fewer hard pitches. Tanaka is taking it to the extreme.
McCullers has dropped his own hard-pitch rate in 2018, throwing even more curveballs. But he’s got nothing on Tanaka’s approach. It’s as if Tanaka is searching for the lower limit, the threshold at which his repertoire is optimized. Tanaka shouldn’t go all the way to 0% hard pitches. He should mix in the occasional fastballs and cutter. But maybe 20% is better than 30%. It seems like 30% was better than 40%. And what if, I don’t know, 10% might be better than 20%? There’s some room to explore here, but even if it sounds kind of crazy, why should it? Tanaka’s slider is terrific. His splitter is terrific. Might be the best splitter in the world, pending more Shohei Ohtani data. Why shouldn’t Tanaka lean on those pitches ever more heavily? Every single batter can hit a fastball. Every single batter expects to see fastballs in fastball counts. Every single batter likes fastballs, when they’re around the zone. Masahiro Tanaka hasn’t thrown a good fastball. He hasn’t thrown good hard pitches, perhaps because hitters have been specifically looking for them. There’s zero reason for Tanaka to cave. He knows his own strengths.
Tanaka is now a knuckleball pitcher, only with a splitter and a slider instead. McCullers’ approach makes all the sense in the world. It’s a very good curveball, right? Tanaka’s approach is no different. It’s just, instead of one best pitch, he has two of them, along with a few clear worst pitches. Tanaka is here to get hitters out. If you don’t need to throw many hard pitches, why force them? At the end of the day, that’s exactly what the hitters all want.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.


So if more [starting] pitchers start pitching like relievers who throw tons of breaking stuff and [starting] pitchers are throwing harder than ever and getting less outs than ever…..is the inevitable pitching [near] singularity actually much closer than we realize?
Can SP go just as deep into games as they otherwise would throwing pitch mixes like this? Would fatigue be worse per pitch all else being equal? Would TTO penalties be worse?
These cases fascinate me; thanks for the great read!
It’s going to be fascinating to see if injuries change… up or down.
Is it really Lance McCullersing? Isn’t it Rich Hillsing? I feel like Rich Hill predates McCullers on this.
I was going to write exactly that – but then I looked at the data. With the exception of short years (even for him) in 2010 to 2014, Hill has thrown a fastball more often than any other pitch: https://www.fangraphs.com/pitchfx.aspx?playerid=4806&position=P
Compare that to McCullers: https://www.fangraphs.com/pitchfx.aspx?playerid=14120&position=P
I think you’re right that McCullers is a more extreme example, but it’s not that different and Hill did make the change around the same time as McCullers getting to the major leagues (2015). So it’s not clear one happened first.
So in 2016 (Hill’s first season of more than 100 innings in his career, and after he made his change), Hill is throwing about as many curveballs as four-seams. In 2017 he threw about 1200 fourseams to 800 curveballs, so that’s not as extreme.
In 2016, McCullers threw slightly more curveballs than four-seams, but in 2017 he threw about 50% more curveballs than sinkers, and barely threw the fourseam at all.
So it looks like if you’re talking about throwing lots of breaking pitches, you could use either Hill or McCullers as an example and be more or less right. But the way McCullers banished his four-seam fastball is different. Although, Tanaka is approaching the platonic ideal of a pitcher who never throws hard fastballs.
McCullersing sounds cooler and more specific than Hillsing. So there’s that.
Wouldn’t it be Brian Bannistering? As he got Hill to pitch that way.
Why are we adding an S to Hilling? It makes sense in McCullersing, since there is an S in his name, but there is no S in Rich Hill.
He’s basically pitching like you need to in The Show 18
Him and Severino are the best pitchers in NY.
Noah Syndergaard says helllooooooo
This has probably been said at some point but something I find interesting about this style of pitching is that in a way it logically seems to make sense that it would be more effective than the conventional norm of having a slow pitch as ones “off speed pitch.” When a guy throws primarily fastball and mixes in a curve/change the hitter has time to pick up the off speed pitch, sit back, and drive it… When the off speed pitch is coming at you with more velocity than the primary pitch, once the pitch is recognized in many cases all a guy can really do is flail at it like Beckham in the clip above.
As people have pointed out, it will be interesting to see what sort of effect on injuries this pitching style will have. But it just makes so much logical sense to me that this method would be even more successful for a guy who can blow a mid-90s mph heater by you as an “off-speed” pitch than the guys who typically pitch this way… aka a guy throwing knuckleballs offset by mid-80s fastballs that aren’t fast enough to blow guys away, even when caught a little off-guard.
Need him to step up tonight!
For his sake, I hope he stops.
He apparently did not.
Seems like a good plan but I wonder if that leaves him vulnerable to high pitch counts, unfavorable counts, and being forced to throw the fastball.
Another way of looking at this is, “What do you want to do with your (four-seam? two-seam?) fastball?”
This is going to be a devious question for college kids, incidentally, because the two answers are (Sophomore) “blow batters away” and (Senior) “impress the scouts/analytics.” Which is an interesting discontinuity, but I’ll leave it there.
As a Boston fan, I think a lot about knuckleballers. And one conclusion I have come to is that the fastball is something the knuckler uses for two purposes:
a) Keep the batter honest (probably not that important)
b) Adjust the eye-level and reactions.
Maybe I’m wrong there. But in a sense a pitcher like Rich Hill with a 12-6 curve, or a pitcher like Masahiro with a nasty duo of splitters and sliders, is in the same position as a knuckler.
The basic purpose of a fastball for these guys is to get a “wait? What was that?” reaction out of the batter. It isn’t the actual pitch mix on a percentage basis — it’s more about sequencing.
(Which might be another interesting article on Masahiro.)
In other words, “no pitch is an island …”
I wonder how analogous this question is to the NBA question of how many possessions/scoring opportunities to give to your best player. I.e. why not let Lebron shoot on every possession? There has been research on that, maybe it’s applicable here.