Offseason Spending on Relievers Isn’t Working Out
While this past winter moved slowly for a number of free agents, the offseason’s available relievers actually found work pretty quickly. By the time the calendar turned, 13 relief pitchers had received multi-year contracts worth more than $10 million, totaling more than $250 million overall. Addison Reed and Greg Holland would later ink deals for more than $10 million, as well. Much has been made of the fiscal restraint exercised by teams this past winter, but teams didn’t really apply that same sort of caution to reliever deals. Perhaps they should have.
In total, there were 30 deals in excess of $1 million dollars signed by relief pitchers this past offseason. With half the season having passed, it seems like an opportune moment to review how those deals are working out for the players and their clubs. Because of how relievers are typically utilized, we are necessarily dealing with small sample sizes, but that’s also just how things operate with relievers: the difference between a good and bad season might be a few rough innings.
The graph below shows WAR and the amount of guaranteed money the player signed for in the offseason.

Teams would hope that the trendline here slopes up and to the right. That would suggest a general correlation between the money received by a player and his on-field production. The graph above, however, doesn’t look anything like that. Indeed, if a slope exists at all, it goes down and to the right. And even if we omit the Rockies from it — they were responsible for the winter’s three biggest relief contracts — this graph would still pretty much look like a jumbled mess. Seven of the 11 players with more than 0.5 WAR this season signed contracts for less than $10 million total. Of the 13 relievers at replacement level or below, eight received eight-figure guarantees. There appears to be little rhyme or reason at all when it comes to money and performance.
Perhaps the total money skews things somehow. To see if that’s the case, here’s a similar graph, except with average annual value instead of total money.

Still nothing, right? It appears that way.
One note: while our main version of WAR accounts for leverage, it also uses FIP instead of ERA. It is possible for relievers, meanwhile, to provide totally satisfactory results even while recording less than ideal FIP numbers. To examine such results, we can turn to Win Probability Added (WPA), which will show how much a pitcher’s results added or detracted to a team’s chance of winning.

Even by this measure, however, no pattern emerges. That’s probably partially due to the fact that WPA and WAR generally line up pretty well. The chart below shows the players who signed deals of at least $10 million and their performance thus far.
| Name | Team | IP | Guaranteed $ | WPA | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wade Davis | Rockies | 30.2 | $52.0 | 0.55 | 0.2 |
| Bryan Shaw | Rockies | 35.2 | $27.0 | -1.22 | -0.6 |
| Jake McGee | Rockies | 29.0 | $27.0 | 0.04 | 0.0 |
| Brandon Morrow | Cubs | 22.2 | $21.0 | 0.43 | 0.5 |
| Tommy Hunter | Phillies | 22.2 | $18.0 | 0.01 | 0.7 |
| Juan Nicasio | Mariners | 30.0 | $17.0 | -0.89 | 0.7 |
| Addison Reed | Twins | 36.1 | $16.8 | -0.51 | -0.2 |
| Pat Neshek | Phillies | 0.0 | $16.3 | 0.00 | 0.0 |
| Joe Smith | Astros | 19.2 | $15.0 | 0.07 | 0.0 |
| Anthony Swarzak | Mets | 12.0 | $14.0 | -0.39 | -0.5 |
| Greg Holland | Cardinals | 17.1 | $14.0 | -1.39 | -0.1 |
| Steve Cishek | Cubs | 34.1 | $13.0 | 0.81 | 0.6 |
| Luke Gregerson | Cardinals | 8.1 | $11.0 | -0.32 | -0.1 |
| Brandon Kintzler | Nationals | 28.1 | $10.0 | 0.23 | 0.2 |
| Yusmeiro Petit | Athletics | 44.0 | $10.0 | 0.13 | 0.1 |
| AVERAGE | — | 25.0 | $18.8 | -0.16 | 0.1 |
For roughly $135 million in salary this season, the biggest free-agent relievers of the offseason are currently on pace for three wins. Even if every single reliever on that list above were worth another win going forward — that is, about 10 times what they’ve produced so far — that production would still cost about $8.2 million per win. Of the players where WPA departs from WAR, the Rockies might be a little happier with Davis’s performance to date than WAR shows. Elsewhere, the Phillies with Hunter and the Mariners with Nicasio aren’t actually receiving the benefit of those good pitching performances due to events that occur in small sample sizes. Of the pitchers who have pitched well and have been good by WPA, we are probably limited to Cishek and Morrow, with the latter just coming off the disabled list.
It would be fair to say that we are dealing with small samples. As I note above, however, we are almost always dealing with small samples when it comes too relievers. Last year, Holland’s WPA on the season was 1.43. It took him a whole season to accumulate that, and with the help of his manager, he’s already been worth negative that amount this season. In order for Holland to help his team this year as much as he did last year, he’s going to have to pitch the second half like Edwin Diaz pitched the first half, which is not very likely. On the list above, only four players have at least 0.2 WAR and 0.2 WPA, something 77 relievers have done this year and 40% of relievers who have pitched 20 innings. There’s a pretty low bar here, and this year’s free-agent class hasn’t delivered.
How does that compare to their cheaper friends? In the graphs above, we looked at 30 relievers, 15 with guarantees of at least $10 million, and 15 with guarantees between one million dollars and $10 million. Here’s how the lesser-paid group has performed.
| Name | Team | IP | Guaranteed $ | WPA | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hector Rondon | Astros | 29.0 | $8.5 | 0.29 | 0.8 |
| Tony Watson | Giants | 36.1 | $8.5 | 2.43 | 1.2 |
| Brian Duensing | Cubs | 23.2 | $7.0 | -0.02 | -0.4 |
| David Hernandez | Reds | 26.2 | $5.0 | 0.79 | 0.5 |
| Matt Albers | Brewers | 28.2 | $5.0 | -0.21 | 0.0 |
| Craig Stammen | Padres | 37.1 | $4.5 | 1.45 | 1.3 |
| Fernando Rodney | Twins | 26.1 | $4.5 | 0.16 | 0.4 |
| Jared Hughes | Reds | 41.2 | $4.5 | 1.73 | 0.8 |
| Bud Norris | Cardinals | 33.2 | $3.0 | 0.43 | 0.8 |
| Boone Logan | Brewers | 10.2 | $2.5 | -0.78 | -0.3 |
| Zach Duke | Twins | 27.1 | $2.2 | -0.29 | 0.6 |
| Tom Koehler | Dodgers | 0.0 | $2.0 | 0.00 | 0.0 |
| Jesse Chavez | Rangers | 49.2 | $1.5 | 0.13 | 0.2 |
| Tony Barnette | Rangers | 24.1 | $1.5 | 0.07 | 0.2 |
| Joaquin Benoit | Nationals | 0.0 | $1.0 | 0.00 | 0.0 |
| AVERAGE | — | 26.0 | $4.1 | 0.41 | 0.4 |
For a quarter of the cost, the cheaper relievers are providing top-quarter performance. Not all of these relievers have done well, with Logan already dropped from the Brewers and Koehler and Benoit yet to pitch this season, but the group does just as well as the highly paid set of players. In summary:
| Guarantee | WPA | WAR | At least .4 WAR or WPA | At least .4 WAR AND WPA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Over $10 M | -0.16 | 0.1 | 26.7% | 13.3% |
| Under $10 M | 0.41 | 0.4 | 53.3% | 33.3% |
It’s possible that this group is just a random assortment that won’t repeat itself, but how much confidence is there behind that assertion? The higher-priced free agents from last year are way behind the lower-priced ones. Even if they were even — and it isn’t close — that still wouldn’t provide much of an argument for signing relievers to big contracts. More study over previous years is probably necessary for confirmation, and we’ll have to see how things play out with the players above, but so far, teams that spent a decent amount of money on relievers probably have some regrets.
Craig Edwards can be found on twitter @craigjedwards.
Meanwhile the Indians have righted their bullpen by picking up two guys from the scrapheap who have combined for 0.5 WAR and 0.8 WPA in 25.2 innings.
Have lots of doubts that it will last but it’s not the first time they’ve pulled that off (Otero, Olson, Goody for example).
How does this look with the Rockies removed? When one team hands out the three largest contracts and plays in the weirdest run-producing environment in the major leagues I think it might be particularly easy to look bad.
I’m also not sure that total guaranteed $ is the right one to use here, since they are only producing WAR over one year. I would think that $ produced this year would be more relevant. It would still look better because of Jared Hughes, Tony Watson, etc but I don’t know how much Wade Davis’s 2020 salary has an impact on the ROI for this year.
I think that Craig covers the second point with this quote under the table of high-priced relievers:
“For roughly $135 million in salary this season, the biggest free-agent relievers of the offseason are currently on pace for three wins.”
I do agree with you that an AAV column in each table would help the presentation, since $/WAR in a season is the framework that’s commonly used.
As for your first question, the three Rockies relievers on the chart have accumulated a total of -0.4 WAR in approximately half a season. Their total salaries (by contract AAV) are about $35 million. So, without those three, the total for the “high-priced reliever” group is roughly on pace for 4 WAR this season for total salaries this season of $100 million. It looks better, but it’s still pretty ugly from the teams’ collective perspective.
I suspected as much. There was no actual new evidence that after all the years we spent debunking it, RP were now suddenly actually worth investing big money in.
But several teams that recently appeared in the WS and playoffs did it with success out of the bullpen. MLB, like every other league, is a copycat league and recency over primacy is a real thing.
That’s why “tanking,” and bullpens are so popular. The Royals, Cubs, and Houston all built through years of high draft choices obtained through bad play. The Royals, Indians, Yankees, and Dodgers have had great bullpens and the Cubs had Chapman on the mound for the last out.
Relievers are still way too fungible and volatile that investing in them really doesn’t make sense. That’s how you get a “breakout” reliever like Kahnle last year with a 1.83 FIP turn into a minor leaguer this year or Stammen increase his K rate by 50% over the last couple seasons. Definitely feels like the best plan for relievers is to buy like 10 guys for 1-2M each, and the odds of hitting on a couple of them are pretty high.
Do keep in mind that Kahnle is not healthy. That probably is a significant reason for his poor performance, and it is the reason he is in the minors so he can build up his arm strength after time on the disabled list. The Yankees simply could not find enough low leverage spots to pitch Kahnle in the majors to get him up to speed. He’ll be back, assuming he does not hurt himself again.
Of course, that is another reason to be dubious of big money for relief pitchers: they can be fragile.
Right. “Bullpen performance is important” and “it isn’t a good idea to give big contracts to individual relievers” can both be true, and it appears they are.
Totally agree. There is no formula for building a bullpen. 2013 RedSox tried a couple of closers, Hanrahan and Bailey, who failed for various reasons, then stumbled into Uehara who was simply amazing the rest of the season. It is serendipity as much as anything and the fact that very few teams have more than a couple of decent relievers, much less eight or more. I think Jacob deGrom might agree that removing top quality starters and bringing in the dregs that inhabit the Mets, and many other, bullpens has not worked out quite the way the computers have told us it would. On one day recently three closers each allowed four runs in the 9th inning. Davis and Boxberger both managed to blow the games while Neris, while not around for the finish, nearly coughed up a 5 run cushion. Last night it was Famiglia’s turn to fold up like a tent and Britton showed that he is a shell of his former self and is a ridiculous gamble for a contender. Perusing the stat sheets show a amazing number of stratospheric ERA’s or FIP’s if you prefer. Ha Ha!As I write this I am watching Rodney, I admit my last choice to close, evaporate against the White Sox, walking two in a row to force in the tying run. No arrow today!
Here are the list of 1st round choices in the “tanking” years for the Cubs, and their fWAR in 2016:
Javier Baez (2.2 fWAR)
Albert Almora (0.6 fWAR)
Kris Bryant (7.8 fWAR)
Kyle Schwarber (-0.1 fWAR)
Ian Happ (0.0 fWAR)
Here are the list of players who had fWARs for the Cubs between Baez and Bryant…
Anthony Rizzo
Dexter Fowler
Ben Zobrist
Addison Russell
Willson Contreras
Kyle Hendricks
Jon Lester
Jake Arrieta
Jon Lackey
If you want to argue that “you can’t win a championship without a superstar” and “the best way to get a superstar is by tanking”, that’s one argument. But that team was not built by tanking. It was a little bit of high draft picks, savvy free agent signings, international free agency, and a couple of massive trade heists.
The argument is stronger for the Royals, although their big star was Cain, obtained via trade, and their success was built on the ridiculous bullpen and not a superstar they got through the draft (maybe Alex Gordon). And the Royals weren’t tanking. They were just really freaking bad.
The Astros are the best example, since they were obviously tanking and got Correa (5.1 fWAR) and Bregman (3.5 fWAR) through the draft for their trouble (Springer was a comp pick). And you can throw in Springer, although they weren’t tanking at that point (Luhnow wasn’t even GM), if you’re willing to count “just being bad”.
I don’t think that MLB teams “tank”, and even if they did, it would be a lousy way to rebuild. If you’re rebuilding, you have to get talent through the draft, international signings, trades, and often FA signings. High draft position is smallish part of one moderate-sized part of rebuilding.
10.5 WAR and two everyday position players (one a superstar) from the previous 5 years’ first-rounders strikes me as pretty darn good, even if most of it is consolidated in one player. Tanking sure wasn’t the only thing that built the Cubs into a great team but you can’t dispute that their draft position helped.
And then, of course, you have to consider other years. Those same 5 guys produced 13.4 WAR in 2017 and are at 9.2 in just under a half-season so far this year, and form a core that puts the Cubs in a great spot to compete for the foreseeable future.
The Cubs were absolutely tanking for several years. It isn’t just about the top 10 draft picks either. The Cubs didn’t really spend on player payroll for several years which gave them flexibility in free agency. Between 2012 and 2016 they did not have a top 10 MLB payroll and for several of those years were not in the top 20. They have been back in the top 10 the last 2 seasons. In addition, Russell and Hendricks were acquired as part of the tanking since they were out of contention and shedding major league talent.
Regarding the draft, between 2005 and 2010 the Cubs had 1 top ten pick, Josh Vitters, a top 100 prospect for several years that eventually flopped. The other players were picked between 13 and 31 and included Mark Pawelek, Tyler Colvin, Andrew Cashner (traded for Rizzo), Brett Jackson and Hayden Simpson. Since they have been winning again, the Cubs did not have a 1st round pick in 2016. 2017 first rounder Brendon Little has struggled and this years pick Nico Hoerner was seen as somewhat of a reach as a first rounder. The Cubs farm system is thin and it will be increasingly difficult to add talent not drafting in the top 10 and losing payroll flexibility as they sign free agents and extend their young talent. Being terrible at developing homegrown pitching under Theo is also going to be an increasing problem.
Overall though I agree that the best way to acquire talent is through the draft, free agency and trades in order to maximize your resources and options. Tanking alone guarantees nothing and to win the World Series requires almost everything to go right.
If we label every time a team trades major league talent for minor league talent “tanking” then the term has no meaning in the MLB context. Tanking is trying to lose games (usually to improve draft position). If you lose games incidentally because you’re trying to acquire minor leaguers in a trade, then tanking is popular just because that’s what teams mostly do.
I agree with that. That’s why I put it in quotes. These teams are not trying to lose, they just are not spending money to move up a few meaningless spots. Rebuilding is truly a better word.
The White Sox or Padres signing a big name free agent or two to get to 75 wins sells a few tickets maybe, but gets them no closer to being a good team and maybe takes them farther away by hurting their draft position a little. They don’t get Nick Madrigal if they win 75 games last year. And yeah, the draft is a crap shoot, but you are still more likely to find a great player drafting in the top 3 – 5 than at 10 – 12.
https://www.fangraphs.com/community/success-rate-of-mlb-first-round-draft-picks-by-slot/
Cool. Looks like I misunderstood you. All cleared up now.
Wait, you don’t consider trading established veterans for prospects part of tanking, sadtrombone? I think that puts your conception of the term at odds with what most people who write at/read FanGraphs think.
Figuring out your tradeable assets and trying to stockpile the farm is step #1 for most clubs, and the draft is a secondary piece of it. I don’t think the Cubs were actively targeting the #3 pick (or aiming for #1 overall) any of their bad years, they were just focusing more on the future than the near-term success of the big-league club, and looking to acquire future assets in every way possible. That tends to lead to high draft picks, but i think conventional wisdom is that’s more of a byproduct than a main goal. Consider: teams like the Brewers/Marlins/Yankees/White Sox of recent years have gotten influxes of 5-10 prospects, many of them with high first-round type ratings, through trading veterans. That high draft position really only nets you one player, since draft boards are so disparate by even the middle of the first round that there just isn’t a huge benefit to draft positioning in rds 2-40.
NBA and NFL teams try to fail their way to top draft picks, but outside of the crazy hype that Strasburg/Harper got in consecutive years I’ve never seen any body of literature around teams racing to the bottom in MLB. By prospect writers or frustrated fans of bad teams, sure (I remember how devastated I and the Mariners’ blogosphere were when they won a series sweep in September that took them out of Strasburg contention), but never in the context of teams consciously trying to improve draft position at the expense of winning MLB games.
Teams that tank do all kinds of crazy things. One of them is trading major league players for prospects. However, that–by itself–is not tanking. Lots of teams do that.
In contrast, trading your major league players for non-prospects (e.g., guys below FV40) would be considered much stronger evidence of tanking. What you’re doing then doesn’t really improve your current team, or even a near-future team. The only conceivable justifications are saving money and losing to get better draft position.
There’s only one team I can remember that traded their veterans for pennies on the dollar and made no concerted effort to improve the major league product, and that is the Astros when Luhnow was hired. That may have been the only team that has ever “tanked” in the sense that they were intentionally trying to lose games. I don’t think any other MLB team has really ever “tanked,” at least not in a way that lasted a whole season.
Tanking is defined as depleting your Major League roster of as many high priced veterans and other valuable trade chips as possible in order to better facilitate a rebuilding phase. Whether the trades made to accomplish that goal are good or bad has nothing to do with it.
Small edit : Cubs had Mike Montgomery on the mound for the last out.
I think there’s a big difference between “utterly dominant reliever who has done it for at least a couple seasons” and a lot of the guys who got big contracts. I’d love to see a similar analysis done on players who received “mega” (for relievers, at least) contracts, like Chapman (good)/Jansen (good)/Melancon (bad), etc.
And on top of that, maybe the year-to-year correlation for “dominant” relievers. e.g. what is the performance in year 2 of relievers that had > X WAR (where X is, I don’t know, 2?) in year 1.
Anyway to sum up – yes, a lot of teams with great success had great bullpens. Nobody’s questioning that – it’s more “if relievers had great seasons, what are the chances of them repeating them?”
Yep, we already knew that FA bullpen spending was a bad idea. The recent playoff bullpens were built via trade for guys actually doing well in season and with typical scrap heap guys, not big FA.
FA spending is a questionable idea overall, since those are guys who are entering their decline phase. Add in the instability of reliever performance from year to year and you’ve got a recipe for a lot of failed contracts.
Your best bet (if there is a “best bet”) in FA is to sign a lot of scrap heap guys in the offseason, play them for a while, DFA the guys who stink and then call up your homegrown relievers with options from AAA to replace the DFA’d stinkers. But that requires knowing you’ll suffer through bad bullpen days, instead of being surprised by it later, and I don’t think teams can handle planning for that.
Of course, you’re always welcome to try the Royals’ method of converting starters to relievers. If you can do it, that’s always good.
It worked with Jose Mesa.
It would be interesting to know how much of this is caused by the choices themselves. The relievers in the first group have already hit big, big money and have much less incentive to perform going forward. The others are looking for such a payday. It’s easy to guess which is the more motivated group.
The three guys the Rockies signed (or re-signed) have just befuddled me.
Based on their track records coming into this season, those signings sure looked reasonable. Not so much right now.
Sort of.
But there were warning signs…
Shaw led the league in outings for years and has always had spells of…hitability… and Davis had been less dominant in recent years.
Too often FA signings are more about the player’s name than their prospects.
I just think it’s a mistake to give almost ANY reliever a multi-year contract, regardless of the money.
Here in St. Louis Bud Norris has essentially been saving our bacon with his performance. He’s been really good and occasionally great. His deal has to be one of the best ones signed this off-season for what his performance has been. I think it’s a one year deal at 3 million.
He’s talked about how he’d love to sign a multi-year deal here and he’d be flexible and wouldn’t demand to be the closer. But does that make sense? Especially when the Cardinals often pull new guys up from Memphis that throw 97+ almost monthly? I mean, Norris was good at this point with the Angels last year as well. Then in the 2nd half he had injury issues and wasn’t great.
Plus the Cardinals see this first hand. They gave Gregerson a 2 year deal. He’s been hurt and hasn’t been good when pitching. Brett Cecil? Talk about stealing money. Greg Holland’s deal is only one year — thank god — and he’s pitched bad enough that he might not get a MLB contract again.
No deal is a sure thing of course. But multiple year deals for the least reliable position in the game year in and year out seems like a misuse of industry resources.
For RPs, I prefer WHIP over WAR (or even ERA).
I would enjoy reading/studying more on Juan Nicasio. Highest WAR and third-lowest WPA on that chart. (I’m guessing he’s not great with inherited runners.)
40:3 K:BB in 31 IP, terrible 54.7% LOB
Giants got a super bargain on Tony Watson so far, which almost cancels out them getting burned on Melancon last year. Nobody could have seen a record deal to a 32 year old proven closer working out badly, though.
Hoping for Watson and Kyle Crick to end up on the same team at some point. Success is in their DNA.
Watson’s contract not going to be as good as it looks, as with the escelators it could be worth 14 mil over 2 years or 21 mil over 3 years. So it’s not the bargain that it looks. And with how it’s structured I would think that it’s going to carry a huge tax number on it the next 2 years- given this years tax number is only 3.25 million. If he’s escelated it to get up to 14 million in 2 years, and they only accrued 3.25 million this year, that would make his tax number for next year a crazy 10.75 million. Yeah, hardly a super bargain.
Andrew Friedman nods sagaciously.
I suspect there’s a selection bias going on here, but not in the typical way.
The relievers signed for big contracts are more likely to be put into high leverage situations, so their failure will be magnified by a larger negative WPA. Shaw, Holland and Nicasio all have a higher negative WPA than the lowest WPA of the cheaper group. Meanwhile, if a cheaper reliever fails in high leverage situations, they simply get moved to a different role.
On the flip side, if pitchers in either group are successful, they keep their role or get put in even higher leverage situations, so their WPA rates are similar (the charts above make it seem like there are much higher WPAs in the cheaper group, but it seems to be a function of larger volume (38 IP for top 3 cheap vs 27 IP for top 3 pricey)).
It’s sort of a sunk cost problem, but that’s being a little unfair to these teams: You simply don’t have a lot of data on whether a reliever still “has it” until you put them out there. On the other hand, the guaranteed money we’re talking about here isn’t that much compared to a starting pitcher or regular player, so pooling the risk by getting a few of these established relievers, and being judicious about their roles, might be effective.
Why isn’t Yoshihisa Hirano in the “cheap” relievers list? He signed for 2 years, $6 million and is 5th among all relievers with a 2.52 WPA. He also has 0.5 fWAR and 1.7 RA9-WAR.
Ditto for Seunghwan Oh. The WPA isn’t there at 0.30, but he has put up a 0.4 WAR on a $2m contract.
And Axford and Clippard aren’t on the lists either.
Is the conclusion don’t pay much for a RP, or don’t sign a RP? Because it’s possible their AAA/AA replacements would be worse……and it isn’t just about efficiency, it’s about winning too. So, maybe the AAA players would be more efficient, but would they bad as “good”?
And, if the argument is “don’t pay them much”….at some point you have to outbid your competition…..
Teams realized multi-year contracts for RPs is yet another layer to CBA’s problems with free agency.
If above-average performances do not lead to long-term contracts, then what is the incentive?
Also, the bargain bin guys in the first half typically regress. Been watching Justin Miller do just that after retiring 30 of the first 31 hitters he faced.
To be fair, Holland appears to have turned it around since returning from the DL.
Ok hadn’t heard of Jared Hughes. What’s he got? He beats his FIP by a huge margin every year and has a very low K% but he sure seems to have a skill for low BABIP / low HR rate.