On Nick Markakis and Defensive Metrics
Yesterday, the Atlanta Braves signed Nick Marakis to a four year, $45 million contract. As Mike Petriello noted, the deal just doesn’t make much sense from a numerical perspective, since nearly every piece of evidence we have is that Markakis just isn’t that valuable of a player. I’ve previously compared Markakis to Nori Aoki, and would imagine that Aoki will sign for something like half of what Markakis just received from the Braves.
But, if we’re looking for an explanation of why the Braves — and others, since it’s not like Atlanta was the only team bidding for his services — valued Markakis, it’s actually not that much of a puzzle. The sentiment for the deal can essentially be summed up in this statement.
braves actually replaced 1 gold glover (heyward) with another (markakis. the new RF, who also has GA roots, has a 4-yr deal
— Jon Heyman (@JonHeymanCBS) December 3, 2014
While the metrics here will suggest that Jason Heyward is a star and Nick Markakis is a scrub, traditional evaluations are going to make them look very similar. And if you just look at their 2014 offensive numbers, they actually do look pretty similar. Both hit for minimal power (.113 ISO for Heyward, .111 for Markakis) while controlling the strike zone, and that combination led to a slightly above average wRC+ for both. If you happen to also think that the defensive gap between the two is not very large, then Markakis begins to look a lot like a veteran version of Atlanta’s former right fielder.
And if you have never heard of UZR or DRS, you very well might think that Markakis is just as good of a defender as Heyward. He’s won two Gold Glove awards, including one last year. He has a career .994 fielding percentage, seventh highest among active players, and his 93 outfield assists rank behind only Ichiro and Torii Hunter among current outfielders. Markakis excels at the kinds of things that people have historically valued in defenders, so if you just evaluate him on these metrics or by an eye-test that relies heavily on those factors, then Markakis looks like a pretty good defender.
And this is why there’s such a stark gap between the evaluation of Markakis’ defensive value between the advanced metrics and the Fan’s Scouting report. As Jeff noted back in February, the fan’s have consistently rated Markakis’ glovework far higher than the numbers have, putting him nearly 15 runs better than what UZR suggests. If you add 15 runs of defensive value to his ledger, 4/$45M for Markakis is perfectly rational.
So, then, this signing basically comes down to how much weight you put on modern defensive statistics. This signing essentially suggests that the Braves are putting no weight on them whatsoever, rejecting their conclusions entirely. The Braves are simultaneously acknowledging the value of defense — if they didn’t think glove work mattered, they wouldn’t be paying significant money to a right fielder who hits like a middle infielder — while rejecting statistical attempts to quantify that value. And plenty of observers are going to agree with that assessment, considering that defensive metrics certainly are not perfect.
But there’s a big divide between imperfect and useless, and most of the acknowledged issues with statistical evaluations of defense have to deal with the limitations of small sample data. The year to year fluctuations in defensive metrics are due to the fact that players are getting graded on how they do in ~50 plays per year, the number of chances they get that are neither routine nor impossible. In any kind of sample of that size, small fluctuations can lead to a big difference; we see the same thing in small samples of offensive metrics, for instance.
That’s why caution is suggested when evaluating any player’s defensive true talent level based on a single-season calculation. If all you have is one year of UZR or DRS and you want to know what to expect from that player’s defense in the future, you’re best served regressing that number heavily towards the mean. How heavily you regress depends on how skeptical you are, but let’s just say that you think there’s very little actual information in any one season of UZR or DRS, so you’ll put just 10% weight on the calculation. In other words, if all you knew about a player was that he had a +20 defensive rating, you’d actually think he was a +2 defender, barely above average.
But there’s a corollary to accepting that metrics like UZR and DRS contain ~10% real information in each season; after 10 years, you’d have collected enough information for the noise to have been filtered out, and the remainder to be almost entirely real information. It’s one thing to suggest that UZR and DRS need to be regressed heavily after a year or two, but you basically have to think they’re entirely worthless if you’re asking them to be regressed heavily after a player has racked up 12,000 innings in the field.
And there’s no reason to believe that they’re entirely worthless. If you try to build a model to predict team wins, you actually do better by including unregressed defensive metrics in the calculations than if you discard the information. While many argue that the only way to evaluate defense is by actually watching the games, this is exactly how the data for UZR and DRS is collected. The potential for human error is a legitimate issue in the collection of the data — and the same kind of human error is a legitimate issue for people who are basing evaluations based on their own personal observations — but after a decade of varying humans collecting the information, the odds of a systemic bias sustaining itself solely against Markakis are slim indeed.
No one thinks defensive metrics are perfect, but neither should anyone think that they’re completely worthless, especially after a decade of fairly consistent ratings. The Braves are essentially betting that UZR and DRS are so systematically wrong that they add no real information even after 12,000 innings of data collection. I don’t happen to think that’s a defensible position. Skepticism of defensive evaluations is still perfectly rationale; wholesale rejection of them, in a very large sample, is probably not.
Dave is the Managing Editor of FanGraphs.
I guess this is what happens when you have a bunch of dinosaurs running the team.
John Coppolella is a “dinosaur”?
Hart is listed as the GM, so I’d assume he gets the final call.
If I’m Coppolella, I’d be cautiously optimistic that the Braves will be so bad by the time I got to wear the GM hat, that I’d end up looking great just by making smart rebuilding decisions. Kind of like Epstein taking over for Hendry with the Cubs.
When you get down to it, John Schuerholzasaurus makes the decisions, and he doesn’t even believe in a 40 year old “new” stat like OBP.
No, he’s the guy the dinosaurs have on a leash and are sending to obedience classes.
There’s no reason to insult dinosaurs. They lasted a lot longer than humans have.
But their baseball teams were lousy.
I heard the Raptors were pretty good. They devoured lefties—along with everything else they could catch.
The Brontosauri (?) had a ton of power, but not much range. And they tended to leave footprints in the OF.
All of them had one major weakness: giant asteroids. But I suspect we’ll find out that human beings have the same weakness someday too.
“The Braves are essentially betting that UZR and DRS are so systematically wrong that they add no real information even after 12,000 innings of data collection.”
More likely: the Barves are essentially betting that whatever highly advanced metrics they use, based on data that we don’t yet/will never have access to, are right, and disregarding amateur statistics.
You are overstating the difference between what teams have and what we have. Of course, they’ve got better stuff overall, but the gap tends to be rather slim, and much of the more advanced data only serves to confirm what the simpler data suggests. You’d be arguing that not only are UZR/DRS irrelevant — in this case, they’d be actively concluding the very opposite of the truth.
Jeff – when you say the gap is slim, are you saying that it is slim in the aggregate? I think public metrics are likely close in the aggregate, but I wouldn’t be surprised if there were offsetting .5-1 WAR differences on a few handfulls of players.
Sure, that’ll happen sometimes.
Eh, I don’t think it’s a coincidence that our weakest area as amateur analysts and Markakis’s purported strength coincide in a situation where we think multiple professional FOs are completely wrong. Highlighting this discrepancy is the choice of words that Hart et al are “betting UZR and DRS are wrong” as though that’s what they ever appealed to in the first place.
Why a small gap? I’d figure HITf/x data would be a big deal for building a defense metric.
We could kiiinda test this: if DRS for airballs got better when they added hang time as input data, then HITf/x should be useful too. Hang time tells the system how long the fielder had to reach the landing spot, which of course affects how hard it was to do. And HITf/x should act like hang time data but for infielders. The speed off the bat tells you how fast the 3B’s reaction had to be to make the stop.
Or it could be hang time wasn’t a big deal, if the tagging as “fliner”, “fly”, “hard-hit”, etc. already got a difficulty rating almost as good as what hang time gets you. Not sure how to tell if hang time made the metric better (higher correlation y-t-y? better matching up with team BABIP allowed?), but we could get the size of the change, actually: if John Dewan has (or could) rerun DRS with and without the hang time input… Or MGL, if UZR now runs on hang time too?
Not that hang time’s contribution really tells us about HITf/x’s contribution, but I had a hard time saying just “No, I think HITf/x would be real, real big.”
I would actually be surprised if their internal metrics differed enough from UZR/DRS to make this true. From what I’ve heard, when teams have proprietary systems (and not all do, plenty just use fangraphs or bp), they tend to be slightly better, and indicate basically the same things with more accuracy. This contract doesn’t depend on how valuable you think Markakis is in right, it depends on whether you think he’s valuable at all, and I would be really surprised if a team’s defensive metric disagreed with a 10-year sample by such a large margin.
Markakis has to put up 6 WAR over the term of this deal to break even, based upon estimates of the cost of a win this offseason. He put up 2.5 WAR last season by our numbers; use the crusty -0.5/season from here and he’s at 5 over the next four years. This is a weird time for ATL to be doing this certainly, but I don’t quite get all the “he has to be an all-star for this deal to work”/”is he even *any* good” talk. I’d put money on him performing up to the $$$ — just not on that performance doing anything for ATL.
I agree with you. I don’t see the outrage in the contract. He really just needs to average 1.5 WAR a year over the contract to break even which is reasonable no matter what metrics you use. However, as we have noted very few free agents contracts are signed with an expectation that the team will get full value because the FA market is probably the most inefficient way to acquire talent. If you use that assumption you would be hoping for 4-5 WAR over the contract which is more than reasonable. The bigger question is why the Braves did it because I don’t expect them to compete this year and if they’re really trying to field their best team in 2017 then this makes no sense because Markakis will be in full decline by then. This contract really only makes sense for a team in on 2015 who would expect the 17 and 18 $s to be a sunk cost similar to the Mariners signing Cruz.
To be sure, though, the very $/WAR figure we’re basing things upon assumes that free agency is an inefficient way to acquire talent. So hoping for 4-5 WAR at 44M ex ante would be a bad buy even by FA standards, where you could have bought 6 WAR for that much money.
I posted this over on the Instagraphs thread before I saw this article. Seems appropriate here:
I agree with the evaluation here, but the lamenting seems like much ado about nothing to me. If you think Markakis is worth 2/1.5/1.0/0.5 WAR at 7.5/8/8.5/9 million per WAR (6% inflation), then a reasonable contract is 4/40. At 1.5/1.0/0.5/0.0 and 7/7/7/7, then a reasonable contract is 4/21. At 2.5/2.0/1.5/1.0 and 7.5/8.25/9/9.75 (9% inflation), then a reasonable contract is 4/59.
All of these outcomes seem perfectly plausible without anything crazy happening. In fact $7M and no inflation seems most unreasonable expectation. And the variance in reasonable contracts ends about the same as the contract itself. My point is that there’s just not much worth getting worked up about on a $45M contract these days. Is it a great contract? Probably not. But it’s not too hard to see it working out just fine either, and the downside is very small in today’s baseball economy. Copy this post and put it over on Eno’s Billy Butler thread.
He’s put up less than 6 WAR over the last 4 seasons, when he was 27-30. Why should we expect him to be even that good over his age 31-34 seasons?
Because most recently he was at 2.5, and his outlier year was recovering from injury. The half season before that again a 2.5 pace. He’s much closer to a 2-2.5 player when healthy, and if he’s injured they’ll have insurance or running someone else out there cheap most likely. It just isn’t that bad a contract, in isolation, even if Atlanta uses UZR as the bible. But it is sort of odd considering where most people have them on the win curve.
Just because something is proprietary doesn’t mean that it is highly advanced, and just because something is publicly-available doesn’t make it amateur. In fact, as the people who generate UZR and DRS receive compensation in connection with so doing, they are definitionally not amateur.
But the important thing is that you’ve defended your Barves against the notoriously anti-Barves Dave Cameron, who no doubt has voodoo dolls of Beachy and Medlen stuffed full of elbow needles.
Odd that you’d read my post to somehow imply that I like this for the Barves.
(Or that I’m a Barves fan, which I most certainly am not.)
And since I’m already piling on the replies here: I don’t think that amateur statistics are necessarily less good than professional ones, and I don’t think that proprietary data necessarily makes for better information (although it probably does — there’s a reason we’re excited for statcast!). With that said, it’s quite likely that Hart looked into what they do internally and made a decision based on it; it’s quite unlikely that he said “look at those two gold gloves, it’s clear he’s better than the numbers I’m pulling up on Fangraphs say he is; I’ll go the final $10M.”
Even more likely: the Braves are making their final personnel decisions based on factors that are hidden from those of us outside their personnel offices.
To conclude that the Braves are outright ignoring information that everybody has access to almost certainly isn’t valid. Especially given the data that other teams seem to value him almost as highly. As has been pointed out repeatedly, the Braves are a professional baseball organization, and they are by any measure a highly successful one. So to take a single personnel decision as a data point and use it to conclude that the Braves are stupid (and you, therefore, are smart) is likely to lead you to erroneous conclusions.
I guarantee you that the Braves are not “essentially” betting on DRS/UZR being wrong. I guarantee you they looked at it and weighed it carefully. I am able to guarantee this because I observe that the Braves are able to successfully put together competitive baseball teams, year after year. Teams who ignore readily available information wouldn’t be able to do that.
One commenter reads this as me saying Dave is bashing the Barves and I’m defending their decision as a smart one; another commenter reads this as me saying I’m smarter than the Barves and they’re idiots.
My point — neither of those dramatic ones, unfortunately — was quite simply that the undertone of Dave’s post struck me as misguided: Hart isn’t actively betting on UZR/DRS being wrong — he’s using a complicated matrix of factors to come to a conclusion, and among them is likely more advanced fielding data than we have access to. Said data, I believe, explains why we and ML FOs diverge on Markakis’s value.
No, sorry, the “you” in my comment above was Dave Cameron, not you Tim. I think your basic point is correct. I do think you’re wrong that the Braves have defensive metrics that invalidate what UZR/DRS say about Markakis (the amateur versus professional bit of your argument)–that seems highly, highly unlikely. I think the rationale for the Markakis signing lies elsewhere, and does not involve the Braves or other teams disregarding those defensive metrics, nor them using metrics that say that Markakis is secretly a good defender.
How long must we deal with the myth that teams and executives know what they’re doing just because they’re actually in the league? We have a mountain of evidence proving that teams and executives make foreseeably horrendous decisions all the time.
We’re not talking about all baseball executives. We’re talking about the Braves. We have a mountain of evidence stretching back to 1990 that suggests that the Braves are a highly successful baseball organization.
I would suggest focusing less on the ’90s and more on their recent run of questionable to very damaging decisions.
It should be noted what happens to the best laid plans…business leaders quite smart an deft frequently end up on the short end of the stick. Baseball, taken as a business or simply a sport, is going to be subject to the same forces. Those forces boil down to immeasurable uncertainty in addition to measurable risk. That’s why it is worth watching, after all.
“betting that whatever highly advanced metrics they use, based on data that we don’t yet/will never have access to, are right, and disregarding amateur statistics.”
The numbers don’t distinguish whether the assessor is amateur or professional; the numbers speak the truth, and speaketh it loudly: there are several players Atlanta could have signed that are equal to Markakis current and projected value, for a lot less $$$.
Of course, if we said “the numbers speak the truth, and speaketh it loudly” ca. 1995 we’d still be appealing to ERA and OPS and wondering why FOs are so dumb when they make FIP/wOBA based decisions.
As an Orioles fan, I’ve watched Markakis play a lot of RF over the years. To say he is a Gold Glover in right field means you haven’t watched him at all. Sure, he makes the plays and he gets too and has some fancy sliding catches. He’s always had a good arm and will get his share of outfield assists and usually doesn’t make errors. The issues are the balls that drop 10 feet in front of him or the doubles down the line that turn into triples down the line because he’s getting older and it takes him a while to get to the ball now. I love Nick Markakis and everything he did for the Orioles, but he is not a Gold Glover or even an average right fielder anymore
I am an Orioles fan too and this does not jive with my impression at all, particularly the “doubles-into-triples” thing.
In general I think that advanced stats might be missing something on Nick, or undervaluing his strikezone management, or something. Also, $11 million really isn’t that much for a ML regular, especially one who is so consistent and durable.
I am worried about the reasons emerging for the Orioles decision not to give Nick a bigger offer. Once again it was cold feet over a medical issue (herniated disc in his neck): the Orioles are really going to scare of free agents with their conservative takes on the results of physical exams.
strikezone management is evaluated by umpires, not advanced statistics
The O’s get a lot of flack for their medical concerns, but it has really paid off for them overall. They saved themselves a lot of money and grief by passing on Balfour last year
Except that it’s not clear that Balfour’s poor performance was related to the medical problem the Orioles detected.
It really is a legacy of Albert Belle, but I worry that Angelos takes it too far.
I don’t follow the logic of “FAs won’t want to sign with Baltimore”…
Do you really think FAs won’t negotiate with a potential suitor, because maybe that suitor might not ultimately sign them?
Once the contract is signed, how does the O’s view of medical stuff impact that formerly free agent?
You could make a case for FAs being leery of team options with the O’s…but that’s about it.
If my memory serves correctly, after the Balfour situation there were a few FAs rumored not to want to engage with Baltimore because you might accept an offer, have it get released publicly that you’re an Oriole, go through a physical, and then have your contract cancelled. This perceived injury apparently hurt Balfour’s value, and he had to sign a lesser contract as a result. Other FAs don’t want to go through that experience and consequently don’t want to engage with Baltimore.
…Or so goes the story. Believe as much or as little as you like. I agree that it’s hard to imagine players not engaging with as many teams as possible. After all, there are plenty of reasons not to play for any team out there.
“I am worried about the reasons emerging for the Orioles decision not to give Nick a bigger offer.”
Couldn’t it be as simple as Markakis has, over 8 years and 6000 PA, proven to be nothing special as a ballplayer and is 31 years old and is heading into his decline phase?
Just reading these 2 comments, from 2 O’s fans who’ve seen a lot of Markakis over the last several years, is exactly what is wrong with the eye test and why we should be more trusting of advanced defensive metrics.
exactly right. compared to those who think themselves armchair scouts, the numbers are probably more accurate. for people who are able to digest and evaluate defensive skill…people like, advance scouts who inform executive decision making, the armchair crowd should probably defer.
So yes, a big criticism of the Braves FO is that it’s stuck in a 1990’s mode of talent evaluation. And I think that’s an entirely fair criticism; they certainly appeared to have way under-valued Heyward, although there are aspects to that whole affair that aren’t publicly known and probably won’t be anytime soon. (I’ll be really curious to see if the Cardinals are able to extend him…) However, that still doesn’t address Tim’s question, or the point of Dave Cameron’s original article: why did so many front offices, including some who are regarded as pretty stat-savvy like the Blue Jays, value Markakis higher than the public analysis did? Yes, feeding frenzies do sometimes happen, and even halfway decent corner outfielders are a rare commodity on the market right now. But still…
It could just be that the demand was dictated by the size of the market. With a fairly small and unimpressive FA market for corner outfielders, a team like the Blue Jays probably didn’t have a whole lot of other long-term options. Markakis certainly has his values – durability for example is one many people cite. It may just have been that the Blue Jays and other teams, even those who are more statistically inclined, were desperate and realized that Markakis was one of the best, and only, options they had. However, why we haven’t seen a similar level of interest in someone like Aoki, I have no idea.
And despite the rumored interest, the Blue Jays, a team at a critical point on the win curve that presumably values wins as highly as almost anyone right now, was not willing to go to $44 million.
You don’t know that. Markakis is from Atlanta area. Some people don’t like Canada.
Right. For all we know, maybe it was the Markakis camp putting out those rumors about Toronto’s interest, especially at more than 3 years or $40+ million.
We really have no way of knowing the level of interest from Toronto. It’s clear they didn’t value him as highly as Atlanta did.
Why would you think that Markakis is a “long-term option?” And why do you need “long-term” (non)assets? There are numerous players that profile similarly but don’t require the commitment to declining mediocrity. If anything, most teams desire flexibility, not tying themselves to 4yrs of Markakis. The Braves should have stood pat if this was their best external option, it would have set them up better for when their new park opens.
I completely agree with you on Markakis. I think the Blue Jays were smart not to sign him, and I think the Braves made a mistake. I guess all I was trying to say is that Markakis was asking for a multi-year deal, therefore making him a long-term option by default. As I mentioned, Aoki (who, like you said, profiles similarly but doesn’t require a 4 year deal) is without a doubt a better option. My point was simply that, with a small and shrinking market for corner outfielders, the Blue Jays probably couldn’t afford to be as picky as they would maybe have liked, especially since they pretty much ruled out resigning Melky and they were also losing Rasmus.
I am a braves fan, and commented on the post about the signing yesterday. I simply feel we overpayed for reliability, and put more value on the fact that markakis is consistently what he is instead of being up and down over extended periods, which describes our lineups under fredi. Basically, we are getting what heyward has been on offense the past two years and reliable defense, along with a consistent of contact and onbase potential at the top of our order. Perhaps that contact will become more valuable, and then again it might not. The overpayment may come from what Markakis has already done, but it also comes with an easier projection of what markakis’s production will provide compared to projecting most other players. Im not saying he is better than most players, he is declining, but his consistency and durability does hold value, probably more so with the braves than other teams do to how inconsistent of a lineup we have had.
Grady Sizemore and Matt Cain were models of durability over the first part of their careers. And if we attribute Markakis’s offensive decline to playing through nagging injuries, can we be certain that he won’t begin to deteriorate rapidly in his 30’s?
You cannot, but the book is also not written on Matt Cain or Grady Sizemore. Sizemore is back in the league, and his injuries were much more severe, at least what is known, than markakis’s have been. Cain also just had surgery to repair his injury, so nothing is known yet. Marlon byrd is a comparable of Markakis’s, and he has remained valuable. Markakis skillset at the plate is working counts and making contact, which leads to good on base potential and productive at bats, whether they be hits or productive outs. Chances are Markakis has seen his best years, but chances also are that his skillset will allow for him to still make positive contributions well into his 30’s
On Cain and Sizemore, my main point was that you cannot predict that player X will be almost 100% healthy over the next few years simply because you’ve been durable over the last few years.
I do agree with your point on the Markakis/Upton analogy. While current age doesn’t help Markakis, but his skillset vs. Upton’s should have different age curves.
It is kind of useless to make a prediction about Markakis’ future based on what happened to 2 other players that you did not pick at random.
How does Inside Edge compare to UZR/DRS in reliability? Markakis grades out ~2nd defensively (behind Heyward) over the past 3 years if you use that.
I think this is an important question to have answered. Perhaps someone with more knowledge can do that, but the Inside Edge numbers show a much different picture than UZR.
What are the differences between UZR and Inside Edge? Why do they rate Markakis so differently? Which is more reliable?
I’m not sure I agree.
2012 – Inside Edge has NM making 1/10 plays that were remote or unlikely. UZR -8.6
2013 – Inside Edge has NM making 2/10 plays that were remote or unlikely. UZR -6.6
2014 – INside Edge has NM making 10/28 plays that were remote or unlikely. UZR 6.6
That seems like it matches up pretty reasonably to me.
Also, look at his inside edge spray charts. There’s just not that much spread in comparison to Hayward, who gets to balls that are way over in the gap.
I didn’t look at the spray charts, but if you push the numbers into a spreadsheet and do the calculations based on the data they have and the league average, it’s there. Over 3 years in RF, you get Hewyard with +19 “plays”, Ichiro with +12, Markakis with +11, compared to league average. I’m not exactly sure how plays would translate to runs but I’m guessing it’s dampened a bit.
One other thing you will notice if you do look at the IE data for all positions is that the numbers are dampened quite a bit on both ends of the spectrum. Instead of a range at a position being +20 runs to -20 runs, for example, you would likely see the IE range at a position be more like +8 plays to -8 plays.
Unless there’s something in the system I’m not getting.
So my read on Inside Edge fielding data has always been that when they term a ball as “Unlikely (10-40%)”, it means that 10-40% of those balls will be caught, across the whole league. Or, put another way, that league average on those balls hit into ‘unlikely’ places is to catch 25% of them. Checking this assumption, I found the average ‘make rate’ for each range, and included it below for each fielding range. The stretch is the last 3 seasons, and I took anyone who had played at least 2000 innings in the outfield (note: not just RF) over that stretch.
Nick Markakis has caught 6.9% of remote (1-10%) balls over the course of the last 3 seasons. Average make rate: 6.05%. Markakis: Above average.
NM has caught 57.1% of ‘unlikely’ balls (10-40%). Average make rate: 30.5%. Markakis: WELL above average.
NM has caught 75% of ‘even’ balls (40-60%). Average make rate: 57.94%. Markakis: well above average.
NM has caught 84.9% of ‘likely’ balls (60-90%). Average make rate: 84.43%. Markakis: slightly above average.
NM has caught 99.7% of ‘routine’ balls (90-100%). Average make rate: 99.26%, Markakis: slightly above average.
CONCLUSION: Inside Edge shows Markakis more love than UZR or DRS do.
Last fun facts:
Top 5 by a weighted aggregate of this score:
Will Venable
Alex Gordon
Ichiro Suzuki
Domonic Brown
Mike Trout
Bottom 5
Dayan Viciedo
Carlos Beltran
Josh Willingham
Matt Holliday
J.D. Martinez
disregard it; Markakis is clearly just Aoki who a number of dumb GMs have decided they need to pay a premium for.
And lets not kid ourselves, I have seen Markakis play right. When I say reliable, I mean that he wont hurt you, and his arm and routes are effective. However, his routes only go a short distance, and it will be frustrating this year to see some of the routine Heyward plays fall in for more hits.
I agree. As an Orioles fan, I’ve seen a lot of Markakis the last few years, and I don’t see how Inside Edge came up with that “Unlikely” number, but then again I’m not familiar with their methodology.
The eye test says Nick has lost a step in the last few years and the UZR/DRS numbers don’t dispute that. Keep in mind the Orioles shifted a lot against LHBs so Nick had Schoop in the OF with him on a number of occasions.
With Nick you’re getting consistency and durability. The arm is still good but not exceptional. I guess in today’s market that’s worth $11 million/year. It better be, because that bat has been going downhill for quite some time—if you can’t hit more than 14 HRs playing half of your games in Camden Yards, I have to wonder how many HRs he’ll hit with the Braves.
Too bad we can’t simply put robots on the field and/or use computers to calculate a player’s stats rather than count what they actually do on the field in which case I guess sabermetrics would be infallible, huh? Funny how I recall reading an article on here about how maybe Heyward really should command a Cano type contract. No bigger Heyward fan than me, but are you guys serious? Methinks a lot of the rationale for that is based upon Heyward’s percieved potential offensively. Well, it seems to me that the Braves are still on the hook for $46 million because they signed the guy based upon his perceived potential who has averaged less than .200 the last two seasons combined. I don’t mean to suggest that we put B.J. Upton and Heyward in the same category, but the fact of the matter is that offensively there wasn’t that much difference between Heyward and Markakis last year other than SB. Markakis also hits lefties a lot better than Heyward and is a better conact hitter which might make only guy on the present roster who is. He also has a reputation for being a good veteran clubhouse presence, something the Braves sorely lacked last year too. This isn’t rocket science here guys. It should be patently obvious that Hart and the Braves view (in my view correctly) Markakis as a “poor man’s” version of Heyward who plays virtually every game and is a reasonably affordable bridge to the future which they hope will also make them competitive while they re-build. Besides, Markakis is 31, not 35.
Uh – B.J. Upton was a 28-year-old with a fairly long track record of being a slightly-above-average hitter with speed and a decent CF when the Braves signed him. His falling off a cliff after joining the Braves is more of a warning about Markakis’s future performance than a parallel to Heyward not reaching his full potential at age 24.
While I agree that you cannot make the heyward parallel, you also cannot make the BJ parallel either. BJ’s rapid decline has not been due to physical age, it is because his skillset had a higher risk of bottoming out, which it has. His approach got figured out, and he has not adjusted. Markakis’s skill set is more focused on working counts and getting on base while still making contact. While he may decline, chances are he will have a much higher floor than BJ due to his approach at the plate and ability to put the ball in play. While it may be weak contact, a ball in play typically leads to better results than a swing and miss.
Who reads this article and takes the time to comment on this if you have such a bitter opinion of sabermetrics? Do something better with your time, bvillebaron.
Heyward was 2.6 WAR better than Markakis last season, Markakis’ best since 2008.
Saying they were basically the same player last year except for SB is wholly disingenuous.
It’s funny that Jon Heyman doesn’t mention that Markakis is already 31 years old. Even if a team did think they were somewhat comparable players during the past few years, a team would be hard pressed to say they will be comparable over the contract’s 4 years.
I didn’t see this much criticism of the Mets signing 36 yo Michael Cuddyer for the same AAV and giving up a pick.
Only two years’ commitment and obviously a lower overall payout. But Cuddyer was my first thought — it’s clear that this kind of stuff is just more expensive now. Still, based upon what the Braves seem doing this looks a little weirder than based upon what the Mets seem to be doing (former: short-term rebuild; latter: compete for a wild card).
point is that Markakis is 31, not 35 or 36. The age bias thing has probably gone a little too far in some parts of the analytical spectrum. No real reason to think NickM cannot be a 2 win player for the next few seasons. I think that one clunker he had in 2013 is getting too much prominence in the projections.
Prior to last year, he hadn’t been a 2 WAR player since 2010.
there was plenty of criticism on these pages at the time
You must not have been looking, FG and others killed the Mets for the Cuddyer decision. The pick value offset much of the short # of years in that case.
Heyman gonna Heyman.
Do the Barfs employ a lot of defensive shifts relative to the rest of the league? Is there a site out there that keeps track of that sort of thing?
No hard data here. But as one who watches a lot of Braves’ games, I do believe they are shift-heavy on the defensive side of things. The announcers are always talking about it.
If that’s the case, it seems interesting to consider that alongside them signing Markakis.
Superficially, it would be easy to say that the Braves value defense with Simmons and formerly Heyward holding down spots in the lineup with less than sterling hitting. Though, with those two, it isn’t hard to value defense because of how good they are. They aren’t like Peralta/Cozart/Mercer who rate well, but are FAR less spectacular to watch.
“The year to year fluctuations in defensive metrics are due to the fact that players are getting graded on how they do in ~50 plays per year, the number of chances they get that are neither routine nor impossible. In any kind of sample of that size, small fluctuations can lead to a big difference; we see the same thing in small samples of offensive metrics, for instance”
This I laugh a little bit when people say Josh Donaldson had the 3rd highest WAR in baseball the past two seasons. He did, but how much of that WAR was based on small sample size defence?
Small sample size doesn’t make the performance any less real or valuable, it just makes it less predictive. Everything that can be said about defensive metrics can also be said about hitting performance in clutch situations; do we insist on regressing every batter’s clutch performance by 90% before we evaluate their season?
Not to mention that he’s been ranked consistantly great by the metrics over those small samples. Put enough small samples together and you get a big enough sample to tell you that he’s a great defensive 3B.
I’m not saying he isnt a great defensive 3B. I’m saying that how often he gets to apply his great defence is somewhat out of his control and will undoubtedly fluctuate from year to year because of the inherent problem of SSS in defence. Its much less predictive/stable and less controllable then someone who derives more of their value from offence.
In 2013 had had 12 “remote” plays. In 2014, that number nearly tripled to 35 (even though he played fewer innings). Thats a pretty drastic change in sample size from one year to the next.
Is he a great defensive 3B? Absolutley. How much value will his defence generate? It largely depends on opportunity which is out of his control.
Do we even take “clutch” performance seriously?
His point is that we don’t regress hitting stats due to variability in situational performance that we know won’t hold up year to year.
I agree that seasonal UZR is still a valuable measure of what did happen, just like batting average. We don’t adjust wOBA for babip flux. UZR is not predictive, but it does capture how many tough defensive plays a guy made that season and this is easily converted to runs saved.
Right! If you want to argue against the validity of defensive statistics as descriptors, you have to critique tangible error in the data, beyond just statistical variability. There are cases to be made in this regard, i.e. human bias, defensive positioning, how much to credit the pitcher, etc…but small sample size isn’t one of them!
Approximately 29 out of his 85 runs above average the last two years are due to defense…so about a third. Also, two and a half full years of rating as a fantastic defender is not a small sample size. Its right on the edge of being statistically valid…i.e. having a 95% confidence interval. At the most, the defensive metrics are overrating his contributions by 10% or so, and even then, 2/3 of his value came from his bat!
Please don’t criticize defensive metrics without doing any actual analysis or knowing what sample size means
I think you missed the point of my comment. In short, defence is far less predictable from one year to the next, in part, because it uses such small sample sizes. Much less predictive then value derived from offence.
Donaldson provided huge value from his defence the past two years. To imply that will continue though (which is my beef with the “He put up a WAR similar to Trout!” narrative) is far from a sure thing.
I feel like his professionalism/attitude might be an important factor here as well. Markakis seems to be really well-respected in this regard, and it probably does have real, if un-quantifiable, value to MLB teams. Maturity issues are the well-documented motivation for the Mariners basically giving away an above average player in Michael Saunders, and I seem to remember lots of murmuring about perceived “inconsistency” from Mr. Heyward over his time with the Braves.
Does anyone else see this as simply really bad management? I feel like a well run team collects the most talented players and teaches them to have the right sorts of approaches, so as to maximize their ability on the field. And I don’t mean this in a robotic, cold-hearted, “number-cruncher” sort of way. This same concept applies in all sorts of fields of life and work, and is really the essence of leadership. Indeed some of that is dependent on clubhouse leadership, but regardless, team management needs to take responsibility for it.
Absolutely, with have lost a lot of well respected, long standing good clubhouse prescences in Tim Hudson, Brian McCann,Chipper Jones, and Dan uggla (on field performance aside, he was well liked.) Markakis is a good starting point as a well respected guy and veteran influence, and his approach at the plate is more suited for where we want to go then where we are coming from. I think part of this deal certainly is paying for intangibles, no matter if you feel that should be measured or not.
Except that there have been no noted maturity issues with Heyward. If anything, Heyward is considered mature for his age and was considered to be a leader amongst the younger and less experienced players on the team. Heyward is well liked and respected, so I highly doubt the Braves traded him so they could replace him with someone who has better leadership skills and who is more mature.
Actually, the point trying to be made is that the positive influence Heyward brought to the clubhouse is part of the reason that Markakis was signed to come aboard. We want that same positive influence and approach at the plate, just at around a third of the cost because of our lack of budget flexibility. There were better ways, trading kimbrel and using that money to extend heyward for instance. But Markakis has value beyond the boxscore, thus why it may seem to be an overpayment.
“The Braves are essentially betting that UZR and DRS are so systematically wrong that they add no real information even after 12,000 innings of data collection.”
This seems like an awfully large leap in logic. The Braves signed Nick Markakis and we can now conclude that they believe that UZR and DRS are “systematically wrong?”
As implied by the article, you have to think that Heyward had other issues that made him easier to trade. Markakis is just a replacement to partially fill the gap and add some credibility to getting rid of Heyward.
I think Heyman is right that this deal should be evaluated in conjunction with the Heyward trade. The logic seems to be that the Braves would rather have Markakis at 4/44, plus Miller and Jenkins instead of Heyward for one year and Walden. Having decided they can’t resign him, that seems like a defensible position – it isn’t ideal (Heyward signing long term at a price they could agree on seems to be what would happen if they had their druthers) but as a ‘Plan B,’ it makes sense. Markakis isn’t nearly as good as Heyward, but he’s not nearly as expensive either, and they have Miller and Jenkins on top of the money to offset the value lost.
Put together, these two moves don’t look altogether different than what Oakland did with the Donaldson/Lawrie deal. Both the A’s and the Braves are taking a less valuable player in exchange for financial flexibility and young, cost controlled players.
This deal isn’t crazy at all when you compare it with some of the other multi-year deals for average to below average players that have been given out so far. Look at what Butler, LaRoche, Cruz, and Cuddyer got. Hell, a reliever’s about to get a four year deal, probably for 8 figures per year.
I think we’re all just vastly underestimating the cost per win inflation that’s taking place right now.
Wouldn’t that be an argument for a non-contending team to just stay out of it for now and redirecting those resources elsewhere?
Markakis has all the makings of a perfectly replaceable corner outfielder. This deal is basically the standard no-upside, predictably-zero-future-value kind of deal that got Wren on the hot seat. It’s smaller in scale, but the logic is identical. To me, this tells me that Wren was not purely at fault and that the systematic issues this team has had over the last 10 years or so are still in place. Nothing has changed for the Atlanta Braves. they just seem more desperate now.
*and redirect those resources
This. Somebody was talking about it yesterday, but there was nothing stopping them from deciding to stand pat with what they had internally, while spending that money smart elsewhere, spreading it around to multiple players to avoid the awful.
Look at the contracts that have been signed so far. Who are you going to “spread around” that money to?
A 39 year old washed up Torii Hunter just got 10 million. If you want bargains to “spread around” your money you’re going to have to dig pretty damn deep these days.
Matt, I wasn’t talking about actual free agent contracts as a place to spend this money elsewhere – you are correct that Markakis is likely as good as it gets in that market right now. Instead, I was thinking more along the lines of the Markakis comps that Mike wrote about yesterday. Maybe I’m totally wrong, because it seemed like Saunders was given away for a song, and Stubbs is likely available for a reliever type. Getting those two in my mind would be cheaper than Markakis without a 4yr commitment, but again I could be off base. Grab 3 or 4 minor league free agents as insurance. Do similar things for your other holes. If inflation is driving the price of a win up while your payroll is roughly static (Braves aren’t exactly big spenders, though last year was a record high) – then you need to get creative.
But maybe I’m wrong – the Braves don’t exactly have the pitcher the Mariners wanted. Nor have the Rockies realized that they should be selling Stubbs while they can get some value, even if it’s just a prospect. I just refuse to acknowledge that this was the best use of their dollars. I don’t pretend to think it’s an insane usage – just that there were better ones with fewer years of commitment.
You’re missing the point. Inflation means the cost of a win is going up everywhere, so where are you going to redirect those resources?
Dave just argued recently that everyone imagines that there is a sea of average players out there that can be had by anyone. It’s just not true. We’re seeing an adjustment to what average players cost.
And if you want someone a little higher-end? Well, 3 WAR position players cost about $100 million now, and if you want a #1 pitcher get ready to pay at least $150 million.
Fair points, but I was referring to the draft. Signing a 31 yr old corner outfielder with no pop to a long term deal is a bizarre move for a team that is likely a year or two away.
I do agree that there is a bit of inflation going on right now concerning the average player’s value, but at the end of the day, the simple rational expectation is that Markakis isn’t going to be that useful once the team is at a point where it can contend.
He’s a complementary piece, not a game-changer, and he’d be an excellent, excellent signing for someone with playoff hopes in 2015. Not so much for a team that, right now, is miles away. Maybe they change that in the next few months, I don’t know. We’ll see.
I went to the Free agent leaderboard and looked at everyone signed to a major league contract so far. I assumed 0.5 WAR decay per year and accepted the projection for 2015 (For Zack Duke I assumed the resulting negative WAR in his third year was actually a zero as he won’t necessarily get playing time if he’s that bad).
I did not include any inflation, but we’re comparing here to a multiyear deal.
I get an average $ per WAR of $8.644 million, MUCH higher than I’ve heard suggested.
These same assumptions mean Markakis should have gotten about $25.9 million for a four year contract.
Adding inflation may make a difference, but I doubt it makes $18 million in difference.
Whoops, forgot about qualifying offers, add a fudge factor for the value of those lost picks and the $/WAR goes above 10 million.
This doesn’t make Markakis’s signing look good, but it makes me feel a lot better about the Red Sox offseason signings so far this year.
There will understandably be disagreement about estimations of range and fielding ability, yet we can still look at some objective data on the subject, such as the number of catches they actually make. Yes, that is still influenced by opposing lineups (LHBs vs. RHBs) and ballpark effects, but the numbers themselves are concrete.
Put-outs per inning for RFs w/500+ innings
1 Jason Heyward – 0.2771450266
2 Chris Denorfia – 0.2699029126
3 Kevin Kiermaier – 0.2604067668
4 Alex Rios – 0.2598482486
5 Giancarlo Stanton – 0.2527533476
6 Marlon Byrd – 0.2460548949
7 Jose Bautista – 0.2434734308
8 Daniel Nava – 0.2414205906
9 Wil Myers – 0.2388369678
10 Gregory Polanco – 0.2326332795
11 Charlie Blackmon – 0.2285415213
12 Ryan Braun – 0.225751073
13 Oswaldo Arcia – 0.225714961
14 George Springer – 0.2249190939
15 Nick Markakis – 0.2244882429
16 Curtis Granderson – 0.2242800102
17 Nori Aoki – 0.2230284922
18 Kole Calhoun – 0.2219862948
19 Josh Reddick – 0.221051426
20 Hunter Pence – 0.2161403509
21 Nate Schierholtz – 0.215523121
22 Ichiro Suzuki – 0.2132642998
23 Dayan Viciedo – 0.2110614697
24 Gerardo Parra – 0.2084690554
25 David Murphy – 0.2062689585
26 Jay Bruce – 0.2033271719
27 Jayson Werth – 0.2024258318
28 Allen Craig – 0.1977920883
29 Torii Hunter – 0.1956912029
30 Yasiel Puig – 0.1898253607
31 Matt Kemp – 0.1839632074
I would like to ask Fangraph’s to prove something that has been said a lot over the past few days – that Markakis does the things in the field gold glove voters like, but not what the computers like. Is this true? The biggest culprits, to me, of undeserved gold gloves are star hitters and guys who used to be very good defensively but aren’t anymore. Markakis is neither of these. If you look at the other two guys with the highest fielding percentage during the 10s, you have Vernon Wells and Curtis Granderson. Wells won gold gloves 2004-2006 when he was arguably a star, and Granderson has never won one. Any other examples, or is Markakis special?
I think that a lot of the problem is the nature of traditional fielding stats, like assists, errors, and fieding percentage. They do a fairly good job of capturing what a player does with balls that he gets to. However, they don’t capture range, and it’s nearly impossible to back-compute range from any of the traditional stats. For that, you need data on where batted balls go, and that’s where the advanced data collection and stats come in.
If you go to Markakis’ page here at FG, go down to the Advanced Fielding stats, and look at the UZR component numbers over on the right, you can see this. Markakis consistenty ranks above average in Arm and Error Rate, which are the aspects that have the most influence on the traditional stats. However, he consistently ranks below average, sometimes well below, in Range Rate, and that’s the bit that traditional stats don’t capture.
I think we are asking the wrong question. It is not “Why do the Braves think Markakis offensive and defensive values are higher than we do”, it is “What else might the Braves value in a baseball player as a baseball organization and a business organization that makes his worth higher to them than to us
As a Braves fan this addition is unexciting at best
As a stat nerd this addition does not add up based on WAR and other metrics (As a roto player I would not pick up Markakis in the auction)
As a business man involved in decisions that affect 1000s of peoples livelihood this may make some sense
Just to be clear I am all of the above. (Well on the last one to some degree but not like the Braves GM(s?))
What is the Braves need in this situation or what is the problem: Is it “The Braves have a need for a RF?” Maybe but not only a RF.
Their options (there are some others but basically these 3)
1. Keep Heyward and probably not sign him after this year or sign him to a massive contract
2. Bring up a QuadA prospect or sign a scrub and have him do poorly this is the equal to; they could do nothing
3. Get a player like Aoki, Melky Cabrera, Nelson Cruz, Ethier, or Markakis (Cruz not now but they could have tried last week)
Signing Heyward long term could end badly, possibly like Uggla or BJ Upton, but probably not. Heyward could be out of baseball before he is 30, he has a hole in his swing and gets hurt a lot, not likely but you never know. They have been burned by bad contract to unusable players before. Also, they don’t likely have the payroll space to do this without dropping someone else as Heyward and his agent will want massive $ to sign. While Heyward is good he is not great and much of his value is from defense which can be bought less expensively than what Heyward costa. The money saved can go to another player and they the money is saved again next year and in 2017 until they get the new stadium when they will need to get a good player or two to compete.
The QuadA/Scrub option clearly means they are giving up entirely for the next year or 2. This, while a nice purely baseball move (and absolutely the right move in roto) will signal that this team is not worth watching for the next two years which will me a massive amount of lost revenue. A baseball organization has to keep 1000s of people employed to run effectively. The Astros/ Marlins/Royals/Seattle rebuild cost lots in lost revenue and fan good will and quite possibly could even cost many people in the organization their jobs. (I am talking about scouts, hotdog vendors, t-shirt sales persons, grounds crew etc…) Ownership and upper management do not like to make moves that exposes an organization to this kind of risk without a large need to do so. They fired Wren for putting the organization in this position and rightfully so. The Braves have set expectations for themselves that they will never be a team that rebuilds like the Marlins but that will never reload like the Yankees/Red Sox. This also keeps the turnstiles spinning.
They chose to bring in an established RF. Their immediate need is to bring in an MLB player with some name recognition that is capable of playing at the major league level every day and perhaps can be a decent clubhouse/fan/community guy and can take a leadership role with the young team. I know that these traits are not statistically relevant to how a baseball team performs but they are relevant to how a business organization (specifically a baseball organization) is run and I do believe affect player performance. If the Braves stay relatively competitive (meaning 70+ games 2015, 75+ 2016) they can keep fan interest for when the new stadium opens and not have burned fan goodwill (at least not entirely) Out of the available RF to bring in I would say that Aoki and Markakis are the most affordable and Markakis is younger so he can be around for the transition of the team through the next 2 bad years to the years when they hope the team will complete and he should be an ok player because of his skillset for the money. Essentially the money they save by not signing Markakis is not that much and they likely earn it back in ticket sales and fan good will (someone will buy a Brave Markakis shirt). Also they probably need to spend it now as they cannot bank the money.
They looked at Markakis as a person and as a player and he had the skills and specifications to fit the job opening they had. (Heyward too expensive with too much risk, Cruz too old, not a leader, to expensive bad contract required, Ethier is most similar to Markakis but would require a trade, Aoki is too old and likely cannot be a leader based on language and cultural barriers at least in US Baseball, Melky burn them before, bad clubhouse guy, steroid baggage, potential Uggla/BJ contract outcome) You can add that while he is not young he is not old, while he is not great he is not bad and while he is not high profile he is not unknown. He is an everyday player that will likely be an asset in terms of skill and contract in 2017. Is he equal to Heyward, No. Are he and Miller equivalent to Heyward, likely based on long term $.
In summer, he is a bad choice for a roto team. The only reason I bring this up outside of RotoGraphs is because in roto it doesn’t matter if my team stinks, I still get to be the GM, it doesn’t affect my fan base, operating capital (still $260) and nobody loses their job. As a Braves fan I am not excited by this move but as a businessman I understand the decision.
your entire post is absolute nonsense. to take the time to reply note for note is beneath me really. Heyward is hurt all the time? hole in his swing? lmao how can you come on here and say such silly things? are you JS jr?
Hey man, you pitch him up in in is all I’m saying. It has been documented In a few articles that’s why his power went away. I am definitely not smart enough in baseball mechanics etc to figure that out myself. I was just trying to give some thought provoking comments. He is hurt a lot, for a 20-25 year old. He is not getting healthier. 128 games in 2011 and 104 in 2013 plus he is always playing with nagging injuries. As a Braves fan it seems that way to me, at least. I mean I love the guy as a player and a fan so Sorry that I offended you. I mean it when I say that stuff about business etc… It is my job. Baseball is my fun. You are right though the post just got way to long.
I said in but was thinking away. You pitch him away and he can’t hit for power so not strictly a hole but has made him loose his power. Again, I like the guy and the Braves will be punchless in 2015, so not thrilled with the signing.
http://www.fangraphs.com/fantasy/jason-heyward-powers-down/
There is only one season where Heyward really played with/missed time due to a nagging injury and that was the 2011 season. That injury hasn’t been a problem since. Heyward’s 2013 injuries consisted of appendicitis and being hit in the face. So we are talking about a one time medical problem that won’t occur again and a freak accident – hardly the type of injuries that should result in a player being labeled as injury prone.
Agreed. He plays hurt a significant amount of time. He has had a barky shoulder, sore neck, sore back, injuried thumb etc quit a bit. I follow the Braves a lot and he was “dinged up” quite a bit. Not injury prone but i do think some of his performace drop has been attibuted to his shoulder one year, thumb another. So imo for a 20-25 he has some issues with health that can affect his performance but not his PT.
I was surprised Markakis won a GG, but I’m forced to watch Cain in RF and Markakis looks like a slightly more graceful Aoki, better arm, not a lot of range, doesn’t make game saving “Oh Wow” plays. Playing in a tiny park probably helps him a lot.
And unfortunately he’s moving to the spacious confines of Turner Field. Of course, there is a wild card: he’s only going to be there for two years, and right now no one has any idea how the new park is going to play.
We (Baltimore Sports and Life) recently spoke with Ben Jedlovec (Baseball Info Solutions) on the defense of several O’s players:
http://baltimoresportsandlife.com/baltimore-orioles/os-defense-qa-ben-jedlovec-baseball-info-solutions/
On Markakis:
BSL: Hardy was not the only Orioles Gold Glove winner – as Nick Markakis won his 2nd, and Adam Jones won his 4th. In ’12, and ’13, Markakis posted -7 DRS numbers. From ’09-’13, his UZR/150 was also negative. In ’14, Markakis’ DRS and UZR were both positive. Similarly, Jones had negative DRS numbers during ’10-’13, along with negative UZR/150s from ’09-’13. In ’14 Jones’ DRS and UZR were both positive. What do you attribute this to? Aberrations? Positioning?
Jedlovec: In Markakis’ case, the fluctuations in his total DRS numbers are influenced heavily by his tremendous throwing arm. He’s been very consistent with his range, falling between -6 and -12 Plus/Minus Runs Saved for six consecutive seasons. He’s also been consistent in Good Play/Misplay Runs Saved, where he’s saved between 0 and 6 runs every year of his career. However, with his arm, Markakis has had some pretty big differences from season to season. For example, in 2007, his best defensive season, Markakis allowed runners to take an extra base on just 44 percent of the opportunities, and he had 14 “kills” (assists without a relay man). Since, he has allowed an extra base rate of 49 percent or higher three times and thrown out five or fewer baserunners without a relay man four times. Though he has been above-average with his arm year in and year out, this fluctuation in results has led to a 10-run swing between his best and worst seasons with his arm.
I hate to say this on here, it is not politically correct
But markakis beING a sonew hat handsome white guy,
And noRI Aoki being a Japanese who isnt too good looking has something to do w it.
Especially somewhere like Atlanta. U kid urself if u don’t think this is true. Might be worth a few million a year.
You’ve never been to Atlanta, have you?
What is the standard error on UZR or DRS? Why is it noone can seem to answer this?
Imperfect doesn’t mean useless is an incredibly inane strawman response to anyone who questions the accuracy of the models. Rather than just issuing this canned and frankly lazy response… why can’t someone who has access to the models actually measure the accuracy (standard dev, standard error, some sort of confidence levels, etc) with basic statistical tests?
This is a statistical community – how is it that basic statistical tests have not been done by people with access to the model’s data? Instead it’s “imperfect doesn’t mean useless” or some derivative of that.
Not a strawman argument, if you read the article you see he comes to the conclusion to find this, and does not use it as his thesis. People like to throw this term around but have no clue what it actually means.
Wait, people think Nori Aoki is as good as Nick Markakis?
Apologies if this was asked and answered in the comments, I’m on mobile and it sucks to read and research on here – but how do UZR and DRS account for the play of a CF when evaluating a corner? Ie, if a CF is consistently getting to, or at least calling for, balls hit into the corner OF area of responsibility, how would that be accounted for?
P.S. FanGraphs join 2014 and get a mobile page or app already.
I’m not sure but I would think that those balls would be ignored in the calculations for the corner OF. It’s the same as when an infielder goes back into the outfield to catch a short fly ball.
Kevin:
What’s the matter, don’t like others who criticize your view? I will make a deal with you: I will find something better to do with my time and you grow up!
I don’t think it’s an overpay even with the advanced D metrics. He was worth 2.5 WAR in 2014. IN 2013 he was coming off and injury. In 2012 he was worth about 2.5 again pro rated for a full season. The year before that 1.7, a down year. The year before that 2.4. He seems to me to be about a 2-2.5 WAR player, a little downside, possibly some upside as well, even though it has been a long time since that 6.1 year. $45 million divided by say, 7 WAR (2.5, 2, 1.5 and 1) gives 6.4 million per WAR roughly. There’s been some inflation, so WAR seems to go for more than $6 million now.
If you only slightly doubt the D metrics then he’s worth it.
The question to me is why the Braves are doing it. Trading Heyward and Upton I’d think they’d push out their spending a year or 2 and for younger players. Although Shelby Miller isn’t old and we don’t know what they’ll get for Upton, I don’t see them being in the thick of it this year and Markakis will fade. But I could be underestimating their chances this year and all they need is the wildcard hunt and then see what happens.