Ben and Sam banter about Serial and basketball, then discuss the Astros-Phillies trade and Jason Heyward.
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Though baseball’s Winter Meetings seem like the playground of the front office executive, there is one other baseball man who’s ubiquitous: the manager. Semi-required to attend media events and an annual luncheon, most of the sport’s managers descend on the meetings to make their mark.
For the most part, they field questions about next year’s lineup, and try to deflect queries about front-office moves. They’ll do a little reminiscing about last year, and a little looking forward to next year. It’s a bit of a dance, since most of the reporters are looking to find out how the roster is going to look on paper, and the person in front of them is mostly in charge of putting that roster on the field.
Still, it’s a great moment to get access to many managers at once. This past August, I asked a collection of players and writers how Bruce Bochy and Joe Maddon — managers with distinctly different approaches and pasts — could both find great success. I thought it would make sense to ask the managers gathered here about their craft, as well.
What has changed about managing? How are the demands on the modern manager different than they once were?
As you’ve certainly heard by now, the Diamondbacks swung a deal for Shelby Miller (and Gabe Speier) on Wednesday night. The trade gives the D-Backs another bona-fide starter to slot behind the recently signed Zack Greinke. The more controversial story, though, is the size of the package given up by Arizona in the deal: Aaron Blair, Ender Inciarte, and oh yeah, Dansby Swanson. In what follows, I provide a stats-driven look at the prospects involved in the trade using my KATOH projection system.
Dansby Swanson (Profile)
As last year’s first overall pick, Swanson is easily the centerpiece of the trio headed to Atlanta. Unfortunately, he logged just 99 plate appearances after signing, which isn’t enough data for me to formulate a meaningful KATOH projection. I will note, though, that Swanson hit the snot out of the ball in those 99 plate appearances. He posted equal strikeout and walk numbers with good power, which yielded a .289/.394/.483 slash line. KATOH will likely pick up on these strong suits next year, once Swanson gives me a bit more data with to work. As a shortstop, Swanson’s level of offensive ability is exciting, and there’s no reason to think he won’t develop into an excellent player. As a point of reference, consider that Andrew Benintendi put up numbers not unlike Swanson’s in his pro debut this year, and is projected for 7.0 WAR through age-28. These two players have their differences, of course, but this should give you a loose benchmark of how Swanson may grade out once he has more playing time under his belt.
When the top 100 prospects in the game were ranked by Baseball America during the summer of 2010, Brett Lawrie was 26 spots ahead of Mike Trout. Both received a large cup of coffee in the majors during 2011 – Lawrie produced 2.6 WAR in just 46 games, while Trout put up 0.7 WAR in 40 – and there was a lot of optimism that we were witnessing two stars in the making: these were the athletic, ultra-talented position players of the future for two franchises.
Four years have passed since those brief debuts, and we know the history of both players has been quite different: Trout has produced a stunning 37.8 WAR, establishing himself as a perennial candidate for best player in baseball, while Lawrie has produced 6.2 WAR in a series of injury-interrupted, slightly above average seasons.
Being compared to Trout is unfair for basically every player in the game, but the point is this: early success doesn’t always mean continued success, mostly because baseball is about how well you adjust, not necessarily how much raw talent you have. A lot can change in the course of four seasons, especially when we’re trying to evaluate young players.
Because of the content of the four years since his debut, we view Lawrie through a certain lens: he was a top prospect, but he’s not a top major-leaguer. He’s had his chance, the thinking goes, and this is what he’s done with it. Major-league baseball is a boiling hot cauldron into which young men are thrown, and they either develop sufficiently thick skin to handle the heat or they don’t. It’s been over four seasons, and this is who he is.
Something complicates that viewpoint, however, and it’s that Lawrie will have just turned 26 when Opening Day rolls around in 2016. It might seem like he’s been around a long time, but he’s still young, and youthful players who were once top prospects are given a longer leash to figure things out. Now, after two separate opportunities to put everything together, Lawrie is headed from Oakland to the south side of Chicago in return for two relief pitchers, Zack Erwin and J.B. Wendelken.
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: No other suitors for Miller after Astros acquisition of Ken Giles or is a #MYSTERYTEAM preparing to strike
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: That was supposed to say: Dodgers might still want a reliever after the Chapman thing fell through!
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: What the…CiL looks all…weird. When did this happen?
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It wouldn’t be fair to say the ALDS game against the Royals was representative of the Astros’ bullpen, because that would be mean and wrong, but there was a definite lingering sense of unreliability. The Astros bullpen finished among the very best in WAR, but it was in the bottom half by WPA, and feelings mirror WPA better than anything else. Nor is this exactly a new problem — the last five years combined, the Astros bullpen is last in baseball by WPA at -22. The Mets are second-worst at -9. The bullpen hasn’t been a real strength for some time, and now the Astros’ bullpen actually matters. They’re no longer positioned to just see what sticks.
What’s the quickest way to upgrade a bullpen? Add one of the league’s true elite relievers. If he’s young and cost-controlled, all the better. Jeff Luhnow has talked a few times about wanting to diversify his group of relievers, bringing in someone overpowering. Enter Ken Giles. The Astros were circling around Giles for seemingly weeks, and now he’s about to be theirs, coming from the Phillies in exchange for Vincent Velasquez, Derek Fisher, Brett Oberholtzer, and Thomas Eshelman. In large part, it comes down to Giles and Velasquez. Giles is the proven power arm, with years of control. Velasquez is the unproven power arm, with real potential to start.
For the second straight season, the Houston Astros have prioritized bolstering their bullpen. Last year, the club signed Luke Gregerson and Pat Neshek. This winter, the team has already completed a trade for the Philadelphia Phillies bullpen ace in Ken Giles. Today, the Astros secured a piece of their playoff club long-term, bringing back Tony Sipp, as first reported by Evan Drellich. Ken Rosenthal filled in the details as Sipp’s deal is for three years and $18 million for the lefty.
Sipp spent the first five years of his career as a roughly replacement-level reliever for the Indians and Diamondbacks before catching on with Houston during the 2014 season. Since coming to the Astros, he has pitched very well, striking out roughly 30% of batters and sporting an identical 2.93 FIP in each of the last two seasons. Sipp had a ridiculous 88 left-on-base percentage last season that drove his ERA under two, and while that feat is unlikely to be matched next season, Sipp is still a good bet to keep producing. Read the rest of this entry »
Thirteen months ago, Houston scouting director Mike Elias described Derek Fisher as “A big kid who can run and has a good swing with some power.” Last night, the Astros sent the 37th-overall pick of the 2014 draft to the Philadelphia Phillies as part of the deal for closer Ken Giles.
Fisher — a 22-year-old left-handed-hitting outfielder out of the University of Virginia — possesses power and speed. Splitting this season between low-A Quad Cities and high-A Lancaster, he went deep 22 times and swiped 31 bags in 38 attempts. His slash line was a solid .275/.364/.483. Punch outs were an issue, as he fanned 132 times.
Fisher, who finished his first full professional season with the Glendale Desert Dogs, talked about his toolsy-yet-unpolished game near the conclusion of the Arizona Fall League season. Read the rest of this entry »
On Tuesday night, the Diamondbacks acquired Shelby Miller to upgrade their rotation. The cost of the acquisition, however, led most people — myself included — to conclude that not only did the team pay an exorbitant cost relative to pursuing other options on the market, but that it’s not even clear that the team improved on the field for 2016, given the loss of a quality Major League outfielder in the deal. As has been the case with several other recent moves Arizona has made of late, the reaction to the deal has been extremely negative. But has it been too one-sided and over the top?
Any time the public reaction is this slanted in one direction, it’s reasonable to ask what we we may be missing. We don’t have to ascribe to the idea of perfectly rational actors in every front office to accept the fact that teams have more and better information than we do, and when there’s a big disconnect between what we see and what they see, we should at least consider the possibility that they know more than we do. And when we look back at the recent history of unpopular transactions, there’s a decent amount of evidence that the magnitude of the criticism looks a bit silly in retrospect.
The most obvious comparison to this kind of prospect-for-pitcher trade backlash is the James Shields trade; in the aftermath of that deal, my post about the trade began “Royals Mortgage Future to Be Mediocre in 2013.” And while the Royals did indeed fail to reach the postseason in their first year with Shields, he helped them make a World Series run in 2014, and then they managed to win the whole thing this year, capping off a strong three year run that has revitalized baseball in Kansas City. With the benefit of hindsight, I certainly could have been a bit more nuanced with my opinion on that trade.
The 2015-16 offseason has been heralded as a historic one in terms of the volume of starting pitching projected to be available on the free market. There’s star-level talent (some of it already signed), in the persons of Zack Greinke, David Price and Johnny Cueto, as well as a bevy of mid-range targets certain to pull down three or more guaranteed years at a minimum of $10-12 million per season. The first big deals are in the books, and the prices in terms of dollars and years have been higher than the already elevated expectations.
What is the track record of both huge and mid-sized investments in starting pitching, and what does it portend for the clubs who have already made a splash in this year’s market? Does landing the big fish really mean you’ve “won” the offseason? Or might the clubs that either didn’t buy a lottery ticket — or held on to their own, suddenly more valuable tickets — come out ahead?
