FanGraphs Baseball

Billy Hamilton Had To Learn To Play Defense, Too

One of the more fascinating stories of last winter was the Cincinnati Reds’ intention to replace the departing center fielder Shin-Soo Choo with the completely unproven Billy Hamilton. While it obviously made sense that Cincinnati had no intention of paying Choo anything like what he got from Texas — a move that looks great right now — they were also subtracting Choo’s .423 OBP from a lineup that had been merely middle-of-the-pack even with him. It’s not entirely a stretch to say Choo’s presence was the biggest part of why Brandon Phillips had suddenly looked so good last year. Phillips declined in nearly every way between 2012 and 2013 then saw his RBI total jump from 77 to 103 in large part because he was hitting behind Choo’s .423 OBP, rather than the out-making ways of Zack Cozart and Drew Stubbs.

That being the case — and because Cincinnati’s main offseason acquisition was the inexplicable decision to give Skip Schumaker two guaranteed years — most of the discussion around Hamilton centered om whether he could get on base enough to take advantage of his fantastic speed. He wasn’t going to match Choo’s OBP, of course, but could he even get on base enough to stay in the big leagues, or to avoid being a one-man out machine out of the leadoff spot? To his credit, after a tough start, he has been more part of the solution than the problem — especially if you can forget he took the worst swing in the history of baseball.

His OBP is at least around .300, which isn’t good, but isn’t the .250 that some of us —  myself included — feared it might be. He’s shown a little bit of power, with six homers. While being caught 21 times on the bases is unacceptable for a player with his speed, that’s the kind of thing that can be eliminated with experience, and he’s still added a considerable amount of value on the bases. He’s a below-average hitter, but that can be tolerated as long as he’s not a complete disaster of a hitter. And he hasn’t been. He’s probably the best candidate in a weak National League Rookie of the Year class.

But while we were spending so much time talking about whether Hamilton would hit, and how many bases he could steal, it was easy to forget he was about to become a major league center fielder. For the first four years of his career, he was a middle infielder. He first played center in 2012 during his stint in the Arizona Fall League. Now that we’ve seen him in center for nearly an entire season… hey, this might just work out. Read the rest of this entry »


Doug Fister is Pitching to Contact

Doug Fister is fresh off seven scoreless innings Monday night against the Braves. Quality starts are pretty much old hat to the Nationals by now, who’re successfully running away with the NL East, but it might be a little bit surprising that Stephen Strasburg hasn’t functioned as the rotation ace. Really, that statement just speaks to the silly amount of awesome depth the Nationals possess, but with his latest outing, Fister ranks eighth in baseball in ERA among starters with 100+ innings. He’s basically even with Jon Lester. He’s slightly ahead of Cole Hamels and Garrett Richards. When Fister has pitched, the Nationals haven’t surrendered many runs, and, isn’t that the whole point?

So, people loved the Fister trade from the Nationals’ end, and clearly it’s worked out very well for them to this point. But there’s another thing that’s a little bit surprising: 2014 Doug Fister hasn’t been 2013 Doug Fister. Usually, when people have thought about the Nationals and pitching to contact, it’s been with regard to Strasburg’s electric right arm. But, Stephen Strasburg’s strikeout rate is as healthy as ever. It’s Doug Fister who’s been pitching to contact, even despite a trade to the league where the pitchers have to hit.

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FanGraphs Audio: Dave Cameron, For What WAR Is Good

Episode 480
Dave Cameron is both (a) the managing editor of FanGraphs and (b) the guest on this particular edition of FanGraphs Audio — during which edition he addresses a question posed most notably by a Vietnam War-era soul hit.

Don’t hesitate to direct pod-related correspondence to @cistulli on Twitter.

You can subscribe to the podcast via iTunes or other feeder things.

Audio after the jump. (Approximately 37 min play time.)

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00:37:30

The Projections and You, Revisited

As always happens around this time of year, we’re arguing the utility and accuracy of WAR as a player-evaluation statistic and model. Every year, the argument gets a little smarter on both sides, but every year, there’s the same struggle over acceptance. I’m sure we’re not done talking about this, not with Dave Cameron included as a BBWAA voter for the Most Valuable Player award, but you might recall that, a few months ago, the argument then was about the utility of projections. More specifically, it was about projections and identifying breakouts and collapses. Again, it wasn’t a new argument, but sometimes it’s the repeating arguments that manage to push us all forward.

Around that time, in the middle of June, I published a post with 20 players and 20 polls. There were five offensive over-achievers, five offensive under-achievers, five pitching over-achievers, and five pitching under-achievers. In each poll, I asked the audience to select how they felt about the player’s projection going forward. Which possible collapses or breakouts were people buying? Which were they dismissing? I know the season’s not over yet, but I thought this could be a fine time to look back on the post and on what has happened since.

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The Cardinals Offense and the Failure to Live Up to 2013

Just a couple of weeks ago, the Cardinals were just behind the Brewers in the National League Central. Just over a week ago, the Cardinals pulled just barely ahead of the Brewers. Today, after taking three of four against Milwaukee, including yesterday’s 9-1 crushing, the Cardinals are five games up on the Brewers, who are actually now in third next to the Pirates. Over the last week the Brewers’ rotation has not exactly made its defenders look good.

While one could go on about the Brewers’ fall, the Cardinals are the main story. They have never really been out of it. At the beginning of the season, St. Louis was a solid favorite to win their division. Two months ago, when they were four games behind the Brewers, the Cardinals’ chances of winning the division were roughly the same as the Brewers. Today, they are overwhelming favorites.

The 2014 Cardinals are not clearly dominant in either pitching or hitting. In particular, on the offensive side they have not hit nearly as well as the 2013 team. Yet they again are poised to win the division. In many ways, the regression was predictable. But does that mean the Cardinals made mistakes when preparing for 2014?

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The Strike Zone’s Still Dropping

Nothing groundbreaking here. The primary trend discussed has been discussed at length in other places, with far superior analysis. Here is one example! During the PITCHf/x era, through last season, umpires were granting more and more low strikes. Now we have most of a new season’s worth of data, and, guess what? Trend’s still alive. Trend’s still thriving. There’s never been a better time to be alive as a low strike, provided low strikes appreciate the company of others. We will, henceforth, focus on what I’ve elected to refer to as the zone of interest, because it is our present zone of interest:

zoneofinterest

The black box is an approximation of the average rule-book strike zone. The red zone of interest is somewhat arbitrary, but it more than gets the job done. Sometimes you don’t need to call on superior analytical techniques. Which is good for me, because I don’t know them. Data’s on the way! Thank you, Baseball Savant.

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Where Do The Diamondbacks Go From Here?

Nobody could ever accuse Kevin Towers of being anything less than bold. Few teams have been as interesting as the Arizona Diamondbacks over the last few years. Setting aside the quality of his moves, the sheer volume and often puzzling circumstances surrounding them garnered Arizona more headlines than such a middling team typically deserves.

His moves cut against the grain of prizing young, cheap talent and instead focused on a loose set of criteria, most of which was derived from the ability to play above one’s tools. It didn’t make the team better but it sure spilled a lot of ink. The problem is a simple one: a general manager’s job is to win and make money for the club, not generate think-pieces and schadenfreude. The Diamondbacks didn’t win and now Towers is out as the general manager, with the search for his replacement beginning in earnest (the list of candidates is as long as your arm.)

The Diamondbacks team  Towers inherited wasn’t a world beater, though it did claim the 2011 National League West crown. One could convincingly argue that the franchise is actually in worse shape now compared to Towers’ first day on the job. What exactly has the outgoing general manager left the next person to fill his chair? More than you might think.

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Cleveland’s Whole Cy Young Month

Earlier today, Finnish martial artist and FanGraphs contributor August Fagerstrom submitted for the consideration of everyone a collection of reasons to believe in Cleveland right-hander Danny Salazar. As Fagerstrom notes, Salazar’s eight later-season starts in the majors compare favorably not only to the eight starts he recorded earlier this season but also to the most recent eight starts made by basically every pitcher in the majors. His 54 FIP-, for example, is the ninth-best such figure among qualified starters over the last month.

Nor is Salazar the only one among Cleveland’s starting pitchers to have produced elite-type numbers of late. In fact, over the last 30 days, Cleveland’s rotation has recorded the best league- and park-adjusted xFIP and FIP and ERA — and also the best WAR figures, too, of both the fielding-independent and run-allowed variety.

Regard, by way of illustration, the top-five rotations over the past month, sorted by WAR:

# Team IP K% BB% GB% xFIP- FIP- ERA- WAR RA9-WAR
1 Indians 161.2 26.0% 6.2% 48.1% 76 69 49 4.5 6.5
2 Tigers 174.0 22.5% 5.8% 43.3% 89 77 121 4.3 0.5
3 Royals 180.2 16.1% 6.4% 43.0% 106 84 67 3.8 4.9
4 Rays 178.0 23.9% 6.3% 37.8% 90 88 75 3.5 4.9
5 Astros 172.0 17.3% 5.3% 48.2% 94 90 93 3.1 2.8

It might be difficult for some, owing to the alarmingly large gap between Detroit’s fielding-independent and run-prevention numbers, to say that the Tigers have featured the second-best rotation over the past month. Regardless, the point remains: by any criteria one might choose to define pitching success, the Indians have been the best by it over the last month.

Here are the individual starters who’ve contributed to that cause, with their numbers from the last 30 days:

# Name IP K% BB% GB% xFIP- FIP- ERA- WAR RA9-WAR
1 Carlos Carrasco 38.2 29.2% 2.8% 49.0% 57 44 19 1.5 2.5
2 Danny Salazar 25.0 23.7% 5.2% 41.8% 87 54 29 1.0 1.3
3 Corey Kluber 38.2 28.2% 6.8% 47.6% 73 84 56 0.8 1.0
4 Trevor Bauer 30.0 25.4% 12.7% 40.8% 101 87 88 0.6 0.7
5 T.J. House 24.0 21.9% 4.2% 61.8% 71 87 70 0.4 0.8
6 Josh Tomlin 5.1 20.0% 0.0% 50.0% 68 44 0 0.3 0.4

Before the current season, this group above had produced 7.6 WAR total over 882.0 innings in the entirety of their collective careers. As a group, they had accounted for fewer wins than Justin Verlander did by himself in 2009 — and way less efficiently, too.

Of late, however, this same cadre of relative misfits has been excellent, producing a collective total of 4.6 WAR in 161.2 innings since last month at this time — or, a slightly higher rate of WAR per inning than Felix Hernandez has produced in 2014.


FG on Fox: Sam Fuld on In-Game Corner Outfield Switching

Talking to a player like Sam Fuld — one with an analytical mind and questions about the game — can be all sorts of fun. Like this week, he suggested that teams might switch corner outfielders in the middle of a game for defensive reasons.

“If you have extremely varied skill levels in the outfield in the corners, between right and left field, like an elite right fielder defensively and a slugger in left,” Fuld said, “I think we’re going to see those guys flip flop within an inning depending on who’s coming up.”

This isn’t something that would make sense on most teams. Most left and right fielders are too close in talent to move around just because a right-handed pull hitter is at the plate. Even with a recent high-profile defensive whiff, it wouldn’t make sense to move Jayson Werth to left and Bryce Harper to right when lefty pull hitters are at the plate. The small defensive upgrade would be negated by the unfamiliarity with the other outfield corner.

“It would only occur when you have one really good and one really bad defensive corner outfielder,” Fuld agreed, adding: “If you get a right-handed pull hitter, you might want that elite defender in left.”

Let’s look at the defensive numbers of teammate corner outfielders over the past two years and see who might be a candidate for this switch. The following teammates had more than a 15-run discrepancy in defensive prowess (measured by Ultimate Zone Rating per 150 games):

Read the rest on Just a Bit Outside.


A Discussion About Improving WAR

Jeff Passan is one of the most aggressive advocates for FanGraphs in the mainstream media, regularly citing data and concepts from our leaderboards and helping to educate the masses about different ways of viewing baseball. He’s certainly not an old-school guy who wants to be left alone with his pitcher wins and RBIs, and he’s more than happy to embrace new ideas supported by data. But he still has some problems with WAR, and specifically, the defensive component that can allow lesser hitters to be listed as among the most valuable players in the game alongside some of baseball’s greatest sluggers. To get an entire sense of his argument, read the whole piece, but here’s a selection that sums up his argument:

Defense does have its place in WAR. Just not in its present incarnation, not until we know more. Not until we can account for positioning on the field. Not until we can find out the exact speed a ball leaves a bat and how quickly the fielder gets a jump and the angle on the ball and the efficiency with which he reaches it. Not until we understand more about fielding, which will allow us to understand how to properly mete out value on a defensive play, which may take years, yes, but look how long it took us to get to this point, where we know more about hitting and pitching than anyone ever thought possible.

The hackneyed Luddites who bleat “WAR, what is it good for, absolutely nothing” should not see this as a sympathetic view. On the contrary, WAR is an incredible idea, an effort to democratize arguments over who was best. Bringing any form of objectivity to such singularly subjective statements is extremely challenging and worthwhile work.

Which is why this at very least warrants more of a conversation among those who are in charge of it. They’ve changed WAR formulas before. They’ll change them again. And when they do, hopefully the reach of defensive metrics will be minimized.

I don’t agree with everything Passan wrote in the piece, but his criticisms of the metric aren’t entirely off base. It is easier to evaluate run scoring than run prevention. WAR is flawed and an imperfect model. Some of the assumptions in the construction of the model may be entirely incorrect, and as we get more information, we may very well find that some of the conclusions that WAR suggested were incorrect, and maybe not by a small amount. Just as the statistical community is quick to highlight the problems with pitcher wins and RBIs, it is fair for Passan to highlight the problems with WAR, especially if the purpose of that discussion is to help improve the model.

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