Postseason Managerial Report Card: Dave Roberts
The Dodgers were supposed to be a team for all seasons. A lineup comprised exclusively of All-Stars? Check. A pitching staff with Clayton Kershaw as a fourth starter? Check. A bullpen with two closers, plus a cornucopia of useful relievers to fill in the cracks? Check as well, particularly with Kenley Jansen turning back the clock.
Injuries had something to say about that, of course. By season’s end, the team lost Max Muncy to a fluke injury and Kershaw to elbow pain that shut him down for the postseason. A lineup with only seven phenomenal hitters? A rotation that stopped at three Cy Young candidates, and had to make do with the perfectly cromulent Tony Gonsolin as a fourth starter? The horror! At least the bullpen was still intact — Jansen and Blake Treinen anchored a top-five unit that kept the Dodgers rolling throughout the season even as their starters dealt with injuries.
All of these factors come into play when evaluating the decisions Dave Roberts made in the playoffs. I’ll stick to the general format of these posts — first hitting, then pitching — but in my opinion, the cascading set of questionable decisions on both sides started with the two injuries that changed the Dodgers’ plans from plug-and-play to figure-it-out.
Lineups/Pinch Hitting
Grade: C
It’s hard to goof up the top of the Los Angeles order. Mookie Betts, Corey Seager, Trea Turner, Justin Turner, Will Smith — you can jam those five in without thinking. That’s what Roberts did in the winner-take-all clash with the Cardinals. He supplemented them with AJ Pollock, Matt Beaty, and Cody Bellinger. Beaty was a contingency plan, a career 104 wRC+ hitter who is a) left-handed and b) capable of playing first base. He was in the lineup out of necessity. Not in the lineup: Chris Taylor, who struggled down the stretch but is still surely a better hitter.
The problem: the Dodgers couldn’t come up with a clear way to put their best position players on the field. The lefty bat they wanted was Gavin Lux, not Beaty, but Lux was blocked by their sterling middle infielders. With only seven professional games in center under his belt, he was clearly a worse option than Bellinger out there. He also hadn’t played first base, another possible landing spot. Meanwhile, Bellinger is enough better than Taylor in center that Roberts chose not to make the other obvious change, sliding Bellinger to first and using Taylor in center over Beaty.
It was clear that this configuration wouldn’t last. Beaty went 0-for-3 before being replaced by Billy McKinney, and the Dodgers used a wave of pinch hitters to scrap through a 3-1 win keyed by Taylor’s pinch-hit home run. Chris Taylor: pretty good at baseball.
In Game 1 of the NLDS, Roberts ran the same lineup back, with some batting order shuffling at the bottom. Beaty went 0-for-3, the Dodgers got shut out, and that was it! Forget what I said about Taylor’s defense; he was in center for the next game, with Bellinger sliding to first base. Taylor mashed — 2-for-4 with a walk and a double — in a Dodgers romp, and it was time for a new plan.
The lineup against lefties was easier — Albert Pujols at first, Taylor and Pollock in the outfield — but the next time the Dodgers faced a righty starter, Roberts tried yet another permutation. This time, he benched Pollock, moved Taylor to left, and put Lux in center, seven games of experience and all. Bellinger, the best defensive center fielder on the team, stood at first base. It was counterintuitive — but potentially the best alignment for a team with strange fit issues.
When Justin Turner was felled by a neck injury, Taylor’s versatility saved the day. He slid to third, Pollock re-entered in left, and the lineup otherwise remained the same until the last game of the season, when Roberts went back to Beaty over Lux. The Dodgers lineup was very resilient most places — but their best defensive center fielder was also their best lefty first base option with Muncy down, and the team’s fumbling to put out a cohesive lineup was a direct consequence.
I don’t give Roberts full blame for that, but his pinch hitting decisions also left something to be desired. The team was very short on depth, particularly after Turner got hurt. There are only so many ways you can flatter your bench of McKinney, Beaty, Pujols, Steven Souza Jr., and Austin Barnes. Roberts did them no favors, though, by picking the wrong spots for his best hitters.
In a close game against the Cardinals, Roberts used Luke Raley as the first hitter off the bench. Lux, meanwhile, was announced and then replaced without taking a cut. In a 1-0 loss to the Giants, the team started Pujols, pinch ran for him with McKinney, then pinch hit for McKinney with Souza. Given that Roberts didn’t seem to trust any of his righty pinch-hitting options, I would have kept Pujols in there. I also would have carried a third catcher so that Barnes could pinch hit, as Roberts clearly wanted him in the game over the rest of his bench.
Some of this comes down to personnel. When Pollock started on the bench, Roberts deployed him efficiently, in the first high-leverage spot he could find. But nothing excuses the last two decisions Roberts made. First, he let Brusdar Graterol bat for himself in a 6-2 game against the Braves with a runner on base. That doesn’t sound weird at first blush, and the Dodgers won comfortably — but he let a reliever bat for himself, then pulled that same reliever before the start of the next inning. That’s right: Graterol’s last act in the game was to strike out swinging.
That’s awful! Even if you think that the Dodgers wanted to save pinch hitters — and sure, whatever, I don’t think that’s a good use of resources but reasonable minds can disagree — they had a bench full of starting pitchers who would have been better options than Graterol. Leaving Graterol in would also have been fine — he had only thrown 14 pitches. Either way, the one thing that did happen was the thing that made the least sense.
Finally, Lux completely disappeared for the last two games after two defensive blunders in center field. He may have been banged up, or otherwise unavailable for reasons that the Dodgers didn’t broadcast, but it sure seemed like he just lost favor and vanished. That’s fine — playing a poor center fielder to get a career .233/.314/.368 bat into your lineup is a weird decision in the first place — but the frequent outfield reshuffling feels desperate to me. I can believe that either option — maxing out on offense with Lux or using Bellinger and a random first baseman to shore up the defense — is correct, but changing back and forth seems harder on the players, and certainly at least a little wrong.
Pitching
Grade: D
It’s easy to be too certain that Roberts’ pitching decisions doomed the defending champions. Mike Petriello recently observed little measurable effect when he searched past playoffs for starters in relief. Rather than reflexively give Roberts an F because Scherzer ended up with a dead arm (a defensible position, to be sure), I thought I’d walk through the games sequentially and see how each move painted him into a corner for successive games.
Against the Cardinals, Roberts was direct and efficient. He got what he could out of Scherzer, then went to an array of dominant relievers. Joe Kelly, Graterol, Treinen, Corey Knebel, and Jansen entered in order. They held the Cardinals to two hits and a walk in 4.2 innings of work. With a bullpen like that, there’s no need to get cute.
Against the Giants, Roberts got cute. After two games where there wasn’t much managing to do, Game 3 was his first test. There, he rode Scherzer for 110 pitches — including skipping a juicy pinch-hitting spot. From there, he opened up the good stuff — Treinen and Jansen combined to pitch the last two frames in a 1-0 loss.
The next day, the Dodgers won comfortably — they were up 5-1 after five and won 7-2. Roberts, though, had turned to Walker Buehler on short rest. That decision could go either way — I would have preferred Gonsolin, but only by a hair. It put a large innings burden on the bullpen, however, and despite a big lead, Roberts didn’t screw around. He went to Graterol, Alex Vesia (excellent this year), and Treinen before the Dodgers really put the game out of reach in the eighth. Finally, he put Phil Bickford in, but the plan was clear — work the big bullpen horses as much as possible.
In Game 5, Roberts shortened the list of trusted relievers even further. Knebel opened, a gambit that paid off despite loud contact. Graterol entered next — a strange decision given that Mike Yastrzemski, a lefty who the Giants like to hide against southpaws, was due up. This was Julio Urías’s game, and it seemed like an okay spot for a lefty, though Graterol also escaped trouble. Then came Urías, but only for 59 pitches and four innings. If Roberts only wanted to use the best of the bullpen, he maybe should have tried to get more than 15 batters faced out of his Cy Young candidate.
That “best of the bullpen” plan didn’t quite work out. Treinen got an inning, and Jansen did as well, but that left one inning remaining. Enter Scherzer, on two days rest after his 110-pitch effort in Los Angeles. He closed out the ninth in an economical 13 pitches, but just…. What was with the double openers? Why use Urías so sparingly? Why not extend Jansen an extra inning given everything that took place beforehand? There were plenty of ways to manage this game. Roberts chose the one — only using his top four relievers, not extending any of them for more than an inning, and keeping an extremely short leash on Urías — that required a bullpen appearance from a 37-year-old pitcher coming off of his highest pitch count of the year.
With his top three starters all burned, Roberts still didn’t want Gonsolin in. He went with a full bullpen game to start the NLCS, with Knebel making his second consecutive start (fun trivia there). He emptied the vaults, and the low-leverage pitchers mostly performed well. Bickford, Gonsolin, and Justin Bruihl combined for four innings, six strikeouts, and one run allowed. Vesia and Kelly each chipped in scoreless innings. Treinen, pitching for the fourth time in six days, gave up a walk-off single to Austin Riley, but the bullpen pieces Roberts was so reticent to use performed just like you’d expect based on their season-long numbers: perfectly well.
Because he only used Gonsolin for five outs, Roberts had completely emptied out the bullpen. That meant Scherzer was pitching on two days’ rest after a high-leverage relief appearance, which was itself on two days’ rest after his longest outing of the year. He was excellent when in, but had a dead arm, and left after only 4.1 innings. That meant Roberts had to turn back to those same bullpen arms for the second day in a row — something he clearly didn’t want to do.
To avoid having to run out everyone again, Roberts got creative. First, he used his two least-disfavored relievers outside of the top group: Vesia and Kelly got the fifth and sixth innings. Then, he went to Treinen again for the seventh. With the Braves sending two lefties to the plate in the eighth, he skipped Bruihl, and also skipped the three trusted righties in his ‘pen: Knebel, Graterol, and Jansen. Instead, he called for Urías, who like Scherzer was on two days rest. Urías scuffled with location and gave up two runs, which could have happened to anyone, but the cost is higher when you bring in a starter to do it.
After an off day, Roberts was forced to go back to the bullpen arms he didn’t trust. Buehler scuffled, which meant Vesia entered in the fourth inning to retire Freddie Freeman. Knebel came in next, but only lasted three batters — single, walk, long fly out. That gave Roberts no choice but to use the Bickfords and Gonsolins of the world — in this case actually Phil Bickford, who gave up a single but then got a clutch double play to end the inning.
From there, the theme recurred: the relievers that so terrified Roberts did just fine. Bruihl mostly did his job against lefties. Kelly backed him to clean up the inning. Evan Phillips, added to the roster for the NLCS, got five somewhat adventurous outs before Gonsolin slammed the door behind him. When the Dodgers roared into the lead with a four-run eighth, the mop-up brigade had done their job again, and Jansen entered for an effortless ninth.
Urías was far from sharp the next day, giving up five earned runs, eight hits, and two walks in only five innings pitched. His stuff didn’t look the same. Perhaps that’s because he had doubled his previous career-high workload, but if that’s the case, maybe he didn’t need to put extra miles on his arm with that high-leverage relief appearance a few days prior. The whole thing felt like present Roberts trying to make up for the excesses of past Roberts — while continuing his own excesses, of course. Roberts emptied the bottom of the bullpen behind Urías, and had Gonsolin soak up the last two innings.
Naturally, the Dodgers had planned a bullpen day the next day, and were missing Gonsolin’s bulk for it. Phillips had another scoreless outing, entering in the first after Kelly was knocked out with an injury that sidelined him for the rest of the playoffs. But even in an absolute laugher of a game — 11-2, with the Dodgers up 6-2 after five — the four core relievers had to throw. Graterol and Treinen handled two innings each, Knebel and Jansen kicked in one apiece.
By the time Game 6 rolled around, things had fallen fully apart. Scherzer’s arm didn’t recover as planned — he might seem invincible, but the workload had been too much for him. Buehler had to make the start on short rest, his second short-rest start of the playoffs. He simply didn’t pitch well enough to win — four innings pitched, three walks, and seven hits, one of which was a homer. That was four runs for Atlanta, which was all they’d need. The high-leverage bullpen brigade poured it on — Graterol, Treinen, Knebel, and Jansen combined for five innings of two-hit, seven-strikeout relief to hold the Braves scoreless — but it just didn’t matter.
There’s a cascading problem here. Roberts didn’t trust huge swaths of his bullpen (and rotation if you count Gonsolin, who never did make a start in the playoffs). One way to compensate for that would be by extending your starters — all of Buehler, Urías, and Scherzer are bona fide Cy Young candidates this year. If you’re going to do that, though, you can’t really do it on short rest — short rest means shorter outings, which means you’ll need to trust the bullpen. There’s just no way to use your ace for only 15 batters, trust only four bullpen arms, and make it through a game.
Over and over again, Roberts leaned on two default ideas. First, he only trusted three starters and four relievers, and wanted those seven players to pitch as many innings as possible. Second, he was willing to use those starters on a schedule other than once every five days, which meant shorter starts when they did pitch, as well as stamina-sapping throw day relief appearances.
These two ideas are at odds! If you want your starters to mostly go deep into the game to minimize bullpen use, you can’t use them on short rest. Even if you think that using starters in relief doesn’t blunt their effectiveness, it certainly limits their ability to go deep into games, and it’s strange that Roberts would accept that tradeoff given his strong desire to have only the very best relievers throw. Much as you might like to, you can’t make the entire airplane out of the black box. Every time Roberts tried to, it only made things worse in the future, which put him in worse binds. He tried to get out of those worse binds by doing more of the same. It’s a vicious cycle, one that ended with the Dodgers home for the playoffs.
Maybe this model would be rational if the “bad” parts of the Los Angeles bullpen were truly awful. They weren’t! The top four relievers were excellent — they had a collective 1.50 ERA in 30 innings of work, with 40 strikeouts and only four walks. The rest of the ‘pen? They had a 3.28 ERA over just under 25 innings, with 31 strikeouts and seven walks. Exclude Gonsolin, who was never going to be a high-leverage relief arm, and the other fill-ins had a 1.74 ERA and 27:6 K/BB ratio.
The Dodgers didn’t hit well enough to make the World Series this year. Their offense, which was productive throughout the season, sputtered at the worst possible time. It’s hard to overcome an offense that scored two runs or fewer in half of their postseason contests. But by contorting his roster to feature only the pitchers he trusted most, Roberts put those pitchers — particularly the starters, who he used aggressively on short rest and out of the bullpen — in tough situations that could have been avoided with different planning.
To me, this is more of a philosophical failure than a tactical one. Many of the tactical decisions that Roberts made were no-brainers, forced on him by decisions made earlier in the playoffs. How would this team have done if the players were used normally? We’ll never know. But Buehler and Urías were asked to do more than they’d ever done, after shouldering career-high workloads during the first season since the shortened 2020 campaign, and both faltered. Scherzer was asked to carry a huge burden — a season-high pitch count in the playoffs, then high-leverage relief, then another big start — and his arm suffered for it. All three workhorse starters wore down, in one way or another.
Could all of them have overcome those difficulties and put together a dominant October performance? Sure. But I strongly disagree with the concept of ignoring the Dodgers’ only plus source of depth this year: their impressive bullpen. This was a team that was well-suited to throw each of its best starters on full rest, use a short-leash Gonsolin with a fully operational bullpen behind him, and challenge other teams to deal with it. Instead, it became a needlessly complicated juggling act. Maybe that was planned — but it still earns my scorn.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
What’s notable about this to me is that even this part about Game 6 of the NLCS that worked ok elides over some decisions that could be criticized: “The high-leverage bullpen brigade poured it on — Graterol, Treinen, Knebel, and Jansen combined for five innings of two-hit, seven-strikeout relief to hold the Braves scoreless — but it just didn’t matter.”
Graterol was pulled probably too early with two outs when he was looking unhittable for Vesia, who didn’t have it and walked the bases loaded. Then Treinen came in without a double-switch and got one batter out before being lifted for a pitch hitter the next half-inning. If the Dodgers had come back, Jensen would have pitched a second inning for the bottom of the ninth (after throwing 19 pitches in the 8th) before the Dodgers would have had very little left for possible extras.
The Dodgers are probably the worst offender of the teams in the playoffs but wow, has there ever been too much “too cute” stuff around pitching in these playoffs.
I follow the logic of individual moves but overall I can’t but agree, I think that in the end they compounded a problem (fatigue after the enormous year over year innings jumps) that was bigger than the generic-year desire to minimize guys in the bullpen you distrust.
They also seem to have a pattern of distrusting guys who probably deserve it. Last year, Jake McGee had a great season, absolutely could not get into a game in the postseason, and went on to have an excellent 2021 for the Giants. That McGee was literally the last guy in the 2020 Dodger playoff bullpen doesn’t make a great deal of sense; they trusted him until the playoffs started, and it went off like a switch, and it was clearly evident this year that that he was fine.
Roberts definitely has a pattern of distrusting his bullpen in the playoffs but it seems like almost every team this playoffs has repeatedly pulled its starters early, but then rather than go to the bullpen decides to bring in another starter, often on short rest. We saw this with the Dodgers, the Rays, the Red Sox, the Astros (although the Astros weren’t entirely at fault), and probably other teams too that I can’t remember. Teams are not trusting their starters to go deep at all, but then are asking them to pitch on short rest. You know who hasn’t done that as much? The Braves.
Either the reality or perceived impact of the ‘ 3 hitter rule’ seems to be in play.
Too cute to the point of absurdity. A sane man would have started any one of his 3 Cy Young quality aces in Games 1-2-3, let them pitch well into the games, maybe like Framber Valdez did, and probably would have walked away with a trip to the World Series securely in hand. Maybe teams would be better off if they didn’t have a plethora of riches in the bullpen and were forced to ride there great starters into the late innings. It almost seems like the managers feel forced to use these relievers simply because they are on the team.
100% agreed, although let’s be real, Roberts has been doing this for so long that it’s definitely a FO-approved strategy. This goes up the chain to Friedman, as does roster construction.
It’s like other teams saw what the Dodgers were doing and decided to copy them. The fact that it hasn’t worked does not seem to be a deterrent.
I think you mirrored my thoughts on the pitching decisions. The real fault of the Dodgers strategy was not trusting the tremendous depth they had in their bullpen. Which is odd since the bullpen really carried that team for large portions of the season and the starters were clearly wearing down even before the postseason started (especially Buehler). And guess what, the bullpen delivered just fine when they were asked to pitch!
I agree with basically everything here. Trea Turner being tattooed into the number 2/3 spots in the order when it was obvious he was struggling mightily was very weird, and this was a Dodgers team with an uncharacteristically thin bench. Also, some people might disagree, but I think the Dodgers’ generally terrible defense at two key spots (shortstop and centerfield) cost them dearly. I just don’t understand how they even considered Lux in center, and with Seager we all know about his limitations.
The pitching decisions were just mind boggling to me. Just like you said, the Dodgers more than any team in the postseason were perfectly prepared for the very classic and effective strategy of using your three aces on normal rest with slower hooks and then going with your number four (Gonsolin in this case) for 18 batters followed by a bullpen that was hopefully kept from being overworked by the aforementioned aces. Does Roberts know he had three of the six best pitchers in the National League in his rotation? Or that the weaker part of his pen is made up of solid relievers? I didn’t get any of it. The Dodgers should’ve had the most ABC pitching plan of all time, but they turned it into alphabet soup. It was a shame to see Buehler unable to do Buehler things in October like he would’ve done on full rest.
The elephant in the room that almost literally no one will mention is the Trevor Bauer situation. The Dodgers plan was to go 4 deep in top 10 starters, including the 2020 Cy Young award winner, which would have made all the Gonsolin and short rest stuff completely moot. Instead they acted like a pitching-desperate team.
Meanwhile Bauer is looking forward to his next sexual encounter while counting all the millions he is making for not pitching.
I have seen a lot of places (like MLB, ESPN, and the TBS announcers) mention Bauer and how his suspension disrupted the Dodgers’ rotation plans. (I’ve also seen most of those sources unable to describe just what is going on apart from the vague phrase “legal troubles.”)
Oh how quickly we also forget about the injury to Dustin May
The Bauer case is interesting because it involves a subculture that many find distasteful but strictly speaking is neither illegal nor addressed by the CBA. On tbe other hand team owners like to portray themselves as family friendly (in a 50’s -60’s movie code way. He may not play zgain but he is still going to make a lot of easy money.
I mean, having sex with an unconscious person is rape. That person literally cannot consent. There is no such legal thing as “consent for later when I can’t consent.”
They replaced Bauer with Scherzer; an upgrade across the board.
I think this is both true and not entirely relevant. No one goes 4 deep in Top 10 starters; if they did, figuring out the optimal usage for them a lot easier. The job is to manage the pitchers you have as well as you can.
I also think that if it wasn’t fairly apparent the probability of Bauer pitching again was fairly remote, the Dodgers would not have made the move for Scherzer. He was acquired to replace Bauer, not to provide insurance against Clayton Kershaw’s injury (even though in the end he did both). I don’t think the Dodgers make the move if Bauer’s in the rotation and pitching effectively.
“keyed by Taylor’s pinch-hit home run [in the WC game]”
Picky point, but it wasn’t a PH HR, as Taylor had entered the game in a double-switch in the top of the 7th and batted in the bottom of that inning, popping out. The walkoff HR was his second PA of the day.
If Scherzer hadn’t closed Game 5, it’s certainly possible the Dodgers would’ve lost and rendered all of this moot.
If Scherzer hadn’t closed Game 5, it’s certainly possible that he, Buehler, and Urias would’ve all been pitching on regular rest and provided 5-6 quality starts among them in the NLCS, and the Dodgers would be playing the Astros right now.
Or, any outcome in between those two possibilities. As a fan, it’s enough to drive you insane. So I appreciate the dispassionate analysis.
That said, there’s no way Roberts is using Scherzer/Urias in relief or starting Buehler on short rest without the front office not only approving it, but likely suggesting it.
Dave Roberts gets one vote in making strategic decisions like this. I don’t know if any of the coaches get a vote, or how many in the front office get a vote, but he gets one vote, and whichever way the vote goes, he defends the decision and takes the heat for it.
When we criticize how the Dodgers use their pitching staff, we are criticizing the front office as well.
Roberts has indicated that the front office and Mark Prior have equal say when it comes to pitching strategy. Hard to argue that it’s the wrong approach when they won 106 games in the regular season but maybe they should just let the manager manage when the playoffs roll around.
I think there’s a way to look at it, though. Think back to the highest-profile instance where the Dodgers used a starter in relief: Clayton Kershaw in Game 5 of the 2016 NLDS vs the Nationals. Lets compare that scenario with what played out here.
In 2016, the Dodgers had peak Kenley Jansen and they asked him for something that might have been impossible: a 9 out save where he entered with men on base in the 7th inning. Jansen was able to get 7 of those outs before being exhausted, and Kershaw entered with Jansen tapped (walks to the final 2 hitters he faced) in an optimized situation (vs LHB Murphy). He threw 8 pitches. The Dodgers in that situation clearly knew Kershaw was available, but used him as a last resort, after having tapped out their bullpen because of the 7th inning emergency and having ridden their elite reliever as far as they possibly could.
Now lets look at 2021. The Dodgers telegraphed their intention to use Scherzer in Game 5 against the Giants. Treinen, who as we saw many times this year and against the Braves, was quite capable of getting more than an inning, had an extremely efficient 7th inning (12 pitches). He could have been double switched into the game, but he was not, so he was then pinch hit for in the following inning with Pollock. Then, come the 8th inning, the Dodgers brought in Jansen, who while he sometimes pitches over an inning has not provided a whole 2 in quite some time. Jansen was also efficient, but had to be pinch hit for because the lineup rolled over to his position. This left them no choice but to use Scherzer, but that entire situation was created by not making a double-switch when Treinen entered, and instead letting the pitcher’s spot -lead off the next half inning-. Seeing 10 batters bat in 2 innings is not unrealistic, and the lineup was arranged to -maximize- the probability that the pitcher’s spot would bat in both the 7th and 8th, since it was leading off the 7th. The Dodgers made strategic choices that opted them into using Scherzer well before he entered the game and that made it quite likely that he’d have to pitch a full inning in doing so. They did not attempt to minimize his outing, provides themselves with a possible path to him not being used because their 2 best relievers were just lights out, or to get the same kind of value they showed they were consistently able to get from those guys against the Braves.
If they as simply as double-switch Lux out of the game for Pollock when Treinen enters, putting the pitcher in the 7 spot, they at least give themselves the possibility of getting 6 outs from Treinen, or getting 4-6 outs from Jansen and not having to use Scherzer at all, or, if they do, having only to use him like they used Clayton in 2016, for a minimal number of batters.
Now, I can’t say that throwing 5 extra pitches is why Max had a dead arm. But if you set that situation up correctly, you give yourself a situation where it’s possible that you don’t need Max. The way that they did it, you make it all but guaranteed that you’ll need him, because you close off the possibility of getting more than 3 outs from Treinen and the chance you need to pinch hit for Jansen is reasonably high.
Even with the same strategic plan of having Max to back up your best relievers, it’s simply the truth that it’s better to not have to do that, and it doesn’t make any sense to take a strategic line that eliminates the 10-20% chance or whatever it was that Treinen and Jansen can get the last 9 outs without assistance. That possibility was worth keeping in play, and it was rendered quite improbable by not doing a double switch when your reliever, who is probably the most capable reliever on your staff of giving you more than 3 outs consistently, is due to lead off the next inning in a tie game.
And that’s really what makes this all so egregious: Imagine if that game had gone to extras! The way that they did not maximize the value of Treinen and Jansen would have looked even more insane if Cody Bellinger doesn’t break the tie. They not only managed the bullpen in a way that virtually guaranteed Scherzer would have to pitch, they did so in a way that punished them severely if the game remained tied. Given the quality of pitching on both teams, the game remaining tied 3 innings later was probably the most likely outcome! Why would you manage your staff in a way that puts you at such a profound disadvantage if you don’t take a lead?
Mike- EXCELLENT ANALYSIS!!!!
Phenomenal post, and I’ll add this: this entire riddle, decision-making, and subsequent discussion is only possible in the National League. People can take that however they want.
It wasn’t only Treinen and Jansen. Urias certainly could have pitched more than 4 innings. It was difficult to avoid the conclusion that a decision had been made beforehand to make the game 1+1+4+1+1+1 to produce the storybook ending of scherzer getting the save and no more thought had gone into the pitching plan than that. Going into extra innings wasn’t part of the script, so that possibility wasn’t taken into consideration.
Urias wasn’t super sharp that day and I think there were justifiably concerns that he was on the verge of tripling his career high in IP (78 in 2020, he crossed 200 that game in 2021)
The thing is that usually they do account for extra innings in their pitching plan. I mean, the Giants operate pretty similarly – in both cases you can tell they have identified specific matchups they want to seek out and avoid and how they’d like to sequence things.
Or, you know, they could’ve just used Phil Bickford to get 3 outs somewhere in the last 3 innings, as they did many times throughout the season.
“I also would have carried a third catcher so that Barnes could pinch hit”
Who?
Keibert Ruiz is a National. No one else caught for the LA Dodgers this season, no other C was on the 40-roster and their AAA catchers were like Tony Wolters, Anthony Bemboom and Hamlet Marte.
“Because he only used Gonsolin for five outs, Roberts had completely emptied out the bullpen.”
Gonsolin gave up a lot of hard contact – wasn’t fooling anyone, as they say – and I was happy to see him come out.
We’ll probably never know, but I would like to know who exactly is making these choices: Roberts, the FO, or some combination. It has to be frustrating for the players to feel like they weren’t put in the best position to succeed.
Andy McCullough did an excellent piece at the Athletic about how the Dodgers decided to use Knebel as an opener.
The answer is that everyone is involved: the idea came from a coach, was discussed in a meeting with the FO, who looked at it and agreed, and then they brought the idea to a wide range of players from the involved pitchers (Knebel, Urias) to team leaders (Betts, J Turner, etc), and proceeded with the plan only when they had consensus agreement to do it.
I can’t imagine that the decision to use their starters in relief is handled any differently, and that input came from everyone from the coaching staff to the front office & analyst group to the players involved themselves and they all agreed to do it. This collective/buy-in approach tracks with how they operate generally, and I would imagine that for more conventional / less disruptive to players decisions (ie not nonstandard stuff like starters in the bullpen and openers), the process is similar without the extra step of soliciting player buyin. I think this also explains why Roberts really seems quite secure despite a lot of public criticism of his decisionmaking: He’s clearly got agency, and I think some of the instances he’s been most criticized for are best described as situations where he’s stuck too rigidly to the previously discussed plan for what situations they want to make certain moves in, when the evidence on the field suggests that it may not have been the right play anymore. The modern MLB manager is first and foremost a communicator, both between the front office and players to get buy-in to how guys are being used and the approach they want to take to situations and games, and also from the team to the public. Dave Roberts is much more consensus-builder and press secretary than he is a tactical decisionmaker, and when his decisions backfire it is as much the fault of the people doing game planning with him on his staff and in the FO as it is Dave himself – more, in some instances, I expect.
So it was a decision by committee.
Heh.
That was well said.
Do you really think that’s how they decided to use urias in the bottom of the 8th inning of game 2 of the nlcs (which I would call the biggest blunder)? When exactly did everyone have this meeting? When they were batting in the top of the 8th? There was a conference call?
Before the game they probably decided that, should they need it, Urias was an option for the 3rd time past the lefty heavy section of the lineup. The first two times they used LHP out of the bullpen for the Rosario-Freeman segment, but the 3rd time, they did not have the option of starting that pitcher earlier (so Freeman would be the 3rd batter and they could swap for Albies) and they had probably agreed on Julio for the Rosario-Freeman-Albies situation in a late/close game, because Julio has a much better chance of handling Albies than most LHP (as Ozzie is much better from the right side)
Earlier in the game they had done the silly-looking thing of bringing in a reliever to face the pitcher in order to have a lefty go pitcher-Rosario-Freeman and be able to be removed before Albies hit.
I am quite confident that they discuss those kinds of matchups and situations and who they want to see for them in which situations well in advance, and also who they want to keep away from whom. That is pretty normal in baseball today.
I’d like to jump in here to add to Mike’s point that, after Game 5 of the NLDS, Scherzer or Roberts or both of them mentioned in interviews that Scherzer had approached Roberts to indicate that he was willing to pitch (and maybe even suggested he pitch). I believe I’m close to paraphrasing Roberts: “sometimes you go with [what] the player [is saying] in that situation”
I find the term “too cute” to be both quite pervasive and a tad vague. The way I’d describe it is that Roberts seemed to lean into or believe too much in the heroics of his top guys. And I think with Scherzer, too, there’s definitely some intimidation as he seems to be quite a force of a clubhouse presence on this team. In general, I think it’s great when a manager and the players can put their heads together and be on the same page. But in this specific instance, I agree with all that Roberts should have stuck to the normal sequence of relievers.
Having said that, I’ll fully admit that I’d personally find it impossible to say no to anything Max Scherzer wanted. I’m intimidated just watching him on TV! But that’s why I’m not in a dugout anywhere! 🙂
So this, Saeder, and I haven’t heard anyone else note Scherzer’s own role in this. He wants to be the hero, and while his intensity can be awesome he clearly went nuts that inning. And I would be everything that he pushed Roberts to use him to get his first save in a key matchup. Don’t get me wrong, he is amazing, but sometimes what makes one great can also ride the edge occasionally tip the wrong way.
The implication is that there really was a consensus on a truly horrendous decision. That’s pretty alarming.
I don’t know why that would be considered alarming. (Or at least I’m not aware of any body of work showing that group decisions tend to be better than individual ones.) Just as adding decision-makers can add more good ideas into the mix or more people to spot/eliminate bad ideas, so too can it throw more bad ideas in the mix, cause confusion/cacophony, make people afraid to disagree or “just want to go along with the group”, or cause good ideas to become lost in the shuffle.
Among the many bizarre pitching decisions Roberts made, putting in Urias in the 8th inning of game 2 of the nlcs was I think clearly the worst. While it’s true that anyone might have blown a 2-run lead on only 6 pitches, Urias was pitching on 2 days’ rest after throwing 4 innings in game 5 of the nlcs, and this was after throwing by far the most pitches of his career in the regular season. He was more likely to be too tired to be effective than other possible pitchers at the time.. Treinen has thrown only 9 pitches in the 7th and could certainly have faced a few more batters before Jansen came in. If Roberts really wanted to bring in a lefty to face Rosario and freeman, he could have used Bruihl who had been pitching quite well. Bringing in a tired Urias may well have cost the Dudgers game 2. But it may also have cost them game 4, because it meant that urias had to go out again after just two more days.
Something which you did not mention was the possibility of starting Buehler in game 2 of the nlcs. He would have had 4 days rest and that would gave given Scherzer two more days of rest before his next start, and in any case Scherzer wasn’t going to start more than one more game in the nlcs. The only reason I could think of for insisting on Scherzer starting game 2 is Roberts intended to have him start game 6 and then be available to relieve again in game 7 with no rest, because he apparently has superhuman abilities.
Some good food for thought here, and some mistakes were made (would argue overusing Urias as a reliever was the most clear and obvious one, especially how badly he worked out, though I understood what was probably the thought process there, given how important Urias was in relief last year, but he was very taxed this year with by far his highest inning counts ever.)
Which third catcher would you liked for him to have called onto the roster? They had 2 on the 40 man, after trading Keibert Ruiz in the TT/Scherzer swap. Bemboom? Tony Wolters? I mean I guess but that seems a silly thing to harp on, or should be criticizing the front office for if that important, not Roberts.
Lux was awful in CF and it’s not his fault, he was pressed into duty when desperate in need of bats after losing Muncy on the last game of the season )(instead of, say, pre trade deadline when you can address it more). But there really wasn’t an easy place for him and defense was an issue. So Roberts is being damned here for using him and then for not using him, in a situation caused by injuries. Lux had a hot bat, relatively, but doesn’t really have a place defensively, especially when his best fit is at 2nd where Turner was entrenched. (I agree TT should’ve been moved down in order btw, given his struggles in playoffs.)
He made some questionable pitching choices for sure and this does a fair job of calling those out, but when you are down to three starting pitchers, and then even lose a key reliever at the start of a necessary bullpen game, a lot of more obvious plans go up in smoke.
This piece (and frankly some of the comments here) feel irrationally harsh, even with, again, some really valid points about what Roberts DID get wrong. Also to the point about how he “had three great starting pitchers” and got too cute with the bullpen use. All these moves are made in conjunction with his pitching coach and the management staff, in tandem with those pitchers healths. They were down to three starters and they were all taxed by the end. Losing Bauer is on the GM for signing him in the first place, losing Kershaw hurt even if not the innings eater he once was, and of course losing May hurt even if at the start of season, Scherzer was brought in to address one of those losses not all three. Gonsolin was ineffective this year. There are plenty of ways to criticize Dodger management or the ill timing of a farm system not quite ready to step in for these absences, but when you combine all these things along with having to use your main guys more than you would’ve liked because of the tight race for first with SF, you get into the predicament they found themselves in with a taxed 3 man rotation. You mention the injuries but seem to dismiss both how those were handled by Dodgers’ brass and how few choices Roberts had at the end. No, he’s not incredibly ingenious at doing pitching maneuvering jiu jitsu, not his strength, but it was a pretty tough situation to navigate.
I really don’t think the situation should have been that desperate. Why not pinch-hit for scherzer in the 5th inning of game 2 of the nlcs, not only for the reasons Ben wrote about but also so as not to overtaxed scherzer? Why not use urias for 5 innings instead of 4 in game 5 of the nlds so as not to have to use scherzer in relief? Why start an unrested scherzer in game 2 of the nlcs instead of a rested Buehler? Why relieve with a tired urias in the 8th inning of game 2 of the nlcs instead of leaving in treinin or bringing in Bruihl? The top three starters were all overtaxed because of the way that roberts had used them.
“Why relieve with a tired urias in the 8th inning of game 2 of the nlcs instead of leaving in treinin or bringing in Bruihl? ” This I totally agree with, I think he should’ve used Briuhl there, who had been very solid, instead of overusing Urias.
I think the others are slightly more defensible and the reason all three starters were overtaxed was not JUST because of how Roberts had overused them for a week, it was because they were used more (especially in Urias’ case) out of necessity the last two months of the season–even with a number of bullpen games they threw in. In hindsight honestly I bet they wished they could’ve just punted the division race, which they finished second in and still won the NLDS, and just sat extra starters more often. But they were mixing and matching emergency starters for several months. This also isn’t the first time Scherzer had to unexpectedly sit in a playoff series (probably all the more reason to not have used Max S in the NLDS game 5 even if he ended up faring well, so he really should’ve been treated more delicately at that point.) There’s a lot of damned if he does/damned if he doesn’t in some of this though that overlooks what happened previous 2-3 months and what he still tried to do to rest guys when he could (a few mismanaged innings in the playoffs still also a part of that for sure).
Trea Turner has a lot more experience in CF than Lux. Why not put Trea in CF and Lux at 2B?
Roberts only trusting a couple of pitchers is not new. He rode Kershaw, Jensen, and Blanton til they dropped in 2016. Kershaw, Jensen, and Morrow were driven til they dropped in 2017. Kershaw, Jensen, Floro, and Madsen were driven til they dropped in 2018. Kershaw was driven til he dropped in 2019.
THIS. Thank you! He has always done this, particularly to Kershaw. But all the Dodger haters fell in love with the lazy narrative that “Kershaw sucks in the playoffs, lol” so that idea stuck for a long time. Only now that Roberts (and the FO) did it to the great Max are more people questioning Dave’s pitching decisions.
I guess I qualify as a Dodger hater and I’ve been saying it was Roberts’ fault literally from the first year he was with the team (2016). Giants fans in general have a huge amount of respect for Kershaw but regarded Roberts as being a buffoon pretty much from the beginning.
Great way to turn a great strength into a liability. The trio of aces in the regular season – 51-11, 2.64; 0-3, 7.94 against Atlanta.
I’m still puzzled why Roberts didn’t just go for a full bullpen game in Game 6. I get that you hate to potentially lose with two great starters on the bench, but they had already had two successful bullpen games in the series and the Braves did not appear to be figuring things out against any of the LA relievers.
Since you have to win both games, I understand the tactic of taking your shot with Buehler, who had been successful on short rest once already, and thereby maintaining the possibility that Scherzer recovers with the extra rest enough to give you something in Game 7.
I think that decision is pretty defensible, even if it has some flaws. The issue is, as Ben mentions, a lot of those decisions became not-really-decisions due to choices that were made earlier in the series, and were instead pretty clear least-bad remaining options when previous choices had eliminated good options.
I love Roberts. I am a Dodgers fan who has found myself defending him regularly. But when you line up all of these decisions, it’s a real stinker. It lines up uncomfortably with some similar tendencies from previous postseasons, including riding Brandon Morrow in the 2017 world series until he failed at a really inopportune time, and taking Yasmani Grandal out of the lineup for extended time in multiple postseasons ostensibly because of passed ball issues.
I’d also like to mention that in that Graterol meaningless at bat Cody Bellinger stole second with the pitcher up and two outs. That just absolutely confounded me as to why he would have the green light to steal when even if he was successful they’re going to stick with the pitcher at the plate. Ridiculous.
Well-written, thank you. The entire ostensible overthinking by Roberts occurred in the context of an inconsistent offense plagued by injuries (Muncy, JTurner, Taylor at times, Bellinger possibly) and having lost Kershaw at the last moment. It seems when these risks work, they’re called ‘brilliant’ and when they’re not, they’re derided as ‘foolish.’ But the Nats did much of the same in 19 and won the Series. Roberts and the FO know the staff and their strengths and weaknesses. Of course riding Urias as both an overtaxed reliever and a starter is a high-risk issue. But perhaps the Dodgers collectively believed risks were the only way to leverage their losses of Bauer, May, Kershaw, Price and Gonsolin as seemingly plausible playoff starters at some point this season. Who else could have lost as much as the Dodgers and gotten this close? Perhaps they believed these unorthodox moves would bridge the gaps created by injuries and a suspension.
Leaning on 3 starters and only a few trusted relievers worked for the Nationals in 2019. Nobody questions it because they won. As a dodger fan who generally questions Roberts bullpen tactics I actually thought this was his best year. The only move I question is Julio in the 8th inning but if that works and he gets a clean inning, we most likely never talk about it again. If you watched the team all year there was a clear “A” list group of relievers and then the rest who even though they had decent numbers on the year, did not inspire a ton of confidence in high leverage (Bruihl, Bickford, Gonsolin). When has Max Sherzer ever had a dead arm in his career?
And if the Dodgers don’t win game 5 there is no NLCS to think about. The Giants had some serious 9th inning magic against the Dodgers (3 blown saves from Jansen himself) and as a usually rational Dodger fan I wanted nobody else pitching that inning other than Max. I have a feeling he would have gone two maybe three innings in extras if needed before we threw in the likes of Bickford in a winner take all game over our biggest rivals. Many Dodgers fans will take solace this year know that at least we took down the Giants.
There is a very important difference between 2019 Nats and 2021 Dodgers – the former had 2 trustworthy relievers, while the latter had at least 6 (maybe as many as 8).
If Roberts had used Bickford and Bruihl more (which he had good reason to do), he wouldn’t have needed Scherzer in NLDS G5 or Urías in NLCS G2. Now, it is possible there are unknown health/rest reasons why those two relievers weren’t used as much. However, unless that is the case, it sure looks like a simple case of Roberts trusting too few pitchers, something he has a record of doing in past Octobers (17, 18, & 19).
Also 2016.
I’m sorry, but even with word volume and meticulous detail, this is still the worst kind of Monday-morning quarterbacking. Roberts is an excellent manager in the areas that matter the most. The Dodgers had abominable luck and weren’t healthy most of the year. They still won 106 games and sustained unity and focus in the clubhouse, much due to Roberts’ influence. Most objectionable is the article’s implication that Roberts makes these decisions all by himself.
I don’t think it is worded correctly to say that Roberts only “trusted” 4 relievers.
I think he clearly trusted Jansen, Treinen, Graterol, Vesia, Kelly, and Knebel. He also probably mostly trusted Bickford too.
That said, the Dodgers pitching was so phenomenal it wasn’t necessary to really think outside of the box this year. They took their biggest advantage and squished it. Why would any team do that? Somebody in upper management should answer that question.
Except he had a couple of those guys available when he brought in Urias for the relief appearance. And Vesia, Kelly, and Bickford never appeared in Game 5 of the NLDS when Scherzer closed the game. So Roberts (and the other Dodgers decision makers) actions don’t show that confidence.
Honestly there were other ways to manage Game 2 so Urias didn’t have to come in. Like not using Treinen in a low leverage spot against the bottom of the order in the 7th. That was a good spot to match up Bickford against righties in lowish leverage spot. Or using Knebel instead of Urias with his reverse splits and ability to flip Albies around. They clearly trusted him against that part of the order since they used him as an opener. Not sure why they wouldn’t trust him there unless they changed their mind or didn’t think he could get them out two days in a row.
Or just use Bruihl where he used Urías.
Yeah, I thought about that as well. I guess they could be thinking they didn’t like Albies as a righty against bruihl
I’ve said this in different ways multiple times – now that Roberts and FO didn’t have Kershaw to kick around, they did the same to THREE starters who pitched a full season after a shortened one.
I just hope they are not damaged in the long term. If ANY one did, Roberts and Dodgers FO cannot be forgiven for that, despite whatever good things they may have done over the years.
Why not play Pollock in CF instead of Lux?
Lots of worthless second guessing. It did not work but really were they the wrong choices? Urias was effective going back and forth last post season. Kershaw has consistently done this as a Dodger (with mixed to poor results) so this type of use was not new to them or to baseball. Hershier did it in the 1988 playoffs very effectively as has many others over the years. On the pitching side the real issue was the Dodgers chasing the Giants and not allowing Schrezer, Buehler and Urias to get their arms ready for post season action and then losing Kershaw the last weekend of the regular season. Gonsolin was not good or ready to eat innings last post season or this. The bullpen overall was terrific. Max, Julio and Ferris I mean Walker were the issues. Pitching them on their bullpen days was probably not helpful. A bad move that worked well before. By the way Graterol was mostly bad all year.
The real issue was the offense. Losing Muncy hurt more than they would have liked but losing him the last day of the season on a freak injury really set them back. But what really hurt was how bad both Turners’ were. What did help was Bellinger and Taylor contributed after a horrible season by Belli (one of the worst ever by a major league regular if not the worst) and a big 2 month slump by Taylor. Lux was also better in the playoffs then he was in the regular season. But how you can over come what the Turners did not do was the problem. Losing Kiki and Joc also really hurt. They did not lose because of the pitching decisions they lost because they did not score enough runs. It was not because of the horrible bench or bad decisions on pinch hitters it was because they could not get a hit with RISP. Still they were 2 games from the WS and those involved two walk off loses.
Also, how much credit does he get for pulling Max in the wild card game? That was a tough call that worked great. Baseball is a hard game and when the starters (and entire team) had to work as hard as it did to get no where (106 wins second place) they were going to struggle in the post season. They went undefeated with Max until the playoffs. If they would have lost every Max start they still would have been second in the West and hosting the Wild Card game. The Giants were equally burned out and the Dodgers took care of business when the two best teams in the regular season met. After that it was all hands on deck and the Dodgers hands did not do what was needed. Roberts did not make move that turned out well but to think they cost the Dodgers the series is a bit of a jump when you look at how bad the offense was.