Prospect Watch: Don’t Forget the Approach
The results of statistical studies are often intuitive, but quantifying our intuition can be useful. Last week, David Laurila published an interview with Carlos Beltran that reminded me of plate discipline data that Jeff Zimmerman and I discussed this off-season. First, Mr. Beltran on his approach:
I…concentrate on getting a pitch in an area I know I can handle. If it’s a pitch on the outside corner, I know I can’t do much with that pitch. Unless I have two strikes, I don’t want to swing at it. If it’s a pitch on the inside corner and I don’t have two strikes, I don’t want to swing at it. That’s a pitch where, even if I take a good hack, I feel I’m not going to do much with it. I have to look for a pitch out over the strike zone, in or away. Basically, near the middle.
Prospect discussion revolves around the 5 tools — Hit, Power, Speed, Defense, Arm Strength. The list, in its entirety, is sufficient yet imperfect. As Beltran discusses, his approach is crucial to his success. Intuitively, we know the importance of plate discipline and there is ample statistical evidence to support our beliefs. Walks are nearly as valuable as singles. As the count fluctuates, the run expectancy changes. Harry Pavlidis and Dan Brooks quoted Rockies’ Catching Coach Jerry Weinstein, who stated “[T]he expected runs produced from each plate appearance starting with a strike decreases by .029 runs and increases by .040 for every ball thrown on a first pitch.” Although we discuss a prospect’s approach less frequently, it’s very important to their Major League success.
Beltran specifically discusses his selectivity within the strike zone. Swinging at strikes isn’t enough, however; one must identify the pitches which are most hittable for him and attack them. This off-season, I asked Jeff Zimmerman to run the numbers on another, similar aspect of hitters’ approaches — BABIP on pitches inside and outside the strike zone.
| Season | ooz-BABIP | iz-BABIP |
|---|---|---|
| 2008 | 0.264 | 0.307 |
| 2009 | 0.270 | 0.306 |
| 2010 | 0.263 | 0.301 |
| 2011 | 0.268 | 0.300 |
| 2012 | 0.267 | 0.301 |
| 2013 | 0.271 | 0.299 |
| Total | 0.267 | 0.302 |
Unsurprisingly, putting a strike in play yields a more successful outcome than putting a ball in play. When watching prospects, it’s important to note whether they appear to have a plan at the plate. Since his age-19 season with the Brooklyn Cyclones, Brandon Nimmo has stood out to me as a player who uses his knowledge of the strike zone to put himself into good hitting situations.
The Mets’ outfielder has begun the season with a slash line of .393/.519/.500, a 22:19 BB:SO ratio and a .500 BABIP. Nimmo’s BABIP is unsustainable, yet it would be unwise to believe it was created entirely by luck. Nimmo couples an outstanding knowledge of the strike zone with a selective approach. Rarely, compared to his peers, will the youngster expand the strike zone. And just as Beltran describes, Nimmo will allow a strike to go by if it is outside of his preference — low fastball middle to middle-in.
Conversely, there are some top prospects who too often swing at pitches outside the strike zone. Oscar Taveras not only expands the strike zone, he often puts bad pitches into play. As the numbers above indicate, this approach is not ideal (though hardly fatal). In the minor leagues, where defense is poor and pitches are of a lower quality, it may be easier to succeed with such an approach.
A hitting prospect’s approach is often discussed secondarily, if at all, to his ability to hit for average and power. However, identifying a player’s approach is an essential step in the evaluation process.
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Are you surprised the Cardinals called up Grichuk instead of Taveras? Does this mean it might not be this year for Taveras (not counting September call-ups)?
Probably it has more to do with the fact i) Grichuk can play centerfield and ii) is OPS’ing 1.204 versus lefties, and the Cards are last in wRC+ versus lefties at .233.
Taveras, while he has played it a couple of times this year, and whether due to lingering effects of the ankle injury, is profiling more as a corner outfielder right now.
Grichuk strikes out more than OT so i doubt it’s Taveras’s outside swing rate that is preventing his call-up. He also is mashing lefties, so not like he has a big platoon issue, but it doesn’t make sense to call him up to be a part-time bat, especially after he missed so much time last year. Grichuk has been impressive in a limited sample so far in AAA, but he’s not as much a jewel of the system as Taveras so they are probably less worried about hindering his development and using him as a platoon or part-time major league bat for now.
All that, and Oscar also just had another little nagging ankle injury.
Nimmo, in what many Mets’ fans considered a “down year” last year put up a nearly .400 OBP while playing significant portions of the season with a worse-than-diagnosed wrist injury. He also played in one of the worst stadiums in all of professional baseball for lefty hitters, partially explaining his lack of power.
After what he did last year under less than ideal conditions and considering what he’s up to today, he looks like he could be Yelich with more walks, a bit lower average, and more power. If he turns into an All-Star, it would go a long way to assuage the pain of so many Mets’ fans decrying the draft pick (the one before José Fernández).
Since Minaya was mercifully fired and Alderson took over, the Mets made a conscious choice to take more projectable guys out of high school as opposed to insta-contribution college guys. Essentially committing to a long-term strategy, which is what’s so appealing to Mets fans who actually follow the minors.
Of course it’s a huge turnoff to the sports-radio kind of fan who has no idea who Steven Matz or Jake deGrom are and just wants the Mets to be the Yankees. But I love that Alderson and his team of sabr-geeks never waver from it and are emulating the stellar example of teams like the Cardinals and Braves as opposed to what they were doing from the mid-90s until 2010, which was basically the brute force band-aid approach (or “Yankees lite”). Essentially the plan is to give the fans what they want even when at the time they think they don’t want it. Which is awesome.
The Cards have a mixed approach and draft college guys. Jon Jay, Matt Adams, Matt Carpenter, Allen Craig and Michael Wacha were all drafted out of college.
Matz and DeGrom were both drafted while Minaya was still Mets GM…
and before crowning Alderson and his draft approach, Nimmo was certainly expected to have some pop in the bat which 3 seasons in hasn’t been seen yet…. and 2012 1st rounder Gavin Cecchini sure seems like a stretch to make the bigs at this point.
I wouldn’t write off Cecchini completely yet. He’s 20 years old. His wRC+ is 92 this year (in a small sample), 94 last year. Not godawful for a young shortstop. His glove will be the key. He may never be a star but I wouldn’t say he is a definitive bust yet.
reports on his D at SS haven’t been too inspiring either, but as you said, there’s still time.
I’m missing the part where Jose Fernandez went to college…
So Nimmo’s put up “nearly a .400 OBP” last year, huh? Okay. And Alfonso Soriano is “nearly” a career .300 hitter.
What exactly are you objecting to? Would putting “.397 OBP” changed anything?
Wait a second–28 doesn’t equal zero?
Perhaps this is why they called up Grichuk instead of Taveras.
Not necessarily: some players are successful swinging at bad pitches over their whole career. Perhaps, Taveras is one of them. Don’t know!
I doubt Taveras’s outside swing rate or potential for success in spite of it had anything at all to do with Grichuk getting the call.
I agree with your implication that BABIP is driven by efficient pitch selection, which is a skill. Most metrics, like wOBA, that we use to evaluate offensive production are correlated with BABIP. For example, the formula wOBA = exp(BABIP)-1.02 accounts for 34% of the variability in actual wOBA (the correlation is .582 across qualified batters this year). If wOBA grows non-linearly with BABIP, then they are probably both influenced by some underlying trait(s), such as efficient pitch identification/selection.
So how about George Springer’s approach?
Oscar Taveras is going to be one of the elite hitters in the game. Period, end of sentence.
I heard a scout compare Nimmo’s aprouch to that of Joey Votto!
For a kid with no high school baseball team he is awefully advanced.
( He has Votto type power too.)
I am excited. Kid has a very advanced approach for his age, has slashed his strikeouts significantly, is walking at absurd rates, and also put on twenty pounds of muscle in the off-season. He’s hitting lefties now, too, something he struggled badly with last year. He’ll be in AA soon enough and looks like he’ll make a push for the big league club sometime early next year.