Randal Grichuk Joins the Extension Parade
This spring, Randal Grichuk is following Mike Trout. The outfielder whom the Angels drafted with the 24th pick in 2009, one slot before they chose a player who’s already in the conversation for the greatest of all time, is the latest to agree to a long-term extension. It’s significantly less than Trout’s 12-year, $430 million pact, of course, but Grichuk nonetheless guaranteed himself a substantial payday by agreeing to a five-year, $52 million deal with the Blue Jays, covering the 2019-23 seasons. That’s not too shabby for a player who was viewed as a fourth or fifth outfielder when he was acquired from the Cardinals in January 2018.
As the Blue Jays have steered themselves into rebuilding mode by shedding the likes of Jose Bautista, Josh Donaldson, J.A. Happ, Russell Martin, Troy Tulowitzki, and others over the past 18 months, either via trade or free agency, the now-27-year-old Grichuk has emerged as more than just a backup. Last year, he started 84 games in right field, another 25 in center — largely when Kevin Pillar, who coincidentally was traded to the Giants on Tuesday, the same day that Grichuk’s deal was announced, missed time with a shoulder sprain — and one in left field. Despite hitting just .106/.208/.227 in 77 plate appearances before missing all of May due to a right knee sprain, he set a career high with 25 homers while posting his highest on-base percentage (.301), slugging percentage (.502), and wRC+ (115) since his 2015 rookie season.
Grichuk is a player with significant strengths and glaring weaknesses, as his .247/.297/.490 career batting line suggests. He’s got a ton of power; his .244 ISO is in the 95th percentile among the 330 qualifiers from 2014-18, one point ahead of Bryce Harper, but his 29.8% strikeout rate over the same span is in similar territory, and his 5.8% walk rate is in just the 17th percentile. He punishes fastballs (career wRC+ of 144 against four-seamers and 161 against sinkers) and is vexed by breaking pitches (58 career wRC+ against curves, 75 against sliders, with the latter accompanied by a 20.3% swinging strike rate). He’s got a slight reverse platoon split (111 wRC+ against righties, 106 against lefties) but is playable against pitchers of either hand. Defensively, Grichuk can play all three outfield positions adequately or better; his UZR/150s are above average at both corner spots (8.7 in left field, 4.1 in right), though he’s slightly in the red in center (-1.4) and was not very good there in last year’s limited duty (-2.3).
Overall, Grichuk has produced a 109 wRC+ and 8.9 WAR in 1868 career plate appearances, about 2.1 WAR per season or, prorated, 2.9 WAR for every 600 PA. That’s an above-average player, if not a spectacular one. ZiPS suggests more of the same is in store:
| Year | PA | HR | AVG | OBP | SLG | OPS+ | Def | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 517 | 29 | .244 | .300 | .504 | 112 | 5 | 2.4 |
| 2020 | 491 | 27 | .242 | .299 | .503 | 112 | 5 | 2.2 |
| 2021 | 481 | 26 | .242 | .299 | .500 | 111 | 4 | 2.1 |
| 2022 | 468 | 26 | .244 | .301 | .507 | 113 | 4 | 2.1 |
| 2023 | 451 | 24 | .242 | .299 | .498 | 110 | 4 | 1.9 |
I’m including the 2019 season here because it’s covered by the extension, which is rather front-loaded — so much so that Grichuck is actually being paid more this year and next, which would have been his final years of arbitration eligibility, than for his three free agent seasons. According to SportsNet’s Shi Davidi, the extension increases Grichuck’s 2019 salary from $5 million to $7 million, and pays him a $5 million signing bonus as well. He’ll make $12 million in 2020, then $9.33 million per year for 2021-23, when he would have reached free agency. Via USA Today’s Bob Nightengale, his 2023 salary can increase by $1 million if he makes 1,200 PAs in 2021-22, with bumps to $1.5 million (for 1,250 PA in that span) or $2 million (for 1,300 PA in that span) possible.
So even if Grichuk does nothing more than maintain that two-win production, the Blue Jays are getting his services at a significant discount, as they’re paying less than $5 million per projected win over the life of the deal. They’re paying him more money now, at a time when their payroll is low due to the rebuild, than they will once coming prospects such as Vladimir Guerrero Jr. and Bo Bichette become more expensive.
They’ll also be sending Grichuk out to the free agent market after his age-31 season, which could mean rough sledding for the flychaser if recent trends hold. Over the past two winters, just eight position players over the age of 30 have gotten deals longer than two years, while the average annual salary of the position players in the 30-33 range who have settled for those two-year deals is only about $8 million. Particularly if Grichuk’s ability to play center field fades or his offensive production slips, it’s not hard to imagine him knocking around on one-year deals after this extension ends.
All of which is to say that even with the discount, Grichuk probably made the right move in locking in this payday. If he were to rise to a new level of performance — say, to hit .280/.326/.569 across a full season instead of just last year’s second half — he might lament settling for this deal, but with nearly 2,000 plate appearances under his belt, the odds of that are dwindling. Even in this age of increasingly malleable skills, it’s not as though his production will surge dramatically if he unlocks the secret of launch angle à la J.D. Martinez, as he already hits the ball in the air plenty.
At the same time, the deal carries some risk for the Blue Jays, as there’s not a whole lot of value left for a two-win player who goes into decline. Given where they are in the competitive cycle, now is a reasonable time for them to invest in Grichuk, and with two trades already under his belt, one can understand why the player would be happy for such a guarantee.
Brooklyn-based Jay Jaffe is a senior writer for FanGraphs, the author of The Cooperstown Casebook (Thomas Dunne Books, 2017) and the creator of the JAWS (Jaffe WAR Score) metric for Hall of Fame analysis. He founded the Futility Infielder website (2001), was a columnist for Baseball Prospectus (2005-2012) and a contributing writer for Sports Illustrated (2012-2018). He has been a recurring guest on MLB Network and a member of the BBWAA since 2011, and a Hall of Fame voter since 2021. Follow him on BlueSky @jayjaffe.bsky.social.
Thank you Jay, very cool!
Good analysis here. I get people not liking this deal. It’s certainly not amazing, but the simple truth is that the Jays need to put a team around Vlad and Bo and they need to do it pretty soon. This isn’t the beginning of some really long rebuild process. They’ve already been quasi-rebuilding for years and the best players they’re gonna get out of it (Vlad and Bo) are about to hit the majors, and the Jays rightfully don’t want to waste their cheap years. The clock is ticking. On the infield, they should have plenty of talent that they can use this year to sift through. But in the OF, there’s not a ton there from which to form an entire decent outfield on a good team. In steps Grichuk, who as Jay says, should at least be an average player with elite batted ball skills and good defense who can effectively fill an outfield spot. Plus, there’s some upside there, and he’ll only be making $28M over 3 years when the money actually matters in 2021-2023. Maybe they could have waited or tried to fill this need in free agency with less long term risk, but I sense the front office sees something here. If they’re right, then great, and if they’re not, meh its probably fine.
Grichuk’s agent deserves quite a pat on the back for this one. I know he’d be entering his age 29/30 season when he hits the free agent market, but corner outfielders in the 2+ win range aren’t exactly hot commodities there. And it’s interesting to see ZiPs thinking that his profile is stable, because guys with .300 OBPs are kind of scary players to invest in. ZiPs sees more power coming out of him before he essentially regresses to the same level he was at before. Methinks ZiPs is putting a lot of stock in that 2015 explosion, where Grichuk was hitting the ball very, very hard–but he has never gotten back to that.
If Grichuk doesn’t improve, and is the same player he was in 2016 and 2018 (which seems like a reasonable expectation), what’s the outcome? Since he was only making $5M this year and likely not more than $9M next year (Dickerson got $8.5M after $6M in 2018), this basically guarantees him that, plus a 3/$38M contract, except that contract is frontloaded. Did anyone see him getting more than 3/$38M on the free agent market in that case? They basically gave him exactly what he would be expected to get if things went right, without getting any sort of a discount, and front-loading the money.
It’s weird. Shapiro and Atkins came from Cleveland, which seems to make a lot of smart moves. But so far, it looks like they mostly trade players too late, accept low ceilings in return, and then…this, which I could never imagine cost-conscious Cleveland doing. I get that the Blue Jays, like Cleveland, never want to totally bottom out, but what they’re doing is a commitment to mediocrity.
Yep, they basically gave the Mets’ 3/$39M contract to Jay Bruce to get Jay Bruce-like production. Although more on the glove side and less on the bat-side.
The way they are not similar, however, is that (1) Grichuk would have been a couple years younger than Bruce was in FA, and (2) that they gave Grichuk it two years early and frontloaded it, giving them more of a chance for something to go wrong. Taking all that into account, I still don’t get it.
When I see this, my first thought is “Man, did Acuna & his agent screw up”.
What do you know?!? Another “significant discount” for a team!
If teams weren’t getting a discount, they wouldn’t be signing these. That’s how it works. Teams get cost savings by avoiding shopping in the free agent aisle, and players who have almost no leverage get income security.
When interviewed about the extension, Grichuk was asked if this deal increased the pressure he felt to perform due to his high paycheque. He replied that it was just the opposite – that he would not be afraid to take risks and try new things if he knew that his financial security did not hang in the balance. Jay – which is your experience? Do long term deals of this type tend to impact positively or negatively on player performance, on average?
I think his expected WAR accumulation over the next 5 years (2019 included) looks a little low due to the expected playing time spit out by the computer algorithm compared to the expected playing time considering the fact that the Jays just extended him to be a full-time starter. With a little good luck in the health department he could exceed the ~11ish WAR projection by another 2 or 3 wins.
He was locked in at $5M for arb this year. Figure $9M in arb next year. That leaves $38M over the 3 free agent years. Using ZiPs, those 3 seasons project aggregate 6.1 WAR. That means the Jays will pay $6.2M per projected WAR in those seasons. So it seems like a pretty good result.
When this extension phenomenon began I mentioned, on this site, that every team should offer it to every player they wanted to keep. As the system is now structured this is the best way for young players to get compensated adequately during the early years of their career. For the teams it controls cost during the arb years and early free agency. as well as securing part of the core, but the team is the only side taking any risk. There is no risk in accepting a lesser amount of money than might be maximized. For all intents and purposes any 8 figure guarantee is enough, unless your name is Antoine Walker. As David Thompson said, when he was being offered huge contracts from both the NBA and ABA, ” I can only drive one Rolls-Royce at a time”. Every extension guarantees the player security for life and it appears that is very compelling to many players. The way that this concept is evolving is interesting. One question I had was who would be targeted by the teams. it started out as a way to get around the arbitration years of top talent but has expanded to include lower level players with David Bote’s, $15M/ 5 years, being the new low figure for someone who isn’t established or a top of the top prospect. It surprised me that a player who doesn’t profile as a regular would get such an deal. I have to think his response was “Where do I sign?” when he got the offer. Will more teams take this approach and keep lesser known, but still valuable, players around for years instead of having to rebuild the bench every year? Should be fun to follow this new development.
Well said. I think another factor is that this FA class didn’t move the salary bar as much as expected (no 50M deal for Harper, etc.). Players are willing to sign now rather than dream about making insane money 4 to 8 years from now.
How are the majority of these extensions that essentially just lock in arb prices in return for discounts on FA seasons better compensating younger players?
It’s not like teams are paying market rates instead of projected arb salaries. The majority of these guarantees are just cost certainty for the club and guaranteed money for players. Many of these deals will actually further under pay young players versus what they could achieve in arbitration.
The ones with signing bonuses and front-loading such as Grichuk’s are helpful, but ultimately players are still taking discounts in exchange for certainty. They aren’t being better compensated than they would by arbitration.
I think there are situations where taking the guarantee can make sense, especially pitchers (see Matt Harvey) or less talented players where any deterioration in skill is the difference between playing in the ML or AAA.
Also multiple people mention how the club is assuming all the risk, but you can’t just generally use the term risk without acknowledging the team has significant upside risk where they are receiving a discount on performance creating a better chance the player significantly outperforms their pay. Much of the downside risk to the team is mitigated by the discount.
It is an interesting phenomenon. I agree.
But I disagree on your point that the team is the only side assuming risk. That’s simply not true. There absolutely IS risk associated with the player not aiming for the maximum possible career earnings. That’s what they’re giving up by locking in early career income security.
I suspect that for some players, most any 8 figure guarantee IS enough. That’s not just life changing money, it’s life changing money for your kids. Hell, Acuna just set up his grandkids for life. Good for him! But ownership knows this, and they know how much these players are worth in terms of revenue generation, and that’s a big big part of the extension boom.
I can see your point but the player is guaranteed his money while the team may get nothing back for their investment. I don’t think risk is the proper way to describe the players situation. Security instead of a gigantic windfall, that may very well never happen is almost the antithesis of risk and much more like insurance. That is a trade of we all make everyday in our lives.
Teams get cost certainty, players get generational wealth.
It would be interesting to see how much negotiations there are on the number of free agent years.
But what are the actual chances a team gets nothing back on its investment? In most downside scenarios there is still some return on their investment.
There is also definite selection bias in the players who are extended in that teams want to extend better players who they think will return greater value. Grady Sizemore exists sure. But career ending injuries are certainly the exception and not the rule. Career altering injuries are more common, but the player is still returning value in that situation.
Heck these players could probably take out more favorable insurance policies safe guarding their future earnings versus the discounts they give up on their contracts. I actually tend to forget that teams further protect themselves from injury risk by taking out insurance on their own players when most of these large contracts are signed.
The idea that teams are taking on significant downside risk in these contracts is really overblown at this point.
Fun fact about those draft picks (used for Grichuk and Trout) – they were compensatory picks for K-Rod and Texeira. I don’t think I can find it in my heart to hate the Yankees any more.
Grichuk is a decent player, but he’s also not someone you’d really want as a 30-something veteran cornerstone once the rebuild is complete. I think the Blue Jays would’ve been better off trading him for prospects sometime next season.
“He punishes fastballs and is vexed by breaking pitches”
So he’s Pedro Cerrano? Got it.